Edward Willis

Thanks Louis

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE The Participants – Japan THE JAPANESE 228 REGIMENT IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR The Imperial Japanese Army 228th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division enters Hong Kong on 8 December 1941 [1] Callinan described one of the defining moments of the Timor campaign – the end of the August ‘push’ by the Japanese 228 Regiment as follows: “The nineteenth of August was zero day, and the closing of the net by the enemy seemed almost complete, so the twentieth would see the confirmation of the orders for our counter-attack. During the night of the nineteenth to twentieth of August the alarm was given in Same, as several reports were received of a rocket or Verey light in the adjacent hills. The hospital and all troops were moved out of the town, standing patrols placed across all tracks, and every man who could possibly fire a rifle sent to reinforce the platoons astride the track from Maubisse to Same. During the next day reports came in that the Japanese were retreating. All platoons reported no enemy in their areas. This was amazing, and immediately every man who was not entirely exhausted was out on patrol and searching for the enemy. It was essential that we maintain contact and harass his retreat. While we had contact with him we knew where he was; if we allowed the enemy to escape us we presented him with the element of surprise. This called for a very great effort from the officers and men in the platoons as now at least they were entitled to rest and food after holding a regiment at bay for ten days. Why the enemy retreated just when he had success almost within his grasp will remain a mystery, but probably his supplies had given out, and, of course, to him the Australians were as elusive as ever, and his casualties had not been light, although not as heavy as we had hoped”. [2] 228 Regiment veterans interviewed by Colin South for the documentary Independent Company, Tokyo 31 August 1987 [3] The abrupt cessation of the offensive certainly mystified the Australians. Colin South, the producer of the documentary Independent Company attempted to address this issue when he interviewed 228 Regiment veterans in Japan. He reported to the 2/2 Commando Association as follows: “… the Japanese were as interested in us, as we in them. We filmed interviews, via an interpreter, with veterans of Timor. Generally, the response was one of respect and honour towards their Australian foe. ……. The 228 Regiment was based in Timor from the invasion [19-20 February] until 6 September 1942, when they were sent to Guadalcanal. They reached Timor after serving in Manchuria, Hong Kong and Ambon. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were based in the West, the 2nd in Dili. Of the 2nd only a handful survived Guadalcanal. Those who became P.O.W.'s still refuse, despite genuine encouragement, to join the 228 Regiment Association. The general consensus was the troops were withdrawn under orders to be sent to Guadalcanal with the other troops, which came from West Timor and the South coast mobilized to replace the 228 from Dili. Once each force made physical contact with one another, time had run out and the entire force moved back to Dili”. [4] The following 228 Regiment soldiers were interviewed by South for the documentary and made the following comments about their experiences during the Timor campaign: Onuki Shigenobu I was in Timor for about six months. During that time, we were sent on four or five missions to mop up the enemy around Ermera. The purpose of the campaign wasn’t so much to seek out all the enemy as to make our presence felt both to the enemy and the natives. I think this was an important objective. Kuwakichi Arakawa … so, we were sniped at. I heard at the time that during the mopping up campaign we had lost more men in the regiment than we had in the Hong Kong campaign. [5] Our regimental commander said to us that we lost so many men in the large-scale campaign, yet we lost even more in these small missions. He was concerned at the loss, and I heard … mind you, I just heard that Captain Nara too was shot dead by a sniper. So, we got a new captain. We were sniped at many times. The experience gave me the impression that Australian soldiers were brave and determined. Masatsuga Kambe We were engaged in the battle from 6 in the morning until 7 in the evening, that is, for 13 hours. Both the Australians and the Japanese were determined, and we fought fiercely. They showed such bravery and determination that though we were confident no one would beat us we marvelled to be honest … at their strength as it were. When they resisted with an admirable courage which we hadn’t really expected from them, I must admit we were truly surprised. South concluded: “My specific quest for [information about] the withdrawal of the Japanese in August 1942 unfortunately has not been answered fully, but two sources of fact are still being investigated: research into the diaries of Col. Doi the Japanese Commanding Officer in Dili, and the translation of two chapters of the 228 Regiment History, dealing specifically with ‘the Campaign against Australian Guerrilla force in East Timor”. [6] South deposited the correspondence, scripts, research notes and other source material used in the production of Independent Company in the Research Collection of the AWM. [7] The diaries of Col. Doi and chapters of the 228 Regiment History are not part of the collection. The author, appreciating the importance of the Timor chapters from the 228 Regimental history arranged to have them professionally translated utilising funds from his Army History Unit grant for the preparation of WWII in East Timor: an Australian Army site and travel guide. The translated chapters are attached here - the included maps have been adapted with English labels. References [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:228_regiment_in_HK.jpg. Accessed 29 February 2024. [2] Callinan, Independent Company: 152. [3] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C242361 [4] Colin South “Independent Company Timor documentary” 2/2 Commando Courier December 1987: 8-9. [5] “The official figures of the Japanese casualties [in the battle for Hong Kong], which appear to have been heaviest round the Wong Nei Chong Gap, and at Stanley on the 24th and 25th December, are killed 675, wounded 2,079; total 2,754. The commander of 230th Regiment states that he had lost 800 men by the night of the 20th and gives his total casualties as 1,000. The 229th is said to have lost 600. No figures are available for the 228th, but if they be averaged at 800 the total loss of infantry of 38th Division amounts to 2,400. This is only an estimate, but since the infantry would be the chief sufferers it tends to support the official total of 2,754 for all arms. There is however other evidence, which though unofficial cannot be altogether ignored, suggesting that the Japanese casualties may have been higher”. - S. Woodburn Kirby. - The war against Japan. Vol. 1 – The loss of Singapore / by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby ... [et al.] London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957: 150. [6] Colin South “Independent Company Timor documentary” 2/2 Commando Courier December 1987: 9. [7] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C242361 228 Regiment - Regimental history - Ch.3 - 4 Timor.pdf

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE AINARO DISTRICT Hatu-Udo (Nova Luca) 9°07’06”S, 125°35’20” E [1] Hatu-Udo location map [2] Hatu-Udo (Nova Luca - see Map No. 17) is 28 miles (45 km.) south of Aileu at a bearing of 177o. This is a small posto town situated only four miles (61/2 km.) from the south coast. Several buildings of stone with galvanized iron and tile roofs constitute the town. These are posto surrounded by stone walls, secretary's house and barracks and Chinese shops. A good water supply is always on hand within a few hundred yards from the posto. The town is exposed to the air except for a few odd trees here and there. There are some small and scattered coconut plantations in the town area. This town was bombed by the Japanese during August, 1942, while Australian troops were stationed there. During November, 1942, it was again bombed by the R.A.A.F. [3] ……. HATU-UDO TO AINARO: This is a wide track in places (12 feet: 3 1/2 m.) with other sections much narrower (4 feet: 1 1/4 m.). First follows a ridge crest falling gently to North. At two miles (3 km.) out of Hatu-Udo the country flattens out for one further mile to the Be-Lulic River. River can be crossed in dry season, but after heavy rain it may obstruct traffic for up to two days. Track then rises (grade 1-10) for 1 1/2 miles (2 1/2 km.) to large village of Sucu-Rai, and then follows contour along west slopes of Suro Range. Half a mile from Ainaro the track descends steeply to cross tributary of Be-Lulic River. Similar crossing place. Then rises gently to Ainaro, where three tracks branch out. Patches of air cover, but mainly open country throughout. [4] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A Group of native Timorese who helped men of the 2/2nd Independent Company when they occupied the area in 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [5] Hatu-Udo (Nova Lusa [sic]) 27/11/42 [6] Hatu-Udo current map [7] Ayris: Next day [in late March 1942] they arrived in Hatu-Udo where they found No. 4 Section firmly established with the wounded Mick Morgan back in charge. The carriers were dismissed, and a new crew was chosen to take the supplies through to Same and The Bull. Aitken and Thornton remained behind in Hatu-Udo. The Hatu-Udo chefe de posto was a man with an incredibly long name that began with José Eduardo da and drew to a conclusion with Silva-Marques. [8] The Australians called him Joe Marks which appeared to please him immensely. He was a young man who, like Luis, was well liked and respected by the villagers. He was the proud owner of a sturdy Timorese racing pony which had a mouth of leather and the heart of a lion. The horse was called ‘Samurai’, which the Australians thought less than appropriate. It spent most of its time being groomed and exercised, though Joe Marks assured anybody who would listen that Samurai was no mere show pony – it had once, in an emergency, carried him to Dili and back in one day. ‘No other horse in Timor could make such a journey in such a time’, was Joe’s assertion. The King of Hatu-Udo was Francisco [Nai-Chico?], a wealthy, cunning old Mombai who, in the early months of the war, had travelled to Portugal by sea. While crossing the Mediterranean, his ship had been attacked from the air, prompting every man, woman and child to dive for cover – except, of course, King Francisco, who remained on deck taking photographs of the aircraft. There must have been another equally brave soul on board because a photograph was taken of His Majesty at work with his camera. The photograph, which he produced at the drop of a hat, showed him standing on a deserted deck, camera in hand against a backdrop of attacking enemy aeroplanes. If anybody asked him where the crew was he invariably replied: “Jesu, I never managed to find out, but they all came back later.” King Francisco, Joe Marks and the Australians got on very well together. Hatu Udo was a pleasant place, made the more agreeable by the King’s insistence that the Australians accompany him on his frequent hunting expeditions, which often produced deer. Venison, it was decided, was a welcome change from buffalo and wild pig. Village tug-of-wars became the unlikely conduit for the cementing of good relations between the 2/2nd and the locals. Daily competitions between the Australians and the Timorese were held in the immaculate posto square to cheering and near-hysterical coaching from both sides. The rules were elastic – it was decreed that because the Australians were physically bigger than their opponents they would be restricted to nine men, while the Timorese were allowed ten. However, “adjustments” were often made, particularly by Joe Marks who was not above attaching his considerable weight to the end of the Timorese line if he thought the occasion demanded it. Hatu Udo offered a brief spell from the horrors of war; it was as though the village had been transplanted away from the battle for the sole purpose of re-charging the batteries of those Australians fortunate enough to spend a few days there. However, there was a war on and the 2/2nd was in need of supplies, mountains of which had already been destroyed to keep it out of enemy hands. There was also a most urgent need to build a radio transmitter that would reach Australia”. [9] Administrative Posto - 28 April 2014 Australian Official history: As from 11th November Callinan took over command of the whole of Sparrow Force, with Baldwin, unfailingly loyal and efficient, as his staff captain, and soon afterwards Spence returned to Australia. Laidlaw succeeded to the 2/2nd Independent Company. By this time it was known that the Japanese were working hard to develop the eastern end of the island where they were building airstrips and laying down supply dumps; in the centre Maubisse festered as the main centre of hostility to the Australians; along the south coast the Japanese were slowly moving eastward and were beginning to consolidate in the Hatu-Udo area. [10] Callinan: A further worry from the west was developing on the south coast. The Japanese were driving along eastward; their advance was slow and careful, but the areas behind them were desolated, and those natives remaining there were hostile to us. To assist us in countering this move I asked for the bombing of Hatu-Udo with all possible aircraft; we knew five was the maximum we could hope for, but that was a large number for us. On the morning of the raid we listened and watched carefully, and then we heard the bombs, but the direction sounded wrong. Soon the reports came in from Dexter who had patrols close in to observe and profit by the bombing; it was the most effective raid of the campaign. The first planes bombed the town itself very accurately, and the others coming in from the north-east bombed the outskirts, while above them the Beaufighters stood by to protect the ever gallant Hudsons. The patrol counted fifty Japanese dead, and nearly one hundred dead natives. Some of the natives had ropes around their necks preparatory to their being hanged, and all the evidence pointed to the Japanese having arranged a ceremonial hanging before an assembly of natives. This was their usual procedure for commencing the subjugation of an area, but in this case the R.A.A.F. reversed the action. The Japanese withdrew westward, and that area remained an invaluable buffer for some months. [11] Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques (‘Joe Marks’), Chefe de Posto, Hatu-Udo The first Portuguese evacuees appear to have departed on the ‘Kuru’ from the south coast on 7 November 1942 - i.e., Ademar Rodrigues dos Santos (and family) – the Portuguese chefe de posto of Ainaro; and José da Silva Marques – the Portuguese chefe de posto of Hato-Udo - both in the western area. These Portuguese officials were accepted as “guests of Government” in Australia and accommodated at Ripponlea, Victoria. [12] Kenneally: “I didn't know Railaco. From a few shops at the side of the road, it has grown to a fair sized township, mostly on the opposite side of the road. The Flat plateau which was the bazaar area, the site of a Portuguese house, and the big open sided thatched building now boasts a big Besser block building equally as large. It was here that Major Spence ordered Pte 'Cisco' Coles to have no conversation with a personable young Portuguese on the grounds that he could be a spy. The gentleman in question was Jose Da Silva, Comandante of Hata Hudu, nephew of the Governor of Portuguese East Timor. Spoke four languages, fluently, one of which was English. When the momentous meeting attended by each Platoon Commander, the 2IC and the C.O. was convened, it was held at Hata Hudu. Jose acted as host and withdrew, saying "I will leave you gentlemen to your discussions, I have no desire to spy on your confidential business" or words to that effect. I'd say he was a man for all occasions. We came to like him greatly while we were at Hata Hudu. Goodbye Railaco”. [13] Dili, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-09. Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques, known to the Australian troops as "Joe", was commandant at the Hatu-Udo posto (administrative headquarters) when the Australian guerrillas were in the area in 1942. He And Private G. Milsom of the 2/2nd Independent Company were discussing the disposition of Japanese troops using a map drawn by Milsom, and by extreme coincidence, a drop of oil from their gourd lamp fell on the exact spot at the exact time as HMAS ‘Voyager’ ran aground at Betano on 1942-09-25. Marques later escaped to Australia on HMAS ‘Castlemaine’ and returned to Dili on SS ‘Angola’ on 1945-12-08 where he again met Milsom who was now acting as a guide with the Military History Section. They are seen examining a photocopy of Milsom's map as he points out the oil spot. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [14] Price: This new found habit of writing to the ‘Courier’ is going to die a sudden death at the completion of this letter; this business is a bit beyond me but Paddy Kenneally's letter in the special of November has prompted me to weigh in with some information that I know will be of interest to the few survivors who knew 'Joe' of Hato-Huda. His full and correct name was Jose da Silva Marcos and he was related not to the Governor of Timor but to the Governor of Goa in the then Portuguese India. Joe was always a good and generous friend to all Australians and his position as Posto in that area was a God send to us. Unfortunately for him he was junior (in rank only) to the Commandant of Suro Province who was based in Ainaro. Unfortunately because of the dislike and jealousy of this area commandant a lot of the hurdles we Aussies encountered at Ainaro sprang from this bloke's hatred of Joe and because of our obvious goodwill and gratitude to Joe. Sir B.J., in his 'Independent Company' expresses his annoyance and rage at the fact that a young and fit Portuguese had been evacuated from Timor. Eric Weller and I are hopeful that B.J. was not alluding to Joe - he had more than 100% for us, the Japs had a price on his head, he was liable to be ordered to report to Dili by his Suro Comandante - and he had spent all of his cash in the Australian cause. I will never forget the sad day that he ordered all of those beautiful horses of his to be led out one at a time as he shot them with my rifle. He did not even have any ammunition for his Porto Army issue weapons! He wept like a child when it came to the turn of the mighty Samir (snake). Every Aussie will remember that horse! In early 1946 my employer in Sydney was commissioned to make an inventory and valuation of the property of the Brazilian Consul who was about to be relieved of service in Australia and return to Brazil. There was no such thing as a Portuguese Consul in those days - all affairs for Lisbon were handled by the Brazilian staff on behalf of Portugal. The Brazilian chief was a Dr. Labhorino who, when mention of Timor etc came up in discussion, became a good friend indeed. He remembered Joe, Joe's courtship of Brendalina (of Atsabe) and Joe's stay at Kirribilli. He went further for me, within two weeks he had traced Joe to Portugal and thence to Goa where he was in service, presumably under his uncle the Governor. The address I wrote to was in Goa but there was never any reply, that is, if he ever received it. A point of interest also ties in the naming of Hato-Hudo. The spelling and pronunciation of Hato-Hudu is in the Tetum and means 'the place on the hill'. The alternative spelling and pronunciation very often encountered of Hato-Uda is in the Mombai and means 'the hill place’. A place of beauty and generosity needlessly razed and ruined. The photos in B.J's book say it all. That's the lot, a Merry Christmas and a great 1991 to each and every one of the Association. Bert [15] Monument To Francisco Corte Real, Hatu-Udo “In 2004 I visited the posto of Hato-Udo, the place where in 1943 the massacre took place in which about 300 Timorese perished, including D. Aleixo and his brother Nai Chico or, after receiving Catholic baptism, Francisco Corte Real. The foundations practically remain from the old wall. However, one can sense a strange atmosphere that hurts our memory as if the spirits of the people who died there are still in the place. Perhaps because in the background, in an imposing setting, the Mate Bian Mountains of Cablac and Tata Mai Lau transport the visitor to an unreal world ... In the centre of the roundabout of the old constructions from the time of the Portuguese administration, there is a monument, standard type, in every way analogous to that of Maubisse. It pays homage to the former head of the Leo-Lima village, Hatu-Udo, Francisco Corte Real, brother and comrade-in-arms of Grand Aleixo, with whom he was also treacherously killed in 1943 for not making a pact with the Japanese and honouring the Portuguese”. [16] Monument to Francisco Corte Real (‘Chico’) – Hatu-Udo - 2 May 2019 [17] Photos And Art Work On The AWM Website Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. This road was often strafed by Japanese aircraft when the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company occupied the posto (administrative centre) at Hatu Udo. In the distance is the home of the late King of Hatu Udo. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [18] Road at Hatu-Udo - Charles Bush - pen and watercolour on paper A village in Portuguese Timor which figured prominently in the operations of 2/2nd Australian Independent Company in their guerilla tactics against the Japanese. It was frequently strafed by Japanese Zero aircraft when the place was occupied by the Australians and bombed by Hudson bombers based on Darwin when the Japanese were in possession. [19] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-15. The posto (administrative centre) seen from the road to Betano. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [20] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A group of natives in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [21] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A group of natives in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [22] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A native Christian woman in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [23] Hatu Udo area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Portion of the high wall around the posto (administrative centre) showing the west gate. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [24] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. These old battlements of the posto (administrative centre) provided the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company with excellent observation points during their occupation. The posto was severely damaged by both Japanese and Australian bombing. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [25] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. This small posto (administrative centre) was bombed by the Japanese during 1942-08 when the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company were stationed there. In 1942-11 the post was again bombed by the RAAF. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [26] Hatu Udo area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The gateway and sentry box of perhaps the most picturesque posto (administrative centre) in Portuguese Timor. This posto was heavily bombed by the RAAF when the Japanese occupied it. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [27] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The two small buildings on the left were used by the Australians when the 2/2nd Independent Company occupied this posto (administrative centre) when they were forced to leave they hid stores in the roof of the small out house on the right. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [28] Village of Hatu-Udo – Charles Bush - pen and watercolour on paper This village was one of the Japanese strongholds during the latter stages of the guerilla operations carried on by 2/2nd and 2/4th Australian Independent Companies. [29] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Residential buildings occupied by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company during their occupation of this posto (administrative centre) during 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [30] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A house that was occupied by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company for some months during 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [31] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-15. A spring used by Australian troops of Sparrow Force, particularly by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [32] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A Portuguese blitz truck, used by the Australian Military History Section Field Team, at a damaged Japanese bridge. Note the Japanese sign on the bridge post. [33] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The Portuguese blitz truck and Jeep and trailer used by the Military History Section Field Team cross the Belulic River. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [34] References [1] ASPT: 82. [2] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [3] ASPT: 28 [4] ASPT: 46-47. [5] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200648 [6] ASPT: Map 17. [7] Adapted from MapCarta map – 1 February 2024 [8] Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques. [9] Ayris, All the Bull’s men: 170-171. [10] Official history – Appendix 2 Timor: 616. [11] Callinan, Independent Company: 190. [12] Chamberlain, Forgotten men : Timorese in special operations during World War II: 36; Fraser, Bob's Farm cadre camp: refugees from Timor in Port Stephens during World War II: 8. [13] Paddy Kenneally “Paddy returns to Timor - June 6, 1990” 2/2 Commando Courier November 1990: 7, 9. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200599 [15] Bert ‘[Re Jose da Silva Marcos] 2/2 Commando Courier February 1991: 7. The author was Herbert William PRICE (TX2781). [16] Fonseca, Monumentos Portugueses em Timor-Leste: 86-87 [17] Leo Lima suco is located 2 km north of Hatu-Udo. The date on the monument inscription should be 5 May ‘1943’. [18] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200651 [19] ART26311 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168672 [20] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200658 [21] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200653 [22] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200654 [23] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200652 [24] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200644 [25] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200650 [26] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200647 [27] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200643 [28] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200649 [29] ART26312 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168677 [30] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200655 [31] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200645 [32] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200656 [33] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200641 [34] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200642

