Edward Willis

There is a Portuguese monument commemorating the people who lost their lives in the Zone of Concentration during WWII outside what is now the Fretilin headquarters in Liquiça. The inscription, dated 1970 refers to “Aos mártires da ocupação estrangeira” (martyrs of foreign occupation) and provides tangible evidence of another tragic aspect of the Japanese occupation years that has been largely forgotten. Monument to the Martyrs of Foreign Occupation In late October 1942, the Portuguese Governor reluctantly accepted the Japanese edict regarding ‘protective concentration’ and encouraged all Portuguese residents to move to ‘internment’ areas at Liquiçá, Maubara and the nearby hill village of Bazar Tete – this was deemed necessary for protection against the ‘rebeliões de indígenas (rebellious Timorese)’. Many Portuguese (and a few Timorese) took the opportunity to be evacuated to Australia at this time and were settled at Bob’s Farm Evacuation Camp that was the topic of our previous post. For those that remained, initially, the protection zone comprised the entire part of the coast stretching from Liquiçá to the mouth of the Lois River with people encouraged to gather in the towns of Liquiçá and Maubara. However, earlier on, several families stayed in the immediate vicinity where they were better able to cultivate subsistence crops. That situation changed quickly, with constant intimidation and confrontations with the ‘colunas negros’ (black columns). In May 1943, members of the Portuguese military detachment in Maubara were disarmed and demobilised. In the town, some internees still managed to maintain small vegetable gardens. Internees were permitted to access the fish farms at the Granja Eduardo Marques (at Boibau) and at the properties of the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho near Fatu-Bessi. Gradually, through more or less indirect pressure, the Japanese were also urging Timorese to stop selling their produce in weekly markets. Anxieties were further increased by sporadic Allied bombing and strafing attacks that sometimes caused Portuguese and Timorese casualties. In September 1944, without warning, the Japanese ordered the transfer of the approximately 200 people based in Maubara to Liquiçá, further undermining living conditions for the internees. Very late in WWII (early July 1945) for the internees were transferred to one of the properties of the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho in the Lebo-Men area, near Fatu-Bessi. Portuguese historian Jorge Silva Rocha recently published an authoritative account of the Zone of Concentration in the Liquiça-Maubara area that has been translated into English and made available to read here – very little has been published in English on this topic to date. PORTUGUESE PRISONERS IN TIMOR DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR Jorge Silva Rocha SOURCE: Jorge Silva Rocha ‘Prisioneiros Portugueses em Timor durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial’ [‘Portuguese prisoners in Timor during the Second World War’] in Prisioneiros de guerras: experiências de cativeiro no século XX / coordenação: Pedro Aires Oliveira. – Lisboa: Edições tinta‐da‐china, 2019: 223-245. As in other theatres of World War II, the war in Asia and the Pacific, more than a military confrontation between enemy armies, was above all a violent confrontation between different cultures and races. [1] A struggle between “white men” and “yellow men”, different in their physiognomy but also with different values and understandings about the respect deserved by the opposing forces imprisoned during combat, about mercy and also about restraint in actions. Bushido, the ancestral samurai code of conduct proudly followed over generations, continued to guide the action of Japanese combatants during World War II towards the correct execution of military tasks, irreproachable conduct in everyday life and, the pursuit of a dignified death in combat. However, the precepts of bushido that established that the combatant should always act with justice and compassion towards his enemy, defeated or weakened, were permanently ignored when dealing with his prisoners of war and civilian internees. In his understanding, the non-Japanese who allowed their capture in combat did not deserve any contemplation and should be hated, despised and killed. With total disregard for the Geneva Convention which established, from 1929, the right and obligation of prisoners of war to be treated humanely and without subjection to torture and any acts of physical or psychological pressure, guaranteeing them health aid and food, as well as respect for their religion, in the concentration and internment camps for prisoners of war established by the Japanese military forces during the war in the Pacific, violent and deadly beatings, refusal to provide medical aid, the insufficient supply of food and even medical experimentation on prisoners. In Japanese concentration and internment camps, thousands of prisoners died every day from diseases caused by malnutrition, such as beriberi and scurvy, or from tropical epidemic diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, dysentery, tropical ulcers, and so on. the cholera. Furthermore, any attempt to escape “white” prisoners was doomed to failure from the outset. His skin colour worked like a prisoner's uniform that it was