Edward Willis

LOS PALOS WATER PROJECT UPDATE At the Committee meeting on Monday 2 September 2024 minuted: 2024 Applications – A$5000 to add Rotary Club water project. EW to provide all banking information to CT to enable funds transfer. Moved RC, Seconded JC. This was in reference to a funding proposal from Byford Rotary Club – “Water Treatment Plant - Los Palos Timor Leste”: https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/452-water-treatment-plant-los-palos-timor-leste/ Max Bird (Project Manager for Rotary Projects Timor-Leste East, Kwinana Rotary Club International Manager) contacted me on 4/12 (e-mail copy and Word document attached) and identified a Technical School in Los Palos as the project site. Max, the on-the-ground site manager, advised that the funds for the project will be required by late January – early February 2025 so that he can purchase the equipment required in Australia that will be transported by container from Melbourne to Dili and reach there in time for him to commence work in June. I will ask Max to provide the required banking details. Los Palos School - Max Bird e-mail.pdf 4-12-2024 Los Palos School 2-2.docx FW Shipment to Timor Leste.pdf

To Doublereds members and supporters: In the lead up to Christmas, please be aware that a limited number of copies of the Guide are now available for purchase from the Doublereds online store priced at $100 per copy (this price covers production and postage costs in Australia and includes a small donation to the Association). Go to: https://doublereds.org.au/store/product/24-wwii-in-east-timor-by-ed-willis/ “The Guide provides an overdue addition to the history of WWII in East Timor – a history surprisingly little known and underappreciated despite its significance to Australia’s participation and contribution to that conflict. Drawing on new information derived from sources in Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese and Tetum it provides a fresh site-based perspective on a war that had devastating consequences for the Timorese people and yet, through Australia’s involvement, established the special and close relationship that exists between the two nations today. Australia’s Army, Navy and Air Force played significant roles in the campaign between December 1941 and the end of the War in August 1945. The guide content, for example, enables travellers to locate and find their way to the sites where battles were fought, ambushes laid and gives an insight into the extensive Japanese defensive infrastructure built by them using Timorese forced labour in the eastern districts in anticipation of an Allied attempt to retake the island. The extensive use of maps and images enhances the descriptive and narrative content of the text and enables a well-informed appreciation of each site described that have not been readily accessible before, in contrast, for example, to the extensive battlefield guide information available for the Kokoda campaign”. Please consider buying a copy of the book and spreading the word to family, friends and other interested parties that it is available. Thank you and regards Ed Willis Committee member, 2/2 Commando Association of Australia

Thanks Rob - another little known aspect of WWII on Timor!

TIMORESE RESISTANCE IN THE AINARO AREA – OCTOBER 1942 – MAY 1943 - Dom Aleixo Corte-Real, the liurai of Suro It deserves to be better acknowledged that a Timorese community in Ainaro, led by Dom Aleixo Corte-Real, the liurai of Suro, resisted Japanese rule until May 1943. As a consequence of his actions, Corte-Real was enshrined as a post-war Portuguese national hero in Timor. The following narrative of Dom Aleixo’s people’s resistance to the Japanese led assault on his domain was prepared by a Portuguese colonial-era historian Humberto Leitao in 1970 and smacks of patriotic fervour but it still conveys the large scale extent and ferocity of the fighting that continued in 1943 in the Ainaro – Suro – Hatu-Udo area after the departure of Lancer Force in January 1943. [1] Luirai Dom Alexio Corte Real of Ainaro and WWII hero (Centre) with Local Chiefs and Antonio Magno (far right). Aileu, Portuguese Timor 1938 “On September 2, 1939, WWII broke out. Portugal as well as neighboring Spain manage to remain neutral. In Portuguese Timor, since 1936, there were some Japanese officers who, in order to be able to travel around the island, disguised themselves as farmers and traders. However, unless you were familiar with the processes used by Japanese people in the preparations for the war against Russia could take those smiling and measurable subjects for harmless and peaceful people, who, after all, were taking advantage of every opportunity to carry out expeditious topographical surveys, take note of the main terrestrial communication routes and collect the more necessary and convenient elements for future war operations. Until the moment arrived, they wore the uniforms of modest officers. Because the island was so far away from the operations fields and we remained neutral, life there went on without much care. On December 8, 1941, however, news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in Honolulu, was captured in Dili. Dutch and Australian Occupation of Dili Japan's entry into the war came with a clear threat of Japanese attacks on the Dutch East Indies and Australia. A few days later, on December 17th of the same year 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Stressman of the Dutch Army disembarked in Dili and, in an audience requested from the Governor, announced that it would become necessary for them to disembark in our territory that same day, Dutch and Australian forces in order to protect the island against an imminent Japanese attack. Shortly afterwards, disembarkation began at the mouth of the Comoro river, located to the west and close to the capital. Surprised, the Governor, after listening to the service chiefs and the commander of a unit stationed a short distance from Dili - made up of indigenous people, for the most part, poorly armed and poorly equipped, decided, due to lack of resources, not to offer resistance. to invaders; but, in order to mark his protest against what had happened, he became a prisoner, entering the Government palace. A few days later, in order to avoid any incidents between personnel from that unit and those from foreign forces, he ordered them to be transferred to Maubisse [2], a post located in the interior of the island, close to Suro. The Dutch [led] force consisted of around 1200 men, many of whom are Javanese; the Australian, for 380, specially trained for guerrilla warfare. They entered the city in the best order and then, it must be said, they proceeded with full respect for Portuguese sovereignty. And yet, it is surprising that there was anyone who could conceive the possibility of, with such meagre forces, preventing the Japanese landing in Dili or at any other point on the island's vast coast, and that, necessarily, it had to be carried out the shadow of warship artillery, against which the Allied forces could not respond effectively. That operation, whose purpose was doomed to complete failure, was, in the end, an act of arrogance that served as justification for the Japanese to also disembark on the island, where they began to commit the most heinous crimes. The Japanese Assault on Dili As was natural, his landing did not take long, as it occurred in the early hours of February 20th of the following year - 1942 -, preceded by a heavy bombardment of Dili. The operation was carried out at the mouth of the Comoro river and then, directing it on land, there were in uniform the peaceful Japanese who a few years earlier had settled on the island under the guise of farmers and traders. The Dutch, who were entrusted with the defense of the city, offered little resistance, except those defending the aerodrome. At the time, the Australians were in the interior of the island reconnaissance of the terrain and preparing for guerrilla warfare. Some Portuguese joined them. Contrary to the way the Australian and Dutch troops behaved, the Japanese soon showed themselves to be arrogant, incorrect and provocative. They did not respect other people's property. They indulged in looting commercial establishments and private homes and destroying everything that was of no use to them. They released the criminals imprisoned in the Dili jail and associated them with the looting. They had vexatious demands. Thus, a sergeant, head of the police, was tasked with finding women for a lupanar (prostitution) [3]. They presented themselves to the indigenous people as their liberators and tried to incite them to revolt. With indigenous people from Dutch Timor and neighboring islands, they formed columns, later known as “black columns”, which grew larger with people from our territory, mainly from Manufai, Maubisse and border kingdoms. By this means, gangs of jackals were released, incited to commit heinous crimes - devastation of cultures and towns, murders of men, women and children, ill-treatment, mutilation and torture. They served as cover when, in difficult interior regions, they intended to advance. For the “saviours of Asia” the lives of those people - the vast majority of whom were brutish people - did not count. They also used them to carry out crimes that they intended not to be accused of. In the early days, the guerrillas caused great damage to these columns, as well as to the Japanese troops. They caused hundreds of deaths. In this distressing situation, the Portuguese from the Metropolis sought to explain to the Timorese chiefs the reasons for the struggles that were taking place in our territory and assured them that, after the war ended, Timor would continue to be Portuguese. Meanwhile, in Ainaro, D. Aleixo, accompanied by highly trusted leaders, was getting news of everything that was happening and any “black column” that wanted to disturb the peace near his Tranqueira [territory] was chased away. Dom Aleixo Moves to Suro-Lau In mid-1942, seeing the direction events were taking, he decided to leave Ainaro to settle in Suro-Lau, whose altitude is 1800 m. As happened at that post, the guerrillas went there from time to time to acquire the living they needed most. Because they fought the Japanese - the “matan bubo” (swollen eyes), as the Timorese called them, D. Aleixo considered the Australians as friends. In return for the favours received, they gave him weapons and ammunition, which were later used in the heroic defense of Suro-Lau. In August of the same year, a revolt broke out in Maubisse. From the Commander of the Companhia de Caçadores, then stationed in Aileu, D. Aleixo was telephoned for men to help quell the revolt. The reguloimmediately ordered 350 men to be presented to that Command under the orders of his son Alexandre [4]. In mid-September, the town of Ainaro was visited by one of the so-called “black columns”. As there, if the leader was not found, the leaders went to the Mission, where Fr. Norberto de Oliveira Barros and Fr. Antonio Manuel Pires. That time they limited themselves to demanding different foods from them and taking possession of several animals that the missionaries were raising for their sustenance. The Black Columns Attack Shortly afterwards, with Maubisse's revolt having already been suppressed, as, according to their intentions, the Japanese wanted to maintain free movement in Aileu, where the Command of the Companhia de Caçadores was located - which, although made up of a small number of men, it could well withstand the attack of a “black column” and even put it into disorganized flight - on the night of October 1st of the same year 1942, they bombarded the commander's residence with mortars and the barracks of that Company, an operation immediately followed by a ferocious assault by bandits from the “column”, largely armed with rifles and hand grenades. The bombing made the officers and soldiers of the Portuguese unit believe that it was an irresistible attack by Japanese forces, which would be followed by the usual horrors. Of this false judgment gave rise to confusion. Most of the soldiers fled. Commander Freire da Costa and his wife, unwilling to fall alive into the hands of the cruel enemy, committed suicide. At least some of the Europeans who were at the commander's residence did the same thing. If there were anyone who did not follow their example, they were murdered, with the exception of one who managed to save himself by hiding under a bed and behind a corpse that he pulled towards him, in order to remain more hidden. However, he was injured by a bullet fired at the deceased, with the suspicion that there might still be a breath of life in him. This attack carried out by the “black column” with invaluable cooperation from the Japanese, resulted in the loss of 9 European lives and several indigenous soldiers. [5] Perhaps it was this column that D. Aleixo, on the following day, October 2nd, saw heading towards Ainaro. As soon as he noticed this, he sent a messenger ordering him to quickly warn the Mission priests that they should flee without delay, as the column, which was not far away, was heading that way. Back in Suro-Lau, the messenger still managed to say that the priests refused to abandon the Mission, as their consciences were clear. Moments later, he fell lifeless because he had demanded greater efforts from his heart than he could take it. The sacrifice of the helpful Timorese was, therefore, useless and all the more so because Fr. Norberto de Oliveira Barros and Antonio Manuel Pires, and also the deportado Ferreira da Silva, who had remained with them, were savagely murdered, their bodies taken behind the church and there covered with straw to which the fire was placed [6]. At the time of this horrible event, the people of Suro, on the advice of their rulers, had already taken refuge in the mountains. Should D. Aleixo, after this and other nefarious crimes, have no doubt that, soon, he would be the target of Japanese attacks and the “black columns”, where there were people from Manufai who hated him to death. On February 11, 1943, the Australians who were still fighting in Timor withdrew to Australia because they were needed to defend New Guinea, which was being attacked by the Japanese. Dom Aleixo’s Defensive Dispositions Near Ainaro Dom Aleixo’s defensive dispositions near Ainaro Aware of the increasing danger in which he and his people found themselves, D. Aleixo decided to man some difficult-to-access positions that surrounded part of the Ainaro plain and dominated the roads that led to Suro. At the time, the group formed by the head of the Atsabe post, second sergeant José Estevão Alexandrino, by the Atsabe D. Cipriano regiment, was already taking refuge in Suro-Lau, accompanied by his son-in-law Jose dos Reis and the latter's brother, from name Alarico Fernandes; by the deportado Felnes Duarte, by the two mestiços José Cachaço and Romualdo Aniceto and by Talu Bere, chief of Maliana. This group, which had been busy fighting against the Atsabe's rebels, finding themselves harassed by Japanese forces, managed to escape from them and take refuge in Suro-Lau. Sergeant Alexandrino, when Lieutenant Liberato ordered him to join the detachment operating on the border, in order to go to the Liquica concentration camp, did not obey and, when in Suro-Lau, he was invited to join the other Portuguese to be evacuated to Australia, he refused the invitation, preferring to stay at D. Aleixo's side. [7] He, as he had planned, distributed his companions and people from the camps in the following positions: (1) In Suro-Lau [8] he stayed with 4 children - Benjamin, Adriano, Alexandre and Afonso -, his beloved friend Francisco Costa, known as Nai-Chico, from Hato-Udo, and people from this village and from Ainaro; (2) The defense of the second position, which was also in Suro-Lau and very close to that occupied by D. Aleixo, was handed over to Cipriano do Carmo Verdial, head of Suro-Craic, and his brother Jaime Verdial da Silva. It was garrisoned with people from Ainaro. These Verdial brothers were 3.0 degree cousins of D. Aleixo, as they were sons of Nai-Pusso, brother of Nai-Cau, of whom we already talked about it [9]. (3) The stronghold of Leo-Moa was entrusted to Sergeant Alexandrino, who had with him those who accompanied him in the fights in Atsabe and also Professor Araujo, his son Vasco and indigenous warriors. [10] (4) The city of Fato-Mera, which dominated the road from Atsabe to Ainaro, was handed over to Antonio Magno and the people of his jurisdiction - this Antonio Magno, also a son of Nai-Pusso, was, therefore, the brother of Cipriano and Jaime Verdial. (5) The last position was that of Manu-Tassi [11], overlooking the road from Maubisse to Ainaro and the paths that lead to Hatu-Builico and defended by chief Marcos, from Nunamogue, by his son Ananias and by people from the same Manu-Tassi, Soro and Nunamogue. Once these positions were occupied, criminals from “black columns” who came within firing range were harshly punished. Aware of D. Aleixo's firm attitude, the Japanese decided to send emissaries to invite him, with tempting proposals, to cooperate with them. To such proposals, the regulo haughtily replied that he was Portuguese and, therefore, he would only serve the Portuguese. Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Sergeant G. Milsom talks with Jamie Verdial of Ainaro who had helped the Australians in the Hatu Udo area. Sergeant Milsom, formerly of the 2/2nd Independent Company, accompanied the Military History Section Field Team attached to TIMFORCE and acted as a guide. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [12] Initial Successful Defense of the High Ground Seeing that it is not possible to lay hands on him due to stupidity and mildly means, they decided to attack the strong positions in which he and his companions were perched. Certain that in the fight they were going to fight they would lose many lives, they tried to reinforce the “black columns” with people gathered in various lands, especially in Manufai, nearby, and the border - at the time completely unmanned by Portuguese troops. According to estimates, around 15,000 men were gathered. As was customary, the indigenous forces were tasked with carrying out the attack, as the certain death of many hundreds of those poor people, deceived by false promises and incited to crime, would not weigh on the conscience of the “liberators of the Timorese people”. With a huge shout, the “black columns” launched the assault. They received very harsh punishment. To this assault others they followed, but, in all cases, the assailants were repelled. The losses he suffered were enormous. Seeing the “black columns” being decimated in such a way by those obstinate people, the Japanese, enraged by so many failures, decided to reorganize the forces at their disposal and resume the fight, successively attacking position by position. Fall of the High Ground Defences It was Manu-Tai which was the first to be captured, but it only fell into their hands after a very hard fight. Chief Marcos, his son Ananias and many of the warriors who fought with them lost their lives there. The attack on the stronghold of Fato-Mera followed, which, despite having been bravely defended, fell into their hands. Chief Antonio Magno was imprisoned there, who managed to survive until the end of that war. After Fato-Mera, Leo-Moa's position was attacked. In this case, the defenders still managed to hold out for a day, but then the lack of ammunition and supplies forced them to surrender. There, the enemy captured alive the Sergeant Alexandrino, D. Cipriano, a regulo of Atsabe, the mestiços Romualdo Aniceto and José Cachaço, the chief Talo-Bere, as well as several indigenous warriors. Sergeant Alexandrino and the mestiços were taken to Ermera, where a Japanese officer killed him with a pistol shot. His two fellow prisoners were killed by firing squad. As for D. Cipriano, a ruler of Atsabe, and the chief Talo-Bere, before the fight for the conquest of Suro-Lau began, they were savagely murdered by people from the “black columns”, who threw them from the bridge from Mau-Mali to the rocks between which the river runs. What now remained was to conquer the position where D. Aleixo found himself. To achieve this more easily, the Japanese preceded the assaults by bombarding them with mortars and three planes, which, at the same time, tried to strafe the defenders, believing that this would reduce their morale. They were wrong, as it seems to have given them renewed courage to fight fiercely and repel all the assaults carried out that day, causing considerable losses to the opponent. That day, the Japanese also suffered the disappointment of the besieged having hit a plane that crashed in Ainaro, near the Mission. [13] The following day, the fighting continued with enormous ferocity. Meanwhile, the Portuguese flag remained, exposed to the wind, in Suro-Lau, defended by a heroic group of Portuguese from Timor. When the third day arrived, the assaults continued, which the defenders, with unwavering bravery, repelled. Despite the successes achieved, the besieged found themselves in a very precarious situation, as the continued fighting during those three days had almost exhausted their ammunition, and the ammunition they had in reserve was already very few. It became urgent to make a resolution. D. Aleixo took it, sending a message to Jaime Verdial so that, during the night, with his companions, he would try to break the siege and head to the plains to seek refuge. He would however try the same, following other paths. Dom Aleixo Captured and Executed According to what was established, those, in the dead of night, because they were not present, saved themselves from martyrdom and certain death. Less fortunate, D. Aleixo and his companions did not escape the surveillance of the enemy, who managed to imprison them in the vicinity of Hato-Udo. [14] Taken to the old posto in this location, D. Aleixo, his main companions, as well as family members, and also the nurse João da Costa Tilman, were locked up there under Japanese surveillance. The remaining prisoners were placed, with a sentry in sight, in nearby barracks. At the beginning of the afternoon, they heard the prisoners discussing, in the yard, about the fate that would be given to them and, among other things, they realized that they intended to tie them up. Hearing this, D. Aleixo, angry, not accepting humiliation or dishonourable death, broke down the door and threw himself, although unarmed, at the first Japanese man who came across him, but, after a brief struggle, he fell with his chest pierced by a bayonet. Of his companions, those who imitated him, it was not long before they were shot or killed with a bladed weapon. Two managed to escape through a window and escape, getting into the dense vegetation. They were D. Aleixo's grandson, Joao Cesar Corte-Real, then a boy of about 19 years old, and Fausto Corte-Real, the governor's brother-in-law. Nurse Tilman, due to his bulk, not being able to use that exit easily, remained in the office where, found by the Japanese, he was murdered. [15] This was followed by another no less horrible tragedy - the death of those brave people who had been placed in the hut. It is possible that this woman, although unarmed, had also fought hand to hand with her tormentors and did not allow herself to remain inert and receive death. This time, the Japanese, with a few remnants of humanity, ordered the women and children to be spared from the slaughter. The Hato-Udo yard was covered in corpses and they remained there unburied for more than two years, until, after the surrender of the Japanese in Timor, on September 11, 1945, it was possible to collect their remaining bones. Portuguese colonial era school book depiction of the assassination of Dom Alexio by Japanese soldier [16] NOTE: Shortly after their recovery, the skulls of Dom Aleixo and his three sons, Alfonso, Francisco, and Alveira, were placed on public display, in Ainaro and were photographed there on 24 January 1945 by Sergeant K.B. Davis of the visiting Australian Military History Section team. The remains were subsequently re-interred in a new monument in Ainaro honouring the Memory of Dom Aleixo. Ainaro, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-24. Skulls of the King Alexio and his three sons, Alfonso, Francisco and Aliveira displayed in the sepulchre of the royal family. The four were killed by the Japanese because they had been of great help to the Australians of Sparrow Force. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [17] Portuguese Honour the Memory of Dom Aleixo To honour the memory of D. Aleixo, there is a tapestry of Portalegre on display in the Noble Hall of the Palácio das Repartições, in Dili, where he is depicted with the Flag of Quinas wrapping his belt, his muscles tensed, with his sword raised in a position to deliver a blow capable of annihilating any opponent. On the right, in the bottom corner, there is the following caption: WRAPPED IN THE FLAG OF THE MOTHERLAND THE REGULO OF TIMOR D. ALEIXO CORTE-REAL PREFERS TO DIE NOT YIELDING TO THE INVADERS. The Tapestry (from the Portalegre Factory) that disappeared in the maelstrom of the Indonesian occupation and which recalled, in the Noble Hall of the Palácio das Repartições, the heroic act of Dom Aleixo Corte Real In Ainaro a monument was erected to him. It is an arch with sober but elegant shapes, set on a platform, to which six steps give access. At the opening of the arch, supported by a metal frame made of curved pieces, an Avis cross stands out. From the severity of the highest mountains of Timor, which partly surround Ainaro, the place offers special conditions for meditation and recollection. Time wastes the importance of events and even causes some, although important, to be forgotten. It would behove time not to do anything more to the sublime act performed by D. Aleixo. To prevent this from happening, it seems to us that, annually, on a fixed day in the month of May, the youth of Timor's schools or their representatives would go on a pilgrimage to Ainaro to lay flowers at the base of the monument, giving them this is an occasion to remember the Hero's glorious deed, the nobility of his character and the unyielding patriotism that led him to sacrifice his own life”. NOTE: “On May 10, 2002, the day of the restoration of Independence in Ainaro, … the inauguration ceremony [was held] of the rehabilitation of the monument promoted on the ground by the late Nuno Franco and coordinated by Dr Rui Fonseca. The Monument dedicated to Regulo Dom Aleixo, in Ainaro Timor-Leste. Under the motto "For Portugal" (top of the Arch), the heroic struggle of this Timorese Regulo against the Japanese Invader is remembered. The monument is also a tomb, and the remains of this Regulo, killed by the Japanese in 1943 during the Second World War, were deposited there. The Monument is also flanked by two stone graves approximately 5 meters to the right and left in front of the monument, where the remains of two martyred Fathers will be found. [?] On the left side of this monument are the ruins of the old Regulo Dom Aleixo Residence, which was destroyed in the 70s. [19] Monument erected in Ainaro in memory of D. Aleixo Corte-Real References [1] Humberto Leitao. - O Regulo Timorense D. Aleixo Corte-Real. – Lisboa: Edição do Grupo de Estudos de História Marítima, 1970: 57-71. [2] Liberato, O Caso de Timor: 40. [3] Brandão, Funo - guerra em Timor: 60. [4] José Simão Martinho, Vida e Morte do Regula Timorense D. Aleixo: 22. [5] Liberato, O caso de Timor: 162, 167. [6] P.e Martinho da Costa Lopes, “D. Aleixo Corte Real, Um Herói já Lendário do Nosso Seculo, revista” Defesa Nacional n.os 193-194. [7] Ezequiel Enes Pascoal, A alma de Timar na sua fantasia: 94. [8] Google Maps - 9°00'58.9"S, 125°32'22.5"E [9] Ezequiel Enes Pascoal, A alma de Timar na sua fantasia: 94. “This post dominated the Ainaro-Cassa-Mape-Bobonaro road”. - Rocha, Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial: 110-112 [10] P.e Martinho da Costa Lopes: 20. [11] 8° 59' S, 125° 32'E – ASPT: 83; 8°58'55.6"S 125°32'02.0"E – Google Maps. “This post dominated the main road Maubisse-Ainaro and the road from Ainaro to the post of Hato-Builico” - Rocha, Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial: 110-112. [12] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200646. [13] There are those who claim that two planes were shot down. [14] Os Ultimas Dias de D. Aleixo Corte-Real - version of his grandson João Cesar Corte-Real, who managed to save himself from the Hato-Udo massacre. [15] João Cesar Corte-Real. [16] https://scontent.fper7-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.6435-9/31543090_10210566516790335_9091489310774919168_n.jpg?_nc_cat=104&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=5f2048&_nc_ohc=4qJBLxuThZwQ7kNvgFHXWnC&_nc_ht=scontent.fper7-1.fna&oh=00_AfBdTkI-oaUTtsTg8Hojt6olIxr5GP1Lowfe8qzrY4IwUg&oe=6662EC13 [17] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221127 [18] Rui Brito da Fonseca. - Monumentos portugueses em Timor-Leste. - Dili, Timor Leste: [Crocodilo Azul?], 2005: 80-81.

Tom Hoyer sent me the attached additional info about the Los Palos water project. Ed Water Project in Timor Leste 2024.docx

Laclo 8° 33' 20” S, 125° 55' 11" E [1] Laclo is 7 miles (11 km.) at a bearing of 246° from Manatuto. It is a posto town of about 20 stone and many native houses on the North Laclo River. There are few native villages in this district, which is rather arid. North of Laclo there is a mountain range of nearly 5,500 feet (1,675 m.) elevation at its highest point; the crest of this range is only 3 miles (5 km.) north of Laclo. An old motor road passed through Laclo for Manatuto to Meti Naro and Dilli. It is now fallen into disrepair and is only traversable by horse. [2] Laclo location map [3] The 4AIC becomes active in the Laclo area: "From Laclubar we carried out daily patrols to familiarise ourselves as quickly as possible with our area of responsibility - along both sides of the Sumasi River which flowed from Laclubar past Cribas before joining the North Laclo River south of the major coastal town of Manatuto, situated on the east-west road between Dili and Baucau on the east end of the Island. Other roads from Dili, Manatuto and Baucau all went south for relatively short distances, the one from Manatuto went south from Cribas to approximately the centre of the Island. Our early patrolling was completely unhindered by the Japanese." [4] Demolition Work On The Manatuto-Dili Road – 20 October 1942 “Lieut. Morgan, who had led the 2/2nd Company party that blocked the road east of Manatuto on the 22nd of September, decided to do it once more before he left the island. A patrol, comprising troops from No.4 Section 2/2nd Company, escorted the 2/4th Company's Engineers and a cuda pack train, with native handlers worrying about their cargo of 400 lbs of amatol, set off from Fatu Maqueric on 20 October. Jack Jones goes over some of the details with his old OC Frank Hammond and Curly Papworth. Jack: ‘We went through Laclo to the Manatuto-Dili road to see if we could do some damage to that road. We arrived at Laclo Village in the late afternoon and made our way over the mountain, reaching the other side in the twilight. ‘We were digging our holes - we only had dixies and digging sticks to dig with - when we heard voices down below. We kept very quiet until we learnt that the 'voices' came from a group of Timorese fishermen who were singing on their journey home. We resumed digging and completed our holes. Then we filled them up with Amatol and stuffed it up the drains that were there too’. Frank: ‘Jack and I cleared the area and lit the safety fuse. The good book says don't run, so we didn't. I think a quick jog would more describe our retreat to a nearby culvert. Jack just beat me to it, but I managed to squeeze in beside him and then the earth shook. We were splattered with light rubble and earth and could hear the whiz of bigger rocks and clods of earth go over our heads. On inspection the road was completely blocked’. Curly: ‘It would have taken a lot of hard work to clear that road again’. Jack: ‘We went back over the range and came to a village we thought was Laclo, but it turned out to be Ili-Heu. It was on the Laclo River. We stayed there until the following day when we moved back to Fatu Maquerec’. On the 23rd, Japanese troops were observed clearing the debris, a task which kept them busy for the next few days. They were last seen returning wearily to Hera on the morning of 27 October. Planning An Ambush There were reports, however, both from the Portuguese and native sources, of large parties of Japanese troops moving across from both Aileu and Dili to Manatuto, presumably to deter the road-blowers. Early on the 27th, Captain O'Connor moved No.4 and No.6 Sections into position to ambush them at the North Laclo River on the western outskirts of Manatuto. The 2/4th Company's Engineer Section prepared to lend a hand by blowing big holes in the near vicinity in another road leading south from Manatuto to Cribas. But nobody thought to mention that to Gordon Hart, who recalls the details: ‘Dan had No.4 Section positioned on the east bank of the river with Manatuto to our rear, with No.6 Section and B Platoon HQ positioned on the west bank. We spent all the first day so positioned - but no Japs! After dusk HQ withdrew with both sections to a rendezvous at a village, Ili-Heu (about a half hour east of Laclo Posto, and approx three hours west of Manatuto), leaving Cpl Arthur Stevenson and two others as a listening post in a village named Nuno-Laluli, near No. 6 Section's ambush site, to observe and report enemy movements into or out of Manatuto during the night. Looking east over the Laclo township – Laclo River in the background – 8 August 2022 ‘No.4 Section led out from Ili-Heu before dawn and as we were entering the Nth Laclo River, John Vierra, a Porto attached to my section, pointed out Jap footprints heading in the direction of Laclo’. Arthur Stevenson explains further: ‘At the listening post that night, I got my first attack of malaria. One of the fit boys pulled me to my feet and said the Japs were in the village. We hacked our way out the back of the hut we were in and went 100 yards or so into a rice paddy where, for the first time I heard the click of a Japanese bayonet in its scabbard as about 120 of them filed past a few yards away on the levee bank heading towards the No.6 Section position just east of Laclo. There was no future in trying to rejoin my section, so I headed instead for Hart's Section position east of the river’. Gordon continues: ‘Word was passed back to Captain O'Connor and No.6 Section was detached to check out Laclo, while No. 4 Section continued on to its ambush position of the previous day. Platoon HQ would remain on the track in its present position until No. 6 Section ascertained what the Japs were doing around Laclo. ‘After we took up our ambush position, contact was made with Arthur Stevenson's listening post, and he reported that a Jap party had passed him during the night headed towards Laclo. As we hadn't had any further contact from No. 6 Section or Pl. HQ, I considered it advisable for the listening party to join No. 4 Section. I then withdrew the section to a village, Obrato, due south of Manatuto. Sketches of views in the Laclo River area – late 1942 [5] ‘A lookout was posted in a high tree which gave a complete view of all approaches. We had safe lines of withdrawal south to Cribas, or down the Sumasi River. Sgt. Jack Shand, (ex Pl. HQ), arrived as we awaited developments. He had become separated from the HQ party. ‘Being in what I considered to be a relatively safe area, I decided to give the troops a breather and a meal before our first face to face confrontation with the enemy. We had been moving around for a couple of days with very little rest or food. ‘I pondered over the options left to us and the Japs, using the limited information that I had. I thought they could patrol back to Dili via the North Laclo, or they could patrol to Laclo and return to Manatuto later in the day. Their movement to Laclo suggested that they may have picked up B Pl.'s wireless messages indicating our base to be at Laclo. ‘Our option if they patrolled back to Dili would be an exercise in shadowing and waiting for an opportunity. If they took the second option, our opportunity to ambush them depended on our anticipating correctly which route they would follow to Manatuto. There were two well defined routes from Laclo to Manatuto. The first was on the northern side of the North Laclo river by which they had moved out to Laclo. The second started along the same track but branched off to cross the North Laclo and an island near its junction with the Sumasi River and then across the Sumasi to the Cribas road running north to Manatuto. ‘I felt the Japs were most likely to choose the southern track crossing the rivers and the island, as this would enable them to cover a much wider area in their patrol for approximately the same mileage. If they took that route, they provided us with the much safer option. If we covered the northern track and they took the southern one (which they did) we would possibly be caught between the returning patrol and any troops they had remaining in Manatuto. ‘Having puzzled over these options I decided to enjoy my lunch! ‘While I was doing so, our lookout, Tom Price, reported heavy smoke rising from Laclo. It appeared the Japs had torched the town. As Laclo was a couple of hours distant from us, I considered we had sufficient time to set up an ambush on the island. Before moving out to do so, I detailed L-Cpl Price to remain in charge of our base and OP, with Jack Ellis (who had a stye in one eye) and Ron Kemp (who had a nasty looking tropical ulcer on one leg) to clear up any sign of us having been in the village and to organise the criados if we had to make a quick exit to our RVs. Jack Shand was also left, he being responsible for B Pl. HQ's radio equipment’. Laclo area showing road demolition and ambush sites [6] Improvising An Ambush While Hart was pondering over his options at Obrato village, No.6 Section was having problems in finding out just what the Japanese were up to at Laclo. Bob Fleming provides an account of some confusion and excitement before the situation was resolved: ‘Halfway through the night, I was awakened by a native runner frantically endeavouring to convey a message from the listening party to the effect that 200 Japs had come to Manatuto. Since the message was verbal and our custom was to communicate in writing when using native runners, little notice was taken of him. We settled back to rest again. ‘But a couple of hours later, another native came running in to say that approximately half the reported Jap force had passed by our village and gone to Laclo, about half an hour's walk further on. This was a bit hard to believe too, but I investigated, taking Pte K. Beaver with me. We went to a hill overlooking the town to observe. There were Japs in it, sure enough, having a fine time bashing the place about and shooting any poor unfortunates not quick enough to get out in time. ‘On returning to our position