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE MANATUTO DISTRICT Cribas 8° 41' S., 125° 59' 06" E [1] Cribas location map [2] Loss of Hudson Bomber A16-209 “In North-Western Area during August the two hard-worked Hudson squadrons - Nos. 2 and 13 - had continued their task of harassing the enemy's bases in the islands north of the Arafura and Timor Seas, and supporting the guerilla force on Timor. The need for support for Sparrow Force was now more urgent than ever because in August the Japanese opened a determined offensive aimed at enveloping and destroying the Australian-Dutch force. …… “During the remainder of August [1942] Hudsons were over Timor almost every day dropping supplies and attacking Japanese positions. Thus on 21st August five Hudsons of No. 2 set out to support the hard-pressed troops on Timor by attacking Maubisse. Bombs were dropped on the town and the Hudsons then reconnoitred the roads in the area. Two Zeros attacked and set on fire a Hudson captained by Flying Officer Wadey, [2] who was able to bail out before the machine crashed into the side of a hill. This Zero then made seven unsuccessful attacks on the Hudsons which all remained in close formation except for one captained by Flying Officer Badger, who flew towards thin cloud, pursued by the second Zero. Badger evaded the Zero by flying low along the valleys until he reached the sea. There the Zero attacked again but was shot down into the sea at 50-yards range. Wadey, badly burnt, was found by natives who carried him in a chair to men of Sparrow Force; later he was returned safely to Darwin”. [3] Sid Wadey’s Account - Shot Down Over Timor “On 21 August [1942], Flight Lieutenant Simon Fraser (A16-178) led five Hudsons out again to support Sparrow Force by attacking Maubisse, near Dili, for the second successive day. Bombs were dropped on the town and the Hudsons reconnoitred the area for enemy activity. Two Zeros attacked, and the Hudson crews soon became aware of ‘the ability of the enemy pilots and their obvious knowledge of the Hudson defences’. [4] The Zeros set on fire the aircraft flown by Flying Officer Sid Wadey (A16-209). He was able to evacuate the aircraft, but his crew were unable to escape. He described the engagement and his escape from his stricken Hudson: ‘When the Zero attacked from ahead, several bursts went through the instrument panel. These I observed, as in slow motion; individual holes appearing, and the panel disintegrating, with a splintered (star effect) look around the holes pointing towards me. Simultaneously, I was aware of my navigator passing me, and heading towards the body of the aircraft, when ‘whoosh’ - flames surrounded me as the incendiaries and cannon hit the inside fuel tank. Behind the pilot's seat there is armour plating, but the tank extended a couple of inches past the vertical side of the plating, and that was where some of the projectiles went. I saw some of the bullets hit Stan Faull, the navigator, in his back as he was passing through the entrance from the cockpit into the body of the aircraft, also he would have been directly alongside the exploding tank. The other members of the crew were similarly in impossible predicaments. In order to escape from the plane it was necessary for the crew to move forward in the body of the plane to one side or the other, grab the parachute, and clip it on the harness. For the crew it was literally impossible in the intense heat and flames to find their respective (or any) parachute pack, grab it, clip it on, dash to the exit door in the back of the cabin and jettison the door, before they could jump out. For the tail gunner, his position was even more desperate. He had to swivel the turret, align it with an opening into the body of the aircraft, his only means of escape, then leap into what was a fiery furnace in order to obtain his pack. I had been protected from the direct blast of the explosion of the petrol tank by the armour plating. The sound was (Whoosh) muffled, and not at all similar to the sound of a bomb; and the actual pressure wave did not subsequently affect my hearing abilities, so the body impact was not great. As we were flying in formation, my right hand was on the throttles, and I instinctively reacted very quickly, flicked the seat belt undone, and jumped at the correct angle, toward the escape hatch in the top of the aircraft. In the process, I knocked back the throttles, and as I jumped vertically head first through the escape hatch, I was aware of being hit in the lower back by the top of the fuselage, as the slipstream forced me backward. I fell clear of the aircraft on the right side, facing forward and could see A16-209 dropping back out of the formation with flames streaming back behind like a comet tail. I looked around hoping to see other parachutes but realised that there would not be any. Pre-enlistment studio portrait of 406716 Sergeant (Sgt) William Ross Edeson, 2 Squadron, RAAF, of West Leederville, WA. He was a salesman prior to enlistment from Perth, WA on 31 March 1941. Sgt Edeson died on operations over Timor in aircraft Hudson A16-209 on 21 August 1942; he was 27 years of age. Sgt Edeson is buried at the Ambon War Cemetery, Indonesia. [4] The formation continued along a straight flight path away from me, and they were still in perfect formation. All the other aircraft were OK. I scanned the sky for Zeros - none in sight. Decided I was now at about 1000 feet above the mountain - so pulled the ripcord - felt a jerk—looked up and saw the parachute open fully. I watched A16-209 continue its rate one turn and disappear into the valley between the mountain for which I was aiming and the adjoining mountain. The aircraft still had its comet tail of flames streaming behind it. As I saw the plane disappear, simultaneously I observed a flight of 3 Zeros, in formation in the valley below, flying low above the trees, as they emerged from behind the opposite side of the mountain below. To my surprise I landed legs together in the middle of the clearing at which I had aimed, slipped, then slid on to my behind a few yards. Looking around I found myself in the clearing, which was a very small and a fairly steep rocky slope, the open space roughly circular and about fifteen yards in diameter, and to my amazement the trees surrounding me were, of all things, Gum Trees, growing densely amid dry grass which was 75 about three to five feet tall. I had expected jungle, not eucalypti’”. [5] 2AIC War Diary: “B Pl report that the plane referred to on 23 Aug 42 had been located approx. one mile EAST of CRIBAS (08412559). The plane was a complete wreck having apparently exploded on crashing. The badly burnt arms and legs of four bodies were buried by the patrol. The one member of the crew who parachuted had been taken to BAUCAU (08272627) by PORTUGUESE and a patrol was immediately sent to contact him. The following details about him were gleaned; he told the PORTUGUESE he was the pilot, was aged 24 years, his home was in PORT ADELAIDE and his name was GEORGE SYDNEY [WADEY]. Some of this information does NOT sound correct but will be checked by the patrol”. [6] War Graves Team Report: "13 January 1946 PORTUGUESE TIMOR …. Witnesses stated that on 21st of August 1942 aircraft shot down by fighters at CRIBAS. The last position stated in the intelligence narrative concerning this aircraft’s disappearance is in the vicinity of CRIBAS. The bodies were buried by natives, all members being killed instantly. The remains were exhumed and brought back to Koepang for reburial. Captain. Crilley has identified the crew by locality and date as: Crew List Hudson Bomber A16-209 – All, Except Wadey Killed in Action [7] The bodies of Faull, Edeson, O’Reilly and Gould were subsequently re-interred at the Ambon War Cemetery. Their names are listed at the Adelaide River War Cemetery on the Northern Territory Memorial. Cribas and Hudson Bomber A16-209 crash site location map [8] Locating The Crash Site - Ron Birch’s Notes “South of Manatuto is the village of Cribas where I asked, always my questions were via an interpreter, if anyone had any knowledge of a plane crash in the area. I was directed to an elderly local who remembered the crash. The local agreed to accompany me to the site where, without prompting, he said that he remembered the big aircraft being shot down by another plane. He pointed out where some of the wreckage landed on two sides of a narrow ravine and other wreckage on an easterly ravine side. He remembers the parachute, he indicated what it was but did not know what to call it, landing slightly to the north of where we were. The three bodies [four in fact] were near the wreckage on the easterly slope. The badly burnt Wadey he remembers well and asked after him. The three [four] dead crewmen he helped bury and pointed out the site. I asked if any Australians had visited the site and he could not remember if any had. The three dead crewmen have in fact been re buried in Ambon. There is no visible wreckage now after 73 years of monsoonal rains washing down the ravines and yearly flooding. The original grave sites were pointed out to me to be on the top of the eastern slope and should not be problem to locate and possibly have a quite think about. This local, Manuel Luis, age unknown, is the last one alive who witnessed the shooting down and loss of this aircraft. GPS: 8.°41.58' S, 125°58.89' E ASOPT: 8°41'S, 125°59’E”. [9] Hudson Bomber A16-209 crash site - 9 August 2022 References [1] ASPT: 82. [2] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [3] Douglas Gillison. - Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42 (Australia in the War of 1939-1945, series 3 Air, v.1): 643-644. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417627. See also, Ed Willis “The Sid Wadey story – rescued on Timor”. https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/207-the-sid-wadey-story-–-rescued-on-timor/#comment-370. [4] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1191818. [5] Extract from Sid Wadey, The Operation Order for the Day Read, unpublished manuscript, courtesy of his widow Mrs M. Wadey, RAAF Hudson Squadrons Association, Adelaide reprinted in John Bennett. - Highest traditions: the history of No 2 Squadron, RAAF. – Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995: 195, 204. [6] 24 August [2/2 war diary]. See also, GOULD Walter Herbert - (Sergeant); Service Number - 414224; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Hudson; Place - Timor; Date - 21 August 1942. NAA: A705, 163/118/426. [Digitised] [7] 24 August [2/2 war diary]. See also, GOULD Walter Herbert - (Sergeant); Service Number - 414224; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Hudson; Place - Timor; Date - 21 August 1942. NAA: A705, 163/118/426. [Digitised] [8] Adapted from MapCarta map – 21 January 2024. [9] Ron Birch. – [Notes on] Portuguese East Timor – 2/2nd and 2/4th Independent Companies WW2 – RAAF Lost During The War In Portuguese East Timor – RAN Lost On The Timor Ferry Service. – September- October 2015. – Copy held in 2/2 Commando Association of Australia archives. Thank you to Ron Birch for providing this site information.

Members and supporters interested in reading the transcripts of the Address given by Committee member John Burridge, MG, and the Poem reading given by Sue Strickland, wife of President Noel Strickland, that featured Jim Smailes' poem "The Independents", please view the attached documents. Photos from the Ceremony can also be viewed on the Doublereds Gallery: https://doublereds.org.au/gallery/category/41-2023-ceremony/ Jim Smailes Poem Presentation 3.docx 22 Cmdo Address - John Burridge.docx

No worries Doug - please proceed as requested. Regards Ed

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE LAUTEM DISTRICT FUILORO (VILA DE AVIS) 8°27'S, 127°00'10"E Fuiloro location map [1] Fuiloro (Vila de Avis - see Photo No.3) is situated 9 miles (141/2 km.) at a bearing of 117° from Lautem. It is in the northwest corner of the Lautem Plateau which extends 8 miles (13 km.) south and 12 miles (19 km.) east at 1,400 feet (425 m.) above sea level. It is a posto town of 200 inhabitants with a large market. North of, the market square is a large building used formerly for a hospital, but now as the Chefe de Posto's residence. South of the square is the typical old-fashioned posto. The secretary's office, telephone and prison are west of the square. The Japanese airdrome is immediately west of the town. There is a very good spring northeast of the town in the bed of a stream; it can be reached by a short road. There is no reticulation system and all water has to be carried. The region is dry and dusty in the dry season, but has plenty of rain in the wet seasons. The vegetation is limited to short or long grass, and air cover is very poor except for a few large trees about the square. [2] Fuiloro (Vila de Avis) [3] …… (i) FUILORO: Situated 9 miles east south east of LAUTEM in the northwest corner of the LAUTEM plain which extends 8 miles south and 12 miles east at 1400 feet above sea level. It is a posto town of 200 inhabitants with a large market. North of the market square there is a large building used formally as a hospital, now the Chefe de Posto’s residence. The Secretary’s office, telephone and prison are west of the square. The Jap aerodrome is immediately west of the town. There is a very good spring north east of the town in the bed of a stream which can be reached by a short road. There is no reticulation system and all water has to be carried. The region is dry and dusty in the dry system but has plenty of rain in the wet seasons. [4] H Detachment and Fuiloro In early October [1942], H Detachment contacted a Japanese force which down from the coast to recce the area about Fuiloro. The Australians had previously established the fact that there was a good potential aerodrome site here. The Japanese also saw this and informed the natives that they would be returning to build a strip. The Australian and Dutch forces harassed this enemy party all the way down the cross island road, picking at them to such an extent that the Japanese, tiring of being ambushed and fired on by troops who could never be seen, eventually returned to Dilli. Right along, this H Detachment had been doing invaluable work, patrolling and recceing and at the same time supplying a great deal of food to the west end of the island. [5] Fuiloro, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-03. Portrait of Senhor Francisco Alberto, Chefe Do Posto (Fort Commander), who Assisted the Australians of Sparrow Force. He had to escape to the hills when the Japanese sent natives to kill him. (Photographer Sgt K. B. Davis) [6] Senhor Francisco Alberto, Chefe de Posto, Fuiloro On the 17th of November [1942], coming from Lautem, they arrived at the Fuiloro post, whose head was the 1st Corporal Francisco Alegria Alberto, two trucks with Japanese soldiers and armed natives. The head of the post was talking to several chiefs of suco and East Timorese when the gang entered and immediately threw themselves at him tying him up. The Japanese then began to question the population about the contacts that Francisco Alberto would have had with the Australians, in order to find reasons to kill him. But, as the responses were favourable to the head of the post, the Japanese addressed the chiefs of suco to decide on the prisoner’s fate. Everyone declared that he had always been good and fair, so he should not suffer any punishment. He was untied and the Japanese took him to Lautem and then to Dili and Liquiçá. The indigenous people of Fuiloro took care of the corporal’s children and the woman he lived with, all later going to Liquiçá. The Timorese also handed over about 200 patacas for the last revenue collected and which had been religiously guarded. The populations knew how to be fair to those who treated them well [7]. Japanese caves at Fuiloro – 12 August 2022 Japanese caves – 08° 26′ 56.63″ S, 127° 01′ 13.30″ E [8] An extensive Japanese built cave complex is located behind the chicken house at Colegio Dom Bosco SPP Fuiloro – local guidance is required to find them. JAPANESE AIRFIELD AT FUILORO – 8°26’52”, 126°59’15” The Japanese referred to the airfield location as Abisu (also Abis or Abys) and this name is still applied in current maps and reference sources; e.g., Wikimapia [9] and airportguide.com [10] The ASPT set the scene for the establishment of the airfield at Fuiloro: e. Lautem Plateau Terrain between Fuiloro and Los Pala along the western boundary of the Lautem Plateau is suitable for airdrome construction. The Fuiloro airdrome is located in an area 3 miles (5 km.) by 1 ½ miles (3 km.) which was surveyed by Dutch Shell Co. and considered by it suitable for airdrome construction. The terrain south of this area is less level, there being a considerable number of grass hummocks which would increase the work necessary for clearing. The best labour in Portuguese Timor is available in the Lautem area. [11] …….. SECTION III-AIRDROMES b. General: At present (February, 1943) the Japanese have three operational airdromes in the Island of Timor, viz., Koepang (Penfoei), in Dutch Timor, and Dilli and Fuiloro in Portuguese Timor. Although the Penfoei airdrome is by far the most developed of the three, the operational significance of Dilli and Fuiloro in relation to Australia is greater when it is realised that Dilli and Fuiloro are, respectively, 55 and 120 nautical miles nearer to Darwin than Penfoei. Dilli and Fuiloro are the only known airdromes in Portuguese Timor. Dilli is operational for fighters and bombers and Fuiloro for fighters. It will, no doubt, shortly be fit for use by bombers. 2. Table of Distances: Direct distances are as follows:- Nautical Miles Statute Miles Kilometres Fuiloro to Darwin 320 375 610 ….. b. Fuiloro (8°26’S., 12°2’E.) – See Photo No.3: Construction of this airdrome which runs across the main road from Lautem about 1 mile (11/2 km.) west of Fuiloro (Vila de Avis) was commenced by the Japanese in November, 1942, and is continuing. It lies on the extreme northwest portion of Lautem Plateau and consists of two runways, one ENE/WSW, 1,300 x 100 yards (1,190 x 90 m.), and the other approximately N/S, 1,400 yards (1,280 m.) long. Both runways are capable of further extension. The airdrome lies in open country 1,300 feet (400 m.) above sea level and is free from obstructions on all sides. Ten or 12 miles (16 or 19 km.) to the South the mountain range rises to 2,000 feet (600 m.) and 15 miles (24 km.) to the southeast it rises to 3,000 feet (900 m.). There are good M.T. roads running from the site northwest to Lautem on the north coast, south to Loré near the south coast, and to the eastern extremity of the island at Tutuala. The surrounding country is suitable for A.F.V.’s and the airdrome could be approached by them from any direction. [12] Mosaic of Fuiloro – 5 January 1943 [13] Fuiloro – Apple Maps – showing approximate location and alignment of Japanese airfield "The enemy was now bringing more aircraft forward to the Timor airfields. Whereas in November [1942] reconnaissance showed 62 aircraft in Celebes and 29 in Timor, in December [1942] there appeared to be 42 in Celebes but 62 in Timor; and there were signs that the Japanese were making a new airfield at Fuiloro 60 air miles closer to Darwin than Dili was. Henceforth Fuiloro became a main target for the Hudsons and Beaufighters. The Beaufighters of No. 31 were now most active. On the 18th two of them sank a sailing vessel 25 miles north-east of Portuguese Timor. They opened a heavier offensive against Fuiloro and the Lavai-Laga area on 23rd December, and shot down one Japanese fighter". [14] "No. 18 (Netherlands East Indies) Squadron, with Mitchells , was now arriving at McDonald, and would undertake its first sorties on 19th January [1943]. …. Throughout January [1943] the bombers and the Beaufighters continued their attacks on Fuiloro. Three aircraft of No. 18 (Lieut-Colonel B.J. Fiedeldij) probably shot down two out of five interceptors over Fuiloro on the 20th, and another flight probably shot down a Dave over Dobo that day". [15] "Throughout March [1943] the Hudsons, Mitchells and Beaufighters continued their attacks on Fuiloro, Dobo and other bases, and on ships". [16] Fuiloro (Abisu) airfield – 12 August 2022 Japanese Ace Victim of Beaufighter Strafing Attack on Fuiloro Airfield "1st Lieutenant Katsutaro Takahashi was born in Okayama Prefecture in 1916, he was considered to be a genius during his childhood. He enlisted in the 2nd Juvenile Flying Soldier programme, and when passing out in July 1936, received an award from the Educational Superintendent. Posted initially to the 1st Rentai, he moved to the new 59th Sentai in May 1938, serving in China. In September 1939 the unit moved to Manchuria, as a late reinforcement in the Nomonhan fighting. Here on 15th of the month, he saw his first action and was able to claim two victories. In December 1940 he attended the Army Flying Military Academy, graduating in July 1941 and rejoining the 59th. He took part in the actions over Malaya, Sumatra and Java as a section leader, claiming seven victories – one of the best totals of the campaign for the Sentai. On 14 December 1942 he was on readiness at Abis, Timor, when warning was received of hostile aircraft approaching. He ran to his aircraft, but as he did so, he was killed by strafing fighters. His gravestone in his home town carries an inscription: “His commanding officer stated that with his natural talent, his abilities became superhuman, and […]” "[17] [WWII] recruitment; recruiting poster depicting Beaufighters in action over an island, appealing for men to enlist as air crew [18] Beaufighter Strike 29 September 1944 "The squadron’s first operational use of their new rockets would not take place until 29 September [1944]. In the meantime, Wilbur Wackett and Keith Noble were in action again on 17 September, flying this time in Beaufighter A19-189. Together with five other No 31 Squadron crews, they were briefed to carry out a search and strafing attack on a Japanese motor transport convoy sighted the previous day on the Fuiloro to Lautem road in East Timor. Led by Flight Lieutenant David Doughton,223 the six Beaufighters took off from Coomallie Creek around 5.20 am. After formating and crossing the Australian coast, the strike force crossed the Timor Sea in a loose gaggle just below the cloud base at a height of 1000 feet. After two hours, landfall was made at Bauleu from where the formation tracked along the coast to Cape Lore before turning north to follow the road towards Fuiloro (see Map 13.1). Hampered by heavy cloud and thick scrub on both sides of the road, the crews strained to pick up enemy movement. Before long their search bore fruit when a group of 3 to 4-ton motor transports was sighted sheltering among large palm trees by the side of the road. Diving to zero feet, the Beaufighters strafed the vehicles with cannon and machine-gun fire. The trucks, which were loaded with drums, burst into flames and, burning furiously, were completely destroyed. A further burst of cannon fire into a group of Japanese observed running from the scene was believed to have killed two of the enemy troops. Soon after, a Japanese armoured motorcycle unit was sighted and given a similar pasting; two strafing runs left the vehicles ablaze. The formation continued at low level along the road as far as Fuiloro, where it circled and strafed the airfield, scoring numerous strikes on buildings. On leaving the target, the Beaufighters came under accurate light and medium ack- ack fire, with shells bursting around the aircraft at 300 feet. Flight Lieutenant David Strachan spotted the two guns responsible, protected in a sandbag emplacement in which the crews could be clearly seen. Turning hard to port, he made a low-level attack on the position, raking it with a long accurate burst. Smoke and debris erupted, causing ‘consternation and evasive action by the gun crews’. During his head-on attack, Strachan’s aircraft received two ack-ack strikes in the belly, cutting the air line to the cannons and rendering them unserviceable. A cannon shell also struck his windscreen but fortunately did not penetrate, demonstrating once again the vital, protective role of the Beaufighter’s thick bulletproof windscreen during such dangerous low-level attacks. Intense but ineffectual small arms fire was also met from a hillside south-east of Fuiloro, with crews observing flashes from all over the hillside. No damage was inflicted on any of the aircraft and the formation proceeded westwards as far as Pedra Branca searching for a suspected enemy camp area. No sightings were made and, with the Beaufighters nearing the limit of their endurance, the leader signalled it was time to return home. Flying at 3000 feet and battling headwinds and a shortage of fuel, Wilbur Wackett and two other crews had to stage through Truscott airfield on the north-west Australian coast, where they landed at 9.45 am after a four and a half hour sortie". [19] PORTUGUESE POSTO, FUILORO REFERENCES [1] ASPT: Map 1 [2] ASPT: 33 [3] ASPT: Map 29. [4] [Timor (1945) - General:] Timor - Information resume for "Tofo" Operation prepared by GS Intelligence, HQ NT Force, Aug 1945. Part 2 - detailed description of terrain etc. - AWM54 571A/1/2 467411 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2620867 [5] Robinson: 120. [6] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221039?image=1 [7] Rocha, Carlos Vieira da. – Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (2ª. ed. Ver. E ampliada). – Lisboa: Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, 1996: 117. [8] https://maps.apple.com/?q=-8.44906,127.02036 https://maps.google.com/?q=-8.44906,127.02036 Latitude : 08° 26′ 56.63″ S Longitude : 127° 01′ 13.30″ E Altitude : 390 m Accuracy : 10 m 12/8/2022, 9:06 am -8.449065,127.020360 [9] https://wikimapia.org/7274243/Fuiloro-Abisu-Airfield [10] https://airportguide.com/airportinfo/WPFL [11] ASPT: 3 [12] ASPT: 2-3. [13] ASPT: Photograph 3 [14] George Odgers. – Air war against Japan, 1943-1945. – Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. – (Australia in the war of 1939-1945. Series 3, Air ; v. 2.): 648. [15] Odgers: 649-650. [16] Odgers: 651. [17] Ikuhiko Hata, Yasuho Izawa and Christopher Shores. - Japanese Army Air Force units and their Aces: 1931-1945. - London: Grub Street, 2002: 135. [18] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C99749 [19] Leon Kane-Maguire. - Lost without trace: Squadron Leader Wilbur Wackett, RAAF - a story of bravery and tragedy in the Pacific War. – Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2011: 164-166. [20] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168683 [21] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221042