not possible to take off. [2] Captive experiences in Japanese-occupied Asia varied enormously from region to region. While some prisoners of war, mostly Western soldiers, were sent to Japan and used as manual labour in forced labour, others were forced to work until exhaustion in the construction of the so-called «Death Railway» between Burma and Thailand. Civilian internees were, as a rule, gathered locally in often improvised camps, but this did not mean that they had an easier life than that of expatriate prisoners. They, too, ended up seeing their health irremediably undermined, their property expropriated or destroyed, and their means of subsistence stripped away. It is estimated that one in three “white” prisoners died at the hands of the Japanese. If in some concentration camps built by the Japanese military forces the mortality rates were below ten percent, there were others where the same rates reached values above 30 percent. In the internment camps, mortality rates will have reached values between three and 13 percent. [3] The occupation operations of vast territories in Southeast Asia carried out by Japanese military forces during World War II reached their maximum geographical limit further south with the invasion of Portuguese Timor on February 20, 1942. Officially ordered in response to the presence of Australian and Dutch military forces in neutral Portuguese territory, the Japanese military occupation lasted for about three years, until September 1945, during which harsh living conditions were imposed on the populations. Throughout this period, Japanese forces stationed in Timor they maintained a conduct of deliberate submission of their prisoners and civilian detainees to violence, torture and public humiliation. Without resorting to direct confrontation, they skilfully led and armed violent bands of natives who sowed terror among the hundreds of Europeans and Timorese who had sought the deemed safe refuge of the mountains, leading them to ask the invader to establish zones concentration under its protection. Over time, these places of voluntary concentration ended up being transformed, despite the lack of walls or fences, into veritable concentration camps where hunger raged and violence prevailed. This text has as main objective to describe, with the detail allowed by the available sources, the main events that led to the creation in Timor of zones of concentration of Europeans; its geographical dispersion and evolution over the three years of Japanese domination; the living conditions and methods used by the invading forces to subjugate the European and Timorese concentrates. Timor in the Second World War: the “invasion” by Australians and Dutch [4] In the midst of World War II, in December 1941, and despite protests from the Portuguese authorities, an allied contingent made up of Australian and Dutch forces landed in Timor on the pretext of strengthening the defense capacity of the Portuguese colony. The Australian Government, following talks with the Dutch Government, had undertaken to provide military aid if the territory of Dutch Timor was invaded by Japanese forces. This support would become effective on December 12, 1941 when a detachment of the Australian Army, with the designation «Sparrow Force» [5] and with a force of around 1400 men, landed in Kupang, in the Dutch part of the island of Timor. Until then, Portugal had refused the military support for the defense of the territory of Timor insistently offered by the Dutch and Australians, confident that it was in its neutrality. [6] The military activity of the Portuguese colony was then far from being effective since most of the European graduates sent to the territory was “deviated” to functions in the local administration due to the lack of capable civil servants. By the time of the Second World War, the tiny garrison existing there was reduced to a company of indigenous infantry (Companhia de Caçadores de Timor) and a platoon of cavalry, also indigenous (da Fronteira), a military device that, officially established at the end of the 1930s, could be considered sufficient for maintaining internal order, but totally insufficient and inadequate to sustain any external attack. The Companhia de Caçadores de Timor was headquartered in Taibessi, three kilometers from Dili; in Maubisse there was a school for recruits and in Oecussi a detachment of that company was stationed. The Border Police Cavalry Platoon had its forces distributed along the border with Dutch Timor and its command was based in Bobonaro. In addition to this 1st-line military device, a significant number of 2nd-line indigenous voluntary forces, called moradores, were also organized in the various Regulados [7] of the territory, which in the past had helped to put down internal insurrections. The colony's military garrison had a total strength of three officers; seven sergeants and about 30 European, mestizo and indigenous corporals; four European and mestizo soldiers; and about 300 indigenous soldiers. [8] Since June 1941, 12 independent companies (commandos) were being secretly prepared by the Australian Army to act behind enemy lines. Confronted with the rapid Japanese expansion in the Pacific, the Australian military leaders decided to take advantage of these units to defend the cordon of islands located to the north and northeast of Australia in order to function as outposts