I was confronted by a native who had been in Laclo when the Japs arrived. He said they were actually poorly armed Dutch Timors in the main, with a few Japs amongst them armed only with pistols. He was cross-examined at length but made no alteration to his story and it was taken as reasonably accurate, although we knew from our observations that there were more Japs than he said and that they were a little better armed. It turned out that his information was badly astray. ‘The section was split into two groups of equal size. One group was set in ambush on a long ridge overlooking the track to Laclo. This was a good position providing a fine view of the track, perfect concealment and a good get-away. I took the second group which was to move around the back of the Laclo and drive the enemy - with the knowledge of native reaction to this sort of thing - back along the track they had used to come to Laclo so as to allow the ambush party to deal with them. The First Ambush ‘The enemy, however, left the town earlier than anticipated. They also chose the same track back as the sub-section was taking to the town, so the two parties moved towards each other along the same track unaware of the other's movements. But luck was on our side. The Nips were careless, and the leader of the column was turning around talking to the fellow behind him when I spotted them about 50 yards away. We hopped off the track in record time and waited in the scanty cover less than 10 yards away. We opened fire on them as they were in a satisfactory position opposite us and kept it up for about a minute before withdrawing, while they were still confused, to let the ambush party, whose fire we were masking have their turn. ‘As our fire was returned with LMGs, rifles and mortars, it wasn't hard to guess that the force was composed of many more Japs than we thought. We later learned that it was about 100 in strength and principally Japanese in composition. ‘An estimated 30 casualties were inflicted on the enemy in this engagement without harm to us. There were a few close calls. Ted Coops was fired upon twice by one Jap from a distance of five yards without being hit. The Jap did not survive Ted's first shot. ‘After our withdrawal, the enemy burned the village we had occupied for the night and apparently burned his dead in the fire. The remainder of his force then proceeded towards Manatuto to be set upon by No.4 Section about an hour and a half later’. The Second Ambush Hart describes that action: ‘Just as our ambush party was about to cross the Sumasi River, Tom Price sent up a message to the effect that it wasn't Laclo town that was burning, but the village Ili-Heu. As this village was much closer to the island, I had to abort or find another suitable spot for the ambush on the eastern side of the Sumasi. Its eastern bank at the road crossing was no more than two to three foot high. The verge was sparsely covered by cane grass and there was an uncultivated paddy field behind it. The cover provided was minimal. ‘We then moved back along the track towards Manatuto searching for a suitable spot with more cover. Suddenly I realised that even if we found a spot with better cover, we would be trapped between the returning patrol and their base at Manatuto. While tossing up in my mind whether to make a mad dash to the island - which had a perfect ambush position - or set up on the not so good spot on the eastern bank of the Sumasi, the Japs settled the matter for me. They suddenly began to enter the Sumasi at its west bank. We had to take up our stations on the east bank at the double. ‘Fortunately, while the paddy field didn't provide much cover, it enabled the men to move quickly off the track and take up positions along the low mound bordering the field adjacent to the riverbank. The width of the riverbed, covered with large and small rocks and stones, was between 200-300 yards, although the stream itself was, at that time, only 20-30 yards wide and only inches deep. ‘The section held their fire until the leading Jap, a veritable giant, was within 10 yards. Then all hell broke loose. ‘It shook me at the time how quickly the Japs 'homed in' on us in a matter of seconds, as if they were expecting us. These were seasoned troops. We were not aware at that time that they had been ambushed by Bob Fleming's No. 6 Section boys earlier near Laclo. However, on looking around, I saw the reason why they had 'homed in' so quickly. Good old John Vierra was standing up in full view of them, blazing away with his rifle. I managed to attract his attention and got him to go to ground. When I queried him later as to why he stood up in full view of the Japs, he replied: 'When you fired the opening shot, they all went to ground, and I couldn't see any of them. I stood up to get a better view’. ‘John may not have been the best-trained soldier, but he sure was enthusiastic when it came to having a crack at the Japs. Withdrawal ‘We didn't hang around for long as it is not too comfortable having mortar bombs dropping around you. ‘Wimpy’ Clarke, our Bren gunner, relishing his first crack at the enemy, had hosed off several mags. One of John Vierra's criados, 'Africano', was acting as No. 2 on the Bren. When we had to skedaddle, he picked up the gun by the barrel. He learnt the hard way. His hand was very badly burned - but not a whimper out of him. Quite a stoic 'Africano', and a very valuable member of No. 4 Section. ‘On our somewhat hasty withdrawal, we ran into a problem. We had committed ourselves to an ambush in haste, without having reconnoitred our line of withdrawal. Now in that Province they had eight - to 10-foot-high cactus hedge rows marking the borders of their land and gardens. This particular field had a buffalo corral attached. We withdrew through a set of sliprails right into that corral. One of the boys had a brainwave and he grabbed those sliprails and laid them horizontally across the face of the cactus hedge to form a ladder. We all negotiated this obstacle, except Wimpy. He decided to fall off right into the middle of the cactus fence. He shot out of that cactus and took off like a startled goanna and he reckoned he never felt a thing. But he was still picking cactus needles out of his hide years after the war ended! Private Owen Williams – “Our First Comrade Killed In Action” ‘We had nominated a couple of rendezvous if we were forced to scatter. One was our OP village, Obrato. The other was Cribas, so I didn't worry unduly when Owen Williams didn't turn up initially. I felt he might have gone round the cactus corral and not through it and then headed straight for Cribas. Tom Price, watching from our OP reported that we had killed 10-15 Japs and wounded another five. Considering the circumstances, we were reasonably content with this outcome of our first face to face brush with the enemy. …. ‘Next day, when Owen Williams hadn't turned up, Jack Ellis, Ron Kemp and Charlie Ranken returned to our ambush spot and learnt that Owen had been killed instantly in the action by a bullet through the forehead. Our first comrade killed in action. The sad news had a very sobering effect on us all. His sub-machine gun was later recovered from a Portuguese official’ Sparrow Force refers to these actions in the War Diary: ‘29 Oct '42: Jap party ambushed by Sec. 6, 2/4 Ind. Coy between Manatuto and Laclo 0630 hrs 28 Oct., 45 Jap casualties, ours nil. Sixty Japs ambushed by Sec. 4, 2/4 Ind. Coy 28 Oct near Manatuto, 12 enemy casualties, ours nil. Cribas road blown by Eng. Sec. 2/4 Ind. Coy night 28 Oct’. The loss of Owen Williams had not then been confirmed.”. [7] NOTE: Private Owen Richard Williams, NX77951, B Platoon, 4AIC – his body was buried by Timorese villagers nearby where he was KIA. All of his personal effects, and his Tommy gun, had been taken by Timorese villagers and handed to the administrator at Manatuto, who returned them to Lieutenant Fleming. [8] Though the location of his grave was noted for 4AIC records, his remains were not found by the War Graves team post war. His name is listed on the Monument to the Missing at the Adelaide River War Cemetery. João Vieira (John Vierra or Viera) “João Vieira [9] – Portuguese (or mestiço). [10] From Taibessi. Corporal - infantry. Assisted the 2AIC – João Vierra [sic] noted as the ‘organizer of food supplies’ in the Dili area [11] Member of the ‘International Brigade’ fighting alongside Sparrow Force: ‘On 22/23 Nov 42 John [sic] Vierra, a Portuguese attached to 4 Sec entered Dili disguised as a Timor’ – highest praise and commendation [12] In action against the Japanese with 2/4 Independent Company at the Sumasi River [13] Assisted SRD’s OP LIZARD - his group operated in Uai Alla area between Bibileu and Mundo Perdido [14] In January 1943, Vieira was cited in Lancer Force’s instruction to S Force: ‘John Vierra (Cribas area)’ – particularly recommended. Operated with S Force. [15] He was a principal in PORTOLIZARD after the LANCER FORCE/LIZARD evacuation – and led a reconnaissance to Dili in mid-May 1943. [16] Vieira joined the LAGARTO group on its arrival under Lieutenant M. de J. Pires on 1 July 1943. From 12 August 1943, Vieira (codename ‘JVP’) led an armed group and established an OP overlooking Dili. [17] Vieira and party moved off and at the end of August 1943 were located between Laclo and Remexio about 10 miles east of Dilli. A certain amount of information was passed to LAGARTO by runner, but the wireless link was not a success and never functioned, a state of affairs which is attributed to the incompetence of Procopio. At the beginning of September 1943, contact was lost with Vieira and no word was received of him until 3 weeks later when it was learned that he was hiding in the vicinity of Kuri 8 miles west of Manatuto. On 25 September 1943, Vieira with Rebello and a few natives rejoined LAGARTO bringing news of Japanese strength and disposition around Dilli. Procopio with the W/T gear and 10 other men who were with Vieira had been captured in Laclo where the party had been ambushed. [18] The LAGARTO group was attacked by a Japanese and native force at Cape Bigono on 29 September 1943 and its leadership captured – Vieira escaped, but was captured a few days later. He was seen in prison in Dili by the deportado António Santos. [19] Vieira reportedly ‘died in prison in Dili, detail not known’. [20] Australian veterans of 2/2 and 2/4 Independent Companies established the “Francisca Vierra [sic] Fund” - i.e. for the widow of John [sic] Vieira. [21] References [1] ASPT: 82. [2] ASPT: 31. [3] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [4] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 108. [5] ASPT: Photographs 40-42. [6] Adapted from MapCarta map – 24 January 2024. [7] Text on road demolition and ambushes from Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 143-148. [8] Cleary, The men who came out of the ground: 233-234. [9] See Carvalho, Relatório ... : 441, 471, 555, 736. [10] Brandão, Funo : 133. [11] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 125. [12] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 154. [13] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 147. [14] Captain D.K. Broadhurst report – A3269, D6/A, p.114. Six of ‘João Vieira’s party’ are listed at A3269, D27/A. p.2. [15] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 228. [16] A3269, D4/G: 376, 380. [17] A32369, D4/G: 99. [18] The official history of the operations and administration of ‘Special Operations Australia’ (SOA) conducted under the cover-name of ‘Services Reconnaissance Department’. V.2 – Operations: 61-100. [19] Cardoso, Timor na 2a Guerra Mundial: 101. [20] Carvalho, Vida em morte em Timor: 130. [21] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 438.

Good morning Tom - apology for not replying to your message much earlier - the 2/2 Committee will meet in the near future to consider the funding proposals that it has received and we'll let you know the outcome immediately after that meeting. Regards Ed Willis - Committee member

Portraits of Rolf Baldwin and Bernard Callinan, lieutenants in the 2nd AIF, at Darby River, Victoria, early 1941. [1] Rolf Baldwin played a key leadership role during the 2nd Independent Company’s successful guerrilla campaign against the Japanese on Portuguese Timor during 1942. Baldwin, commander of A Platoon, was a 33-year-old school teacher from Melbourne. An erudite man with a wide and deep knowledge of Australia, especially its bush and old gold-field areas, he was never lost for a yarn. As an officer and man he was known to be wise and fair, and was respected by the troops under his command. Later in the campaign he was to be a hard-working and loyal second-in-command of the unit. [2] In the cadre of potential officers brought together on Wilson’s Promontory when the No. 2 Independent Company was being formed, Bernard Callinan, 28, an engineer was joined by Rolf Baldwin, 32, a teacher at Melbourne Grammar School. An ‘eccentric’ schoolmaster with a pencil moustache, Baldwin was not the typical rugged type found in the unit. He freely admitted that he didn’t like sport, but he was chosen because his knowledge of astronomy had impressed Spencer Chapman when he met him on his recruitment drive. Baldwin had grown up at the Melbourne Observatory where his father had worked as the government astronomer. And his work as a schoolmaster at Melbourne Grammar made him the well-organised, efficient type that was needed at the top. Baldwin and Callinan had both read and discussed Reitz’s book, which described how a small force of well-organised Boer guerrillas could tie up a conventional army many times their number. [3] The salutary lesson of the book for Callinan and Dexter was why the Boers eventually failed: through exhaustion, lack of food, and because the friendly population had been driven away from them. When formed, the company was led by Major Alexander Spence, 35, a journalist from Proserpine, Queensland, with Captain Callinan as his second-in-command. The formation of this elite unit had been rather hasty, and it was about 50 men short of its full complement of 270 officers and men. But all the officers needed to run the company were there, 17 in total. While most of the company’s ordinary ranks came from Western Australia, only four officers were drawn from that state. Captain Baldwin, the Melbourne Grammar master, commanded A Platoon. Captain Geoff Laidlaw, 31, a salesman and surf champion from Newcastle, NSW, led B Platoon. Laidlaw, with a huge bear-like frame, was known in the company as ‘the Bull’. George Boyland, 30, a Western Australian, led C Platoon. [4] Baldwin provided his own self-deprecating account of his contribution to the Timor campaign to the ‘Courier’ in March 2000: TIMOR MEMORIES SERIES 7. ‘Recollections’ by Rolph [Rolf] Baldwin [6] In the early part of the war a Lieutenant on the reserve of officers, aged 30 and in a reserved occupation to boot was a drug on the market. It was J.R.D. [7] who solved that one for me by introducing me to Freddy Spencer-Chapman. [8] Formation of No. 2 Independent Company The result was that I called up as a Fieldcraft Instructor under Freddy. There were two of us, the other being David Dexter (Old Geelong Grammar) who came to the position by quite a different channel. In that position we stayed together during the training of the officers and NCOs of the first and second Independent Companies, later Commando Squadrons, and were posted together to the 2/2 Aust Independent Company quite an adventure for two Victorians to serve in a unit that was overwhelmingly Western Australian. Together we shared the long, rigorous winters training on Wilson Prom, which was odd training for the tropics but nevertheless, served its purpose well, for the real hardships of that apprenticeship formed a very cohesive unit. Dexter and I were together all through Timor. [9] ‘Shipped across to Timor’ It was as well for us that it was formed as soon as the war with Japan broke out we were shipped across to Timor, first for only a few days to the western part and then to the eastern end which was then Portuguese. In some ways we were on easy street for we never suffered serious bombing nor shelling and casualties were comparatively light. On the other hand, we shared a small territory with vastly superior numbers of the enemy, we had to live mostly off the land under the same conditions as the natives did, our line of communication with Australia was non-existent for 6 weeks at the beginning of 1942 and was never better than tenuous and these conditions had to be endured for nearly a year without any leave or rest, with rations becoming poorer all the time and the health of us all deteriorating. The story is told in 'Independent Company' by Bernard Callinan [10] which appeared in 1953 and in ‘Timor 1942’ by Wray [11] which was published in 1992 so I shall not attempt to summarise but merely mention a few incidents in which I was personally concerned. ‘When the Japanese first arrived’ When the Japanese first arrived in Dili the Independent Co. was dispersed in the hills surrounding the town except for one section (an officer and 20 men) which manned the airfield. This section fought fiercely from midnight until the early hours of the morning then blew the numerous demolition charges which had already been set and in the resulting confusion, vanished into the hills behind the town. After taking a while to consolidate their position in Dili the Japanese came out into the hills to search for their elusive enemy. There, of course, they were met by the 'ambush and vanish' tactics in which the Independents had been trained, and suffered heavy casualties from an enemy they did not see. [12] After their first burst of activity, the company broke contact, except for maintaining a few observation groups and made clear away, over the central range of rugged mountains to previously selected places in the southern part of the island where we could re- group and prepare ourselves for the next phase. This was a jump into the unknown for the selection of bases had been made off the map without any chance of reconnaissance. Bobonaro and Senor Souza Bobonaro was the place that fell to my lot and there I presented myself after a couple of days spent in moving under cover of darkness and lying up near native villages during daylight, living the while on such provisions as we could buy from the Timorese. By this time these people had accepted us as friendly, but we still did not know how we should be received by the Portuguese. So, it was with some inward trepidation and very conscious of our bush ranger appearance that I marched into the square of the first Portuguese posto that I had seen, with the platoon sergeant and a couple of men for escort. All doubts were groundless, however. Senor Souza [13] was provincial governor of a province of perhaps 300,000 people, very pro-British in his outlook and most cordial in his reception of people who were technically invaders. My escort was handed over to the hospitality of the local military detachment and I was taken into his own household for lunch. To one who had been living hard for some weeks and absolutely native for the last few days it was indeed a shock to see neatly uniformed servants, crisp white napery to sit in a capacious leather easy chair and be offered his choice of Fosters or Johnnie Walker with an accompanying tray of delicious sandwiches. Such luxury could not last and we were soon back to the bush, but the impression is still strong. ‘I had gravitated to the position at Company HQ …’ At this time Koepang had already fallen and with that had gone our only link with Australia so that we