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE LAUTEM DISTRICT LORÉ 8° 38' 43.5" S, 127° 00' 49.8" E Loré location map [1] Loré is 21 miles (33 1/2 km.) at a bearing of 158° from Lautem. It is built on the southern foothills about 3 miles (5 km.) north of Cape Loré and is served by the anchorage of Saenamo. The country is hilly and covered with fairly dense forest. It is a posto town with a very small population. The posto consists of a residence, kitchen and storeroom. It is surrounded by a coconut plantation, and west of this a maize plantation. South of the posto is a rest house, stable and store shed. There are several native houses along the Saenamo road, and, along a track running southeast, some Chinese shops and a native village. North of the posto is a small stream from which water is brought in a bamboo pipe to a concrete water tank next to the posto. [2] Loré, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-04. The stone walls of the Portuguese posto (Fort). (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [3] Loré posto – 12 August 2022 LORÉ – a small posto under the command of the commandant of FUILORO. Has no resident commandant, but has a native woman of the higher caste who seems to be the local ‘queen’. She provided food and seemed very friendly. LORÉ is inland about three kilometres from the sea. The posto itself comprises one small two story building and two houses of the ordinary bungalow type. LORÉ was not bombed or machine gunned during the August disturbances. [4] JAPANESE AIRFIELD AT CAPE LORÉ - 8° 41 S 127° 01' E [5] Before 1942 was over the Japanese had occupied the Cape Loré area and started building an airfield. “The Japanese set up an airfield near Cape Loré on the south coast (Sae Namo: [Note] the Japanese called it Sinamo). Traces of the airfield cannot be found from the satellite image, inferring from the topography and the straight space, it may be the area of the houses that are currently lined up”. [6] Cape Loré airfield site - - 12 August 2022 HUDSON AIRCRAFT A16-166 SHOT DOWN OVER CAPE LORÉ - 24 DECEMBER 1942 An Australian No. 2 Squadron Hudson aircraft was the first victim of the increased Japanese defensive presence on the south east corner of Portuguese Timor: "Next morning [24 December 1942] Japanese shipping, four transports and an escorting destroyer, were reported off Lavai on the eastern end of Timor's northern coast and a joint 2 and 13 Squadron strike ordered against them. Four Hudsons of No. 2 Squadron were to attack first, followed by three from No. 13 Squadron. Aircraft captains were Flt Lt Austin and FOs Cambridge, James and Johns of 2 Squadron and Flt Lt Rehfisch and FOs Thomson and Warlow-Davies of 13 Squadron. Hudson aircraft A16-166 engine component displayed at Loré posto - 12 August 2022 All aircraft approached from the east, the initial attack being made by two flights of two. No direct hits were reported. Meanwhile, No. 13 Squadron's three had almost overtaken the second flight from No. 2 Squadron and the leader was in the process of making a turn to port when Thomson was seen, instead, to fly straight ahead or of on a tangent, as Doug Osborne, Warlow-Davies' observer, later expressed it. Almost immediately Rehfisch and Warlow-Davies, who had stayed with the leader, dived to attack, the only other sighting of what was considered to be Thomson's aircraft, A16-166, being after the attack, passing underneath Rehfisch's Hudson. After the return of the two 13 Squadron crews to Hughes, where one direct hit on the bow of one of the largest merchant vessels was claimed, enquiries as to the missing Hudson were made of No. 2 Squadron but none of their crews in the attack saw A16-166 at any stage. No explosions or crashes had been seen either, though, and it was hoped that a forced landing had been made and that the crew had survived. This was not to be, however, the Hudson had, in fact, been shot down, perhaps by a mixture of anti-aircraft gunfire and Japanese fighters. One of the largest vessels present, the 7,005 ton Maebasi Maru, claimed two Hudsons shot down with her deck guns that day, but with only one Hudson missing, clearly there was an error in this claim. Post- war it was reported by a former Japanese intelligence officer that at around 1700 hours on 24thDecember a Hudson had been "chased" by two Zeros. Only one engine was functioning and black smoke was coming from the aircraft which subsequently crashed about one and a half miles south of Cape Loré on the south coast. The wreckage of a Lockheed, type unknown, was subsequently found near the position indicated, local witnesses confirming that it had been shot down by Japanese fighters, but it is possible that the initial damage had been caused by shipboard gunfire. Under the circumstances it was considered likely that the wreckage was of A16-166 and the scattered, unburied remains of those aboard were gathered and later buried in the Koepang War Cemetery. Thomson's crew had only been in the area since 3rd October, their original navigator, Bobbie Nicholls, being sent south in November due to a spinal infection. Nicholls was replaced by Sgt Reg West, a former navigation instructor from Evans Head. In addition, Keith Chote, one of "Jock" Whyte's WAGs, was flying with Thomson that day filling in as an extra gunner”. [7] RAAF Searcher Team Investigation Post War 16 May 1946 Mrs E. Chote Mie Gunyah 5 Kirk Street TOOWOOMBA Qld Dear Madam, I deeply regret to inform you that your Son, Sergeant Keith Gilbert Chote, who was previously reported missing on air operations is now known to have lost his life on air operations near Cape Loré in Timor on 24th December, 1942. This change of classification is based on a report received from the Royal Australian Air Force Search Organisation which has located the wreckage of the aircraft in the scrub near Cape Loré. The bodies of the five members of the crew were found near the aircraft unfortunately, individual identification, as not possible, and the crew will be buried in a comrade’s grave in an Australian War Cemetery. The Directorate or War Graves Services will communicate to you particulars of the burial. Interrogation of Japanese prisoners discloses that on the afternoon of the 24th of December 1942, the aircraft was shot down by Japanese fighter aircraft. It was seen being attacked by two Zero fighters and crashed near the coast, about one and a half miles south of Cape Loré. A native who witnessed the crash stated that all five members of the crew were killed instantaneously. The Minister for Air and members of the Air Board desire me to extend to you their profound sympathy. It is hoped that the accompanying enclosures will be of assistance to you. Yours faithfully M.C. Langslow Secretary Casualty Section Albert Park Barracks SC3 [8] Formal Confirmation of the Deaths of A16-166 Crew Members CREW: NAME AND RANK SERVICE NUMBER ROLE Flying Officer G.P. Thomson 405889 Pilot Sgt J. McA. Dunbar 416661 Sgt K.G. Chote 405542 Sgt R.M. Clark 416653 Sgt R.S. West 405163 P.6 (N) Investigations conducted in Timor by F/Lt Hamer have established that this aircraft was shot down Japanese fighters and crashed on the afternoon of 24th December 1942 near Cape Loré in Timor. 2. F/Lt Hamer inspected the wreckage of an aircraft which appeared to have been a Hudson or Ventura. His informant stated that it had been shot down by Japanese fighters pursuing it from the direction of Lautem (8o 22’ south, 126o 55’ east) in February or March 1943. 3. Informant stated that five or six crew members were killed instantly. F/Lt Hamer collected the unburied remains of the crew which were still lying scattered in the scrub, and it was established that the remains were of five persons. It has been impossible to identify the aircraft from the markings and plates removed from the wreckage. (See extract of report dated 13/1/46 herein). 4. As there was no record of an R.A.A.F. Hudson or Ventura missing in this area in February or March 1943 further enquiries were made by F/Lt Hamer who obtained from Captain Goto, former Japanese intelligence officer in Portuguese Timor, the following account: At about 1700 hours (Japanese time, Timor) on 24th December 1942, one Hudson being chased by two Zeros, approached SAENAMO from direction west of CAPE LORÉ. Only one engine was working. The plane emitted black smoke and crashed about 11/2 miles south of Cape Loré near the coast. 5. From experience in other cases it is considered that Captain Goto’s information is reliable and can be accepted. Since, however, it was not clear from reports whether the wreckage inspected by F/Lt Hamer could have been the aircraft referred to by Captain Goto, F/Lt Hamer was interrogated on this point and stated that the position of the wreckage was quite consistent with it being the Hudson referred to by Captain Goto. 6. Accordingly, it is considered that although the individuals have not been identified, since the remains of five have been recovered and there is no doubt that the aircraft is A16-166, this crew should be reclassified ‘killed in air operations’. [9] JAPANESE RADAR STATION AT LORÉ - 08°34'S, 126°59'E SECRET JAPANESE RADAR - LORÉ PORTUGESE TIMOR: 1. On 16 Dec a Radar station (reported as two steel lattice towers about 20 yards apart protruding 20 feet above trees and with standard rotating screen on top) was observed 6 miles N by E of Loré in Portuguese Timor. Source: Situation Report No, 186 page 7 COMMENTS: a. Twelve intercept missions to this area have been made during the past year. Seven have been negative and five have resulted in the interception of signals considered most probably to have originated from enemy shipping in the area. The last mission was run on 4th October 1943. b. Although there is no direct evidence of a Radar in this area, circumstantial evidence indicating that the installation of one might well be expected. c. Unfortunately there is no photographic coverage of the area. d. The Japanese are thought to have developed a chain of Radars extending from Soemba, thru Timor, Tanimbar and Aroe to New Guinea. The weak link in the chain appears to be in the absence of a Radar at the eastern end of Timor. Japanese radar – Netherlands East Indies – July 15, 1945 – Loré location highlighted [10] e. An installation at Loré would complete the chain and would give coverage in the direction of interest from the Japanese viewpoint, the south and southeast, and would be well situated with respect to the airstrips at Lautem. f. The presence of a Radar in this locality may be regarded as a probability until further evidence is received. JOEL H. MACE Lieut Commander RANVR Assist Director [11] Cape Loré – site location map ‘LONGEST SPITFIRE RAID OF WWII’ - LORÉ RADAR STATION – 27 NOVEMBER 1944 On the 27th of Nov 1944, five Spitfires from No. 549 sqn RAF and two Spitfires from No.1 Fighter Wing, RAAF in conjunction with four B-25's from No. 2 sqn RAAF plus an ASR Catalina, attacked and destroyed a Japanese radar station at Cape Loré on Portuguese Timor. The raid was a round trip of some 850 miles taking 4.5 hours. The Spitfires were first to attack carrying out strafing runs on the installations resulting in the radar tower being destroyed. The B-25's then destroyed the remaining buildings once the Spitfires were clear. [12] The Cape Loré, Timor raid of November 27 1944, was known as the longest Spitfire raid of the war and is reported here in detail: “One day as the American B-25s were returning to their station at Darwin after a raid, one of the crewmen was testing a camera as they flew over Cape Loré on the SE coast of Portuguese Timor. When the film was developed someone noticed, completely by accident, four little radar aerials sticking up out of the bush. (The actual position of the radar Installation was 08°34'S, 126°59'E). The find was reported to Colonel McClusky, Commander of the USAAC Bomber Wing, who sent a couple of spotter aircraft to find these aerials. They were unsuccessful, so McClusky approached W/Cdr R.C. Wilkinson - 'Wilkie', joint Wing Leader and Wing Commander OPs 1 Fighter Wing to request the RAF Spitfires (to) escort a flight of B-25 Mitchells to the target. He wanted them to fly in low and hit the target with cannon and machine gun fire and get some smoke going, so the B-25s could come in and bomb the installation. Wilkie conferred with joint Wing Leader, G/Capt B.R. 'Blackjack' Walker. Although Walker was the Senior Ranking Officer on the Station, any operations undertaken were under Wilkie's command. The raid was set for 27 November 1944. The original force was to be four B-25s, ten Spitfires from 549 Squadron, a Catalina flying boat, two Spitfires from 1 Fighter Wing, being Wilkie and Walker and two spare Spitfires. In the RAF, once an officer attains the rank of Wing Commander he can have his own initials painted on the aircraft as opposed to squadron letters. As Wilkie was back on OPs, he had his initials RCW painted on his personal aircraft - this was the only time Wilkie was to fly 'personalized'. They flew to the Austin Strip (at Snake Bay, Melville Island) where they refuelled for the long flight. The Spitfires were equipped with standard 97-gallon tanks, plus two 25-gallon wing tanks, a 30-gallon belly tank and an additional 90-gallon belly tank!! The last two mentioned would have to be dropped before they made their attack. But out of the 14 Spitfires, only seven were able to take off, the others suffering various fuel line problems! (Les Bushell was one of them). Using every inch of the runway the escort staggered into the air for the rendezvous with the Mitchells and headed for Timor Island. Incidentally, it should be noted that on other occasions the wing tanks could be removed and in their place two 30-gallon barrels of beer could be affixed. This alteration didn't help the aircraft to fly any further but it was definitely good for morale. The Spitfires made a low pass over the island and were welcomed by two bursts of light machine gun fire from a tree about seventy yards north of the installations. Wilkie led the Spitfires in for the attack and beat the area up with cannon and machine gun fire and started a bit of smoke going, they then pulled out and let the B-25s come in and do their stuff. The bombers scored direct hits and flattened the station. There was no interception and there were no casualties, all aircraft returning safely to base. The entire raid took four hours and fifty minutes. This was the longest Spitfire raid ever flown. Those who flew the Spitfires were: G/Capt B.R. Walker DSO 1 Fighter Wing W/Cdr R.C. Wilkinson OBE, DFM & Bar, C de G 1 Fighter Wing S/Ldr E.P.W. Bocock DFC 549 Squadron (A58-341) F/Lt W.V.B.N. Wedd 549 Squadron (A58-304) F/Lt L.F. Webster 549 Squadron (A58-326) W/Off A.N. Franks 549 Squadron (A58-414) W/Off J. Beaton 549 Squadron (A58-323) A group portrait of Supermarine Spitfire pilots of 549 Squadron RAF which formed part of No 1 Fighter Wing, RAAF, who are operating from a base in North Western Australia. Left to right: Back row: Flight Lieutenant (Flt Lt) J.R. Williams of Cardiff, Wales; Flt Lt W.B. Van N. Wedd of Paris, France; Squadron Leader E.P.W. Bocock DFC of Gazeley, near Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, Commanding Officer of 549 Squadron RAF; Flt Lt L.F. Webster of Barking, Essex; Flt Lt W.H. Walker of Sheffield, England. Front row: Warrant Officer (WO) A.N. Franks of Wolverhampton; WO Jock Beaton of Isle of Skye, Scotland and Flt Lt G.W. Turner of Que Que, Southern Rhodesia. [13] At a press briefing in Adelaide ‘Record Flight by Darwin Spitfires’, they reported that this flight was led by an Australian. Wilkie shrugged this off as bad press. A/Cdr Richard Grice stated, "The longest operational flight ever made by Spitfires, stands to the credit of a Royal Air Force squadron at Darwin, which smashed the installations on Timor recently". He said the round trip flight was more than eight hundred and fifty miles and there was no loss or damage to the squadron. He conveniently forgot the Americans' part in the raid. Grice, who was the Senior Officer of the United Kingdom Army and RAF Liaison Staff in Australia, made a trip to Darwin to congratulate personally the Officers and Airmen on their achievement and brought with him sixty dozen eggs and other Christmas cheer. It was reported these items were well received by the men. This extract from Colin Storey's diary, provides some interesting background detail: Early in November our Commanding Officer, S/Ldr Bocock DFC (he won the award in the Battle of Britain where he shot down five German aircraft) called all four of us Fitter Armourers to his tent. Hardly surprisingly, we wondered what we had done to deserve it! He asked us if we would fit two bomb carriers to a Spitfire. He had made rough drawings of how he thought it could be done and after we examined them, we told him we would give it a go. The reason behind this request (he said) was that a secret mission was shortly to take place and it would be of great help if the Spitfires could carry two 250-pound bombs. It took us several days to do the job and the CO then tested them out over the sea. The test proved that the carriers worked 100% and he was very pleased with us. The mission turned out to be a raid on Japanese radar installations on Timor Island and would be a round trip of more than 850 miles. It was then realised that with the extra weight of the bombs, even using belly tanks, the long distance over water would not be safe, so the idea of the Spitfires carrying bombs was shelved. On 27 November 1944, 12 aircraft in all, including four of ours, made the raid on the base. The Spitfires went in first. One of our pilots (F/Lt Wedd) was credited with destroying the radar tower and W/Off Beaton set the main buildings on fire. The Mitchell bombers (from 2 RAAF Squadron) followed and dropped bombs in the middle of the camp killing most of the Japanese”. [14] SECRET BLUE DCV/B1/27 NOV (.) (A) DCV/27 NOV 12 X-RAYS (B) RADAR INSTALLATIONS CAPE LORÉ (C) 270055Z TO 270120Z TO 200 FEET (D) SEVEN DUTIES REACHED TARGET FOUR DUTIES MADE THREE STRAFING ATTACKS ON RADAR INSTALLATIONS CLAIMING 90% STRIKES THREE DUTIES MADE TWO ATTACKS ON RADAR AND TWO ATTACKS ON CAMP AREA APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS NNE OF ANTENNAE ONE FIRE AND TWO OTHER THIN COLUMNS GREYISH SMOKE SEEN AFTER ATTACK MANY STRIKES SEEN ON HUTS AND INSTALLATIONS FIVE DUTIES WENT U/S AT AUSTIN DUE TO AIRLOCKS (E) SLIGHT LIGHT INACCURATE FROM MG POST IN TREE 70 YARDS NORTH OF RADAR (F) THRU (H) NIL (I) CINE-CAMERA OF ATTACKS AND COAST AREA NEAR CAPE LORÉ (J) FOUR DUTIES SAW BOMBS FROM FIRST BOMBER FALL IN TARGET AREA TWO SAW REMAINING BOMBERS ALSO HIT TARGET AREA ONE EUROPEAN TYPE HOUSE AND SMALL PLANTATION APPROXIMATELY 3 ½ MILES NNW CAPE LORÉ NIL ENEMY ACTIVITY AT CAPE LORÉ AND ELG (K) 1-2/10 THS CU BASE 4000 FEET VISIBILITY CLEAR OVER TARGET EN ROUTE 5/10 S/CU AND CU BASE 3000 FEET TOPS TO 20,000 FEET VISIBILITY 15 TO 20 MILES (L) CAMP AREA NEAR RADAR INSTALLATIONS COMPOSED OF APPROXIMATELY 7 WOODEN OR BARK COVERED HUTS AND ONE MORE SUBSTANTIAL BUILDING TWENTY FEET SQUARE (M) 703 ROUNDS EACH SAPI AND HEI 20MM 6681 ROUNDS 60/40 .303 API [TOO: 0720Z] [15] THE MILITARY HISTORY SECTION TEAM’S VISIT TO LORÉ - 3 JANUARY 1946 Sergeant George Milsom of the Military History Section Team diarised on 3 January 1946 when visiting Loré: "We were shown a crashed HUDSON bomber in which six Australians had lost their lives; the wreckage was fenced in by the natives. The most peculiar thing we saw was some Jap defences on the beach below LORÉ; the Japs had put small sharp bamboo stakes up in the sand, thousands of them inclined towards the sea and they evidently anticipated a landing". [16] [17] Charles Bush, the war artist with the Team prepared two paintings while they were in Loré. ‘MOTH’ EATON’S VISIT TO LORÉ – 4 DECEMBER 1946 “At Saenamo there is good general anchorage with some shelter from Cape Lore, and also a small sheltered area between two reefs running seawards for about 1/4 mile (1/2 km.) and some hundred yards or so apart. Small vessels can shelter here in almost any weather, and it fronts a stretch of good landing beach with deep water close in. There are several buildings on shore and ample cover from the air, with vegetation right on to the beach in places. There is also some small amount of shelter on the beaches between Saenamo and the Mamaluto River, given by the reefs which separate the beaches. The reef continues for 2 miles (3 km.) southeast to Cape Lore, a well-marked low promontory with a sandy patch on the point and dense vegetation further back”. [20] The Australian Consul Charles ‘Moth’ Eaton visited Loré in early December 1946: “During my last visit to the interior I was particularly interested to see the Japanese defences of Lautem-Cape Loré areas. I do not know if the full facts are known to our military authorities but at one time some 25,000 Japanese soldiers occupied these areas. The Japanese camps and defence works along the road between Lautem and Fuiloro were considerable and the camouflage almost perfect. The Cape Loré beach-head was the best defence work I have seen in Timor; the earth and wire works were extensive. I also visited the Japanese Cape Loré radar station. This station is actually on the top of a mountain at the rear of Cape Loré. I was very interested in this station as I personally took part in an attack on this work in December 1944. The attack was an interesting one as it was the first time that diaphragm bomb-heads were used in Timor. The Radar Station had been hit but the extent of the bomb damage was difficult to ascertain as after the attack the Japanese dismantled the remains. Without doubt the main building was severely damaged by the diaphragm bombs”. [20] Sign post on the Cape Loré beach-head - 12 August 2022 REFERENCES [1] ASPT: Map 1 [2] ASPT: 34 [3] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221043 [4] “Road reconnaissance – Fuiloro to Via-Lai-Via – 16 September 42” in [Timor (1941-1942) - (Sparrow Force and Lancer Force) - Operations:] Sparrow Force. Reconnaissance report of South Coast of Port Timor and Intelligence reports … - AWM 54 571/4/19 [5] Northern Territory Force war diary June-July 1943 [6] https://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/200902/article_8.html [7] David Vincent. – The RAAF Hudson story – book two. – Highbury, SA: Vincent Aviation Publications, 2010: 90-91. [8] CHOTE Keith Gilbert - (Sergeant); Service Number - 405542; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Hudson A16-166; Place - Nova Ancora, Australia; Date - 24 December 1942 NAA: A705, 163/96/208: 13.https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=1056202&isAv=N [9] CHOTE Keith Gilbert - (Sergeant); Service Number - 405542; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Hudson A16-166; Place - Nova Ancora, Australia; Date - 24 December 1942 NAA: A705, 163/96/208: 14. https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=1056202&isAv=N [10] Craig Bellamy. - Radar countermeasures development in Australia: a case study of multinational co-operation in World War II at Fenton, Northern Territory. - Honours thesis, Charles Darwin University, Darwin, 2015: 219. [11] General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Section 22 - Current Statements No. CS/No. 0075 - Date 19 Dec43 - NAA: A11093, 676/4A11 PART 2 [12] Gordon R Birkett ‘The November 1944 raid’ ADF Serials Telegraph News 1 (5) Summer 2011: 9-11. http://www.adf-serials.com.au/newsletter/ADF%20Serials%20Telegraph%20News%20-Summer%202011%20Vers%201.pdf [13] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C279452?image=1 [14] Victor Possé. - Together up there : the unit history of No. 549 RAF/RAAF Fighter Squadron in Australia during World War Two. – Loftus, N.S.W.: Australian Military History Publications, 2003: 62-63 [15] Garry Shepherdson “How to read RAAF historical records: coloured signal forms” ADF-Serials Telegraph Newsletter 10 (4) Winter 2020: 99-110. /109/ http://www.adf-serials.com.au/newsletter/ADF-Serials%20Telegraph%20Vol10%20Iss4%20v1d.pdf [16] Ed Willis ‘The Military History Section Team’s patrol to the eastern end of Portuguese Timor, 29 December 1945 – 9 January 1946’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/310-the-military-history-section-team’s-patrol-to-the-eastern-end-of-portuguese-timor-29-december-1945-–-9-january-1946/ [17] ASPT: Photograph 93 [18] Note on painting – “Identifiable with panorama sketch in Terrain Study (presumably made by Lt Doig’s party?” https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/ART26156 [19] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168680 [20] ASPT: 24 [21] C. Eaton, 'Despatch No. 18, Australian Consulate, Dili, 31 December 1946' in NAA: A1838, 377/1/3 Portuguese Timor Part I. As Commanding Officer of 79 Wing, Eaton flown in one of the B-25's from No. 2 Squadron in the attack on the Cape Loré radar station.