where they hoped to sustain a first onslaught of the enemy. In this context, an independent Australian company would initially land in Dutch Timor, but would end up, together with Dutch military forces, being deployed to Portuguese Timor, where it would later be reinforced by another independent Australian company. On December 17, 1941, around one o'clock in the afternoon, contrary to the wishes of the Portuguese authorities, and under the pretext of the imminent Japanese invasion of the Portuguese colony, the Australian and Dutch forces disembarked in the vicinity of Dili. [9] The Portuguese governor, Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, upon learning of the entry in the territory of those forces, made it known that it had not requested any external help for the defense of the territory and, therefore, could not agree with the ongoing action, considering it a hostile occupation action. Once the Allied invasion was completed, considered by Portugal as unjustified, since the assumption of the invasion of the territory by Japanese forces had not been verified, the Portuguese authorities protested to the Dutch and Australian governments and the governor of the colony declared himself prisoner of the invading forces. Five days later, a note was delivered to the British ambassador urging the Australian and Dutch troops to leave the territory as soon as the Portuguese military contingent arrived in Timor, which, meanwhile, was being prepared in Mozambique and which would have a number manpower equivalent to that of the occupying Allied forces. On January 26, 1942, after negotiations with the British and Japanese, an expeditionary contingent destined for Timor finally left Lourenço Marques (Mozambique). The force consisted of a chasseur company, an engineering company and an artillery battery. [10] On February 2, 1942, the first Japanese attacks on Kupang, in the Dutch part of the island, were reported. The war was getting closer and closer to Portuguese Timor. On February 17, the Portuguese ship João Belo was off Dili and had already established radio contact with land, where all the preparations for receiving the Portuguese expeditionary force had been completed, when the unforeseen event occurred. The Japanese authorities, who had previously agreed with the sending of the Portuguese military force, informed that they would not allow its disembarkation and, given this development, the Portuguese force withdrew to Colombo, in Sri Lanka, and later, to India, where it was until February 1945 and from where he would finally return to Mozambique. The invasion and occupation by the Japanese imperial forces At the same time that the Portuguese authorities sought to assemble in Mozambique the personnel necessary to replace the Dutch and Australian forces stationed in Timor, the Portuguese Government he also sought by all means to maintain a constructive diplomatic dialogue with the Japanese authorities, which would allow controlling any Japanese retaliation arising from the presence of those forces on Timorese soil. On 19 February, the secretary general of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teixeira de Sampaio, received in private audience the Minister of Japan in Lisbon, who was the bearer of an urgent official message. The latter, after the usual greetings, informed the Portuguese ruler that, for reasons of self-defence, the Japanese Imperial Government had decided to expel the Dutch and Australian forces from the Portuguese colony of Timor. He further requested that the Japanese occupation of Timor be considered neither an act of war against Portugal nor a form of attack on Portuguese neutrality. Japanese forces would withdraw as soon as the need for self-defence ceased to exist. Three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the occupation of Southeast Asia carried out by Japan reached its southernmost limit with the invasion of Portuguese Timor, officially in response to the presence of Australian and Dutch military forces in a «neutral country». On the night of February 20, 1942, Japanese forces landed in various parts of the Portuguese colony, beginning an occupation that would last until the end of WWII. Gradually, Japanese military forces occupied a significant part of the territory and came to dominate almost all of its coastline. From May 31, 1942, Governor Ferreira de Carvalho and the few administrative employees who had remained in Dili saw their movements restricted to their official residence and contacts with the metropolis were no longer possible. Dili was then practically deserted. Most of its inhabitants abandoned the city and sought refuge in the interior of the territory. The reduced Portuguese military forces were, however, instructed by the governor not to offer resistance and were moved to Aileu, where the bulk of the civilian population was taking refuge. Here, one of the biggest massacres perpetrated by Japanese forces would take place with the collaboration of the infamous «black columns» [11], organized by the Japanese using inhabitants of the locality of Atamboea (Dutch Timor) who, initially, had been enlisted as porters. Timorese, Australians and Dutch were thus forced to seek refuge in the mountains, where they carried out resistance and guerrilla actions against the invader, greatly favoured by the difficult characteristics of the relief and by the