were lost to the people at home and they were similarly denied any means of telling us of their situation. All we knew of the war situation was what we could hear from our Portuguese friends. During the six weeks of this silence I had gravitated to the position at Company HQ and so was privy to a wildly exciting moment when 'Winnie the War Winner' by a near miracle managed to establish contact with Darwin. Even more memorable was quite a while after when RAAF Hudsons came over and dropped some of the supplies we so urgently needed, boots, medical supplies and best of all, silver money with which to buy food from the natives. The August Push For a while after this our fortunes brightened. The platoon 'were all situated in tactically useful positions where the food supply was adequate and could carry out vigorously their roles of observation and harassment. This they did to such effect that in August the Japanese set out on a full scale, well-coordinated effort to round up their tormentors. With probably 2500 first rate troops in five columns converging on a centre from as many points of the compass they gradually forced the Australians inwards. Finally, they were in the position where they were denied the possibility of hit and run and would have to engage their enemy in pitched battle which could only end in surrender or annihilation. On what seemed the vital night at about midnight I was standing chatting with the CO 'It looks now like the last man and the last cartridge' said he and almost as he spoke a big green rocket went up. Mentally finger on trigger we waited for what seemed the inevitable, but nothing happened. Then at first light our patrols went out and gradually it was confirmed that the unbelievable had happened - the enemy had simply vanished. Nor was this only temporary, over days it became clear that they had actually gone back to Dili and we could carry on our little war under something like the old terms. Arrival of No. 4 Independent Company This we did for another month or so when we faced our next great excitement, that the 2/4 Independent Company, a unit identical with our own in numbers and organisation had arrived on the island. Their arrival provided me with another set of vivid memories for it fell to my lot to be the OC beach during their landing. This was a complicated task. For one thing the troops coming ashore would have no transport to convey their stores and for another they would have no idea of how to find their way to the positions they were to occupy. To cope with this each section of the 2/2 Company had to provide two guides and such and such number of ponies and have them at the designed beach at an appointed time. There were many difficulties involved for it was a matter of moving a total of 400 ponies from several directions to the one point without arousing the suspicion of the enemy and then, when they had arrived at the beach, keeping them hidden and fed and watered until they were needed. As this had to be managed on a large tract of flat ground about two thirds of which supported a scrub not unlike a big tea tree or old man Mallee, providing good cover from the air whilst the remainder was scattered patches of kunai grass. The landing and dispersal The fixed point in regard to movement was that a Japanese reconnaissance plane came along regularly every morning soon after sun rise. The troop ship was to be the destroyer HMAS ‘Voyager’ and of course she would have to come in after dark and be away before first light. By the night ‘Voyager’ was due, all was ready when we struck our first difficulty in the shape of a signal which said that her departure was to be delayed by 24 hours, but the hiding, feeding and watering of the ponies for the extra day was managed. Then came the actual night. ‘Voyager’ arrived punctually and the disembarkation went on smoothly from my point of view. As each 2/4 section came ashore it was met by the 2/2 representative concerned, carried its stores to the waiting ponies and went on its way. Keeping an eye on this kept me pretty well occupied but towards the end it seemed to me that the ship was coming pretty close inshore. Then, as the last troops were on the beach I went along to the Commander of the ship for a few words. From him I had the devastating news that the ship was aground and unable to move herself. The fate of the ‘Voyager’ On our feet we concocted the plan that enough men would be left aboard to fight the ack-ack guns against the certain air attack next daylight and that the rest of the sailors, unarmed, for the ship carried only a few rifles, would occupy the hiding places of the horses. We hoped against hope that there would be no land attack and, in fact, none did come while the sailors were ashore. By the time all the sailors were in their new quarters it was full light and soon after the 'chaffcutter' as we called the plane, came over and went back to Dili. Later came the bombers. A stranded ship would be an easy target, but they scored only a couple of hits and one bomber was smoking so heavily that we felt the natives were right when they reported it destroyed. In the afternoon the Commander of the ‘Voyager’ had her engines destroyed and the poor old ship was fired. Red hot rivets flying from her plates were a sight to remember. During the night two corvettes took off the sailors. Next day another soldier and I had the eerie task of going back to the ship to look for a signals book that it was thought might have been left behind. [14] End of the Timor Campaign The Timor part of my recollections ends with the beach on the south coast of the island as we waited for the destroyer HMAS ‘Arunta’ to take us off. The 2/2 Company had already gone in December 1942 but my great friend Bernard Callinan who was originally 2/IC of the 2/2 had become Commanding Officer of the combined 2/2 and 2/4 Companies and stayed on with me as Adjutant till the 2/4 came off in January 1943. [15] We were separated on the beach and I was on my own as, in nothing more than filthy old shirt and a pair of old ragged drill trousers, I went up the scramble nets and fell asleep on the first flat piece of deck I could find. None of us wore badges of rank then so it was some time before I was found and taken along to the ward room where I met a similarly bedraggled Bernard. What would you like to drink? Would you have a Pym’s No. 1? and of course, the Navy had. Final war years That concludes these recollections for I spent 1943-45 as a staff officer in Melbourne, New Guinea, the Tableland and then New Guinea again. Finally, by an odd quirk of fortune I fetched up after the Japanese surrender in Rabaul where I met old comrades in what had become the 2/2 Aust Commando Squadron and was shipped home with them in December 1945. Captain R.R. Baldwin VX50054 NB: Baldy, as he is affectionately known, turned 90 on 16 December 1999. REFERENCES [1] National Library of Australia digitised item, http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-136262775 [2] Christopher C.H. Wray. – Timor 1942: Australian commandos at war with the Japanese. – Melbourne: Hutchinson Australia, 1987: 31. [3] Deneys Reitz. - Commando : a Boer journal of the Boer war / introduction by Leo Cooper ; preface by General the Right Honourable J.C. Smuts. - London : Folio Society, 1982. [4] Paul Cleary. – The men who came out of the ground: a gripping account of Australia’s first commando campaign, Timor 1942. – Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: esp. Ch. 1 ‘The Pick of Australia’, 1-17. [5] https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/RCDIG1068966/large/5387433.JPG [6] Rolph [Rolf] Baldwin ‘Timor memories series 7. “Recollections”’ 2/2 Commando Courier March 2000: 11-14. https://doublereds.org.au/couriers/2000/Courier%20March%202000.pdf , published online 2016, accessed online 12 June 2024. [7] Sir James Ralph Darling (1899–1995), Headmaster of Geelong Grammar School (1930-1961). See Peter Gronn, 'Darling, Sir James Ralph (1899–1995)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/darling-sir-james-ralph-21871/text31931 , published online 2019, accessed online 12 June 2024. [8] Edward Willis ‘Lieutenant Colonel Freddie Spencer-Chapman, 1907-1971 – master of guerrilla jungle warfare’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/144-lieutenant-colonel-freddie-spencer-chapman-1907-1971-–-master-of-guerrilla-jungle-warfare/ , published online 2018, accessed online 12 June 2024. [9] Michael McKernan, 'Dexter, David St Alban (1917–1992)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/dexter-david-st-alban-307/text29034 , published online 2016, accessed online 12 June 2024. [10] Bernard Callinan. - Independent Company: the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941-43. – Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1953 (repr. 1989). [11] Wray. – Timor 1942. [12] Edward Willis ‘Commando Campaign Sites – East Timor -Ermera District - the unit strikes back - the “Battle” of Grade Lau’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/250-commando-campaign-sites-–-east-timor-ermera-district-the-unit-strikes-back-the-battle-of-grade-lau/ , published online 2020, accessed online 12 June 2024. [13] Senhor António Policarpe de Sousa Santos, Administrator of Fronteira Province; see also Callinan, Independent Company: 68, 83, 115. [14] See also Edward Willis ‘75 Years On - the arrival of the No. 4 Independent Company and the wreck of the Voyager - 23 September 1942’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/116-75-years-on-the-arrival-of-the-no-4-independent-company-and-the-wreck-of-the-voyager-23-september-1942/ , published online 2017, accessed online 12 June 2024. [15] Edward Willis ‘Quicras - Manufahi District - WWII In East Timor an Australian Army site and travel guide’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/346-quicras-manufahi-district-wwii-in-east-timor-an-australian-army-site-and-travel-guide/ , published online 2022, accessed online 12 June 2024. ADDITIONAL READING ‘Rolf Redmond BALDWIN - Regimental Number: VX50054’ Men of the 2/2 – VX. https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/vx/rolf-redmond-baldwin-r101/ , published online 2017, accessed online 12 June 2024. NAA: B883, VX50054 - BALDWIN ROLF REDMOND : Service Number - VX50054 : Date of birth - 16 Dec 1909 : Place of birth - SOUTH YARRA VIC : Place of enlistment - ROYAL PARK VIC : Next of Kin - BALDWIN JOSEPH. https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=6131176&isAv=N , published online 2003, accessed online 12 June 2024. Command and leadership 2/2nd Independent Company Timor, 1942: an interview with Captain Rolf Baldwin.(In retrospect). 83 min 20 sec. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C299666, published online 1992, accessed online 12 June 2024. Lana Capon ‘Rolf's war service’ Investigator: Geelong Historical Society No. 201, December 2015: 157-162. Michael Collins Persse ‘Rolf Redmond Baldwin (1909- 2006)’ Investigator: Geelong Historical Society No. 201, December 2015: 163-165. Rolf Baldwin (Baldy) interviewed on 30th May 2003. 98 min. Australians at War Film Archive. https://australiansatwarfilmarchive.unsw.edu.au/archive/364 , published online 2003, accessed online 12 June 2024. ‘Sparrow’ spread his seeds of knowledge far: Rolf Redmond Baldwin, teacher and soldier 16-12-1909 - 8-7- 2006’ The Age Tuesday, October 3, 2006: 10. http://libraryedition.com.au/library_edition/Print.Article.aspx?mode=image&href=AGE%2F2006%2F10%2F03&id=Ar01003 , published online 2006, accessed online 12 June 2024.

TLV has made funding submissions for (1) Magical Child Group Youth Group, Gleno, Ermera and (2) Youth as Instrument for Peace Youth Group, Fatukahi Village, Fatuberliu Administrative Post, Manufahi Municipality Timor Leste Vision Grant Proposal.doc

Manatuto 8° 44′ 16″ S, 126° 22′ 23″ E [1] Manatuto location map [2] Manatuto (see Photo No. 54 and Map No. 20) is 30 miles (48 km.) at a bearing of 840° from Dili. It is east of the North Laclo River and on the coast. Manatuto is the capital of its province and is a posto town of about 30 to 40 stone houses. The posto is on a dominating conical hill which slopes gently northwards to the beach. Most of the town is built around the foot of this slope, but also extends a short distance along the coast eastwards to another isolated ridge which runs down to the sea. The two hills and town area have a fair amount of air cover from trees. Manatuto is important in that it commands a major road junction. The main motor road runs east/west through the town, and another runs inland between the posto hill and the river to Cribas with a horse track to Laclo. The area surrounding the town and two hills is absolutely flat and is covered with paddy fields (sawa). [3] ………. 10. Manatuto—Manatoetoe on chart (126° 01'E.) - See Photo No. 54: About 3 miles (5 km.) ESE of Cape Subao (Soebang on chart), is a fairly important place and the residence of a Government official. There is anchorage in about 30 fathoms (60 m.). The bottom in the anchorage is soft mud and not good holding ground. There is no landing place except on the beach, which is steep-to, and there is a heavy swell at times. Easy to approach. It can be easily distinguished by a white church with two towers and some houses built on a hill. Anchorage is with the light structure, a white conical masonry beacon, bearing about 210°. There are many reefs eastward from this anchorage. One Portuguese ship recently lost two anchors in the coral. Manatuto was the exporting place for the surrounding district, and a coastal steamer called monthly to collect cargo. Sheep and fowls were obtainable. It was used as an anchorage by the Japanese forces and they landed troops from here in shallow draught barges in which they also conveyed M.T. [4] Manatuto (Vila de Manatuto) – 27 December 1942 [5] Manatuto – current map [6] Callinan: A similar occurrence in November resulted in the murder by natives of the Administrator and his secretary at Manatuto. It was a strange coincidence that both these administrators at Aileu and Manatuto had attempted to remain strictly neutral, even to the extent of providing food and assistance to the Japanese and attempting to restrict the movement of Australians in their areas. When these murders were followed up by that of the Chefe de Posto at Fuiloro, in the east, the Portuguese saw there was no other alternative but to come to the Australians for active protection. [7] …….. 56. Administrator’s House [Posto], Manatuto [8] Administrative Posto - 8 August 2022 The best killing field for Japanese was in the eastern end where their developmental work left them open to attack, also where the natives, under the Administrator, Senhor Pires, were in general actively hostile to them. So I arranged for Laidlaw to move Nisbet's platoon to a position just west of the Baucau-Ossu road. In this way we would have a watch along the whole of the road from Manatuto to Baucau and down to Viqueque, and it was hoped to inflict greater casualties. [9] ……… Ayris: Ray Parry’s No. 5 Section was fortunate to have made the river mouth rendezvous. About a week earlier Parry had led a two-man reconnaissance patrol to a village near the north coastal town of Manatuto, to check out forty armed pro-Japanese Chinese who were said to be in the area. They reached the village after a long trek across mountains and through steep-sided gorges, only to find it ominously quiet. The Australians were creeping up on an administration building when they were confronted by about forty Chinese-Japanese, all carrying weapons. It was a tense moment which was relieved only when the two Australians turned about and returned to their section. [10] Cleary: Baucau, the second largest centre on the island, came in for special treatment, as did Manatuto, the coastal centre between Dili and Baucau. Manatuto was first bombed on 16 October when three Hudson bombers from 13 Squadron hit the town because their original target, Dili, was obscured by cloud. After dropping two 250-pound bombs and more than 30 incendiaries over the town the main buildings were seen to be ‘burning fiercely’. [11] …….. Two days later [19 November 1942?], a second mission flown by 31 Squadron had better luck when two Beaufighters strafed Japanese barracks and Timorese huts in a coordinated attack on the northern centres of Manatuto, Laleia, Vemasse, and Point Bigono, while another two strafed Baucau, Laga, and Point Lavai. All four returned safely. [12] 54. Manatuto = looking northeast (21/8/42 [13] Harry Wray: The town with the pro-Jap Comandante was Manatuto, and it was to this town that the burned R.A.A.F. officer was taken and removed from there by our Sapper Corporal. Manatuto was a seaport on the north of the country, which is the same side of the island as Dili, and to the east of Dili. An excellent motor road ran along the coast to Manatuto and in consequence it was a favourite Jap resort. They frequently made trips out from Dili, and in the later stages sent troops mounted on bikes for a jaunt out there. A party of our men from the Company, which relieved us had a most successful ambush on this road and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japs travelling along the road on bikes. One of the Aussies said that the Japs seemed unable to locate them and amused themselves firing back along the road in the direction from which they had come, while the Aussies were actually in front of them. Our troops were able to withdraw in comfort while the Japs fought imaginary assailants in their rear. This road was a favourite hunting ground for the men from The Bull’s Platoon who were in the area most of the time, and they made things lively for Jap passers-by. Manatuto was a favourite target for our bombers, not that there was much there to bomb apart from a small fleet of native fishing boats, but I suppose it was bombed from time to time in the hopes of catching the Japs there as it was such a favourite resort of theirs. I have mentioned the ‘queer blokes’, the two ex-Malayan police officers who trained natives in the eastern end of the island. One of them hid in the roof of a house in Manatuto and overheard the conversation of some Jap officers in the room below him. He gained some useful information I believe, as he was a Jap linguist of some ability. He escaped from the town without the Comandante or the Japs being any the wiser. As already mentioned the Comandante had always been pro-Jap and was on most friendly terms with them. This happy state continued until about the time we were in Mindelo district, say October/November 1942. One day a large party of Japs and numbers of their native followers went to Manatuto. They left during the afternoon and camped a short distance from the town. Our H.Q. was given information that the Japs were in Manatuto and sent a message to Australia with the news. Over came the bombers and gave the town a good doing over while the Japs watched from a safe distance. The moment the bombers went we assume the Japs must have said to themselves that it could be coincidence, and that the Comandante must be friendly to the Australians and have tipped them off to send the bombers. Whatever they thought they sent a party of their native adherents back and they chopped the Comandante into pieces in their own inimitable style. We were pleased to hear that our enemy the Comandante was no more but regretted that the Japs had left the town before the bombs fell. [14] …….. Back to Manatuto – now and again the Japs would take a trip inland from Manatuto to Ossu as the road from Manatuto was good for cars or bicycles. The ‘queer blokes’ heard that the Japs were on one of these jaunts to Ossu one night took a small army of the local natives they had trained to the town where the Japs were camped quite unsuspecting that any enemies were in the neighbourhood, and let their natives armed with Sten guns loose on the sleeping Japs. The natives had a thoroughly enjoyable night and caused considerable casualties we hoped among the confused and unprepared Japs. [15] Aerial Photo - Manatuto Village [16] REPORT ON JAP VISIT TO MANATUTO By T.C. Nisbet, Lieut. At Fatu Makeric, 12 September 1942 The information contained in this report although coming from Porto sources must be considered as near correct because all the reliable sources told the same story. Approx. 