Association Committee member and immediate past-President Ed Willis participated as a member of the vehicle-based support team in the inaugural La Rende! (No Surrender!) Trek in Timor-Leste operated by Maddog Adventures - Sunday 24th - Saturday 30th September 2023. (https://maddogadventures.com.au/adventures/la-rende-trek/) Ed made the following remarks at the Trek launch event held on the evening of Saturday 23 September: "Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honour for me to present here representing the 2/2 Commando Association of Australia at the launching of the inaugural “La Rende! (No surrender) Trek”. Through the Association I have attempted to promote historical tourism in Timor-Leste by identifying and documenting sites connected with WWII in this country and publishing my research on the Association’s website (Doublereds). My father served as a signaller with the No. 2 Australian Independent Company (better known as the 2/2) during their 1942 guerrilla campaign against the invading Japanese – hence my interest – or as my wife would say – obsession. I was pleased when contacted by Sam Maddock earlier this year to assist with planning the Trek having previously worked with David and Shirley Carlos of Timor Adventures with planning and guiding two successful road-based “Timor 1942 Commando Campaign” tours in 2018 and 2019. We had another tour ready to go in 2020 when Covid intervened. Dave had also put a lot of work into planning a Trek. I would like to acknowledge David and Shirley for their pioneering efforts promoting historical, cultural and recreational tourism in TL. Sam asked me early on about a name for the Trek and I suggested “No surrender” based on the 2/2’s rejection of a surrender demand from the Japanese at Hatolia (a key stop on the Trek) in March 1942. I thought the name would also resonate in relation to the Timorese people’s unfailing resistance to the Indonesian occupation of the country. Major Guy Warnock assisted by advising on the proper translation of “No Surrender” into Tetum as “La Rende!”. I also suggested dedicating the inaugural Trek to the late Major Jim (‘Taipan”) Truscott, OAM. An ex-SAS officer, Jim was proud of his service on Timor during the initial INTERFET peacekeeping operations in September 1999, particularly his liaison work with Tuar Matin Ruak (TMR) during the tense early stages of the operation. He contacted me in early 2019 to work with him on preparing a ‘Battlefield guide to East Timor” covering WWII, the Independence War and the Peacekeeping operations. Sadly that project was incomplete when he passed away in April 2021. Before Jim passed away, with his support, I successfully applied for an Australian Army History Unit grant to prepare what I’ve called “WWII in East Timor: an Australian Army site and travel guide” that I hope to have prepared for publication by the AHU in early in 2024. This is a comprehensive guide to all relevant sites in the country that can be utilised by ADF personnel, tour companies and the general public to plan vehicle based tour and treks. It includes GPS references, maps, images and information about each site that puts in a WWII historical context. It is based on my research using print publications in English, Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese and Tetum, archival sources and most importantly on country site visits – the last month-long one conducted in August-September 2022 in company with fellow 2/2 Commando Association committee member Murray Thornton. I hope the site information I’ve shared with Sam and Guy relating to Dili and locations along the route has been useful to them and provides one of the foundation pieces for what should be a successful inaugural La Rende Trek that is a precursor to many more iterations so that becomes as well known and regarded as the Kokoda Track. Thank you". Robbie Martins, Ed Willis, Sam Maddock & Guy Warnock at the La Rende! Trek launch event Trek participants were: Sam Maddock Owner, Maddog Adventures Eamon Hicks Guide, Maddog Adventures Stuart Burns Guide, Maddog Adventures Robbie Martins Guide, Maddog Adventures Domingos ? Guide, Maddog Adventures Warrant Officer Tom Vallas Defence Cooperation Program – Timor Leste (DCP-TL) Support team members were: Gida Freitas Business Administration , Maddog Adventures Marcal Costas, Driver, Maddog Adventures Major Guy Warnock Defence Cooperation Program – Timor Leste (DCP-TL) Ed Willis Committee member, 2/2 Commando Association of Australia Colonel Paul Pembroke, Defence Attaché, Australian Embassy TL, had approved one other DCP-TL participant who, due to unforeseen circumstances, had to withdraw at the last minute.“ The whole trek traverses the entire island of Timor from north to south, some 130km. This iteration covered the first half of the trek from Bazartete to Hatabulico approximately 75km, over 5 days of intense hiking. The trail crosses rugged ridges, crystal clear rivers, passes through Portuguese era coffee plantations, thick tropical jungles and crosses Mount Ramelau, which peaks at 2,986m”. The Trek route follows tracks utilised by the No. 2 Australian Independent Company during their commando campaign against the Japanese in 1942. For Ed, a memorable event on the Trek was on 30 September when following a moving ceremonial welcome by local villagers “I accompanied a group of Australian Defence Force personnel and members of my tour group to visit the site where Liberator A72-159 went missing on a reconnaissance mission for Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) Operation Sunbaker over Timor on 17 May 1945. Sadly 15 RAAF and Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) men, including former 2/2 man Sergeant Des Lilya, were killed in the crash. Wreckage from the downed plane can be viewed at the site that is located on a remote hill side near the town of Maubisse”. See “Escape From Timor – How Four Men Made It Back To Darwin After The Japanese Invasion of Portuguese Timor – Arnold Webb's and Des Lilya's Stories” This initial Trek was still part of the development phase, and proved its worth by: • verifying the efficacy of the route in terms of distances and timing • establishing and/or reinforcing local contacts for local guidance, accommodation and meals • confirming existing site and historic information and gathering new information • taking photos and video (including drone footage) to be used for the record and for promotional purposes Maddog Adventures are planning to run the Trek again next year with potential dates scheduled around Anzac Day (25th April) and 20th September 2024 – when the 25th Anniversary of the commencement of the INTERFET peacekeeping operation will be commemorated.