unconditional support of the local populations. Many Timorese were eventually executed by the occupying forces, accused of collaborating with resistance elements. The most famous case of Timorese resistance to the invader is that of D. Aleixo Corte Real, ruler [12] of Ainaro, and his subjects, who were surrounded by Japanese forces and by elements of the «black columns» in the mountains of Suro-Lau, where they resisted for a few weeks. The lack of food and ammunition led D. Aleixo to surrender along with his warriors. Imprisoned and summarily judged, they ended up dying at the hands of the Japanese invaders. Throughout the first five months of occupation, guerrilla actions managed to inflict serious damage on the occupying military forces; however, starting in August 1942, Japanese forces launched a counteroffensive that led to the interruption of most cooperation circuits between local populations and resistance forces. Unable to respond militarily, Portugal tried at all costs to negotiate with the Japanese authorities adequate conditions of coexistence, but after exhausting all possibilities of understanding, there was no other solution than to request the support of its international allies with towards the liberation of Timor. Impossible To Resist The definitive breaking point with regard to the security of the populations of the colony of Timor took place at dawn on 1 October 1942. That dawn, and the day that followed, the village of Aileu, the town in the mountains where a large part of the European and native inhabitants loyal to the Portuguese authorities had taken refuge, was swept by a wave of destruction and death, the most serious hitherto experienced since the invasion. With the cover and support, less and less disguised, of Japanese forces, a large «black column» coming from Dili assaulted the military barracks there. [13] The military unit that was stationed there (Companhia de Caçadores de Timor) was a one of the few still in operation in the whole territory, and it had gathered the bulk of the troops left over from the Portuguese armed force that had played an active role in the actions carried out to quell the indigenous revolts that since the Japanese invasion had arisen in various parts of the colony. [14] This assault on Aileu had, as the governor of Timor Manuel Abreu de Carvalho would later write in his report on the events of those days, a single objective «previously and thoroughly prepared» and that involved dismantling the residual capacity of Portuguese military response still existing in the territory. [15] In addition to the commander of the military unit, Captain Ferreira da Costa, several European and indigenous soldiers were killed, as well as some European civilians who had taken refuge in that officer's house. In possession of the reports of events made by the few survivors who ended up managing to reach Dili, the Portuguese governor found that he no longer had the capacity, with the means at his disposal, to face an «extermination program» [16] that would certainly have continuity until the complete subjugation of the Timorese, Europeans and indigenous peoples. Especially targeted in the violent actions perpetrated by the «black columns», the non-indigenous population that was dispersed throughout the territory had exhausted all its capacity for resistance and was at serious risk of annihilation, therefore requiring rapid action by the governor. Having assessed the general security conditions, Governor Abreu de Carvalho concluded that the only means of effectively protecting this population would be to submit to the authorities in Lisbon and the Japanese consul in Timor a request for the Portuguese population to leave the territory. In Lisbon, the request was not favourably received as it was considered an action contrary to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over the territory. The Japanese consul, recognizing the need to find an urgent solution to the situation, proposed, as an alternative, placing the Portuguese population under the protection of Japanese military forces. Reluctant to accept the protection proposed by the Japanese, only after two tense negotiation sessions with the Japanese military command, during which he tried to obtain the best guarantees of protection and security, as well as the clear definition of the concentration zones, he agreed Governor Ferreira de Carvalho to sign an official request to protect the lives of the Portuguese. As concentration zones, in addition to Dili, the locations of Liquiçá and Maubara were defined, an area that would come to be dubbed the «butcher shop of the Portuguese». The Concentration In Liquiça And Maubara On November 25, 1942, the Portuguese governor ordered the beginning of the concentration of the Portuguese who were dispersed throughout the territory, starting with the residents of the Baucau region, located 122 kilometers east of the capital, Dili and where, by order of the governor, the alternative headquarters of the government of the colony had been established in July of that year. [18] With clear and well-defined instructions for those responsible for the various administrative districts, the evacuation plan from the interior of the territory to Liquiçá and Maubara established that all movements had to be carried out with special care so as not to affect either the lives of the native inhabitants or