200 Japs went to MANATUTO in six launches or small boats on the morning of the 1st September. They disembarked at about 0300 hrs and encircled the town. At daybreak they commenced an intensive search hoping to find the aviator (F.O. Wadey, RAAF) as they are supposed to have persistently demanded to be shown his whereabouts. When they could not locate him they went to the Administrator’s House and demanded that he be brought to them. The Administrator at the tome was absent (Timor Revolt) and the Japs were interviewed by the Secretary who told them that without a direct order from the Government he couldn’t have the aviator brought to MANATUTO. The Japs then asked to be put on the phone to speak to the Porto Doctor at CALICAI telling him that unless the airman was [produced] they would go to CALICAI and destroy the hospital with their big guns – the Doctor refused replying that were plenty of mountains behind CALICAI. The Japs had a meal in the Administrator’s House and also carried out mortar practice. Corporal Loud reports seeing wheel marks which he states to have been made by a field piece of some sort. The Japs returned to Dili by boat leaving MANATUTO at approximately 1600 hrs on 1st September. There was no indication in any of the reports that the Japs took supplies of rice or tinned foodstuffs back with them. The Jap air force was represented by one fighter which was noticed stunting over MANATUTO in the morning and also in the afternoon. My conclusion is that the Jap did hope to nab the airman as his movement in this case is most unlike his methods against us (NB) and he had no reason to visit MANATUTO for food as the Administration in that province is most helpful towards the ENEMY in this respect as is born out by the behaviour of the troops while there. T.C. Nisbet 1700 hrs (NB) Six launches I consider hardly strong enough to indicate an attempt to ‘take’ the place against opposition. [17] Mitchell Bomber A47-3 Brought Down Over Manatuto “The following day, 22 September, four Mitchells were dispatched on a shipping sweep along the north coast of Timor. During a strafing attack on a barge in the harbour at Manatuto, which was narrow with steep banks on both sides, Flying Officer Allen Slater's aircraft (A47-3) crashed into the sea from 500 feet, about 400 metres from shore. All on board were killed. It was thought the enemy machine-gun emplacements were responsible, but A47-3 had been fouled by wires stretching between the headlands. Jim Henderson explained: ‘Our strategy was to dive in low and bomb the ships but the Japanese had anticipated this and strung wire ropes from bank to bank. The first B-25 hit the wire ropes and dived into the sea out of control. I was fortunate in that my turn to attack did not come until next day and 20 we were told to bomb from 6,000 feet’”. [18] Crew List Mitchell Bomber A47-3 – All Killed in Action [19] NAME AND RANK SERVICE NUMBER ROLE Flying Officer Allen Wallace Slater 414849 Captain Flying Officer Murray Scott Millett 426641 Navigator Flying Officer John Francis Daggett 434341 Gunnery Officer Flying Officer Bernard Alwin Wisniewski 423966 Gunnery Leader Officer Flight Sergeant Keith Rutherford Philipson 429669 2nd Pilot Flight Sergeant Desmond Frederick Harberger 435448 Air gunner All crew members are listed at the Adelaide River War Cemetery on the Northern Territory Memorial. Slater, Wisniewski and Millett on panel 7. Daggett on panel 6. Philips on panel 9. Harberger on panel 10. References [1] ASPT: 83. [2] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [3] ASPT: 31. [4] ASPT: 11. [5] ASPT: Map 20. [6] Adapted from MapCarta map – 20 January 2024. [7] Callinan, Independent Company: 173. [8] ASPT: Photo 56. [9] Callinan, Independent Company: 189-190. [10] Ayris, All the Bull’s men: 374. [11] Cleary, The men who came out of the ground: 248. //AWM64, 13 Squadron// [12] Cleary: The men who came out of the ground: 250. //AWM64 ORMF 0118, 31 Squadron// [13] ASPT: Photo 54. [14] Harry Wray memoir: 229-230. [15] Harry Wray memoir: 231. [16] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 90. [17] National Archives of Australia: NAA: AWM52, 25/3/2/4 [War diary] October 1941 – October 1942. [18] Bennett, Highest traditions: 219-220. [19] MILLETT, Murray Scott - (Flying Officer); Service Number - 426641; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Mitchell A47-3; Place - Timor Coast; Date - 22 September 1944. - NAA: A705, 166/27/572. [Digitised]

Kevin Stanley Curran (10 December 1920 – 20 April 1978) - VX47342 I was attracted to the story of Kevin Curran by a former friend (since passed away) who grew up in post WWII Melbourne and one of whose favourite memories was watching Kevin Curran play for Hawthorn. My friend knew about Curran’s wartime heroics because they were well publicised in the press; and he thought that the way Curran played football epitomised his fighting spirit. This narration of Kevin Curran’s life has been prepared from material in the public domain – newspaper reports (some quoting his own words), articles and correspondence from the 2/2 Commando Association’s Courierand books on the Timor campaign that describe Curran’s activities and actions. Gordon and Kevin Curran Pte. Curran, Gordon Thomas VX47360 11 Platoon, B Company, 2/40 Infantry Battalion KIA Baboe 21/2/42 (DVA lists 22/2/42). Cpl. Curran, Kevin Stanley VX47342 No.2 Section, A Platoon, 2/2 Independent Company. [1] EARLY YEARS Kevin Curran played just 85 games for Hawthorn, but his story from recruitment to captaincy was so remarkable and full of incident it could be mistaken for a movie script. Curran was just a raw 18-year-old playing for Traralgon when chairman of selectors and former great Albert Hyde visited to see another player called Jones. He wasn’t impressed with Jones, but definitely was with Curran, and asked him to join Hawthorn on the spot. Kevin was less than enthusiastic. He was happy on his farm hunting rabbits and foxes, and it was only after his local team had a bye and getting permission from his father he travelled to the big smoke to join the ‘Mayblooms’ as Hawthorn were then popularly known. Hyde asked the selectors to give Curran plenty of time in the reserves to acclimatise to league football, but his performances were so good he was eventually promoted for the Round 7 match against Fitzroy at Brunswick Street. However, the vice-president at Hawthorn, Jim McGuire, was unhappy, as the player Curran had replaced was one of his employees. Amazingly, McGuire took out his anger on Curran – abusing one of his own players, an 18-year-old making his VFL debut no less, before the ball was even bounced. Not surprisingly, Curran was overawed and struggled. Hyde quit the selection committee in disgust the following week, and Curran, possibly disillusioned with the treatment, enlisted in the army. ENLISTED IN THE ARMY Kevin and his brother Gordon enlisted on the same day, 23rd July 1940. After being assigned to the same training battalion, they went their separate ways in March 1941 with Kevin, by then an Acting Corporal, volunteering to be tested for a special assignment at the 7th Infantry Training Centre, Foster on Wilson’s Promontory and Gordon being transferred to the 2/40 Battalion. Kevin proved his worth in the commando training cadre at Foster and was taken on the strength of the 2nd Independent Company on 14th July 1941 becoming a member of No. 2 Section of A Platoon. The brothers were temporarily reunited in Darwin on 8th December 1941 when their two units embarked on the troop ship Zealandia for transport to Koepang in Dutch West Timor as part of the ignominiously named Sparrow Force. They separated again a few days later when the 2nd Independent Company departed by sea to occupy Dili in Portuguese East Timor. PREPARATIONS TO DEFEND THE DILI AIRFIELD Curran’s Section under the command of Lieutenant Gerry McKenzie was assigned to the defense of the Dili airfield: “As the Australians grew more comfortable with their surroundings, they soon joked and skylarked their way through local settlements along the hills. They were making an effort to learn the local languages, which was avoided by the Portuguese. Corporal Kevin Curran employed a novel technique for breaking the ice with the locals. Pulling back his ears with both hands, Curran's false teeth would emerge from his mouth and then drop into his hands. The villagers would yell and laugh and come from all around to see Curran's magic”. [2] Doig gave a good description of the defensive preparations at the airfield and Curran’s role in preparing them: “… McKenzie returned to the drome and set about constructing his own defences. A Bren strong post forward, reached by a tunnel from the deep storm drain, camouflaged by ‘sling nets’ off the grounded Japanese Nanyei Maru freighter. A Bren post held back on the rough apex where diagonal runways met, to cover our demolition post and signal pit and give depth and also flank protection to our forward post. Sub-section weapon slits supporting the Brens, the whole system linked by crawl trenches, controlled from a deep command post, centrally sited. The whole earthworks being revetted by the large quantity of hewn foot square 40 ft. lengths of hardwood (the Portuguese had conveniently brought there to build a modern hangar) and which was ‘taboo’ thereby making it a sheer delight to the hefty Curran and crafty Delbridge and their subsections to axe into suitable sizes with competitive glee. Having thrilled the adjutant with their ‘fire power’ and convinced him of their marksmanship, No. 2 Section was given a 40 deg. arc of responsibility on the drome perimeter and permitted to cut fields of fire. This turned into ‘wails of misfire’ when shortly it was discovered that a considerable acreage of ‘valuable palms’ were swiftly felled and placed to roof over pits and posts, now bending under the weight of sand and bristling with cactus and carefully transplanted clumps of tussock, kunai grass and the like, for camouflage”. [3] THE JAPANESE ATTACK Wray provides an excellent account of the defence and demolition of the airfield on the night of the 19th February 1942 and Curran’s key role in what happened: “At the aerodrome McKenzie was not satisfied with Van Straaten's contention that the shelling was coming from a Japanese submarine and that it was only part of a minor raid. From his position McKenzie could see a destroyer in the harbour and the silhouette of a tramp steamer standing off shore opposite the aerodrome. The rattle of chains as the ships unloaded could be heard clearly across the harbour. He again telephoned Dutch Headquarters, but Van Straaten insisted that the shelling was coming from a submarine and that, at most, the Japanese would land a raiding party to attack the aerodrome, then withdraw. Still not satisfied, and preferring to believe the evidence of his own eyes and ears, McKenzie sent out a further patrol under Corporal Kevin Curran (subsequently captain of Hawthorn Football Club in Victoria) to check for enemy movements between the aerodrome and the Comoro River. The patrol made its way across the Comoro River through a darkened, white- walled Arab village and onto the main Dili road. The men waited until 2 a.m. and as all seemed quiet they returned to the aerodrome. … Back at the aerodrome McKenzie sent Corporal Curran out to check all positions and ensure that his troops were ready for action. In the dark it took Curran about an hour to make the circuit of the defensive positions, ever watchful for Japanese infiltrators, and to satisfy himself that all was well. McKenzie's section - a small number of men in fixed positions faced by a well-equipped, numerically superior foe - was in a difficult position. Once the sun rose the Japanese would be able to blast the defenders out with mortar and machine-gun fire. However, McKenzie had his orders. The aerodrome was to be held as long as possible. If McKenzie's small force had to withdraw, the aerodrome must be destroyed. … There were constant skirmishes as the Japanese probed the Australian defences looking for weaknesses. Then fighting flared near the main defensive positions around the hangars. At one stage Corporal Curran and the remaining members of his subsection were cut off from the rest of the Australians by the Japanese attack but they fought their way back at bayonet point, Curran killing five Japanese, including an officer. With concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire the Australians fought off parties of Japanese attackers repeatedly, but shortly before dawn McKenzie decided that he could hold the aerodrome no longer. The Japanese were pushing down on the defenders, the Dutch reinforcements had not arrived and with the coming of daylight the Japanese would overwhelm the Australians who would be trapped within a small defensive perimeter. The small force was cut off from the Dutch force and from Independent Company Headquarters and could get no orders from above. In view of these insurmountable difficulties McKenzie decided to blow up the runways, demolish the stores and withdraw his troops by fire and movement through the craters, which would be left by the demolition. … To cover the withdrawal, McKenzie arranged a dawn diversion using privates Poynton and Thomas, armed with tommy-guns, and privates Hudson and Hasson, who had rifles. Corporal Curran was to lead the demolition party. At this time Curran's subsection was in action using grenades against Japanese parties attempting to force their way into the Australian positions along a large drain near the hangars. Just before dawn Hasson was forced from his position. The other three members of the covering group counter-attacked, their intense machine-gun fire creating havoc among the streams of Japanese trying to force their way across a plank over the drain by the hangar. Under cover of this counter-attack the sappers fired the demolition charges. They had arranged several different means of detonation, so despite the Japanese attempts to cut the wires the charges all went off. As the aerodrome exploded in clouds of dust and smoke the Japanese machine-gun fire reached a crescendo. Despite the concentrated fire most of the Australians managed to take advantage of the confusion to escape into the half-light. … In the final withdrawal it was every man for himself, and the section split up, men making their way individually or in small groups through the Japanese fire, moving from crater to crater across the aerodrome. The main body reformed at a pre- arranged rendezvous point in a recently abandoned Dutch artillery position some distance from the aerodrome. Lieutenant McKenzie, accompanied by Private Hooper, set off for Dili in an attempt to join up with Captain Callinan, while Corporal Curran, believing correctly that news of the Japanese landing was not known to Company Headquarters, set off with his remaining subsection and the sappers for the camp at Three Spurs. … After leaving the aerodrome early on 20 February Corporal Curran, sappers R.S. Richards and R. Williamson had gone only about a kilometre when they almost walked into a Japanese unit headquarters. They went to ground and had to lie all day under the blazing tropical sun, without water and only metres from the Japanese. After nightfall they continued their trek, … By day they had to keep under cover, hiding from low-flying Japanese planes, and by night move on as best as they could. They finally arrived at Three Spurs on 27 February to find preparations for the abandonment of the position under way”. [4] GORDON CURRAN KILLED IN ACTION In an amazing parallel to Kevin’s exploits in Dili, his brother Gordon performed similar heroics in the Australian defence of Koepang a couple of days later, but tragically did not survive. “A number of veterans retell the story of the action of G.T. Curran, who was killed by a sniper as he single-handedly wiped out two enemy machine-gun posts by deliberately walking straight into their line of fire”. [5] Gordon service record shows that he was originally posted as missing then as a Prisoner of War (POW). It was not until the end of the war that released POWs from the 2/40 revealed his fate and his wife and parents were notified. “Private Gordon Curran, a soldier from Traralgon, who had been posted missing in Timor for a lengthy period, has now been officially declared killed in action. He is a son of Mr. and Mrs. Jack Curran of Argyle Street, Traralgon. A sister, Mrs. J. Turnbull, resides in Morwell. The young soldier was a smart footballer prior to joining the services, and was employed at the Traralgon Gasworks. A young wife and son are the chief bereaved”. [6] SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN TIMOR Kevin Curran made significant contributions later in the Timor campaign as Wray records: “Any advance of the Japanese force from Dutch Timor - the more immediate of the two threats - would doubtless be through Memo and Maliana and from there to Cailaco, Marobo or Bobonaro. Dexter had to ensure that each possibility was covered: 1 Section, under Corporal Doug Fullarton at Cailaco, was to watch the approaches to the craggy fortress; 2 Section, under Corporal Kevin Curran at Maliana, was to keep contact with the enemy; and 3 Section, under Lieutenant Clarrie Turner, was to watch the Bobonaro track. Dexter and Curran had reconnoitred beyond Memo to the border on 8 August when arrangements were made with the Dutch about the appropriate action to take in the event of an enemy advance. On 11 August Curran made contact with about 400 Japanese soldiers crossing the Malibaku River to Memo. Next day he opposed their move to Maliana before withdrawing to Lone Tree Saddle where Dexter's ambush delayed the enemy later that night. The Japanese turned towards Bobonaro with 3 Section on their flank. Laden with command of the Dutch, Dexter led his charges through a mountain pass; they were on their way quickly and took no further part in proceedings”. [7] PROMOTED IN THE FIELD AND DECORATED The Australian force was re-organised in November: “In November Callinan took over the command of the force from Spence, with the ever-reliable Baldwin as his second-in- command. For reasons of military security the name of the force was changed on 18 November 1942 from Sparrow Force to Lancer Force. Laidlaw was promoted to major and appointed Commanding Officer of the 2/2 with Turton, now promoted to captain, as his second-in-command. At the same time Dexter, Nisbet and McKenzie were also promoted to the rank of captain - Dexter leading A Platoon, Nisbet assuming command of B Platoon and McKenzie taking over C Platoon from Boyland. … After Captain McKenzie was detached from 2 Section to his new role, and Lieutenant Turner of 3 Section retired sick, corporals Fullarton (1 Section), Curran (2 Section) and Palmer (3 Section) took over the sections and commanded them during the final months of frequent fighting. In B Platoon Sergeant M. Morgan was posted to higher duties. Largely as a result of their actions during the Timor campaign Smyth, Denman, Fullarton, Curran and Palmer all received commissions [as lieutenants]”. [8] On his return to Australia, Kevin Curran was awarded a Mention in Despatches for “Exceptional services in the S.W.P. [South West Pacific] Area”; it could reasonably considered that he deserved more. [9] BACK IN AUSTRALIA After being evacuated from Timor in mid-December 1942, the 2nd Independent Company were in a period of hiatus before being given a new assignment. Men of the 2/2nd A Troop are pictured at Larrimah after their return from Timor – Kevin Curran in the centre of the front row [10] Eric Smyth says that one ‘irregularity’ which appeared to stick in the Army’s craw was that some 2/2nd men had received field commissions in Timor without going through an officers’ training school. Smyth, who was one of them, said when word went out that they would be required to do the course at Canungra, there were serious rumblings of discontent. However the Army insisted – no course, no commission. The first to be called in was Kevin Curran, a Victorian footballer who weighed a hundred kilograms and who was a good fighter, to boot. Eric Smyth: “He was a clumsy sort of bloke but he had very good reactions. A staff sergeant was teaching him how to use a bayonet, which was rather ironic given that Kevin had used one in the fight for Dili Airfield. The staff sergeant made the mistake of telling him that as far as the bayonet was concerned, he was too clumsy to be any good. This must have been too much for Kevin to swallow because he dropped the staff sergeant on the spot. He was placed on a charge and they sent him back to the unit while it was decided what to do with him”. [11] DOIG’S ‘STRAIGHT MAN’ The 2/2 spent some time in Canungra re-training. Doig did his best to lighten proceedings using Curran as his straight man: “As a training centre Canungra was a thorough heap of bastardry, peopled by a bundle of diced officers from the Middle East campaigns. Food was poor, and generally living conditions damnable. It seemed that they were trying to approximate the conditions of the Kokoda Trail. The Company was divided into three Cadres, namely Officers, N.C.O. 