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE LAUTEM DISTRICT LAUTEM (VILA NOVA MALACA) Lautem location map [1] Lautem (see Photo No. 85 and Map No. 31) is 93 miles (149 km.) at a bearing of 82° E. from Dilli and is the capital and chief posto town of Lautem Province. [8°22'14"S., 126°54'30"E.] It is built on the alluvial flats at the entrance to the narrow valley in the foothills which come steeply down to the sea. The rocky limestone hills come almost to the water's edge; they are fairly well covered with scrub. Lautem is a fair-sized town with a population of about 500, including Portuguese, Chinese and natives. It is an important commercial and market centre and a useful anchorage; the export trade is with copra, oil, rice, and maize. On the flat-topped hills west of the town there are three groups of old fort-like buildings. The most south-westerly group is the administrative posto and subsidiary buildings; a few yards northeast is the telephone hut and a long building containing the secretary's office and armoury. The second fort-like enclosure is north of the posto overlooking the town; the house is used for a school. The third group is north of the school and just above the beach; it contains a hospital and prison. The bulk of the town proper consists of about 10 Chinese shops and about 20 native houses. East of the shops there are a number of stone houses for Portuguese civil servants, and further east a stone customs house and cemetery. There are extensive vegetable gardens on the flats in the valley and maize and sweet potatoes were plentiful. There is a spring half a mile (1 km.) southeast of the town and another half a mile (1 km.) south of the town. A pipe leads from the latter to a reservoir near the school, a branch line going to the posto. [2] …….. SECTION IV-ANCHORAGES A- THE NORTH COAST 17. Lautem (Vila Nova Malaca) - Lautaim on chart (126' 54' E.): Is the headquarters of a military officer, and is a place of some importance. Exports were hides, copra and timber. There is good anchorage in 11 fathoms (20 m.). The water shoals rapidly further inshore because the little bight is shallow but free of coral rocks. There are coral rocks at both corners of the bight. K.P.M. vessels used to anchor here. For small ships anchorage 200 to 300 yards (175 to 275 m.) offshore. Only good anchorage in the east monsoon. Easy to approach. A white fort built on a rocky point is very conspicuous. Just eastward of the rocky point the coast bends in a little, and there are four stone pillars (probably intended as a foundation of a light structure) on the beach. With these bearing 150°, there is good anchorage in about 11 fathoms (20 m.). Inshore and along the beach are coral reefs. [3] Lautem is a good landing place, important from a military point of view because of the road running through to the south coast. Anchorage is about 300 yards (275 m.) offshore in about 11 fathoms (20 m.), the depths decreasing rapidly towards the shore. There are coral reefs off the beach. The beach itself is about (1 1/4 miles (2 km.) long, and of flat hard sand. West from Lautem village to the Malai-Lada River there is a stretch of sand about 18 yards (17 m.) wide, which is level and hard and said to be possible for landing of aircraft. The north coast road passes inland close to the beach. Air cover is good in this vicinity, but it is poor farther west. Buildings in Lautem include 12 stone houses, the largest of which is the customs house. The Japanese landed troops here from flat-bottomed barges. [4] The Japanese Occupy Lautem “When the Japanese arrived in Lautem, on November 15 [1942], the administrator and his wife remained at the headquarters, as did the deportados who were there, with nothing unusual happening to the troops, who maintained a very correct attitude. According to what was possible to ascertain from the narration of indigenous people, on the night of the 15th to the 16th, the head of a suco in the headquarters area, bordering the Luro post area, sought out the administrator and informed him that they were on their way to Lautem elements of the «black columns» who would finish off all the Portuguese they found, as they had already done in other places, advising the administrator and his wife to flee immediately to their posto, where they would be safe and from where they would then move on to a better location, if that were necessary. The administrator was convinced that he was in danger and followed the advice given to him, especially since he seemed to place some trust in this chief, and followed everyone to that village, about 15 kilometers from Lautem. Upon arriving there, the two poor Europeans were immediately surrounded by a crowd of indigenous people, who tied them up and mistreated them, ending up killing them savagely. Neither the Japanese nor elements foreign to the people of the circumscription had, as far as it was possible to ascertain, interfered in these two deaths, which can only be attributed to the ill will that existed between the indigenous people towards this administrator and his own wife who they considered responsible for many injustices of which they were often victims. Once again, the poor performance of the local authorities and the poor application of justice to the indigenous people were responsible for acts of indiscipline and crimes that the difficult circumstances in which they lived made possible, with the discontented taking advantage of them to take revenge on those who had lacked due justice”. [5] In addition to the administrator and his wife, three deportados Antonio Teixeira, Mário Goncalves and Raul Monteiro were also killed. [6] The Japanese Forces Operating In The Lautem Area “The units of the 48 Division that replaced the 228 Regiment (the unit involved with the invasion) began to arrive in Portuguese Timor in early September 1942. They then spread to all areas of the Portuguese territory. Some units arrived in Lautem on 15 November 1942. The Japanese forces in the area (the eastern part of the Laga-Baguia-Allambata) was named the East Area Force and was made up of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 2nd Formosan Infantry Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 48th (Zeni) Engineering Regiment. According to the map of the distribution of Japanese forces on the island of Timor in the period of the summer season (around April to November) 1943, the East Area Force headquarters was in Lautem with Colonel Toru Tanaka as commander, the 2nd Battalion was in Abis (the top of the mountain near Fuiloro), 3rd Battalion in Com, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion was in Koepang (Dutch Timor). The Commander at Abis was Major Shichijuro Takizawa, and Commander at Com Lieutenant Colonel Zenkichi Sugano. The task of the Japanese forces in Lautem was to neutralise anti-Japanese actions carried out by Timorese, use the Lautem military base to attack Australia, build a new military base in Abis, and defend the eastern part of the island”. [7] 85. Lautem – vertical (14/9/42) [8] Lautem (Vila Nova Malaca) Portuguese Timor [9] Lautem township map – Apple Maps Ruins of Lautem fort high above the town, not accessible now, fort walls line the entrance to Lautem Vila and warehouses [10] Lautem Fort in Mahlira village, on a strategic hill, contains the coat of arms of the Portuguese state with inscription “For the sake of the country”. [11] JAPANESE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE LAUTEM AREA “SECTION 5 – HISTORY OF OCCUPATION OF VILLAGES BY ENEMY 17. LAUTEM (VILA NOVA MALACA) The enemy built up considerable base area here and at LAUTEM WEST the airfield was continually maintained until recently when (since July 16th 1944) denial ditches have been dug across the runway. This abandonment of this area probably confirms native reports that the present enemy strength in the LAUTEM area is no more than 100 Japanese and that the main forces have been withdrawn. The enemy HQ (commanded by Col TANAKA) was situated at PISA in the hills approximately 5 km behind LAUTEM. The enemy had large barracks on each side of the road inland from LAUTEM to FUILORO. It is reported that the enemy were using small tracked vehicles which may have been carriers captured from Australian forces. In this area the enemy employed up to 500 natives conscripted from the islands of MOA, LOKAR, LETI and KISAR. These worked in the gardens at LAUTEM and the main food production was maize. In Jan 1945 it was reported that the only food being used was maize 3 times per day”. [12] In November 1946, the Australian Consul Charles “Moth” Eaton observed: “During my last visit to the interior, I was particularly interested to see the Japanese defences of Lautem-Cape Lore areas. I do not know if the full facts are known to our military authorities but at one time some 25,000 Japanese soldiers occupied these areas. The Japanese camps and defence works along the road between Lautem and Fuiloro were considerable and the camouflage almost perfect”. [13] Map showing Japanese military infrastructure in the Lautem area Lautem. Foto: hasai husi Taiwan Hohei Dai-2 Rentai, Dai-9 Chutai Kai (Asosiasaun Kompahia 9, Rezimentu Infantaria Formoza 2), Senyu no Hi (Monumentu ba Kolega sira iha Funu) [14] COMFORT WOMEN IN LAUTEM “One of the Japanese soldiers who had previously worked in Lautem wrote in a brief collection of Japanese war veterans, "In Lautem there was also the opening of a busy ianjo." Idelfonso Januario, who lives in Lautem, told about women who were brought from abroad. The following is his account: The women were brought from Kisar or Java. They stayed separate from the soldiers. There was a guard, and when the Japanese came, they gave them money to enter. João Moniz of Boruari Village, Moro, said that women were also brought from the Celebes (Sulawesi) and Java. According to João, a woman named Pualau from Daudere, Macalotah,. had a child named Hanako fathered by a Japanese soldier. Hanako was born after the Japanese left Timor. The Japanese army positions in Lautem were always under attack by aircraft from Australia. Two Japanese ships from Java were sunk near the port of Lautem on 15 December 1943. The two military vessels were Wakatsu-Maru and Genmei-Maru, who were bringing stores and 700 women who were to become ianfu in Timor. At that time, the air and sea of the island of Timor were dominated by the Allied forces”. [15] On 7 December 1943, submarine chaser CH-2 departed Surabaya, Java for Lautem, East Timor, escorting convoy KAI-13 consisting of Genmei Maru and Wakatsu Maru. By 15th, the convoy arrived at Timor, but was attacked by Dutch B-25s bombers, who hit Genmei Maru with six bombs. Genmei Maru caught fire and on 16th, still burning, Genmei Maru was scuttled by shore artillery. On 17th, Wakatsu Maru was attacked by RAAF Beaufighter bombers. At 0750, she blew up and sank. [16] LAUTEM WEST AIRFIELD On 21 July 1943 “Reconnaissance by Lightnings of No. 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit found further evidence of continued Japanese airfield construction. On Timor two new airstrips were discovered, one of 5,000 feet running parallel to the coast at Cape Chater and another at Lautem, and a total of thirty-six enemy aircraft were counted on Timor airfields”. [17] AIRFIELD RUNWAYS USE DEFENCES REMARKS LAUTEM WEST 4000 ‘ probably longer F & B [fighters and bombers] Possibly 9 Lt [Light] guns 1400 ‘ SE of the strip A new airfield probably completed. level ground and is 5 miles WEST of LAUTEM. [18] The 31 Squadron website gives the coordinates of the Lautem West airfield as S 8.395178, E 126.859484[8.39518° S, 126.85948° E] and this appears to be the most likely location. This locations needs to be verified by on-site inspection. [19] Establishment of the Lautem West Airfield A Japanese source describes the establishment of the airfield: “The airfield built by the Japanese military in Lautem was a so-called "secret airfield". This was done from around September 1942 under the direction of the 3rd Air Wing Commander (Major General Rikitomo Tsukada). Aerial reconnaissance identified a suitable site on a flat plateau area near Lautem. The Army's 9th Field Airfield Establishment Corps (Major Toru Kawabata) had established the "secret airfield" by around February 1943 with the cooperation of the 4th Aviation Area Ground Service Corps. “Using the grassland that was part of the wide plateau, it was possible to take off and land planes with a little leveling and clearing, and the scattered forest (some of which was planted) could be used for parked aircraft and other purposes. There were two Lautem airfields, east [Cape Chater] and west. In addition to the Lautem airfield, the Kawabata unit also established the Abis (Vila de Avis, Fuiloro) airfield, and Sae Namo near Cape Lore on the south coast. ….. The Australian continent is just south of Timor Island. Eventually, Imperial Headquarters delineated an "absolute defense zone", intended to secure the resources of Dutch Indonesia; the plan was to stop the Allied Forces advancing westward and northward from Western New Guinea and Northern Australia. While geopolitically understandable, however, the loss of air and sea supremacy made the Japanese soldiers in the area strongly feel that Japan's defeat was not far away, although they could not express it. The Allied Forces marched west along the northern coast of New Guinea with a stepping stone strategy, annihilating all the bases of the Japanese army. On the other hand, although the troops deployed in the Banda Sea received airstrikes, they were not confronted in land battles. …… Lautem airfield was described as the ideal "secret airfield", being constructed on a vast meadow dotted with trees in a ranch style. It was the ultimate camouflaged airfield, where even Japanese first-time pilots could not determine the landing site. Planes were parked in a grove of trees and were difficult to spot from above. The lower branches of large trees that were dozens of meters high were removed, and many aircraft could easily be concealed under the canopies. Also, near the entrance of the forest, there was a large cactus with crimson flowers that could hide a small aircraft. They grew in clumps and hid the parked aircraft. Also, they tried to erase the traces of the runway tracks of the planes. Of course, this kind of thing cannot be continued forever, and about half a year later, the airfield was discovered by the enemy”. [20] Japanese Air Operations Against Australia From Lautem West Lautem West was “used by the Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) as a base for bombers and reconnaissance aircraft for missions over Darwin, the Northern Territory and north-west Western Australia. Also used by the Japanese Navy”. [21] “Compared with these naval air forces, the Japanese Army air forces played a relatively minor role in Japanese operations against Australia. Bombers and fighters of the 3rd Air Brigade (Dai 3 Hikôdan), 7th Air Division (Dai 7 Kôkû Shidan) and 3rd Air Army (Dai 3 Kôkûgun) participated in the only air raids by Army planes on Australia, which occurred on 20 and 22 June 1943 from Lautem in the East Indies. The bombers were from the 61st and 75th Air Regiments (Hikô Dai 61 Sentai and Hikô Dai 75 Sentai, respectively), while the fighters were from the 59th Air Regiment (Hikô Dai 59 Sentai). Reconnaissance aircraft of the 70th Independent Air Company (Dokuritsu Hikô Dai 70 Chûtai; also under the 3rd Air Brigade), however, did fly numerous scouting missions over Australia before and after these air raids”. [22] “[A] Japanese raid [on Strauss Airstrip approximately 60 kilometres south of Darwin] of 20 June 1943 followed a reconnaissance flight two days earlier by a Mitsubishi Ki-100 ‘Dinah’ of the Japanese Army Air Force’s 70th DCS based at Lautem on Timor, when equipment bound for the newly arrived 380th Bombardment Group (Heavy) of the USAAF was photographed stockpiling at Winnellie”. [23] “… on 28 June [1943] Lt Cdr Suzuki led 27 Zeros from Lautem, Timor, to escort G4M Rikkos [bombers] to Darwin. Following the bombing 12 Zeros of the 3rd and 4th chutais claimed one and two probables. Three Zeros of the element at the tail end of the formation were hit and one pilot was badly wounded, but all managed to return home after a flight of four hours and 45 minutes. Two days later 27 Zeros were again led by Suzuki to escort Rikkos, this time the target being Brooks Creek airfield which was believed to be the base of the B-24s. On this occasion defending Spitfires attacked before the bombing. The Japanese pilots claimed 12 destroyed and three probables, gunners aboard the Rikkos claiming one more shot down (five Spitfires were actually lost). One bomber was lost but all the rest of the formation returned after a flight which this time took five and a half hours. 27 Zeros were again involved in escorting Rikkos to Brooks Creek on 6 July, this time led by Lt Shiozuru, but on this occasion three G4Ms were lost and two Zeros were damaged”. [24] Cooper notes in relation to an earlier air raid on Darwin (2 March 1943) that: “The incoming formation of Zeros had proceeded independently and from a more northerly bearing than the bombers. Lautem airfield in Portuguese Timor was only 650 kilometres away and was therefore the preferable take-off point for the fighters, while the long-legged G4M bombers could easily operate from Penfui, 850 kilometres distant from Darwin”. [25] The presence of the Zeros in these raids must have alerted Australian intelligence to the fact that if they were land-based they must have flown from a location closer to Darwin than Penfui or Dili and prompted the reconnaissance flights that discovered Lautem airfield in late June 1943. Allied Air Forces Operations Against Lautem West Once discovered, the airfield was subjected to almost continuous bombing and strafing by American, Australian and Dutch aircraft. The units involved included 380 Bombardment Group (528, 529, 530 and 531 Squadrons) of the USAAF Fifth Air Force, 79 Wing RAAF (No 2 Squadron), 18 (NEI) Squadron, which was manned by both Australian and Dutch airmen, and 31 Squadron RAAF Beaufighters. By the middle of 1944, Allied bombing had rendered the airfield unusable and most of the remaining serviceable aircraft were moved to Kendari airfield and other locations. Following the official surrender of Japanese forces on Timor, they destroyed most stores at the airfield and disabled their surviving aircraft before the arrival of Australian forces. [26] The following is one example of a strafing mission conducted by a Beaufighter from 31 Squadron: “In all, five sweeps and one strike were flown over Central and Eastern Timor. On one mission by two Beaufighters, captained by Flight Lieutenants Strachan and Sippe on the 13th [1944] near Lautem strip, some 200 Japanese were seen crossing a river bridge. The aircraft could not line them up because at the time they were in a tight turn, but the Japanese were observed jumping off the bridge in great confusion. Continuing on they destroyed two well-camouflaged “Dinahs” parked in disperse bays. This attack was carried out in spite of an intense barrage of ack-ack, heavy, medium and light”. [27] GEORGE MILSOM’S ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY HISTORY TEAM’S VISIT TO LAUTEM, JANUARY 1946 At the end of WWII, ex No. 2 Independent Company soldier George Milsom (TX4141) was promoted to Sergeant and became a member of a three-man team Military History Team that was sent to both Dutch and Portuguese Timor to record significant campaign sites. George was the guide of this team; Lieutenant Charles Bush was the official war artist and sometimes used George as a model and Sergeant Keith Davis the photographer. In Dili they received help from two new criados Fernando and Akiu. George Milsom was an avid letter writer and his parents kept all of his letters. This post features a letter dated 14 January 1946 that he wrote after the Military History Team had completed its patrol to campaign sites at the eastern end of Portuguese Timor. The twelve day patrol travelled through the following locations: Dili, Manatuto, Vemasse, Baucau, Lautem, Lore, Fuiloro and Ossu then back to Dili. Milsom’s narrative of the patrol is complemented by photographer Keith Davis’s photographs of some of the locations visited by the Team. The adventures and social activities of the men and their reliance on the hard working jeep as their mode of transport makes for interesting and entertaining reading. “We stayed a right there and went on to LAUTEM next day (Sunday) [1 January 1946]. There we found the Administrator Senhor GONSALVES sitting on the verandah of a house that the Japs had built and used for their HQ. He is a big chap, big-hearted, and welcomed us with VINHO DA PORTO. He has gathered round him all the Japanese junk from the area, broken down bombers and small motor cars; I have never seen such a collection before. We slept in Japanese beds with sheets and mosquito nets and had hot bathe in the concrete bath the Japs had built. Then we went to the airfield and you should see the wrecked planes, all in the most fantastic angles and positions, you will have to see the photo to believe it. We did not run short of petrol there because there is a dump of 56,000 44 gallon drums there. The Administrator has trucks, cars and hundreds of bicycles. One shed he has is full of gear, one wall was covered with chiming clocks. He gave us some souvenirs. The junk heap was even able to supply us with two wheels for the jeep”. [28] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. Senhor Gonsales seated on the veranda of a mud house built by the Japanese. VX128043 Charles William Bush (in shorts) Military History Section (MHS), an Official War Artist, is working at an easel. Also identified (far right, back to camera) is TX4141 George James Beedham Milsom, MHS. [29] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. This Japanese twin engine aircraft was probably destroyed by them at the end of the war. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [30] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. Damaged bicycles in the Lautem area where the Japanese maintained their largest dumps of petrol, equipment and stores. They destroyed much of this material and many aircraft at the nearby airfield at the end of the war. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [31] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. A wooden Japanese signpost with empty petrol drums and mobile anti-aircraft guns in the background. [32] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. Equipment and stores deliberately damaged by the Japanese at the end of the war. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [33] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. A native weaving a fish net. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [34] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1945-12-29. A wrecked Japanese twin engine aircraft. It bears the identification number 911 on its tailplane. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [35] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. Remains of a damaged Japanese Zero fighter aircraft and a line of hand carts. The Japanese maintained their largest dumps of petrol, equipment and stores in the Lautem area and destroyed much of it at the end of the war. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [36] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. This Japanese twin engine aircraft was probably destroyed by them at the end of the war. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [37] Lautem, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-02. A burnt-out Japanese twin engine fighter aircraft at the Lautem airfield. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [38] COASTAL DEFENCES – LAUTEM AREA “B. DEFENCES Little information is available of coast defence artillery on TIMOR but at various points such as LAUTEM, DILI, ATAPOEPOE and particularly in the KOEPANG area there are AA weapons which may be sited in a ground or coast defence role”. [39] Background: Japanese island defense doctrine “Every Japanese manual from 1909 focused on the importance of offensive action to achieve victory. What the Japanese lacked in firepower and matériel was to be made up for by spiritual power, superior martial values, and total dedication to fulfilling one's duty, even if it meant attacking a superior force with bayonets or defending a position to the death. An officer corps evolved which loathed defense and fixed fortifications. However, the Pacific War became nothing more than a series of defensive battles for the Japanese, a war of attrition that they did not have the resources to win, nor even to achieve a stalemate. The US Army's 1944 Handbook on Japanese Military Forces describes the Japanese attitude toward defense. "The defensive form of combat generally has been distasteful to the Japanese, and they have been reluctant to admit that the Imperial Army would ever be forced to engage in this form of combat. So pronounced has been their dislike for the defensive that tactical problems illustrating this type of combat is extremely rare." The 1938 Combat Regulations (Sakusen Yomurei), still in effect at the beginning of the Pacific War, called for passive defense in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority (unyielding resistance until additional forces arrived to resume the offensive): prior to this the Japanese had adhered only to the concept of active defense. Active defense was only to be adopted when the enemy gained local superiority and continued until operational initiative could be regained and the offense resumed. In reality, because of the previous schooling and aggressive nature of Japanese officers, the conduct of the defense on Pacific islands was essentially active defense. Their goal was to halt the enemy at the water's edge, and if unable to decisively defeat him there they sought to reduce his strength, and conduct immediate counterattacks to keep him disorganized until mobile reserves could annihilate him. Among the key problems Japan faced were the vast distances involved, limited shipping, brutal climate, and numerous health hazards. She was compelled to defend islands in widely varied terrain and weather conditions - from baren, rocky, sub-arctic outposts to vast, mountainous, rainforest-covered islands. ……. An early-war Japanese report, Concerning Defense Against Enemy Landings, stated that enemy forces must be annihilated on the shore, and that, "therefore the second or third line of defense positions ordinarily will not be established very far to the rear." However, most of the islands on which the early South Pacific battles were fought were quite large, hilly and thick with jungle. It was impossible to defend the many miles of beach-lined coasts. …… The defended island was ringed with trenches, rifle pits, machine guns, anti-boat guns, and coast defense guns. Anti-aircraft guns were generally positioned on or near the shore to double as anti-boat weapons. Most positions were covered, except for larger AA and coast defense guns. All artillery was incorporated into the beach defense for direct fire: space was not sufficient to position it far enough in the rear to allow indirect fire. Usually the only "field artillery" on these islands comprised light infantry guns. Strongpoints were spaced along the shore as well as inland, especially around command posts, space permitting. Even if all or most of the island's perimeter could be defended, the defences were sometimes concentrated in interconnected defended areas, essentially large strongpoints, with light defences in between them. Antitank ditches were dug to block the passage of armour into key areas. The airfield occupied much of the island, but never was it incorporated into the defense as it provided an exposed field of fire deadly for the attackers to cross. Defences were established along its edge to cover the far side. If the island was too large for the entire shoreline to be defended by available forces, a central defended area was established with both strong beach defences and cross-island defense lines. The Japanese tended to deploy the balance of their defences on the seaward side of the islands, believing that the Americans would want to beach nearer to shore on the reef's edge. On the atolls lagoon side the coral reefs were wider meaning landing craft were forced to discharge their troops further out. Building and manning the island defences The basic design of the island fortifications was based on the dictates of pre-war manuals, but there were many variations and exceptions in the field. Such variations were provoked by the need to blend the fortification into the terrain (requiring its size, shape, and profile to be modified), locally standardized design induced by material shortages, types of material available, weather conditions, preferences and concepts of local commanders, and the ingenuity and imagination of the officers and NCOs supervising construction. A Japanese manual on field fortifications notes: "It is most important not to adhere blindly to set forms in construction work, but to adapt such work to fit the tactical situation." Dimensions, even for positions housing the same type of weapon, varied considerably and could be of irregular shape: local initiatives were the rule rather than the exception. Despite very different appearances, the common, basic design can be seen in many examples. Establishing the defence A unit was assigned a specific sector of defense and several factors were considered. Firstly came the direction from which the enemy would approach: the defenses were principally oriented in that direction. Avenues of approach into the sector from the flanks and rear through adjacent unit areas were also considered and some defenses, even if only supplementary positions, were oriented in those directions. While unit boundary lines were specified, with coordination, fields of fire from one unit's sector into an adjacent unit's were permitted to cover gaps. Weapons were also emplaced to cover avenues of approach into a unit's flanks regardless of the adjacent unit's dispositions. Key terrain features, which the enemy might attempt to occupy, were identified as were routes of advance through the defense sector, and defenses and obstacles established there. Secondary defensive positions were selected to provide depth to the defense. This was a critical aspect to the Japanese and a factor that made it so difficult and slow for the Allies to break through. Defenses established in the depth of a unit's sector were not necessarily emplaced as continuous lines. Although they might seem to be randomly selected, they were not haphazardly chosen: they were emplaced to cover other defensive positions, movement routes, key terrain, and dead space not covered by the primary opinot.si They were often emplaced to engage the enemy from the flanks or even the rear as they advanced. Individual fighting positions were scattered throughout some areas requiring the assault force to clear each. Often the assault troops would clear only the most troublesome, leaving reserve units to mop up bypassed positions: sometimes these were re-occupied by stragglers and infiltrators. Inaccessibility was another factor affecting the choice of fighting position. For example, placing a position high on a steep hillside made it difficult for the enemy to approach while under fire. It is apparent that the concealment and inaccessibility of positions often took precedence over other considerations. The key aim was to establish crossfire from several directions and all-round protection from attack from any direction”. [40] Eastern Coastal Defences at Lautem “Lautem is a good landing place, important from a military point of view because of the road running through to the south coast”. [41] A Japanese coastal bunker is clearly visible from the road on the shoreline on the eastern outskirts of Lautem (8° 21' 32.0" S, 126° 54' 26.2" E) “In this case, in order to strengthen the defence of the Lautem coast, the Japanese built stone tochka in April 1944. Tochka which means "point" in the Russian language, that is, the construction is round, and it is enough that is strong with its wall and has the same layer a small window to remove an outer arm”. [42] Tochka on the beach at Lautem. Photo: Michitaka Yamaguchi. [43] Japanese bunker on the eastern outskirts of Lautem township – 11 August 2022 Japanese pillbox on the western approach to Lautem township – 11 August 2022 Western Coastal Defences at Lautem Two Japanese coastal defence pillboxes are located on high ground above a bay located approximately half way between Lavai and Lautem just off the highway (8° 24' 12.9" S, 126° 49' 03.1" E). The access point to the pillboxes is indicated by a stack of painted tyres. The coast line along this section is described in the ASPT: “15. Laivai to Lautem—See Map No. 31: Except for a patch of reef-bound coast about 3 miles (5 km.) east from Laivai, the foreshore for 8 miles (13 km.) is beach interspersed with coral reef. There is then 3 miles (5 km.) of reef-bound coast to the Malai-Lada River. The main road lies about a mile (1 ½ km.) inland from the coast. There is good air cover, particularly for the westerly eight miles (13 km.). Water is available right along the coast”. [44] The Japanese must have assessed this bay as the most suitable for an Allied landing along this section of coast and therefore to be defended in order to protect the nearby Lautem West airfield from capture. The pillboxes probably housed machine guns that could have poured lethal defilade fire on any landing craft attempting an assault. The surrounding area warrants more thorough investigation to locate and document the associated Japanese defensive infrastructure. Front view of Japanese pillbox - 11 August 2022 REFERENCES [1] ASPT: Map 1. [2] ASPT: 12. [3] ASPT: 12. [4] ASPT: 19. [5] Carvalho, Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de. - Relatório dos acontecimentos de Timor (1942-45) [Report of Timorese events (1942­45)]. - Lisboa: Edições Cosmos, 2003. – Originally published: Lisboa: Ministério das Colonias, 1947: 457-458. [6] Carlos Vieira da Rocha. - Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (2a. ed. rev. e ampliada). Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, Lisboa, 1996: 116. [7] Luta ba lia loos no justisa: relatóriu finál ba Peskiza Konjunta Asosiasaun HAK ho Koligasaun Japonés sira ba Timor-Leste konaba eskravidaun seksuál militár Japonés iha Timor-Leste, 1942-1945 / hakerek-nain (ortografia): Akihisa Matsuno; tradutór: José Luís de Oliveira. - Dili, Timor-Leste : Asosiasaun HAK ; Osaka, Japan : East Timor Japan Coalition, [2016]: 128-130. [8] ASPT: Photograph 85. [9] ASPT: Map 31. [10] M. Hero “Stumblings ... Saturday, February 2, 2013 - Lautem Fort”. http://stumblingmatthew.blogspot.com/2013/02/lautem-fort.html [11] Sri Budi Rahayu, Yayuk. - Bangunan kolonial di Timor-Timur. - Jakarta : Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1998/1999 [i.e. 1999?]: 48. [12] [Intelligence - Timor, Flores', Soembawa, Lombok:] Summary of Intelligence Information (Enemy) - Timor information to 27 August 1945 - enemy strengths and dispositions and maps to be read in conjunction with New Guinea Force Operation Instruction No 84: 29. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2751986 [13] Charles Stuart Eaton. – The cross in the sky: the life and adventures of Charles ‘Moth’ Eaton - soldier - pioneer aviator - pathfinder for global peacekeeping. – Melbourne: Echo Books, 2021: 268. [14] Luta ba lia loos no justisa: 129. [15] Luta ba lia loos no justisa: 136. [16] See https://wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?163921 [17] George Odgers. - Air war against Japan, 1943-1945. – Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957 (repr. 1968): 60. (Australia in the war of 1939-1945. Series 3, Air ; v. 2) [18] Northern Territory Force war diary June-July 1943 [19] http://www.sim-outhouse.com/sohforums/showthread.php/129345-Campaign-and-Missions-for-31-Squadron-RAAF-Coomalie-Creek [20] https://gbitokyo.seesaa.net/article/200902article_8.html [21] Lautem Airfield (Lautem West Airfield) https://pacificwrecks.com/airfields/timor/lautem/index.html [22] Shindo Hiroyuki “Research essay: Japanese operations against the Australian mainland in the Second World War: A survey of Japanese historical sources” http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/437f72f8ac2c07238525661a00063aa6/04fe8252bce8187eca256a1d00111139?OpenDocument [23] WWII Strauss airstrip: background historical information / prepared by the Heritage Branch. – Palmerston, NT: Department of Natural Resources, Environment, the Arts and Sport, 2011: 25. [24] lkuhlko Hata, Yashuho lzawa, and Christopher Shores. - Japanese naval fighter aces, 1932-45. – Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2011: 73. [25] Anthony Cooper. - Darwin spitfires: the real battle for Australia. – Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2011: 54. [26] Lautem Airfield (Lautem West Airfield) https://pacificwrecks.com/airfields/timor/lautem/index.html [27] https://31squadronassociation.com.au/about/war-history/history-8/ [28] Ed Willis “The Military History Section Team’s patrol to the eastern end of Portuguese Timor, 29 December 1945 – 9 January 1946” https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/310-the-military-history-section-team’s-patrol-to-the-eastern-end-of-portuguese-timor-29-december-1945-–-9-january-1946/#comment-759 [29] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221037 [30] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221036 [31] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221031 [32] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221029 [33] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221030?image=1 [34] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221033 [35] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221028 [36] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221032 [37] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221035 [38] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221034 [39] [Intelligence - Timor, Flores', Soembawa, Lombok:] Summary of Intelligence Information (Enemy) - Timor information to 27 August 1945 - enemy strengths and dispositions and maps to be read in conjunction with New Guinea Force Operation Instruction No 84. - https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2751986 [40] Gordon L. Rottman. - Japanese Pacific island defenses 1941-45. – Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003: 29-30. [41] ASPT: 19. [42] Luta ba lia loos no justisa: 132. [43] Luta ba lia loos no justisa: 132. [44] ASPT: 19.