the «prestige» that the European Portuguese had among them. The administrative authorities should be the last to leave, ensuring the choice of an indigenous chief who, due to his prestige and trust, would be responsible for looking out for the interests of the populations and for guarding the assets of the Portuguese State that could not be moved. From the posts [19] and from the various administrative districts, archives and all equipment that could be of some future use should be protected and evacuated. With regard to the foodstuffs intended to feed the displaced people, the instructions were also clear: buy locally everything possible (corn, wheat, rice, beans, oil, potatoes, fats, etc.). Likewise, fuels such as petroleum, gasoline and alcohol had to be purchased. [20] In the weeks that followed, without the attacks by elements of the «black columns» taking place in various parts of the territory, and despite the hardening of the Japanese forces' action in relation to the European Portuguese, the governor continued with the actions foreseen in the plan of evacuation and concentration outlined, and determined the appointment of two new «heads of post», two sergeants, for the localities of Liquiçá and Maubara, where the concentration of inhabitants from Baucau and other points would take place from inside the territory. There would then be three concentration nuclei: Dili, where about three dozen Portuguese, including the governor, his family and the administrator of the municipality of Dili, were kept by imposition of the occupying forces since the day of the invasion; Liquiçá and Maubara, which would receive around 400 people and where the Treasury Services (Finance) and the Services of the Military Division would be installed. In Dili, and despite the reduced number of employees there, the Governor's Office Division, the Civil Administration Services continued to operate; the Health Department, the Municipal Services and Public Works, the Treasury Fund (in charge of the Nacional Ultramarino bank) and the hospital. [22] Medical assistance to the population was provided by three Portuguese doctors (in Dili; one in Liquiçá and one in Maubara) and by four European nurses and 14 indigenous nurses distributed across the three locations and Oecussi. Religious assistance in the three concentration centres was provided by four missionaries. Later, in view of the difficulties experienced in obtaining food for the concentrates, the Transport Services (land and sea) and the Supply Service were created, whose mission was to acquire, by whatever means possible, the foodstuffs necessary to feed the concentrated Portuguese, subsequently promoting their equitable distribution or their free sale in case of excess stocks. [23] Fig. 1 — Areas of concentration and localities of origin of the concentrated population [20] The public mail and telegraph services did not work, as did the justice services. There were national flags hoisted daily at the governor's residence, hospital building in Dili, Liquiçá, Maubara, Oecussi and at border posts, in affirmation of Portuguese sovereignty over the territory. As Ferreira de Carvalho would later mention: «The concern at the end of 1942 was to organise things, especially with regard to supplies, in order to make the existence of the Portuguese in the area as less precarious as possible.» [24] At the beginning of 1943, around 150 European Portuguese, public and civil servants, and their families remained in Timor. The rest had, with the help of Australian naval forces, left the territory. Gradually, these Portuguese arrived in the concentration areas of Liquiçá and Maubara, where they settled, the first to arrive, in the available housing, the rest, as they could. There, the action of the “black columns” continued to be felt not only in the vicinity of those areas, but also, and with some frequency, within them. In the neighbourhood, there were also some Australian forces who, with the help of faithful natives, were looking for the best opportunity to attack the small Japanese military detachment stationed there. The difficulties inside the concentration zones grew over time. Alongside the progressive scarcity of foodstuffs, the difficulties related to obtaining medicines also grew. Medicines that the governor proposed several times to buy from the Japanese. However, of the approximately 70 products requested from the Japanese consul, only 17 would be supplied and even then, 11 months later. [25] About 700 people lived in the areas of Liquiçá and Maubara in mid-1943, including European and indigenous Portuguese. They lived in a state of extreme physical and psychological vulnerability, insecurity and fear, which created an environment of general demoralisation, impotence and tension among the inmates. In a short time, the occurrence of petty theft became regular among the concentrated; slaps and attacks from the camp guards, a constant; prison, arbitrary; the beatings and torture, a certainty. With difficulty, and within the possibilities of the moment, he tried to normalize the life of the concentrates and provide for their most urgent needs. Within the concentration zones, and despite the restrictions imposed by the Japanese, European and Timorese Portuguese began to develop a certain autonomy and routine in community life. In view of the high number of children in Liquiçá and Maubara, in