's and O.R's. We officers were being instructed by a professional Captain who had been to Duntroon, but with no overseas service. I'm afraid we were inclined to treat him as some sort of joke. The weather was warmish and to sit down in the shade of a tree after a lunch listening to boring lectures by a bloke who wouldn't know shit from honey, was sleep inducing. One afternoon, Lt. Kevin Curran, who was a terrific reactor to a good joke was playing with a piece of stick, and I said, ‘I'll tell you a yarn on that stick. It went like this. A bloke was boasting in the bar that blindfolded he could tell any piece of timber just by its smell. Bets were made and the blindfolded chap was tried out on different pieces of wood, which he accurately identified. Then the barmaid took over, got a used match, wiped it on her private parts, and handed it over for identification. This chap took about three deep sniffs and said, 'I'm absolutely sure it's either pussy willow or a splinter off the outhouse seat’. Kevin went into his usual paroxysm of laughter with tears streaming down his cheeks. The instructor wanted to know what was going on. Nobody said a thing and he stalked away mumbling under this breath about uncouth animals. We never saw him again”. [12] ANOTHER CLOSE CALL IN NEW GUINEA The 2/2nd then campaigned in New Guinea; Doig described a particular incident in which Curran again paid a lead role: “Another' patrol to go out on New Year's Day was the Transport Section under Lt. Kev Curran, This was the longest patrol, to Japa and beyond. It took two canoe loads to cross the river (Lt. Curran couldn't swim and after donning a couple of Mae West lifejackets his instructions to the canoe gang which included three top grade swimmers was to save him first and bugger the weapons). They safely made it over the river and headed in the direction of Topopo on the way to Japa. They reached Topopo on January 3rd and onto Japa the next day, returning to Topopo on the 5th January. On the night of 5th-6th January the Japs returned to Topopo, perhaps led by natives who had been seen in the area and the Australians were stranded on a knoll in Topopo commanding all the approaches. At dawn when the patrol was about to stand to the Japs opened with heavy fire from rifles and machine guns at about ten yards; as usual their shooting did not measure up to their fieldcraft and all the encircled men made their escape by doing a back flip over the side of the ridge through the Japs and into the surrounding jungle where several fired on the enemy from vantage points. Sgt. Cash who was in charge of the natives on a knoll further back fired his Bren gun into the Japs and got many. The Australians then rendezvoused at Damaru, except for five who were missing for some days. The Jap had achieved complete surprise and had superior fire power but had wounded one man and slightly wounded four others. The patrol later reported that the distance they had to travel to Japa plus the fact that they had to use the same track on the return journey had enabled the Kanakas to inform the enemy of their movements”. [13] Ramu River, Faita Area, New Guinea. 1944-01-07. Corporal K.J. Monk Of Gippsland, Vic (1) And VX47342 Lieutenant K. S. Curran Of Glenferrie, Vic (2) Of The 2/2nd Commando Squadron being ferried back to camp by natives in their dugout canoe after an eight day patrol into Japanese territory towards Bogadjim. [14] Curran told what happened in his own words: “The Jap whistle was the signal and then all hell broke loose. The Nips used grenades – there seemed to be hundreds of them – a woodpecker [medium machine gun], machine guns, rifles and sub-machine guns. Our men jumped up half-dressed and hurled grenades. There were squeals from the Japs. The natives who had spoken to our boys kept calling ‘White fella him come over this place’. It was just as well our boys did not get at them. We have no idea of the Jap casualties, but from the fire we sent out in those wild few minutes they must have been heavy.” In circumstances much the same as what occurred after Dili aerodrome fire fight: “… Lieutenant Curran lay in a hole within earshot of the Japs for more than eight hours. The rest of the men had dispersed”. [15] Curran’s service record states that he was ‘Wounded, remained on duty’ in this incident. Lamarien, Henry Reid Bay, New Britain, 28 July 1945. A group of officers of 2/2 Commando Squadron. Kevin Curran can’t be missed in the centre of the back row [16] WARTIME FOOTBALL IN NEW GUINEA In quieter times towards the end of the war, football became a prime leisure time activity: “The Unit got together a very good looking Aussie Rules footy side under Lt. Kevin Curran who was a Vic. League player with Hawthorn. They thumped most of the units in our area very comfortably. The news of our successes spread to Wau and we got a challenge from 7th Inf. Bn. to play them on the Wau strip. Their sports officer's first remark was how much did we want to back ourselves for. Kevin Curran made a few enquiries and found out that this 7th Bn. mob were hot stuff and had trounced nearly every unit while in Australia. Their coach was their C.O. who was an ex V.F.L. player and his team had been all allocated good jobs such as batman, drivers etc. so they were always in a position to train together and fed well. They had never had malaria whereas half our mob was still suffering the effects of this debilitating disease. We smartly cried off any punting. It's just as well we did. When we played they ate us without salt. I counted their side a dozen times to see that they didn't have at least twenty men playing, they seemed to have so many loose men all over the field”. [17] CURRAN RETURNS TO PLAY WITH HAWTHORN After joining Hawthorn from Traralgon in 1940, Kevin Curran managed just one senior game before embarking on five years of military service, much of it abroad. When he resumed in the VFL in 1946, by this time aged 26, he immediately impressed as a follower who combined an almost recklessly rugged approach with considerable skill; he became known as the ‘foundation stone’ of the Hawthorn team. [18] In 1946 he made a return to Hawthorn and the following season represented Victoria at the Hobart Carnival, the first on 9 interstate appearances during his career. He won Hawthorn's best and fairest award in 1948, also winning the Simpson Medal for his performance against West Australian in an interstate game. Curran captained Hawthorn for the 1950 season and his appointment saw a disgruntled Alec Albiston leave the club feeling he should have got the job. When he retired at the end of the following year he had played a total of 85 VFL games and booted nine goals. 1946 Keith Shea returned to coach the Hawks again in 1946, but this time in a non-playing role as Jim Bohan was formally appointed captain. Confidence was also boosted by the return of Col Austen, Kevin Curran and Wally Culpitt with the end of World War II. … The season ended with another loss to Fitzroy in front of just 6,000 at Glenferrie Oval, and another wooden spoon, the 7th since Hawthorn had entered the league in 1925. The new recruits struggled and not one of the 14 players to debut would go on to play more than 50 games. Jim Bohan and Jack McLeod played well enough to represent the Big V, and Kevin Curran won the most determined player award, but it was a bitterly disappointing season that saw Shea sacked at season's end. Hawthorn Football Club – season 1946 – Kevin Curran is in the middle of the back row [19] 1947 1947 was another lack lustre year for Hawthorn and they again just avoided the ‘wooden spoon’. Curran played well enough to retain his spot in the Victorian team that won the mid-season interstate carnival in Hobart. Kevin’s predilection for a beer or two after the match was recalled many years later by Geelong legend Fred Flanagan: “At one carnival - I think it was 1947 in Hobart - a Hawthorn player named Kevin Curran got stuck between his door and the wall one night after a few too many. I was rooming with Leo Turner in the next room and Curran's roommate, Wally Culpitt, woke us up with his yelling. It was quite unusual. But he was a terrific bloke, Curran, and a commando in the war”. [20] Victoria’s team for the 1947 Hobart Carnival – Kevin Curran is in the back row as usual [21] 1948 The Hawks began 1948 full of hope and confidence, but with a list short on height and big bodies. Alec Albiston knew he would be forced to use players out of position and hope that teamwork would get his side through. … War hero Kevin Curran was superb, winning the club champion award as well as the Simpson Medal as best player for Victoria against the Sandgropers. Wally Culpitt was also selected for the state game, whilst mates and leaders Col Austen and Albiston finished 2nd and 3rd in the best and fairest. [22] Doig recalled Curran’s visit to Perth with the Victorian football team: “Perhaps one of the most outstanding early social events was, the visit of Kevin Curran to W.A. in 1948 with the Victorian State Football team. Big Curran was one of the younger members' of the team, which included oldsters like Jack Graham and Jack Dyer (Capt. Blood). Kevin reckoned the fitness level was much below average and most of them had to use the lifts in the old Shaftesbury Hotel where they were housed, as the stairs were beyond them. A special evening was arranged by the Association for him to meet as many of the boys as possible. It was held on the Tuesday evening after the second game between the Vics and W.A. Kevin had won the Simpson Medal for fairest and best player of the Saturday match but was injured in the Tuesday game when he had a confrontation with a goal post. The turnout was nothing short of amazing with over sixty present, as well as many members of the Press”. Left to right: Jack Denman, Tom Nesbit, Jack Carey, Bruce Dooland, Kevin Curran, Joe Poynton, Colin Doig “We also welcomed Bruce Dooland who was playing for South Australia in the baseball carnival at the same time. Tom Nisbet was an outstanding member of the W.A. side also. To add a further dimension to our sporting prowess Jack Carey had been selected in the W.A. Amateur Football side, which was playing in an Australia-wide carnival. What a line up for our Unit Association! A lot of the Victorian players accompanied Kevin to this night out which was well catered for in the way of eats and beer. Kevin was like a king holding court with his courtiers. The boys made a big fuss of him and he lapped it up. Probably the best part of Kevin's visit was the night he arrived at Perth Airport when a lot of the boys were there to welcome him, whisked him away and headed for an old haunt of ours on the Esplanade foreshore. Battles were fought and football matches replayed until the early hours of the morning when we poured him into bed at the hotel. The vigorous night out did not seem to affect the big man's footy ability next day as he was kicking the ball about 60-70 yards every boot”. [23] 1949 Hawthorn entered 1949 with Alec Albiston at the helm as captain-coach for the third year in succession. … Hawthorn was thumped by Geelong by over 14 goals the following week, and then trailed the lowly Saints by 39 points at half time. Albiston finally lost it, telling the players to hand in their jumpers unless they started performing. He also read out a telegram from champ Kevin Curran, who was in hospital with a broken jaw. Inspired, the Hawks rallied for a sensational 8 point victory, kicking 10 goals to 3 in the second half. … Lack of forward options was killing the Hawks - they failed to kick above 100 points all season, and on seven occasions didn't even get above 50. However, individuals such as Albiston, Col Austen and Curran continued to shine. All were selected in Victoria's 87 point win over Western Australia, in which Coleman kicked 7 goals. [24] 1950 A change of jumper, a change of coach, a former captain and the best player quitting the club, threats of player strikes, supporter outrage and not a single victory. 1950 is remembered by Hawthorn supporters for all the wrong reasons. At the end of 1949 Alec Albiston was told he would not be coaching the club the following year, but was still very much required as a player. This was fine with Albiston, and the board, led by new president David Prentice, eventually settled on Bob McCaskill as a replacement. McCaskill had played for the Tigers in the 1920's, and after a successful spell with Sandhurst in the Bendigo League had managed to coach North Melbourne to the finals for the first time. McCaskill immediately set about changing the club, starting with the jumper. The guernsey was changed from brown with a gold V to brown and gold stripes to make the players look more physically imposing. McCaskill also said in an interview he believed the Hawks could make the four, and the club had a 'splendid leader in Alec Albiston'. Certainly on reading that last quote it would seem pretty clear Albiston was considered the leader and captain for 1950. Indeed, Albiston swore he was promised this role by the board when he was told his services as coach were no longer required. Despite several tempting offers to captain-coach in the country, he ignored his good mate Col Austen's advice and decided to stay at Glenferrie. Albiston missed the early practice matches due to cricket commitments, and in that time McCaskill was greatly impressed by the tough play of Kevin Curran. A former war hero, Curran was a big man who threw his body around, a very different style of play to the fast roving of Albiston who loved a goal so much he was nicknamed ‘Hungry’. The new coach believed Hawthorn needed a more imposing figure as captain, and so it was announced on April 11 that Kevin Curran had been appointed captain by unanimous vote of the selection committee. To say the manure hit the fan would be the understatement of the century. Albiston and Austen immediately asked for clearances, Alec coming out the following day and slamming the selection committee in the press, calling it 'one of the dirtiest things I have ever had put over me'. Players threatened to strike in support of Albiston, and many supporters called for the board to resign. The selection committee issued a statement saying Albiston and made a mistake and no promise had been made. Hawthorn, a club that had maintained a low profile since it joined the VFL, was suddenly all over the papers. Albiston and Austen turned up to the final practice match on April 15 and were told they were no longer required. McCaskill had said his position was untenable with his players making statements in the press, and either they went or he went. That night there was the sad sight of Austen and Albiston standing outside Glenferrie Oval in tears. Two of the club's greatest players who genuinely loved the club had been told they weren't wanted - a tragic series of events. Just whether Albiston was ever offered the captaincy is still a matter of debate. Indeed, some people put his demotion down to religion. Albiston's father Walter had founded the Victorian Protestant Federation in 1918, whilst Curran and McCaskill were Catholic. The allegations have never been proven, although sectarian difference did exist within the club at the time. Albiston and Austen were cleared to North Melbourne and Richmond respectively, and all of a sudden the club was without its two best players just a week before the season started. Given its reliance on so few already, the team was always going to struggle. The club lost its opening three games by a combined margin of 258 points and only 7.25 from Collingwood in Round 4 prevented another caning. The side was nothing short of pathetic, getting smashed every week and suffering real embarrassment when The Argus suggested other clubs give Hawthorn financial assistance. New captain Curran was already on the sidelines, suspended for four weeks for attempting to kick Tom Miller of Footscray. “New captain disqualified MELBOURNE, Wed: Kevin Curran, Hawthorn’s newly appointed captain and interstate follower, was disqualified for four matches last night by the Victorian League tribunal. Curran was found guilty of misconduct in attempting to kick Footscray ruckman Tom Miller during the final quarter of the Footscray Hawthorn match on Saturday. … Before the charge against him was sustained, Curran said in a statement to the tribunal: ‘I would rather get out of the game then be found guilty of kicking anyone’”. [25] His former 2/2nd comrades sprang to his defence against this charge: “Former W.A. commandos up in arms Former W.A. members of the famous 2/2nd Australian Commando Squadron are up in arms again. This time they are fighting a verbal battle - in defence for of a former officer of the unit, interstate footballer Kevin Curran. Curran now captain at Melbourne League football club Hawthorn was recently outed for two months [sic] for kicking an opponent. Instantly, Curran’s Army comrades in all states took up the cudgels on his behalf. One of the most outspoken was Western Australian Archie Campbell - a fellow officer of Curran’s – who is currently living in Melbourne. Campbell who roved road for West Perth during seasons 1933 to 1940 said that he had played in many Army games with Curran over several years and had never seen him do anything unsporting. He described it as ‘unbelievable that such a scrupulously fair player as Curran would deliberately kick an