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE DILI DISTRICT THE OLD DILI CATHEDRAL – PRIME TARGET IN THE BOMBING WAR Catedral de Dili (Cathedral) – opening 1937 [1] “Arriving at the front door of Portuguese Timor on the morning of 17 December, the Soerabaja waited outside Dili, a tiny harbourside settlement dominated by an enormous white stucco cathedral, a grand symbol of the duopoly of colonialism and Catholicism in a land of tribal animists. The cathedral itself was overshadowed by mountains that rose sharply just over a kilometre behind the town”. [2] Callinan described the cathedral as he saw it in January 1942: “The only other notable building in the town was the Cathedral – a new building built with the aid of the church in Macau. It was reputed to have cost a million patacas, or almost a hundred and sixty thousand pounds. It was a dazzling white building with twin towers, and a brilliant red and blue leadlight window behind the high altar. One Sunday I went down to Dili to Mass in the fine Cathedral. The Father Superior usually gave, at the completion of the Mass, what sounded to me like an informal talk to the natives present. He would stand amidst the seats at the back of the Cathedral, and moving slowly amongst them, speak quietly and fluently in Tetum; his voice carried well, and every word was distinct. It sounded simple and sincere, and there was not a move from any native present whilst he was preaching”. [3] According to another account: “The cathedral was a grand building with two tall spires on either side of its many windowed façade in the centre of Dili. Its bells could be heard all over town”. [4] “To the south of the Customs there was the Cathedral with two towers and an imposing presence due to its size. The facades were gently ornated, although the typological variety of arches was able to provide visual complexity. It was inaugurated in 1937, and for its construction in 1933, the previous parish church built between 1876 and 1877 had to be demolished”. [5] Ruined Cathedral, Portuguese Timor (c. 1947) - Charles Bush [6] DESTRUCTION OF THE DILI CATHEDRAL, NOVEMBER 1942 [7] “General Douglas MacArthur had taken a personal interest in the Timor campaign ever since April 1942, when he overruled General Blamey and ordered that the No. 2 Australian Independent Company (2AIC) be kept there to continue prosecuting guerilla war. When things started turning for the worse towards the latter part of the year, MacArthur got involved again by authorising an all-out bombing campaign on the capital Dili, and on key centres throughout the island. So committed was MacArthur to seeing his personal war in Timor succeed that he committed US air power to the conflict, even though the skies above Timor were becoming increasingly menacing for bombers without fighter support”. ……. “On the third run over Dili, MacArthur’s mission really found its mark. At 5.30 p.m. on 1 November six B-26 bombers hit strategic targets near the waterfront. [8] Many bombs fell on the town but some hit the jetty, starting fires that culminated in a vivid flash and a huge explosion around midnight. The fires continued to burn throughout the night. The No. 4 Australian Independent Company (4AIC) men who had now returned to their OP over Dili counted more than 60 bombs in all in this first raid. [9] The following day, nine B-26s were reported from C and B Platoon positions as they approached Dili at around 8 a.m. Most of the bombs were dropped in between the cathedral and the Chinese shops, and had little effect. The bombers were later seen from Company HQ, located near the south coast, with two Zeros chasing after them. At headquarters they tuned into the radio frequency of the bombers and heard one pilot telling the other, ‘Slow down,’ Matthew, I can’t keep up with you.’ All of the bombers returned safely to their base south of Darwin. In the early hours of 3 November, the RAAF’s 2 Squadron joined the B-26s in a total of five raids on Dili, culminating in an attack by nine B-26s at around 8 a.m. [10] The daylight attack did not have a military target such as an ammunition dump or fuel store, but an unmistakeable civilian target, the cathedral in the centre of town. The ornate cathedral, with its twin bell towers, stood more than four storeys tall and construction had only been completed five years earlier. Other cathedrals around the world survived the war, most notably Cologne Cathedral in Germany, which was spared because Allied bomber pilots relied on it for navigation. The 4AIC Company troops sealed the fate of the biggest structure in the colony when they reported from their OP rumours that it was being used to assemble fighter planes. The 4AIC men didn’t verify the information, and it conflicted with a report in September by the 2AIC Company, which said that some of the 3,000 Japanese troops in Dili were billeted in the cathedral. However, the men at the OP passed the information onto their Company HQ which then sent it on to Darwin. The bombing was observed by several soldiers, including the 4AIC commanding officer Major Walker. [11] One of the soldiers at the OP who saw the bombs hit the building, Sergeant Bill Gibbs, said they ‘got a kick’ out of seeing the grand edifice go down. Gibbs said ‘rightly or wrongly’ the OP’s intelligence told them that the cathedral was being used for military purposes. Gibbs was looking through binoculars when the raid came and he saw two bomb bursts, one through the side wall and a second through the roof. ‘We were very pleased about this. It was the first sign that our efforts were being taken notice of by our side.’ [12] ……. Bombing the cathedral might not have been the best way to win the support of the Portuguese, who had built it, but the Australian soldiers thought the campaign in general had a good effect on Timorese support for their cause. A 4 November message to Darwin said: ‘The natives were very impressed with the recent Allied bombing activity.’ [13] Requests for bombing came from all over Portuguese Timor now that the USAAF had joined in …”. Dili, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-20. The bomb damaged Cathedral. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [14] At war’s end the unroofed shell of the cathedral building still dominated the ruins of the town’s bombed out centre. Symbolically, the Portuguese Governor insisted that the ceremony acknowledging Australia’s role in liberating Portuguese Timor was performed in the open space in front of the cathedral on September 24 1945. To reinforce the authority of its re-established control of the colony, the administration re-purposed the prime space occupied by the cathedral to build the more expansive but lower rising Palácio do Governo that resides on the site today. The stones of the cathedral were used to build a temporary pier on the nearby harbour front. [15] THE NEW CATEDRAL DE DILI (CATHEDRAL) Driving in a westerly direction from the Dili city centre along the Av. Mouzinho de Albuquerque brings visitors to the landmark Catedral da Imaculada Conceição (Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception). This contemporarily designed and attractive building was constructed by the Indonesian government, completed in 1988 and inaugurated by President Suharto during a brief visit to Dili in November of that year. Aditjondro cites construction of the cathedral as an example of a third type of “symbolic violence” the Indonesian government inflicted on the Timorese people; that of reminding “them of how good the Indonesian state has been to the Catholic Church of East Timor”. [16] Pope John Paul II consecrated the cathedral during his similarly fleeting visit to Dili in October of the following year. Old cathedral location in relation to new cathedral This new cathedral was a belated replacement for the first cathedral destroyed by Allied bombing during WWII that was located closer to the waterfront on the site of the current Palácio do Governo (Palace of the Government). [17] Like the Christo Rei statue, little expense was spared by the Indonesians in constructing the new cathedral. It has been placed within a spacious walled and well-drained compound with landscaped surrounds that vary in condition through cycles of neglect and rehabilitation. It is also twin-towered and white-rendered with the towers being curiously offset on opposite sides of the building. The cavernous interior can accommodate a large congregation; it is reported over 2,000 people attended a mass of thanksgiving and forgiveness after the recovery of President Jose Ramos-Horta when he returned to Dili following treatment for his wounds in Darwin in April 2008. [18] The Timorese people have embraced this church as their own despite its provenance as another visitor observed: “Yet, visit Dili Cathedral on a Sunday morning and it's a very different story. From 7.30am crowds flock to mass and by the time we arrive at a quarter to eight we can barely get in the door. The pews are packed. Those who arrive late have to perch on the very edges of their seats. The stairwells are full; some people poke their heads around the main doorway; others sit on the floor. The sea of heads seems to go on and on into the distance. Like the Jesus statue, Dili cathedral could do with a lick of paint. Most of the light bulbs which make up the rudimentary chandeliers have blown, casting a dim light over the priest. Some of the pale blue ceiling panels are starting to peel off, while others are stained with damp. The stations of the cross are so modest you can barely make them out. But none of this deters the congregation. They have clearly taken care to dress in their Sunday best. Their shirts are clean and ironed. Their hair is washed and brushed. They wear sturdy, neat shoes. And they listen, many intently, to the service”. [19] Catedral da Imaculada Conceição (Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception - 31st July 2008 REFERENCES [1] Património arquitetónico de origem Portuguesa de Díli = Architectural heritage of Portuguese origins of Dili / editors Eugénio Sarmento, Flávio Miranda [and] Nuno Vasco Oliveira. - Dili: Secretária de Estado da Arte e Cultura, 2015 : 28. [2] Paul Cleary. - The men who came out of the ground : a gripping account of Australia's first commando campaign : Timor 1942. - Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: 30. [3] Bernard Callinan. - Independent Company : the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941-43. - Richmond, Vic. : Heinemann, 1984: 14-15, 31. [4] Rowena Lennox. - Fighting spirit of East Timor: the life of Martinho Da Costa Lopes. – Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, 2000: 28. [5] Património arquitetónico de origem Portuguesa de Díli: 28. [6] Charles Bush / Portugese Timor inscribed in pen and ink on reverse of cardboard c. pasted into reverse of cardboard: "RUINED ROMAN CATHOLIC CATHEDRAL / DILLI – PORTUGESE TIMOR" / Painted from a sketch made whilst / on tour of duty as official war artist / 1945. / Charles Bush / 3 Napier Street. / Essendon, Victoria. / (Exhibited in the Minnie Crouch / watercolour competition. https://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/explore/collection/work/26985/ [7] The following text has been adapted from Cleary, The men who came out of the ground : 239, 242-244. [8] Martin B-26B Marauders of the US 2nd Bomb Squadron, 22nd Bomb Group. https://www.ozatwar.com/ozcrashes/nt142.htm [9] 4AIC war diary, September–December 1942, AWM52 25/3/4. The 2AIC War Diary points out that many bombs also hit the town and the raid was comprised of six planes. Raid by eight bombers on 1 November, in 2AIC war diary, AWM52 25/3/2; AWM64 ORMF 0188, 13 Squadron. [10] 4AIC war diary, September–December 1942, AWM52 25/3/4. The 2AIC War Diary only mentions one raid at 8 a.m. by US bombers. The difference could be explained by the fact the 4AIC was operating the observation post. In both war diaries the planes are referred to as Boston bombers, but in fact they were B-26s. [11] Comment inserted by Walker into 2AIC war diary on 4 November: “I personally observed hit on church from OP. Approximately 1/3 of roof appeared to be blown away. Major Walker”. [12] Paul Cleary interview with Bill Gibbs, Queanbeyan, October 2007. [13] Cable by Major-General F.W. Berryman, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Allied Landforces SWPA, 21 November 1942. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221108 [15] Património arquitetónico de origem Portuguesa de Díli: 28. [16] George J. Aditjondro “Ninjas, nanggalas, monuments and Mossad manuals: an anthropology of Indonesian state terror in East Timor” in Death squad: the anthropology of state terror / edited by Jeffrey A. Sluka. – Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000: 179. [17] “Dili: circuito urbano 1” pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/dili_urbano.pdf [18] “President's Recovery Spurs Prayer of Gratitude” http://www.ucanews.com/2008/04/23/presidents-recovery-spurs-prayer-of-gratitude/ [19] Jo Barrett “Keep the Faith” post September 8, 2008 East Timor who cares? http://easttimorwhocares.wordpress.com/

Perth's new Korean War Memorial (https://pkwm.org.au) was officially opened yesterday (27 July 2023) - exactly 70 years since the armistice agreement which ended the Korean War was signed. Often referred to as the “Forgotten War”, the conflict ebbed and flowed on the Korean peninsula between 1950 and 1953. Australia played a crucial role in defending South Korea and was just the second country, after the US, to send military forces as part of a United Nations' response to North Korean and Chinese aggression. 2/2 Commando Association President Noel Strickland and committee members Ed Willis and John Burridge attended the opening. It is of interest to note that at least six 2/2 Commando Squadron veterans served in the Korean War: Ray Parry (WX12415), John (Jack) Stafford (later Steen) (VX18894), Alf Peters (WX16414), Frank Cahill (WX17861), Harris Brown (WX13194) and George Paterson (NX127251). The names of the WA men are inscribed on panels on the reverse of the main memorial. Ray Parry’s service is particularly noted on the Memorial website under the heading “Inspiring Leadership”: “Corporal Ray Parry of South Perth was awarded the Military Medal (MM) for the courage he displayed on the night of 23 April 1951, during the battle of Kapyong. Parry and four of his mates held an outpost at the rear of the ridge occupied by B Company. When the Chinese tried to outflank the company position, they ran into the outpost. Despite repeated attacks Parry and his men held out till dawn”. (https://pkwm.org.au/2022/07/25/inspiring-leadership/) Korea. 1951-04-26. Lance Corporal M. R. Neyland (left) and 5/400049 Corporal R. N. Parry, both members of 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), keep an eye out for the enemy on Hill Sardine. (https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C275185) Jack Stafford is one of a small group of Australian servicemen awarded the Silver Star – the third-highest military decoration that can be awarded by the US. The citation states: “Pte Stafford a member of the 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, distinguished himself by gallantry in action against the enemy north of the Chong-Chon River in Korea on the 29th October 1950. … Throughout the entire campaign Pte Stafford has shown outstanding courage and has been an inspiration to all members of his unit. His masterful use of the Bren gun and his complete disregard for his own safety have repeatedly been the deciding factor in carrying his unit to success over numerically superior enemy forces”. (https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/vx/john-henry-stafford-r636/) George Paterson re-enlisted in the Army on 29 October 1950 and was posted to the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), landing at Pusan South, Korea. “The Chinese launched their first offensive on 1 Nov 1950 causing a withdrawal of the UN force, including 3 RAR. 3 RAR blocked the enemy attack on the 4-5 Nov 1950 at the Chongchon river where George was killed. He was 29 years old. George Paterson’s body, along with the bodies of seven British soldiers, were handed over by the North Koreans. They were re-buried in the United Nations Memorial Cemetery at Pusan South Korea”. (https://gloucesterrslsub.com.au/news-reminisce/21-paterson-a-soldier-who-saw-action-in-ww-2-and-korea.html) Grave of 2400018* Private (Pte) George Angus Paterson, of the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), who was killed in action on 5 November 1950. Pte Paterson's body, along with the bodies of seven British soldiers also killed in North Korea in 1950, was recently handed over by the Communists (North Koreans), for reburial in the United Nations Military Cemetery at Pusan, Korea. A wreath was laid at the grave of Pte Paterson after the burial service, which was conducted by Australian Presbyterian padre, Senior Chaplain R M Park. * NOTE: Korean War service no. (https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1101866) A feature of the ceremony was a formation fly pass by three Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer aircraft of No. 2 Flying Training School RAAF, Pearce to recognise the contribution of the RAAF during the Korean War. An early casualty in the conflict was Wing Commander Lou Spence, DFC and Bar, brother of the first Commanding Officer of the 2/2, Major (later Lt. Col.) Alex Spence, DSO. Just a week into the Korean War, airmen of 77 Squadron under Spence’s command, who had been stationed in Japan with the British Commonwealth Occupying Force (BCOF), were flying ground-attack missions and bomber escorts from Iwakuni, Japan. On 9 September 1950 he led four Mustangs in an attack on storage facilities at An'gang-ni, South Korea, which had recently been captured by the communists. While he was operating at low level because of poor visibility, his aircraft failed to pull out of a steep dive and he was killed when it crashed into the centre of the town. ADDITIONAL READING Raymond Norman PARRY WX12415 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/wx/raymond-norman-parry-r552/ John Henry STAFFORD VX18894 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/vx/john-henry-stafford-r636/ SEE ALSO JOHN HENRY STEEN Alfred George Philip PETERS WX16414 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/wx/alfred-george-philip-peters-r558/ Francis Ernest CAHILL WX17861 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/wx/francis-ernest-cahill-r149/ Harris John BROWN WX13194 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/wx/harris-john-brown-r131 George Angus PATERSON NX127251 https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/nx/george-angus-paterson-r537/

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE DILI DISTRICT DILI BAY e. Disposal of Japanese Ammunition W.D. Forsyth, the Political Adviser to Brigadier Dyke (Commanding Officer of TIMFORCE) in Dili reported: 5. On 24th September [1945] work proceeded; e.g., Japanese brought ammunition by truck to the waterside, natives carried it to barges and assisted Japanese to dump it out at sea; dumps, dismantled guns and other equipment were inspected; some interrogations were made. [1] Sergeant K.B. Davis of the Military History Section team took a sequence of photographs that provide a visual narrative of this dumping exercise. The photographs reveal that the ammunition wasn’t taken far out into the bay before being unceremoniously thrown overboard. Looking in the background of the photos taken it may be possible to identify the area of the bay where the dumping took place. The ammunition probably still resides in this location. The photos have the collective title: Dili, Portuguese Timor 1945-09-25. In concurrence with the terms of the surrender, Japanese arms and ammunition were being dumped in the sea off Dili harbour. Timorese natives unload ammunition from a truck while Japanese officers, still arrogant, stand by. [2] Some of the ammunition were in boxes that had been badly damaged by white ants (termites). [3] TX13874 corporal J.D. Butler, 12/40th Battalion stands guard over Japanese ammunition on Dili beach. [4] Japanese prisoners and native collaborators load ammunition onto a barge on Dili beach. [5] Japanese prisoners and native collaborators load ammunition onto a barge on Dili beach. [6] Japanese ammunition on a barge on its way out to sea to be dumped. [7] An Australian soldier carrying an Owen gun stands guard as Japanese prisoners dump ammunition from a barge outside Dili harbour. [8] An Australian soldier carrying an Owen gun stands guard as Japanese prisoners dump ammunition from a barge outside Dili harbour. [9] Japanese prisoners of war dumping ammunition overboard outside Dili harbour. [10] Japanese prisoners of war dumping ammunition overboard outside Dili harbour. [11] After the surrender: Japanese troops dumping ammunition in the sea off Dili, Portuguese Timor, 26th September 1945. [12] References [1] Portuguese Timor – Surrender of Japanese. – NAA: A1838 TS377/3/3/2 PART 1 [2] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201931 [3] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201933 [4] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201928 [5] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201929 [6] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201930 [7] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201932 [8] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201937 [9] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201936 [10] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201935 [11] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201934 [12] Gavin Long. – The final campaigns. – Canberra : Australian War Memorial, 1963. – Australia in the war of 1939-1945. Series 1, Army ; v. 7: between 556-557.