mid-July 1943, a school was opened in each of the two locations, where teachers continued to ensure the elementary education of children. Without any school material, 138 students started to attend the school, a number that grew in the following two years. At the end of 1943, and in the following two years, the «normal» exams for the 3rd and 4th grades were held. [26] In September of the same year, a nursing course would also begin in Dili and Liquiçá directed by two Portuguese doctors (Dr. Santos Carvalho [Díli] and Dr. Rodrigues [Liquiçá]), frequented by Europeans and indigenous people who have completed the primary education exam. Students on this course were only able to complete the first year of training as there were no resources to allow them to teach the practical classes planned for the 2nd year. [27] At the end of July 1943, the command of the Japanese military forces ordered the collection of all radio equipment existing in Dili, as well as all the equipment used for its installation and operation. Thus, until the end of the war, any possibility of official communication with the outside of the colony was prohibited. The Japanese military police, Kempetai, insistently inspected all places where such equipment could be hidden. His deepest fear was subversion, sabotage and revolts fomented by information that secretly circulated through the most diverse means. [28] Radio equipment constituted an effective and fast means for the dissemination of information and instructions over short and long distances and they were therefore considered a central element in the planning and execution of any conspiracy. Whenever they suspected the existence of radio equipment operating for subversive purposes, elements of the Japanese military police did not hesitate to interrogate, torture and even execute the individuals believed to be in possession of that type of equipment. With all the financial reserves of the government of the colony exhausted, and with no possibility of funds being sent from Lisbon to meet the needs, the governor developed the necessary contacts with the Japanese authorities in order to obtain a loan of 400 thousand yen or gulden from the Japanese Army. The terms of the loan having been established between the parties, it was granted and signed on November 8, 1943, and on the 20th of the same month the legislative diploma was published in which the Colony Government authorized the circulation of the new currency in equal value with the pataca. In October 1944, a new loan was taken out from the Japanese authorities in the amount of 200,000 gulden and in March 1945, another 400,000. Only with recourse to these three loans was it possible to continue to acquire the goods necessary for the survival of the concentrates. However, the difficulties in obtaining foodstuffs and the high prices charged mainly by the Japanese, but also by the indigenous people who had them, made their purchase unaffordable for most Portuguese with a lot of family. In Maubara, the concentrated Portuguese still managed to cultivate some land with reasonable results, although very insufficient to supply the needs. In Liquiçá, the poor quality of the soil and the scarcity of water doomed all attempts at cultivation to failure. Between 9 and 16 March 1944, with monitoring and strict control of movements by the Japanese authorities, Captain Silva Costa, special envoy of the Lisbon authorities, traveled to Timor from Macao in order to investigate the living conditions of the Portuguese in that colony. Having reserved two days to visit the concentration zones of Liquiçá and Maubara, in the report that he later presented to the Minister of Colonies Silva e Costa very telegraphically reports what he witnessed there, limiting himself to mentioning that «[...] saw no one with the appearance of hunger or serious illness, regular physical appearance” and “there are old people between 60 and 70 years old [...]”. Concerned with obtaining answers to the questions raised in the extensive inquiry that had been sent to him by Lisbon, questions that largely focused on the governor's actions since the beginning of the occupation, and despite, as he mentions in his report, having held a conference ‐ either with the governor or with concentrated Portuguese, he flagrantly failed to correctly assess his living conditions. [29] From April 1944, the health status of the concentrates in Liquiçá began to deteriorate significantly, to the point of being classified as very bad by the Portuguese health delegate during the months of June and July. Malaria; scabies; tuberculosis; serious dental diseases caused by the lack of foods rich in vitamin A, C and D, but also by the lack of toothbrushes and toothpaste for oral hygiene; intestinal poisoning resulting from the ingestion of plant species unfit for human consumption; beriberi; difficult-to-heal ulcers and general weakening of the population contributed to that classification. [30] As if the existing difficulties were not enough, the areas of Liquiçá and Maubara began, at the beginning of the year, to be periodically machine-gunned, presumably by Allied planes that were trying to reach the small Japanese military detachment stationed near those locations. As a result of these actions, several adults and children, European and indigenous Portuguese, were seriously injured, pierced by projectiles. [31] The cycle of