opponent. Campbell’s sentiments echoed in Perth today by another squadron officer, Colin Doig. Other W.A. members of unit have written letters of protest on Kev Curran’s disqualification”. [26] His first game back was against Austen's new side Richmond. Austen had expressed doubts about Curran's tactical ability in the lead-up to the game, and Curran decided to take matters into his own hands. Kevin lined Austen up from 40 metres away and flattened him after kicking the footy away, resulting in another 4 week suspension. Although contact was apparently minor, Curran probably didn't help his chances by stating ‘If I was going to do something, I would pick a place - not in the open’”. [27] The Age report of the tribunal hearing where Curran was suspended makes interesting reading: “Curran Suspended for Four Matches The V.F.L. Tribunal suspended hawthorn captain, Kevin Curran, for four matches last night for charging Richmond back man, Col Austen, in Saturday's Hawthorn Richmond game. … After the Tribunal has announced its decision on Curran, Austen, who played with Hawthorn last year, shook hands with him and said, ‘Bad luck, Kev'. During the hearing Austen said he had been good friends with Curran while at Hawthorn, and there was no reason why they should not be good friends now. Curran refused to comment on the disqualification. The game on Saturday was Curran’s first after a four weeks term of suspension attempting to kick Tom Miller (Footscray) on May 6. Last Saturday he was reported by field umpire Hogan and boundary umpires Cranch and Lee for charging Austen in the centre of the ground after Austen had disposed of the ball in the last quarter. Announcing the tribunal’s decision, the Chairman (Mr T. Hammond) said Curran had ample opportunity to slow down before colliding with the Richmond player. Field umpire Hogan said Austen had kicked the ball from the centre of the ground and taken for five paces when Curran ran in and bumped him to the ground. He said Curran could have stopped colliding with Austen. He was about seven or eight yards away when the ball was kicked. Hogan said he himself was about 15 yards away when the incident occurred. ‘Other players converged on the spot and I ran in between them’, he said. ‘I had not the slightest doubt what had happened’. Boundary umpire Cranch said after Austen kicked the ball Curran kept on running at him and crashed him down. Boundary by Lee said Curran had deliberately charged Austin from about 10 yards away. Austen said the only thing he could remember about incident was kicking the ball and then getting bumped from the side and going down. He was slowing down at the time and did not travel more than a pace or two before being bumped. The bump was not hard enough to hurt, Austen added. The player’s advocate, Mr. Dan Minogue, then asked permission to ask Austen if there was any personal feeling between the two players. Mr Hammond said the question could be asked if it had any bearing on the case. Asked the question, Austen said he had been the best of friends with Curran while he was at Hawthorn and there was no reason why they should be anything but the best of friends. Curran said he was moving to intercept Austen when that player had the ball and after he had disposed of it could not pull up and ran into him. ‘If I had wanted to do something, I would not do it while everyone was watching me. I have nothing against Austen’”. [28] 1951 After the disastrous winter of 1950 only two changes were made to the to the senior list, which, not surprisingly, subjected the club to a fair amount of criticism. But coach Bob McCaskill had faith in the team and stuck to his guns. … Peter O'Donohue was formerly appointed captain, Kevin Curran choosing to concentrate on playing after his turbulent reign as skipper the previous year. … John Kennedy Snr won his second Best and Fairest from as many starts, starring along with fellow second year player Roy Simmonds. Kennedy and Curran represented Victoria against both South Australia and Western Australia. [29] “Bulldozer ruckman” [30] Curran was Victoria’s best player in a narrow defeat to South Australia in heavy conditions in Adelaide: “South Australia gave Victoria a five-goal start from the end of the first quarter at Adelaide Oval today, then sailed in to outslug, outplay, and finally defeat them by six after one of the comebacks for many a year. … [Kevin] Rose, Victoria’s high powered dynamo at centre began the third term as if he intended to win the game on his own efforts. But he and ruckman Kev Curran were the only two in the team who looked as if they would still be kicking on at the finish. … Curran’s goal gave the lead back to Victoria – four points – just before the end of the third term, but the Victorians had had it. … Victoria’s best was ruckman Kev Curran. So burly he looked above himself in weight, he was going on at the finish when others were run into the ground”. [31] CURRAN GOES TO BENDIGO Ex Hawthorn captain Kevin Curran left the club to accept the position of playing coach of Sandhurst and to take over the Athenaeum Hotel in Bendigo, robbing the team of one of its best players. Ironically, Sandhurst was where McCaskill [the new Hawthorn coach] had honed his coaching technique, winning nine premierships, six of them in a row. Sandhurst would also be where Hawthorn recruited Graham Arthur and Brendan Edwards a few years later, with no small thanks going to Curran. [32] Curran won the 1952 Michelsen Medal, while playing in Bendigo for the Sandhurst Football Club. But after the glory came heartbreak, when Sandhurst suffered four consecutive grand final defeats from 1952-55, the most gut-wrenching a one-point loss to South Bendigo in 1955. The 1950s are widely considered the golden age of Bendigo football. In the days before car ownership and television began diverting attention to Melbourne, the Bendigo grandstand would heave and crowds would pack six and seven-deep to watch heroes such as Noel McMahen, a Melbourne premiership captain who went to Rochester. In 1955, spectators saw arguably Bendigo's greatest individual performance in the grand final between the Queen Elizabeth Oval co-tenants, Sandhurst and South Bendigo. Kevin Curran was still playing-coach at Sandhurst. South Bendigo burst ahead early and led by nine goals to one at half time. Teeming rain seemed to rule out Sandhurst's chance before Curran imposed his will on the game. Like a “bullock dragging a stump”, he hauled the Dragons within sight of victory before South Bendigo held on to win by a point. In the grand final two years later, Eaglehawk defeated Kyneton by five goals before 16,600, an attendance that remains the record. [33] Curran was also later inducted into the Bendigo Football League's Hall of Fame. [34] LIFE AFTER FOOTBALL A letter to the Courier from 2/2 compatriot ‘Blue’ Sargent in March 1967 summarised Curran’s life after football: “I haven't seen any of the old mob for a long time now apart from the old Curran. I call in every now and again to hear the latest on who has passed this way. He's usually got some news regarding someone from the Unit. I've never seen a man do so much for others as does this Kev Curran. He's a very active Bendigo City Councillor and always off to do something or other for one of his ratepayers. He's also very active with the Scouts, Legacy and every other damn worthwhile organisation in Bendigo. He's standing as a Labor candidate for the Upper House in the forthcoming State elections. Bendigo Province, which covers a large section of central Victoria includes the Shires of Haywood, Marong, Strathfieldsaye, Maldon, Carisbrook, Castlemaine, Maryborough, Daylesford, Kyneton, Woodend, Gisborne, Lancefield, Heathcote, Avenel, Seymour and Kilmore so if the lad should happen to get elected, as he richly deserves, he would have quite an area to look after and believe me he's just the boy who could handle it. … Kev Curran and I have talked about the grand Safari and are eager to participate. Perhaps Bendigo could be a night stop either to or from Sydney. Good accommodation is available and an excellent barbecue could be arranged”. [35] VALE KEVIN CURRAN Col Doig recorded the sudden and unexpected passing of Kevin Curran in April 1978: [36] REFERENCES [1] http://www.sparrowbook.com/#!gordon-and-kevin-curran/zoom/c50a/i22211jt [2] Paul Cleary. – The men who came out of the ground: a gripping account of Australia’s first commando campaign, Timor 1942. – Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: 35. [3] Colin Doig. – A history of the 2nd Independent Company and 2/2 Commando Squadron. – Perth: [The Author], 1986: 38. [4] Christopher C.H. Wray. - Timor 1942 : Australian commandos at war with the Japanese. - Hawthorn, Vic. : Hutchinson Australia, 1987: 65-67. [5] Peter Henning. - Doomed battalion: mateship and leadership in war and captivity: the Australian 2/40 Battalion 1940-45. - St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1995: 95. [6] Morwell Advertiser, Thursday 4 October 1945: page 6. [7] Wray, Timor 1942 : 118-119. [8] Wray, Timor 1942 : 149-150. [9] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1569666 [10] Cyril Ayris. - All the Bull's men : No. 2 Australian Independent Company (2/2nd Commando Squadron). - [Perth, W.A.] : 2/2nd Commando Association, 2006: 387. [11] Ayris, All the Bull's men : 390. [12] Col Doig. – The ramblings of a ratbag. – [Perth: The Author], 1989: 109. [13] Doig, A history of the 2nd Independent Company … : 215. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C19074 [15] “Betrayed patrol fights off Japs” The Daily News Tuesday 11 January 1944: 3. [16] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C71280 [17] Doig, Ramblings: 123. [18] “Curran will lead Hawks” The Argus Thursday 5 April 1951: 11. [19] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2238 [20] “Footy doesn't get any bigger than the Big V” http://www.heraldsun.com.au/afl/more-news/state-of- euphoria/story-e6frf9jf-1111116286143 [21] The Mercury Hobart 15 July 1947: 23. [22] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2240 [23] C.D. Doig. – A great fraternity: the story of the 2/2nd Commando Association, 1946-1992. – [Perth: The Author], 1993: 3. [24] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2241 [25] “New captain disqualified” The Daily News Wednesday 10 May 1950: 21 22. [26] “Former W.A. commandos up in arms” Mirror Saturday 20 May 1950: 9. [27] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/printarticle.aspx?articleid=1038 [28] “Curran suspended for four matches” The Age Wednesday 15 June 1950: 22. [29] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=1065 [30] “Curry on the menu” Mirror Saturday 30 June 1951: 1. [31] “A mud patch, S.A. outplay Victorians, comeback fight in hard-hitting wet-day game” The Mail Saturday 7 July 1951: 6. [32] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=1072 [33] “Sandhurst lost through the wind and toss” The Argus October 3 1955: 15. http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article71699109 [34] Luke West “BFNL to hold Hall of Fame night” Bendigo Advertiser February 27, 2014 http://www.bendigoadvertiser.com.au/story/2117305/bfnl-to-hold-hall-of-fame-night/ [35] 2/2 Commando Courier March 1967 : 9. [36] 2/2 Commando Courier June 1978 : 1. Ed Willis Revised: 14 May 2024 © 2/2 Commando Association of Australia

Thanks Louis

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE The Participants – Japan THE JAPANESE 228 REGIMENT IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR The Imperial Japanese Army 228th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division enters Hong Kong on 8 December 1941 [1] Callinan described one of the defining moments of the Timor campaign – the end of the August ‘push’ by the Japanese 228 Regiment as follows: “The nineteenth of August was zero day, and the closing of the net by the enemy seemed almost complete, so the twentieth would see the confirmation of the orders for our counter-attack. During the night of the nineteenth to twentieth of August the alarm was given in Same, as several reports were received of a rocket or Verey light in the adjacent hills. The hospital and all troops were moved out of the town, standing patrols placed across all tracks, and every man who could possibly fire a rifle sent to reinforce the platoons astride the track from Maubisse to Same. During the next day reports came in that the Japanese were retreating. All platoons reported no enemy in their areas. This was amazing, and immediately every man who was not entirely exhausted was out on patrol and searching for the enemy. It was essential that we maintain contact and harass his retreat. While we had contact with him we knew where he was; if we allowed the enemy to escape us we presented him with the element of surprise. This called for a very great effort from the officers and men in the platoons as now at least they were entitled to rest and food after holding a regiment at bay for ten days. Why the enemy retreated just when he had success almost within his grasp will remain a mystery, but probably his supplies had given out, and, of course, to him the Australians were as elusive as ever, and his casualties had not been light, although not as heavy as we had hoped”. [2] 228 Regiment veterans interviewed by Colin South for the documentary Independent Company, Tokyo 31 August 1987 [3] The abrupt cessation of the offensive certainly mystified the Australians. Colin South, the producer of the documentary Independent Company attempted to address this issue when he interviewed 228 Regiment veterans in Japan. He reported to the 2/2 Commando Association as follows: “… the Japanese were as interested in us, as we in them. We filmed interviews, via an interpreter, with veterans of Timor. Generally, the response was one of respect and honour towards their Australian foe. ……. The 228 Regiment was based in Timor from the invasion [19-20 February] until 6 September 1942, when they were sent to Guadalcanal. They reached Timor after serving in Manchuria, Hong Kong and Ambon. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were based in the West, the 2nd in Dili. Of the 2nd only a handful survived Guadalcanal. Those who became P.O.W.'s still refuse, despite genuine encouragement, to join the 228 Regiment Association. The general consensus was the troops were withdrawn under orders to be sent to Guadalcanal with the other troops, which came from West Timor and the South coast mobilized to replace the 228 from Dili. Once each force made physical contact with one another, time had run out and the entire force moved back to Dili”. [4] The following 228 Regiment soldiers were interviewed by South for the documentary and made the following comments about their experiences during the Timor campaign: Onuki Shigenobu I was in Timor for about six months. During that time, we were sent on four or five missions to mop up the enemy around Ermera. The purpose of the campaign wasn’t so much to seek out all the enemy as to make our presence felt both to the enemy and the natives. I think this was an important objective. Kuwakichi Arakawa … so, we were sniped at. I heard at the time that during the mopping up campaign we had lost more men in the regiment than we had in the Hong Kong campaign. [5] Our regimental commander said to us that we lost so many men in the large-scale campaign, yet we lost even more in these small missions. He was concerned at the loss, and I heard … mind you, I just heard that Captain Nara too was shot dead by a sniper. So, we got a new captain. We were sniped at many times. The experience gave me the impression that Australian soldiers were brave and determined. Masatsuga Kambe We were engaged in the battle from 6 in the morning until 7 in the evening, that is, for 13 hours. Both the Australians and the Japanese were determined, and we fought fiercely. They showed such bravery and determination that though we were confident no one would beat us we marvelled to be honest … at their strength as it were. When they resisted with an admirable courage which we hadn’t really expected from them, I must admit we were truly surprised. South concluded: “My specific quest for [information about] the withdrawal of the Japanese in August 1942 unfortunately has not been answered fully, but two sources of fact are still being investigated: research into the diaries of Col. Doi the Japanese Commanding Officer in Dili, and the translation of two chapters of the 228 Regiment History, dealing specifically with ‘the Campaign against Australian Guerrilla force in East Timor”. [6] South deposited the correspondence, scripts, research notes and other source material used in the production of Independent Company in the Research Collection of the AWM. [7] The diaries of Col. Doi and chapters of the 228 Regiment History are not part of the collection. The author, appreciating the importance of the Timor chapters from the 228 Regimental history arranged to have them professionally translated utilising funds from his Army History Unit grant for the preparation of WWII in East Timor: an Australian Army site and travel guide. The translated chapters are attached here - the included maps have been adapted with English labels. References [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:228_regiment_in_HK.jpg. Accessed 29 February 2024. [2] Callinan, Independent Company: 152. [3] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C242361 [4] Colin South “Independent Company Timor documentary” 2/2 Commando Courier December 1987: 8-9. [5] “The official figures of the Japanese casualties [in the battle for Hong Kong], which appear to have been heaviest round the Wong Nei Chong Gap, and at Stanley on the 24th and 25th December, are killed 675, wounded 2,079; total 2,754. The commander of 230th Regiment states that he had lost 800 men by the night of the 20th and gives his total casualties as 1,000. The 229th is said to have lost 600. No figures are available for the 228th, but if they be averaged at 800 the total loss of infantry of 38th Division amounts to 2,400. This is only an estimate, but since the infantry would be the chief sufferers it tends to support the official total of 2,754 for all arms. There is however other evidence, which though unofficial cannot be altogether ignored, suggesting that the Japanese casualties may have been higher”. - S. Woodburn Kirby. - The war against Japan. Vol. 1 – The loss of Singapore / by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby ... [et al.] London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957: 150. [6] Colin South “Independent Company Timor documentary” 2/2 Commando Courier December 1987: 9. [7] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C242361 228 Regiment - Regimental history - Ch.3 - 4 Timor.pdf