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE DILI BAY THE ALAIN GERBAULT STORY An interesting sidelight in the events leading up to the beginning of WWII in East Timor was the arrival in Dili of the celebrated French tennis player and circumnavigator yachtsman Alain Gerbault. [1] He had singlehandedly sailed his yacht, of his design and that bore his own name, from Tahiti (departing in September 1940) via Port Moresby (July-August 1941) and arrived in Dili on 30 August 1941 mooring at the harbour pier. Cover "Alain Gerbault" by Éric Vibart He was in an unkempt and emaciated state and his yacht was in need of repairs before he could continue his journey onwards to an uncertain destination. During his sojourn in Dili he was visited and interviewed by David Ross, the RAAF intelligence officer who served as British consul. Sustained by the hospitality and generosity of members of the Portuguese colonial administration and with his yacht made seaworthy he made three attempts to depart Dili but had to return because of adverse weather and sea conditions. Le dernier voyage d’Alain Gerbault (1940-1941) [The last journey of Alain Gerbault (1940-1941)] [2] Depressed by these setbacks and debilitated by malaria, he was taken by concerned friends to the Lahane hospital where he died on 16 December 1941 the day before the Dutch-Australian Sparrow Force contingent landed and occupied the airfield and Dili township. Buried under a simple cross in Santa Cruz cemetery, his fate wasn’t publicised until September 1944. [3] In 1947 the French government organised the retrieval of Gerbault’s body and it’s reinternment in dedicated memorial located in Bora-Bora, Tahiti. [4] Dili, Portuguese Timor 1945-09-29. Derelict vessels and native outrigger canoes line the beach at Dili. (Photographer Sergeant K.B. Davis) [5] Post-war, the fate of Gerbault’s yacht has been of continuing interest because it reputedly housed his collection of research papers and Polynesian artefacts, but more controversially a cargo of gold ingots concealed in the keel. [6] The boat wasn’t amongst the numerous vessels that littered the Dili foreshore at the war’s end. Gerbault’s story was the centrepiece of Timorese author Luís Cardoso’s historical novel “Requiem Pour Alain Gerbault” that is set in Dili during WWII. [7] This post includes J.C.H. Gill’s recollection of his encounter with Gerbault in Port Moresby in August 1941 and transcripts of David Ross’ notes of his meetings with him in Dili from late August to early November. REFERENCES [1] Éric Vibart. – Alain Gerbault: vie et voyages d’un dandy révolté des années folles. – Paris: Seghers, c1989. [2] Luís Cardoso. – Requiem para o navegador solitário : romance [Requiem of the solitary navigator]. – Lisboa : Dom Quixote, 2006: 13. [3] “Death of Gerbault – famous yachtsman and writer” Pacific Islands Monthly XV (2) 18 September, 1944: 39. https://nla.gov.au:443/tarkine/nla.obj-315148632 [4] “Last resting place of lone yachtsman – Alain Gerbault’s remains taken from Timor to Bora Bora” Pacific Islands Monthly XVIII (4) November 18, 1947: 63. https://nla.gov.au:443/tarkine/nla.obj-316583400 [5] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C201944 [6] An Australian Navy intelligence officer remembered Gerbault’s visit to Port Moresby: “Within a few days I had inspected the Alain Gerbault from stem to stern and truck to keelson. All I found was evidence of genteel poverty; the gold turned out to be lead and iron ingots for ballast which he was selling to the natives for money for stores, replacing them, with rocks and bags of sand”. See J.C.H. Gill “The brotherhood of the sea” The Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 9 (3) 1971/1972: 78-80. https://www.textqueensland.com.au/item/article/d6d7968bb648a46aa59578933ff96bf8 [7] Luís Cardoso. – Requiem para o navegador solitário : romance [Requiem of the solitary navigator]. – Lisboa : Dom Quixote, 2006. “Novel by Timorese author, set in Timor-Leste (East Timor); the central figure is Catarina, a naive and romantic young Chinese girl who travels to Dili in search of her fiancée shortly before World War II and suffers through the Japanese invasion and occupation. In her trunk is the book A la Pour suite du Soleil [In search of the sun] the account of a trip by Alain Gerbault, the solo navigator of the title, who died in Timor in 1941”. ADDITIONAL READING “Alain Gerbault” https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_Gerbault J.-P. Alaux. - Alain Gerbault: marin légendaire [Alain Gerbault: legendary sailor]. – Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques Maritimes et Coloniales. 1950. Pedro d'Alte “Quando as personagens se sentam à mesa - a narrativa de Senna Fernandes de Luís Cardoso Autores” [When characters sit at the table: Senna Fernandes’ and Luís Cardoso’s narrative] Revista Da Anpoll, 51 (3), 2020: 199–210. See esp.: 202. https://doi.org/10.18309/anp.v51i3.1416 Joana Matos Frias “Olhos novos para contemplar mundos novos: corografias de Ruy Cinatti” Cadernos De Literatura Comparada, 24/25, 2011: 185-2011. https://ilc-cadernos.com/index.php/cadernos/article/view/139. Relates Ruy Cinatti’s interest in preserving the memory of Gerbault’s Timor connection, see esp.: 206-211. Denise Rocha “Paisagem de guerra em Díli nos anos 1942 a 1945 em Requiem para o navegador solitário(2007), do timorense Luís Cardoso” in Encontro Nacional de Estudos da Imagem (7:2019: Londrina, PR). - Anais do VII Encontro Nacional de Estudos da Imagem [e do] IV Encontro Internacional de Estudos da Imagem [livro eletrônico] / André Luiz Marcondes Pelegrinelli, Ana Heloisa Molina, Gustavo do Nascimento Silva (orgs.). – Londrina: UEL, 2019 :144-162. http://www.uel.br/eventos/eneimagem/2019/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/5.-PAISAGEM-ESPAÇO-E-CONSTRUÇÃO-Atualizado.pdf Denise Rocha “Resistência feminina Chinesa no Timor Português em Requiem para o navegador solitário (2007), de Luís Cardoso” in Representações da mulher nas literaturas de língua portuguesa / Denise Rocha (Organizadora). - Campo Grande: Editora Inovar, 2020: 73-85. Denise Rocha “Tempos de paz e guerra em Dili, capital do Timor Português, no romance Réquiem para o navegador solitário (2007), de Luís Cardoso” [Times of peace and war In Dili, capital of Portuguese Timor, in the romance Requiem para o navegador solitário (2007), by Luís Cardoso] Via Atlântica, São Paulo, no. 38, December 2020: 282-337. https://www.revistas.usp.br/viaatlantica/article/view/147914 ALAIN GERBAULT IN PORT MORESBY The Brotherhood of the Sea J.C.H. Gill [1] During the 1920's I was an avid reader of a monthly magazine called The Wide World Magazine. It published in the main true adventure stories from all parts of the world. One series of stories dealt with the adventures of an intrepid Frenchman named Alain Gerbault, who sailed a small vessel named the Firecrestinto and out of all sorts of adventurous situations - that he sailed the vessel single-handed made the stories all the more fascinating. However, I never dreamt then that I would play a small part in the closing scenes of Gerbault's life. It was the end of June 1941. After a short leave in Australia I was returning to Port Moresby, where I had been stationed since September 1939, to take up a new appointment as Naval Intelligence Officer. As the Burns Philp ship Macdhui, in which I was travelling, entered the harbour I idly surveyed the small craft at anchor. They were all familiar with one exception; a weather beaten single-masted yacht of about twenty tons burthen. On disembarking I reported to my N.O.I.C. In due course I asked about the stranger. I was told she was the Alain Gerbault, named for and crewed and navigated by the owner. "Also," said Commander Eddy, "he's going to be your baby." It turned out that Gerbault had been living in Tahiti, where his political views - allegedly pro-Vichy - had rendered him exceedingly unpopular. He had been banished on a charge of moral turpitude - a strange one for free and easy Tahiti - and was sailing to another sanctuary where the political climate would be kinder. The N.O.I.C. did not regard him as a threat to the security of Port Moresby, but indicated that I had better get to know Gerbault and report on him to the powers-that-be in Melbourne. I first had a consultation with my opposite number in Army Intelligence. The M.I.O. had little to add except a rather startling allegation that Gerbault had a hundred-weight of gold concealed in the keel of his vessel. In the Wide World photos Gerbault had appeared to be of spare build; by 1941 he was positively emaciated in appearance. I got to know him by the simple expedient of "coincidentally" passing the small boat landing as he rowed his prahu in to come ashore and taking and making fast his mooring line. Ever the perfect gentleman he thanked me and introduced himself. I mentioned the Firecrest and had it made from then on. I should have mentioned that he had also been a tennis player of some note; this also proved a good topic of conversation. Within a few days I had inspected the Alain Gerbault from stem to stern and truck to keelson. All I found was evidence of genteel poverty; the gold turned out to be lead and iron ingots for ballast which he was selling to the natives for money for stores, replacing them, with rocks and bags of sand. His appearance was due to a combination of malnutrition and malaria. Missing teeth caused him to splutter when he spoke. It was a good idea I soon found when speaking to him to keep upwind. He was quite frank about having been tossed out of Tahiti. He was sailing for the Marianas where he hoped he might get a job at the Japanese broadcasting station on Saipan, I think it was. He felt that he would not be subject there to the indignities he had suffered at Tahiti. Commander Eddy, who had had the misfortune to be downwind during a talk with M. Gerbault, had this sole comment to make: "Thank God I won't have the job of baling out the microphone afterwards." We decided he probably was pro-Vichy, but harmless as far as we were concerned. Netherlands naval vessels were using Port Moresby as a rendezvous with their fleet tanker Pendopo to refuel. On 30 July 1941 the cruiser Java entered port to refuel, Pendopo having arrived the day before. As one of my routine jobs was visiting friendly war vessels (which, however, one did not do whilst they were refuelling) I sallied out on the morning of 31 July to convey the N.O.I.C's respects and certain information to the captain of the Java. Gerbault saw me at the landing and asked me to inquire if the captain would see him as he was anxious to obtain information on the approaches to Dili in Portuguese Timor, his next port of call. After I had concluded my formal business with the C.O. of the Java I asked him if he had ever heard of Gerbault. His reply was "What sailor has not?" I then told him about Gerbault's request and also about our conclusions concerning him, adding that he did not appear to have concealed radio transmitters about his little vessel. "However, sir," I concluded, "this is not an official request from us. The decision as to whether you allow him to visit you or not is entirely yours." He pondered briefly and then said "What odds! He is a great sailor and I want to meet him. I will send a boat for him at 1500. Please convey my respects to your commanding officer and ask him if as a favour to me you may escort M. Gerbault and introduce him to me and then remain as the guest of my officers." My N.O.I.C. readily complied. Gerbault in his threadbare best suit and I were duly conveyed to Java, the introduction performed and Gerbault whisked away by the captain. Two hours later word came to take M. Gerbault ashore. The executive officer and I hastened to the gangway so I could pay my respects and go ashore with Gerbault. A few minutes later the captain and he appeared still deep in conversation. Gerbault was clutching a chart tracing. At length he farewelled the captain and proceeded down the gangway. I fronted up to pay my respects. The captain shook my hand and said "Young man, I have you to thank for a most agreeable afternoon. Almost, I was able to forget the war for a while." Almost, I felt I could have had a future in the Netherlands navy. However, I must end this reminiscence on a sad note. My duty took me to places where I was out of touch with many events. Months later I read in an intelligence report that Gerbault had died of malaria at Dili in February 1942 [in fact December 1941]. On 27 February 1942 his kindly benefactor went down with his ship in the battle of the Java Sea. [1] J.C.H. Gill “The brotherhood of the sea” The Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 9 (3) 1971/1972: 78-80. https://www.textqueensland.com.au/item/article/d6d7968bb648a46aa59578933ff96bf8 TRANSCRIPTS OF DAVID ROSS’ RECORDS OF HIS MEETINGS WITH ALAIN GERBAULT IN DILI 30 August – 5 January 1942 [1] /53-54/ 30 August 1941 I signalled arrival of Alain Gerbault yesterday 30/8/41. Later in the day I introduced myself to him when on the jetty; he was then awaiting arrival of Commander Barbosa, who had invited him to dinner. Gerbault enquires as to my nationality and nature of work in Timor Dilli. After the fewest possible pleasantries he lost no time in airing his political views, though there was not the least indication of antagonism in the manner in which he expressed these views; the gist of the opinions he expressed to me are as under: 1. The British Empire may win the war, but he is by no means certain of this. 2. IT would in any case be impossible for Britain to invade Germany. 3. France did what she could when invaded and could not be blamed for her surrender; Britain has more people than France, but she keeps them in England; there were no British Troops in Greece or Crete, has so far used mostly Empire troops Australians and New Zealanders to fight her campaigns. The young German soldiers fighting in Europe are really only trying to avenge what was done to their country twenty odd years ago. 4. Cannot forgive the Free French their attitude towards Vichy; had De Gaulle, at the very outset, said he respected Vichy's views but felt that he must disobey them in accordance with his own, and had subsequently refrained from ‘slandering’ Vichy through the press and over the air, he , Gerbault might have joined the Free French. However, should France declare war on England he has no wish to fight for or against Vichy, he wishes to be left entirely free to go his own way. 5. That he does not dislike the British people, especially those in the overseas territories, and in England he had many good friends in earlier days, but he does consider that the people in England, especially Jewish circles in London, are responsible, to a great extent, for this war. 6. Does not consider Japan will enter the war and that we do not fully understand her "southward movement" - that this only refers to China and the Japanese occupation of French Indo China is merely a measure designed to more easily facilitate her bringing the war in China to a speedy end. Gerbault further informed me that on 1st September, he is to see the Governor at 11.30 a.m. when he will endeavour to obtain permission to remain in Timor for several months. I despatched a signal to that effect under today's date. There are quite a sufficient number of Portuguese in Dilli, connected with the higher administrative posts in the colony whose views now are sufficiently far from pro-British, whose opinions would be further adversely affected by political discussions with Gerbault, and it is amongst this particular section of the population that Gerbault would move if he remained here any time. Gerbault has accepted my invitation to dine with us on 1st September. /55-56/ 2 September, 1941 Alain Gerbault I have had a further discussion, on general topics, with Gerbault, and he was my guest for dinner on 1/9/41. While a guest in the house he kept quite clear of all political subjects. In my company alone, however, he talks very freely. He had an interview with the Governor on 1st of this month. According to Gerbault the Governor did not appear to be particularly pleased with his presence in Dili, has intimated that he can remain here for three weeks in any case, and that in the meantime the Governor will send a radio to Lisbon, advising of Gerbault’s arrival at Dili, and will then ‘let them decide’. Gerbault further informed me that after all, he does not think he will remain here very long, is disappointed in the place and with his reception. As you probably know, Gerbault is not without a certain amount of conceit. In discussing the war he is very insistent in his view that Japan will not enter hostilities, admits he has many friends in Vichy government circles, considers that, instead of fighting Germany we should now be with Germany against Russia. Is bitter against Communism and the Jews. Gerbault speaks very highly of the reception and kindness accorded him by British authorities wherever he called on his way here , especially the Navy at Port Moresby; he contends that, in the tragic event of France declaring war on England, he only wishes to be away from it all, at least in some place where he cannot be embroiled in it, politically or in any other way; and now intimates that he will perhaps go to Keeling (Cocos) Islands and, if welcome to stay there , will do so. Should this not be the case he will go on to Madagascar. In addition to my own personal contact with Gerbault, I have arranged that his movements be closely watched; he has made no effort, so far, to contact any of the Japanese here, nor have they approached him. Any item of urgent moment will be communicated to you by signal. ……. 15 September 1941 Busy overhauling his gear. Barbosa has placed the facilities – so called – of the Marine Department at Gerbault’s disposal. There is no difficulty in keeping close contact with his movements. He has more or less singled me out as the repository of his woes, probably because I was one of the first to contact him, and made him free of the Mess, which he visits occasionally, and I have naturally encouraged him to talk, when we are alone. I also have two men along the waterfront watching his movements. I can safely say that so far he has made no attempt to contact any of the Japanese. He has visited the Sporting Club several times, played Bridge with Sanders and Barbosa; recently had dinner with Sanders, whom he considers to be ‘rather an objectionable old man’ mainly because he is of Jewish blood. He has also conceived a dislike for Brouwer, whose views he considers to be ‘leftist’. Gerbault would appear to be somewhat contemptuous of the Portuguese community as a whole, considers there are too many half castes, but seems to be progressing in his association with the Barbosa set. Confesses that he now rather likes Dilli and that if he does not depart from here by 1st week in October, adverse weather conditions over his route will prevent him from leaving until next March! Barbosa, according to Gerbault, is pressing him to stay, and so far there is no evidence that the Governor sent a radio to Lisbon advising Gerbault’s arrival at Dili. The Governor is still at Baucau and will probably remain there until the end of September. Gerbault further informs me that he is still undecided as to where he will go; he is still playing with the idea of first Keeling Islands, then, if not welcome there, on to Madagascar. He admits, however , that should the war continue for three or four years more he will become short of money and, in that case, South America would be the best place for him, as he could obtain finance by writing articles for the South American newspapers , and perhaps have a book published over there. In a letter to the Director General, Ross has touched on this subject or Brouwer - a subject on which he feels very strongly, and which is causing him no little concern, and also advises that he has written to Mr. Walsh, H.M.B. Consul General, Batavia, regarding Brouwer’s activities. The suggestion conveyed in Ross’s letter to Walsh being that, as he is no doubt in close contact with the head of the Dutch Shell in Batavia, he might recommend that Brouwer be replaced by another geologist. Referring back to my earlier reports - a cable addressed to Brouwer was subsequently sighted, requesting that he approach the Governor and ascertain whether his replacement by another geologist would necessitate further representations to Lisbon. It is understood that Brouwer replied to the effect that further approach would not be necessary. The above cable was shortly followed by another, advising Brouwer that, on instructions received from London he was to be replaced by another geologist and that he, Brouwer, was to return to Balikpapan. /50/ 18 September 1941 Alain Gerbault (continued). Gerbault yesterday informed me that he will most probably leave here in two weeks from date; he will have completed necessary overhaul by then. Gerbault now inclines to the view that America will force Japan into war, in which case it would be wiser for him to get away from this area without undue delay, fearing that, in the above eventuality, he would be blockaded here. I had a very long discussion with Gerbault and encouraged him in his proposal to leave here as soon as possible; he states that his first move would be to visit Keeling Islands (Cocos), as he has previously stayed with Clunies Ross. /47-48/ 30 September 1941 13. Some weeks ago, a message was received requiring me to make representations to the Governor concerning the stay here of Alain Gerbault. His political views are anti British and do no good to our interests here. At the time the Governor was absent in Baucau and could not be reached except by a long car journey. I mentioned Gerbault to the Governor yesterday, and he said that Gerbault had told him that he would be leaving Dili as soon as the weather was favourable for a run through the Indian Ocean. The Governor can hardly instruct Gerbault to leave Dili as Portugal is neutral and Gerbau1 is not doing any harm to the Portuguese. He said he thought Gerbault was rather eccentric. 14. Gerbault asked the Resident of Koepang for permission to call there and to visit the island of Sawu nearby. The reply from Koepang forbade him to enter Dutch waters except under grave emergency, so Gerbault is rather like a lost soul wandering over the world trying to find a haven where he would be welcome. Really he cannot make up his mind where to go to where or when. /36/ 13 October 1941 Alain Gerbault Has practically completed laying in his stores and has informed me that he expects to leave Dili on the 14th of this month – destination Madagascar, via Cocos. Gerbault appears to be most anxious for communication with France to ascertain if any monies are available in connection with his books. He also says that he requires charts of the South American coastline, that Madagascar is now the only place where he could obtain these. Gerbault expresses the fear that hostilities might ultimately extend to the Pacific and, if so, that he would be ‘blockaded’ should he remain in Dili. Gerbault infers that he may proceed to South America from Madagascar, as in that country he would have more security and also an opportunity of replenishing the exchequer by writing articles for newspapers. His departure from Dili will immediately be signalled to you. /34/ 5 November 1941 Alain Gerbault An earlier assumption of mine has been justified, in that Gerbault has paid at least two visits to the Japanese Consul. I am not in a position to say definitely that he will use the Japanese Consul as means of communicating with France, but it is quite reasonable to assume that he will. In view of the fact that this Consul was formerly in New Caledonia Gerbault would be most anxious to make contact with him. I reaffirm my earlier view that Gerbault should be made to leave Portuguese Timor, to which I would now add that, if entering British territorial waters he should be picked up. /11/ 5 January 1942 As a matter of passing interest, Alain Gerbault, the French yachtsman who arrived here many months ago from Port Moresby, died from malaria about the middle of last month. His boat has been taken over by the Portuguese Court for disposal. Gerbault was a very strong pro Vichy Frenchman, but was far from normal mentally. [1] Timor (Portuguese) Intelligence Reports. 1941 – 1942. NAA: A981, TIM P 11. https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=181031&isAv=N ADDITIONAL IMAGES Plan of the motor yacht “Alain Gerbault” [1] Boats moored near Motu Uta island. Taken from Papeete, Tahiti, French Polynesia. Mo'orea in background, centre yacht "Alain-Gerbault". [2] Dili pier – pre-WWII post card photo Launch notice for Luis Cardoso “Requiem of the solitary navigator” [3] REFERENCES [1] “Alain Gerbault” https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_Gerbault [2] “Alain Gerbault” https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_Gerbault [3] https://raiketak.wordpress.com/2007/02/09/requiem/