degradation would continue in 1945. In the month of May, the state of health of the Portuguese in Liquiçá was so serious that the Japanese themselves sent a doctor to observe them. Assisted by a nurse, he examined and treated around 80 patients; they even made dressings for wounds and ulcers. «The treatments carried out consisted of injections of vitamin b1, and distribution of roles of this vitamin in solid concentrate, cod liver oil and aspirin tablets.» [32] When, in September 1945, the occupation of Timor was declared to have ended due to the surrender of Japan, the general state of health of the Portuguese who still remained in the concentration zones was one of extreme weakness due to lack of food. They were «skeletal, almost unrecognizable at first sight», they were «[...] walking skeletons, true ghosts of themselves [...]». Later, in 1972, José dos Santos Carvalho, a doctor and health delegate, wrote about the evaluation he had carried out at the end of the war of the health status of the concentrated Portuguese: In almost all of them, I observed the following symptoms: extreme emaciation, transparent skin glued to the bones, extremely pale complexion, sunken and dull eyes, uncertain gait, stooped torso, lack of physical vigour, depression of the will, erased memory, atrophied muscles, caries or falls. teeth, malleolar [lower limbs] or facial oedema, heart palpitations at the slightest exertion. How to explain them? By hunger. Nutrition deficiencies [...] led us to organic misery and would end up giving them natural death [...]. About the number of deaths that occurred during the period of concentration, the cited report does not give any indication; however, José Duarte Santa, the Liquiçá post chief, would later report the deaths of 14 of the 521 Portuguese who had been interned in the Maubara and Liquiçá concentration zones (287 males and 234 females). In the remaining Timorese territory, 164 Portuguese and around two thousand indigenous people died. [34] Prisoners Of War In addition to the Portuguese concentrated in the conditions just described, in Timor, there were also European and Timorese Portuguese, military and civilian, imprisoned and tortured for reasons directly related to the war. On July 10, 1944, a Portuguese soldier, Lieutenant António Oliveira Liberato, and three prominent Portuguese civil servants [35], were, after being detained and interrogated by the Japanese military police, the feared Kempetai, transferred by sea to a place of captivity located on the island of Alor, called Kalabai, where they were detained in a rudimentary house, surrounded by barbed wire, guarded by armed indigenous people commanded by a Japanese soldier. The displacement of thousands of prisoners of war by sea was put into practice by the Japanese in the first months of the war. Due to the need for manpower, ships full of prisoners circulated daily between Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Timor. [36] In an intense war zone, these prisoners were transported, in conditions similar to those of transporting animals, in old freighters without any external identification, which is why they were frequently torpedoed, bombed and sunk by Allied aviation. Other POWs, subjected to endless long-distance voyages on overcrowded and slow-moving ships, eventually died of asphyxiation, starvation, or disease. [37] Accused of collaborating with Australian and Dutch forces, Lieutenant Liberato, like other inhabitants, had been detained two months before, and during his captivity in Dili he was subjected to tight interrogation which included torture sessions, «tortures of unspeakable inhumanity». [38] According to various reports, the prisoners were tied by the wrists with a rope, then hung from the prison bars and hoisted so that their feet did not touch the ground. Endless sessions of interrogations and beatings followed, only interrupted for brief periods to rotate the interrogator or else, following some program of psychological action on the prisoner who, after being beaten, sat him down at the table, talk friendly to him, give him some food and cigarettes, and then hang him on the bars again. The so-called «water torture» was also applied to Timorese prisoners, which consisted of laying the prisoner «[...] on his back, on a platform, tied hand and foot, with a funnel inserted into his mouth, by force, between teeth, filled the patient's stomach with water. After the first dose was expelled through the mouth, through the nostrils and through the ears, another was repeated [...].” [39] They would remain in Kalabai until January 1945, isolated, poorly fed [40] and frequently bombed by Allied planes, whose actions would result in the injury of one of the Portuguese. Similar to what happened in Maubara and Liquiçá, the health status of these prisoners gradually deteriorated and led to the appearance of beriberi among the Portuguese. «[...] everything had already disappeared, even the wedding rings, and they had nothing with which to find anything to eat other than what was provided for them and the organism refused.» [41] On February 23, 1945, he died the first Portuguese, engineer Canto Resende. Observed by a doctor on March 20, the remaining three Portuguese were diagnosed with beriberi and malaria without, however, being provided with any type of treatment. On the 25th of that month, another Portuguese (BNU manager