WWII IN EAST TIMOR AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY SITE AND TRAVEL GUIDE AINARO DISTRICT Hatu-Udo (Nova Luca) 9°07’06”S, 125°35’20” E [1] Hatu-Udo location map [2] Hatu-Udo (Nova Luca - see Map No. 17) is 28 miles (45 km.) south of Aileu at a bearing of 177o. This is a small posto town situated only four miles (61/2 km.) from the south coast. Several buildings of stone with galvanized iron and tile roofs constitute the town. These are posto surrounded by stone walls, secretary's house and barracks and Chinese shops. A good water supply is always on hand within a few hundred yards from the posto. The town is exposed to the air except for a few odd trees here and there. There are some small and scattered coconut plantations in the town area. This town was bombed by the Japanese during August, 1942, while Australian troops were stationed there. During November, 1942, it was again bombed by the R.A.A.F. [3] ……. HATU-UDO TO AINARO: This is a wide track in places (12 feet: 3 1/2 m.) with other sections much narrower (4 feet: 1 1/4 m.). First follows a ridge crest falling gently to North. At two miles (3 km.) out of Hatu-Udo the country flattens out for one further mile to the Be-Lulic River. River can be crossed in dry season, but after heavy rain it may obstruct traffic for up to two days. Track then rises (grade 1-10) for 1 1/2 miles (2 1/2 km.) to large village of Sucu-Rai, and then follows contour along west slopes of Suro Range. Half a mile from Ainaro the track descends steeply to cross tributary of Be-Lulic River. Similar crossing place. Then rises gently to Ainaro, where three tracks branch out. Patches of air cover, but mainly open country throughout. [4] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A Group of native Timorese who helped men of the 2/2nd Independent Company when they occupied the area in 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [5] Hatu-Udo (Nova Lusa [sic]) 27/11/42 [6] Hatu-Udo current map [7] Ayris: Next day [in late March 1942] they arrived in Hatu-Udo where they found No. 4 Section firmly established with the wounded Mick Morgan back in charge. The carriers were dismissed, and a new crew was chosen to take the supplies through to Same and The Bull. Aitken and Thornton remained behind in Hatu-Udo. The Hatu-Udo chefe de posto was a man with an incredibly long name that began with José Eduardo da and drew to a conclusion with Silva-Marques. [8] The Australians called him Joe Marks which appeared to please him immensely. He was a young man who, like Luis, was well liked and respected by the villagers. He was the proud owner of a sturdy Timorese racing pony which had a mouth of leather and the heart of a lion. The horse was called ‘Samurai’, which the Australians thought less than appropriate. It spent most of its time being groomed and exercised, though Joe Marks assured anybody who would listen that Samurai was no mere show pony – it had once, in an emergency, carried him to Dili and back in one day. ‘No other horse in Timor could make such a journey in such a time’, was Joe’s assertion. The King of Hatu-Udo was Francisco [Nai-Chico?], a wealthy, cunning old Mombai who, in the early months of the war, had travelled to Portugal by sea. While crossing the Mediterranean, his ship had been attacked from the air, prompting every man, woman and child to dive for cover – except, of course, King Francisco, who remained on deck taking photographs of the aircraft. There must have been another equally brave soul on board because a photograph was taken of His Majesty at work with his camera. The photograph, which he produced at the drop of a hat, showed him standing on a deserted deck, camera in hand against a backdrop of attacking enemy aeroplanes. If anybody asked him where the crew was he invariably replied: “Jesu, I never managed to find out, but they all came back later.” King Francisco, Joe Marks and the Australians got on very well together. Hatu Udo was a pleasant place, made the more agreeable by the King’s insistence that the Australians accompany him on his frequent hunting expeditions, which often produced deer. Venison, it was decided, was a welcome change from buffalo and wild pig. Village tug-of-wars became the unlikely conduit for the cementing of good relations between the 2/2nd and the locals. Daily competitions between the Australians and the Timorese were held in the immaculate posto square to cheering and near-hysterical coaching from both sides. The rules were elastic – it was decreed that because the Australians were physically bigger than their opponents they would be restricted to nine men, while the Timorese were allowed ten. However, “adjustments” were often made, particularly by Joe Marks who was not above attaching his considerable weight to the end of the Timorese line if he thought the occasion demanded it. Hatu Udo offered a brief spell from the horrors of war; it was as though the village had been transplanted away from the battle for the sole purpose of re-charging the batteries of those Australians fortunate enough to spend a few days there. However, there was a war on and the 2/2nd was in need of supplies, mountains of which had already been destroyed to keep it out of enemy hands. There was also a most urgent need to build a radio transmitter that would reach Australia”. [9] Administrative Posto - 28 April 2014 Australian Official history: As from 11th November Callinan took over command of the whole of Sparrow Force, with Baldwin, unfailingly loyal and efficient, as his staff captain, and soon afterwards Spence returned to Australia. Laidlaw succeeded to the 2/2nd Independent Company. By this time it was known that the Japanese were working hard to develop the eastern end of the island where they were building airstrips and laying down supply dumps; in the centre Maubisse festered as the main centre of hostility to the Australians; along the south coast the Japanese were slowly moving eastward and were beginning to consolidate in the Hatu-Udo area. [10] Callinan: A further worry from the west was developing on the south coast. The Japanese were driving along eastward; their advance was slow and careful, but the areas behind them were desolated, and those natives remaining there were hostile to us. To assist us in countering this move I asked for the bombing of Hatu-Udo with all possible aircraft; we knew five was the maximum we could hope for, but that was a large number for us. On the morning of the raid we listened and watched carefully, and then we heard the bombs, but the direction sounded wrong. Soon the reports came in from Dexter who had patrols close in to observe and profit by the bombing; it was the most effective raid of the campaign. The first planes bombed the town itself very accurately, and the others coming in from the north-east bombed the outskirts, while above them the Beaufighters stood by to protect the ever gallant Hudsons. The patrol counted fifty Japanese dead, and nearly one hundred dead natives. Some of the natives had ropes around their necks preparatory to their being hanged, and all the evidence pointed to the Japanese having arranged a ceremonial hanging before an assembly of natives. This was their usual procedure for commencing the subjugation of an area, but in this case the R.A.A.F. reversed the action. The Japanese withdrew westward, and that area remained an invaluable buffer for some months. [11] Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques (‘Joe Marks’), Chefe de Posto, Hatu-Udo The first Portuguese evacuees appear to have departed on the ‘Kuru’ from the south coast on 7 November 1942 - i.e., Ademar Rodrigues dos Santos (and family) – the Portuguese chefe de posto of Ainaro; and José da Silva Marques – the Portuguese chefe de posto of Hato-Udo - both in the western area. These Portuguese officials were accepted as “guests of Government” in Australia and accommodated at Ripponlea, Victoria. [12] Kenneally: “I didn't know Railaco. From a few shops at the side of the road, it has grown to a fair sized township, mostly on the opposite side of the road. The Flat plateau which was the bazaar area, the site of a Portuguese house, and the big open sided thatched building now boasts a big Besser block building equally as large. It was here that Major Spence ordered Pte 'Cisco' Coles to have no conversation with a personable young Portuguese on the grounds that he could be a spy. The gentleman in question was Jose Da Silva, Comandante of Hata Hudu, nephew of the Governor of Portuguese East Timor. Spoke four languages, fluently, one of which was English. When the momentous meeting attended by each Platoon Commander, the 2IC and the C.O. was convened, it was held at Hata Hudu. Jose acted as host and withdrew, saying "I will leave you gentlemen to your discussions, I have no desire to spy on your confidential business" or words to that effect. I'd say he was a man for all occasions. We came to like him greatly while we were at Hata Hudu. Goodbye Railaco”. [13] Dili, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-09. Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques, known to the Australian troops as "Joe", was commandant at the Hatu-Udo posto (administrative headquarters) when the Australian guerrillas were in the area in 1942. He And Private G. Milsom of the 2/2nd Independent Company were discussing the disposition of Japanese troops using a map drawn by Milsom, and by extreme coincidence, a drop of oil from their gourd lamp fell on the exact spot at the exact time as HMAS ‘Voyager’ ran aground at Betano on 1942-09-25. Marques later escaped to Australia on HMAS ‘Castlemaine’ and returned to Dili on SS ‘Angola’ on 1945-12-08 where he again met Milsom who was now acting as a guide with the Military History Section. They are seen examining a photocopy of Milsom's map as he points out the oil spot. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [14] Price: This new found habit of writing to the ‘Courier’ is going to die a sudden death at the completion of this letter; this business is a bit beyond me but Paddy Kenneally's letter in the special of November has prompted me to weigh in with some information that I know will be of interest to the few survivors who knew 'Joe' of Hato-Huda. His full and correct name was Jose da Silva Marcos and he was related not to the Governor of Timor but to the Governor of Goa in the then Portuguese India. Joe was always a good and generous friend to all Australians and his position as Posto in that area was a God send to us. Unfortunately for him he was junior (in rank only) to the Commandant of Suro Province who was based in Ainaro. Unfortunately because of the dislike and jealousy of this area commandant a lot of the hurdles we Aussies encountered at Ainaro sprang from this bloke's hatred of Joe and because of our obvious goodwill and gratitude to Joe. Sir B.J., in his 'Independent Company' expresses his annoyance and rage at the fact that a young and fit Portuguese had been evacuated from Timor. Eric Weller and I are hopeful that B.J. was not alluding to Joe - he had more than 100% for us, the Japs had a price on his head, he was liable to be ordered to report to Dili by his Suro Comandante - and he had spent all of his cash in the Australian cause. I will never forget the sad day that he ordered all of those beautiful horses of his to be led out one at a time as he shot them with my rifle. He did not even have any ammunition for his Porto Army issue weapons! He wept like a child when it came to the turn of the mighty Samir (snake). Every Aussie will remember that horse! In early 1946 my employer in Sydney was commissioned to make an inventory and valuation of the property of the Brazilian Consul who was about to be relieved of service in Australia and return to Brazil. There was no such thing as a Portuguese Consul in those days - all affairs for Lisbon were handled by the Brazilian staff on behalf of Portugal. The Brazilian chief was a Dr. Labhorino who, when mention of Timor etc came up in discussion, became a good friend indeed. He remembered Joe, Joe's courtship of Brendalina (of Atsabe) and Joe's stay at Kirribilli. He went further for me, within two weeks he had traced Joe to Portugal and thence to Goa where he was in service, presumably under his uncle the Governor. The address I wrote to was in Goa but there was never any reply, that is, if he ever received it. A point of interest also ties in the naming of Hato-Hudo. The spelling and pronunciation of Hato-Hudu is in the Tetum and means 'the place on the hill'. The alternative spelling and pronunciation very often encountered of Hato-Uda is in the Mombai and means 'the hill place’. A place of beauty and generosity needlessly razed and ruined. The photos in B.J's book say it all. That's the lot, a Merry Christmas and a great 1991 to each and every one of the Association. Bert [15] Monument To Francisco Corte Real, Hatu-Udo “In 2004 I visited the posto of Hato-Udo, the place where in 1943 the massacre took place in which about 300 Timorese perished, including D. Aleixo and his brother Nai Chico or, after receiving Catholic baptism, Francisco Corte Real. The foundations practically remain from the old wall. However, one can sense a strange atmosphere that hurts our memory as if the spirits of the people who died there are still in the place. Perhaps because in the background, in an imposing setting, the Mate Bian Mountains of Cablac and Tata Mai Lau transport the visitor to an unreal world ... In the centre of the roundabout of the old constructions from the time of the Portuguese administration, there is a monument, standard type, in every way analogous to that of Maubisse. It pays homage to the former head of the Leo-Lima village, Hatu-Udo, Francisco Corte Real, brother and comrade-in-arms of Grand Aleixo, with whom he was also treacherously killed in 1943 for not making a pact with the Japanese and honouring the Portuguese”. [16] Monument to Francisco Corte Real (‘Chico’) – Hatu-Udo - 2 May 2019 [17] Photos And Art Work On The AWM Website Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. This road was often strafed by Japanese aircraft when the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company occupied the posto (administrative centre) at Hatu Udo. In the distance is the home of the late King of Hatu Udo. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [18] Road at Hatu-Udo - Charles Bush - pen and watercolour on paper A village in Portuguese Timor which figured prominently in the operations of 2/2nd Australian Independent Company in their guerilla tactics against the Japanese. It was frequently strafed by Japanese Zero aircraft when the place was occupied by the Australians and bombed by Hudson bombers based on Darwin when the Japanese were in possession. [19] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-15. The posto (administrative centre) seen from the road to Betano. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [20] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A group of natives in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [21] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A group of natives in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [22] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A native Christian woman in the bazaar. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [23] Hatu Udo area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Portion of the high wall around the posto (administrative centre) showing the west gate. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [24] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. These old battlements of the posto (administrative centre) provided the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company with excellent observation points during their occupation. The posto was severely damaged by both Japanese and Australian bombing. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [25] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. This small posto (administrative centre) was bombed by the Japanese during 1942-08 when the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company were stationed there. In 1942-11 the post was again bombed by the RAAF. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [26] Hatu Udo area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The gateway and sentry box of perhaps the most picturesque posto (administrative centre) in Portuguese Timor. This posto was heavily bombed by the RAAF when the Japanese occupied it. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [27] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The two small buildings on the left were used by the Australians when the 2/2nd Independent Company occupied this posto (administrative centre) when they were forced to leave they hid stores in the roof of the small out house on the right. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [28] Village of Hatu-Udo – Charles Bush - pen and watercolour on paper This village was one of the Japanese strongholds during the latter stages of the guerilla operations carried on by 2/2nd and 2/4th Australian Independent Companies. [29] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Residential buildings occupied by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company during their occupation of this posto (administrative centre) during 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [30] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A house that was occupied by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company for some months during 1942. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [31] Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-15. A spring used by Australian troops of Sparrow Force, particularly by men of the 2/2nd Independent Company. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [32] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. A Portuguese blitz truck, used by the Australian Military History Section Field Team, at a damaged Japanese bridge. Note the Japanese sign on the bridge post. [33] Hatu Udo Area, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. The Portuguese blitz truck and Jeep and trailer used by the Military History Section Field Team cross the Belulic River. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [34] References [1] ASPT: 82. [2] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [3] ASPT: 28 [4] ASPT: 46-47. [5] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200648 [6] ASPT: Map 17. [7] Adapted from MapCarta map – 1 February 2024 [8] Jose Eduardo De Abreu De Silva Marques. [9] Ayris, All the Bull’s men: 170-171. [10] Official history – Appendix 2 Timor: 616. [11] Callinan, Independent Company: 190. [12] Chamberlain, Forgotten men : Timorese in special operations during World War II: 36; Fraser, Bob's Farm cadre camp: refugees from Timor in Port Stephens during World War II: 8. [13] Paddy Kenneally “Paddy returns to Timor - June 6, 1990” 2/2 Commando Courier November 1990: 7, 9. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200599 [15] Bert ‘[Re Jose da Silva Marcos] 2/2 Commando Courier February 1991: 7. The author was Herbert William PRICE (TX2781). [16] Fonseca, Monumentos Portugueses em Timor-Leste: 86-87 [17] Leo Lima suco is located 2 km north of Hatu-Udo. The date on the monument inscription should be 5 May ‘1943’. [18] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200651 [19] ART26311 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168672 [20] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200658 [21] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200653 [22] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200654 [23] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200652 [24] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200644 [25] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200650 [26] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200647 [27] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200643 [28] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200649 [29] ART26312 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C168677 [30] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200655 [31] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200645 [32] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200656 [33] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200641 [34] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200642