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE AINARO DISTRICT Same Saddle Same Saddle ambush site: 8°55’20”S, 125°37’00”E Same Saddle: 8°55’51”S, 125°36’20”E Same Saddle action site showing the track followed by the Japanese forces between Maubisse and Same [1] The ‘Area Study of Portuguese Timor’ (1943) describes the track between Same and Maubisse used by the advancing Japanese forces in the reverse south to north direction: SAME TO MAUBISSE: Leaving Same and travelling northeast, the river Abaca is crossed by a wooden bridge, just before reaching the main Maubisse-Alas track. At the junction the road swings north on flat country for a distance of two miles (3 km.). Here a well-constructed village is passed on the western side of the road. To this point the road would be passable for jeeps. It then commences to climb the Cablac Range and, as far as the Same Saddle, is an excellent partly- constructed pony track, with good air cover. West of the track for 11/2 miles (21/2 km.) is a precipitous stretch of the range with large boulders 8 feet to 20 feet (21/2 m. to 6 m.) in diameter, abutting the road. On the northern side of the saddle the country is fairly open, and the track becomes narrow, but still fit for ponies. It then drops down into a tributary of the Be-Lulic River and immediately afterwards climbs for 11/2 miles (21/2 km.) to the village of Aituto, at the junction of the old Ainaro-Maubisse road. This road is unsuitable for M.T. because of landslides but is used by pack ponies without difficulty. There is no air cover whatsoever along this section. [2] Same, Portuguese timor 1945-12-18. Through this valley runs the Same to Mobisi [Maubisse] road. The valley was the scene of many skirmishes between men of the 2/2nd and 2/4th Independent Companies and the Japanese during 1942. [3] Robinson narrates one of the larger scale actions of the campaign that took place two days after the Nunamogue ambush: Two Section of Four and One section of Two Company were at this stage at Ainaro while One Section of Four was at Hatu-Udo and [illegible] Section of two was distributed between these two towns. Two Section of Two Company was being held in reserve at Fatu-Cuac. While these sections were in these positions a native rumour began to spread [that] there were 2000 Japanese in Aileu and that these troops would be moving out to Maubisse on the night of 27th September. The Australian forces were in position to meet this move. Shortly after the rumour was received at Company Headquarters, the Portuguese reported that 2000 Japanese troops had been moved from Dilli to Aileu on the 27th and the report also confirmed the rumour that they would be moving on the same night. It was anticipated that this move south was the move down to Betano which the Australians had expected. Orders were radioed to all platoons that this southward move was to be hindered, and in any way delayed as long as possible, to allow the troops down at Betano time to clear the stores and equipment from the beach head. C Platoon was instructed to watch the track running from Maubisse to Same, and to ambush there, B Platoon to OP the road between Maubisse and Aileu, D Platoon to again move to a position where they could harass the enemy flank and A platoon to be ready to move to a position from where they could present a second obstacle to C Platoon’s series of ambushes on the Maubisse-Same track. On the morning of the 29th [September], a Japanese force of 500 moved out of Maubisse, on the track leading to Same. It was now obvious that Maj Callinan's observations had been correct and that the enemy was going down to Betano to have a look at the ship which was wrecked there. Same, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-18. This mountainous pass was a feature well known to members of the 2/2nd and 2/4th Independent Companies during their operations against the Japanese in 1942 [4] Ambushes had been set by C Platoon with Nine Section forward and Platoon Headquarters on the track at the Same Saddle, and Seven and Eight sections in position behind the saddle. At 1030 that morning the first of the Japanese approached these positions and the Nine Section men, allowing the enemy to approach to close range, opened up with automatic weapons and rifles, halting the advance. The enemy did not break contact however, and were most determined, fighting back against the Australians, forcing Nine Section to drop eventually back from their position. It seemed that the Japanese were most determined to push down the valley and the Australians were undecided as to whether they should attempt to hold their positions on the saddle, or disperse and take to the hillsides, from where they could move along with, and harass, the Japanese party. At first it was decided that the troops would stay in the positions on the saddle, but after a pitched battle it was found that the Japanese force was outflanking them, and that their forward position was almost surrounded. This necessitated a very hurried withdrawal and quick positional set up on a nearby spur. From this new position an OP was sent forward and at twelve o’clock this man reported that the Japanese were beginning to move forward again down the valley. Advancing this time the Japanese broke a precedent, for instead of using the tracks they took to the sides of the hills. The Australians then realised that they had chosen the wrong course in staying in the valley. The troops in the forward ambush position saw the Japanese as they were approaching along the Conaca Creek, in time to open up from their position, then withdraw. Eight Section and Platoon HQ were the first troops to move back and they proceeded to a position south of Same. Seven and Nine Sections and the troops of the No. 4 AIC who had been with them followed the same route back and rendezvoused there that afternoon. A Platoon did not contact the Japanese force, which continued on down the valley and arrived at a position near Same about two thirty that afternoon. The long range plan was now coming into operation. C Platoon were in a position to cover the Same to Fatu-Cuac and Fatu-Cuac to Betano tracks, which was the route the Japanese were likely to take. A Platoon was moving east from Ainaro to attack the Japanese right flank and B and D platoons were watching for any further move to the south from Aileu and at the same time waiting for the return of the party which had gone down to Same. Then everything went wrong. The following day, September 30, the forward patrols of C Platoon lost the Japanese, who seemed to disappear into the ground itself. A Platoon patrols were operating in the Same-Fatu-Cuac area and could neither find any sign of the Japanese party. This loss of contact was mainly caused by the continual presence of enemy aircraft, operating throughout the daylight hours over the Australian[s] … [5] Paul Cleary provides a fuller and more personalised account of the fire fight. On this occasion, some men from the newly arrived No. 4 AIC were involved, gained their baptism of fire and suffered the unit suffered its first casualty: [6] THE NUNAMOGUE ambush marked the beginning of a sustained drive by the newly arrived 47 Regiment. The grounding of the ‘Voyager’ had triggered a massive reaction by the Japanese army, which now flooded the southern region with its troops and militia. Against this drive, the Australians developed a three-pronged strategy aimed at stopping the Japanese advance and hitting it from the rear on both flanks. It was the ‘most ambitious’ plan ever attempted by the Sparrow Force, Callinan said, although its success relied on fighting the enemy at very close quarters and on more conventional terms. Two days after the Nunamogue ambush, the Australia HQ learned of more Japanese movements towards the south, prompting it to order the No. 2 AIC C Platoon, together with No. 4 AIC troops, to take a position between Maubisse and Samé, while they sent B Platoon to harass the movement along the Aileu–Maubisse road. Like Ainaro, Samé was a major administrative centre in the southern region, which had taken on great strategic importance for the Portuguese administration after an uprising against colonial rule in 1912. After marching throughout the night, two sections from the C platoons of both the No. 2 AIC and No. 4 AIC companies, about 30 men in total, moved into a position 10 km north of Samé on a track winding through a valley. The track followed a series of s-bends down one side of the valley, before winding its way up the other side towards a pass known as the Samé Saddle. Same Saddle ambush site as identified by Paul Cleary The men were just moving into position when at around 8 a.m. runners from observation posts reported about 500 troops coming their way. They were moving in the same fashion that David Dexter had observed near Ainaro - as though they owned the island. And like the 228 Regiment before them, the new arrivals were afraid of leaving the main road. Even though they presented easy targets to would-be ambushers, the Japanese somehow felt safer in large numbers on the main thoroughfares. It might have looked like a scene from medieval times, with officers mounted on horseback on either side of the column, except that a Japanese spotter plane circled overhead. The enemy employed aerial surveillance for the very first time in a bid to counter the hit-and-run tactics of the Australians, and it certainly spooked the men on the ground - even the seasoned warriors from the No. 2 AIC. The No. 2 AIC men chose a position just south of the bottom of the valley, giving them a clear and elevated view of the Japanese, who would be coming down the s-bends, reaching a small creek before making their ascent up the other side of the valley. The position chosen by the No. 2 AIC men seemed like an ‘ideal spot’ to the new arrivals from the No. 4 AIC Company, but it meant that the men would have to cross up to 1 km of open ground when making their retreat. Commanding the No. 2 AIC men was Lieutenant Ray Cole, but the men who set up the ambush were the privates from 9 Section who were some of the most experienced men in the company, having run observation posts since February in the hills immediately west of Dili. The No. 2 AIC men were so busy that morning setting up the ambush that they didn’t have time to stop for breakfast. Same Saddle ambush site – 29 April 2014 The Tommy gunners took positions in scrub next to the track while the powerful Bren guns set up about 200 metres down the track on a rise looking straight at the s-bends. Assembled this day was even more fire power than at Nunamogue - six Bren guns, 10 Tommy guns and about 20 rifles - but the 30 men faced a formidable enemy force that would be directed from above. Covering the retreat that day were sections from the remainder of both platoons situated on a saddle south of the ambush position. Same Saddle behind the ambush site – 29 April 2014 Spotters from the No. 4 AIC Company raced back to the ambush position and told their officers what they had seen. Corporal Finch returned and found the platoon lined up in its firing positions. He told his commander, Captain Charles Thompson, 26, about the officers and the plane. Thompson in turn told one of his snipers, James Taylor, 25, and one of his Bren gunners, to shoot first at the officers on horseback. Taylor was one man in the No. 4 AIC Company who had previously seen action. He was believed to have fought in the Spanish Civil War. As they waited, the No. 4 AIC men’s immediate thoughts turned to how they would be able to withdraw when the inevitable order to retreat was called. One of the No. 4 AIC sections was well positioned for the retreat, but two others were on a bend in the road that meant a more difficult exit. At about 10.30 a.m., the first two Japanese platoons ambled down the hill with no forward scouts. As they came within 50–70 metres of the forward Tommy gunners Cole blew a whistle, triggering an eruption of fire that stirred up a huge cloud of dust around the falling Japanese. The Tommy gunners concentrated their fire on the troops at the front, while the Bren gunners and riflemen fired at those in the rear. The leading Japanese officer on horseback went down immediately, although the horse was unharmed. Another view of the ambush site – 29 April 2014 Within minutes the Australians had wiped out the first two platoons but the troops in the rear quickly put their trademark flanking action into operation. Private Harry Sproxton saw the Japanese at the rear moving into action from his position alongside the track. They were running at the Australians, prompting Sproxton to turn his Tommy gun towards them and fire. As Sproxton fired, he heard a loud scream from the soldier next to him, Private Roy Wilkerson, 28, a miner from Kalgoorlie. Sproxton thought that Wilkerson had been hit, but in fact the hot shells from Sproxton’s Tommy gun had gone down his shirt. Sproxton continually fired at the flanking enemy troops but still they kept coming. The No. 4 AIC’s Tommy gunners could see the Japanese closing in, but no order to retreat came. Sproxton was using the 50-round drum magazine that day, and after it had been emptied he realised it was time to move. The Bren gunners had each poured five or six 28-round magazines into the column. One had fired eight magazines. In those furious minutes, the Australians had fired more than 1,500 rounds at the force, but still they kept coming. No-one remembers an order to retreat coming from Cole or Thompson - nothing could have been heard above their furious fire. But as the Japanese came perilously close, someone began to move, and instantly men jumped to their feet and began racing across the exposed valley, a creek to their right, and a rise to their left, as they surged towards the saddle. All of the Australians had so far got out of the ambush without suffering a scratch, but now they had to pass through scrub and then some open country before they reached the saddle, where Lieutenant Campbell was coordinating cover fire. As they ran, the Japanese spotter plane buzzed the Australians and directed the enemy troops to take the high ground to their left. All of the Australians were still heavily loaded, with six of them carrying the Bren guns that weighed at least 10 kg, although one of the first men to make it to the saddle that day was one of the Bren gunners, Ron Trengove. Some of the Japanese had taken to the higher ground and were now firing at the Australians as they approached the saddle. Campbell’s men began engaging the Japanese as the Australians retreated up the hill. Luckily none of the Australians was hit by friendly fire, but it was a close thing as Campbell’s group fired Bren guns over their heads at the Japanese behind and above them. As the retreating men raced over the saddle, they broke up into small groups all heading in a south-east direction towards the coast. The Australians were buzzed by the Japanese spotter plane, making it impossible to set up ambushes. After all the Australians had made it over the saddle, Campbell’s party joined the rush down the track. In the mad exodus, one Australian was left behind, Private Edward ‘Snowy’ Hourigan, 28, from Kilmore, Victoria, who was last seen crossing over the saddle and going down the south side. The men kept heading south until they reached the Su River, where they met by chance the men from H Force who had just returned from almost two months in the eastern end of the island. The C Platoon men had orders to hold the river ‘at all cost’, but the officers and men realised there was no way they could follow those orders, so they continued heading south-east until they reached Fatu-Cuac, where they found the criados, who had carried their gear. They had covered a distance of more than 20 km that day, most of it running. As it turned out, the Japanese did not pursue them. Instead they headed directly south to Betano where the wreck of the Voyager lay. [7] In the haphazard escape from the ambush, some of the No. 4 AIC Company men became separated and lost. With no knowledge of the language or the country, one party found themselves wandering through the wild hills for days. Private Frank Killorn, 21, of Cambooya, Queensland, was a member of a lost group that asked at every little village they came across for directions. The Timorese directed them towards the east. Private John Barnes, 20, from Charleville, Queensland, had brought to Timor a small phrase book that he used to ask directions. For several days after the ambush, up to eight men from the No. 4 AIC were listed as missing, but gradually they all filed in until there was just one man who didn’t come back, Private Hourigan. Three of Hourigan’s mates volunteered to go back to the saddle to search for him, and when they approached the area the Timorese told them: ‘Australie mate’ (dead Australian), near the top of the saddle. The party found Hourigan shot through the chest and head. It seemed a mystery that Hourigan was found at the top of the saddle because he had last been seen running down the hill. Ian Hampel, who helped to bury Hourigan, reasoned that he must have gone back up the hill in a vain attempt to make a stand and slow the Japanese advance. At the time Hourigan had been grieving over the loss of his brother and just before he had embarked for Timor his mother had died. Hourigan had been the last living member of his family. The Australians had killed or wounded as many as 100 enemy troops in the Nunamogue and Samé ambushes. Even so, the Japanese had succeeded in making a major inroad into their territory. The southern region of the island was no longer the exclusive domain of the Australians. Dexter’s platoon was ordered to step in and hit the Japanese at the coastal town of Betano, where stores were still awaiting transport. Dexter’s platoon set up a position covering the village, but the enemy avoided it and headed for the ‘Voyager’. The Japanese then moved west along the beach before turning inland towards Ainaro, burning villages as they went, including all the Timorese huts in the town of Hatu-Udo, which contained much equipment left by the Australians. Dexter sent out patrols to search for this rampaging column but in the deceptive landscape of Portuguese Timor it passed through undetected. This enormous body of troops had moved right through an area swarming with Australian patrols. For Callinan, the result of his ambitious plan to hit the Japanese head-on had been ‘most disappointing’, given the numbers of troops deployed. The Australians had thrown 200 troops against an enemy strength of 600–700, putting ‘more troops in that area than we had ever been able to muster previously’, and yet the Japanese by and large moved around the territory unchallenged. [8] The Japanese drive had serious ramifications for maintaining crucial support from the local population. This was a war that would not be won on the battlefield. It remained a guerilla war that relied on support from the local people, and the Japanese were about to show how utterly ruthless they were prepared to be in dealing with civilians. ACTION 2: 1st week in November 1942 Wray recounts another action on the Same Saddle in early November: In the first week of November two soldiers from Lieutenant Palmer's section disguised themselves as Timorese and led fifty friendly natives in an attack on pro-Japanese natives on the Same Saddle. Ten of the enemy were killed, huts were destroyed, and the rest of the pro-Japanese natives scattered. This was typical of the actions of A Platoon during October and November when two sections would be forward around the Same Saddle with the other section resting in Same. The success of this action prompted the Australians to raise 300 natives from the Same area to use in other raids. This proved to be reasonably effective, and a number of hostile natives, deterred by the Australian action, returned to their villages. To reinforce the lesson, a few days later troops supported by the 300 natives from Same went down the Aituto Valley attacking rebel natives and Japan ese. During the raid a number of villages were burned out, about 150 huts being destroyed. As a result of this operation many more hostile Timorese returned to their homes discouraged. [9] REFERENCES [1] ASPT: Map 1. [2] ASPT: 47-48. [3] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200484. [4] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200483 [5] Robinson: 114-116. [6] Cleary: 241-246. [7] Author interview with Harry Sproxton; and G. E. Lambert (ed.), op. cit., pp. 110-1[5]. The approximate location of this ambush is 8°55’20”S, 125°37’00”E. The Samé saddle is located at 8°55’51”S, 125°36’20”E. [8] B. Callinan, Independent Company, op. cit., p. 167. [9] Wray: 148-149. ADDITIONAL READING Ayris: 345-346. Prepared by Ed Willis Revised: 7 March 2023 148123184_SameSaddle-WWIIinET-AASTG.pdf