João Duarte) died, swollen and with serious mobility difficulties. Barefoot for not being able to put on shoes, on March 28, 1945, they started a march that would last two days and during which they would cover about 12 kilometers, ten on the first day, two on the second in very poor health and unable to walk, Lieutenant Liberato was transported on a stretcher supported by four men. They stayed in the village of Railaco until April 18 of that year and from there they continued on to Kelass, subject to the same difficulties in terms of accommodation and food. There they remained for five days, Lieutenant Liberato, very weak due to malaria and beriberi, without any medical assistance and with only six quinine pills, grudgingly supplied by the Japanese. On the 26th of June, they begin a new trek to Makoada. They would leave the island of Alor on the 23rd of August, arriving in Dili on the 28th of the same month. Only the following day, and after intervention by the governor with the Japanese consul, would they be definitively released. [42] Fig. 2 — Itinerary of Portuguese prisoners [43] On September 5, 1945, the Japanese military commander officially informed the governor of the Portuguese colony of the cessation of hostilities at the request of Japan and the return of the territory of the colony of Timor “to the fullness of Portuguese administration”. [44] Four days later, the command of the Japanese military forces ordered the transfer of the Portuguese who remained in Maubara (about 200) to Liquiçá, which would take place on the 14th and 15th of that month. In a context of overpopulation concentrated in Liquiçá, the food problem worsened significantly, reaching in October the lowest level ever: an average of 471 grams of foodstuffs, around 1050 calories a day. The reoccupation of the Portuguese colony began at the Liquiçá and Maubara posts, and only ended on November 21, 1945. It was carried out without weapons, by a group of 163 European Portuguese, 19 indigenous administration officials and 14 salaried workers. The Australian military authorities, who traveled to Dili on September 23 to deal with the governor about the surrender and withdrawal of Japanese forces from Timor, immediately proposed carrying out an inquiry into war crimes committed by the Japanese during the occupation of the territory. Alleging a lack of instructions on the subject, the governor rejected the proposal to create a joint commission of inquiry, noting that «with regard to the Portuguese and the indigenous populations of the colony, the Portuguese authorities would carry out the inquiry». [45] In a telegram dated September 26, the Minister for Colonies instructed Governor Ferreira de Carvalho to provide all the necessary support to an Australian mission that would travel to Dili to carry out the aforementioned inquiry, passports having already been issued on that date. and seen by some senior Australian entities in charge of carrying out the said investigations. [46] The governor would later mention in the report he wrote on the events in Timor that, until his departure from the colony on December 8, 1945, he had not No Australian authority had appeared to carry out the inquiry and neither had the central government given any further statement on the matter or ordered any action. We know today that on June 21, 1946, two members of the Australian War Crimes Commission arrived in Dili to investigate war crimes committed by the Japanese in Timor. The contacts established with the local Portuguese authorities resulted in the creation of a joint investigation commission composed of Australian elements, a member of the Portuguese administration and an officer of the Dutch Army. In the reports that these elements wrote a posteriori, they clearly expressed not only the reduced cooperation received from the Portuguese authorities, but also their obstructive action to the investigations carried out. [47] In 1946 and 1947, the new governor of Timor, Óscar Ruas, dedicated special attention to the punishment of Timorese who had collaborated with the Japanese forces and had committed violent war crimes in their service. More than a thousand individuals were accused throughout the Timorese territory, who were arrested and later sent to the island of Ataúro where, once judged, many ended up being convicted. Final Considerations The experiences lived in captivity in the various Asian territories occupied by the Japanese during WWII varied enormously, despite the existence of certain standards of action by the Japanese imperial military forces with regard to the implementation and control of prisoner camps of war or the internment of civilians. In the four years that the conflict lasted, and especially during the operations of the Pacific War, there was no uniform “Japanese model” for establishing that type of camp or for treating prisoners of war or civilian internees. Differences, many of them significant, are noticeable from field to field and are due not only to the combatant/non-combatant status of the imprisoned individuals and their nationality, but also to the geography of the events and, above all, to the nature of the events, camp commanders and military garrisons responsible for their security. In the Japanese military, the appointment of an officer to command a prison camp was not looked upon favourably. Thus, and although there were conscientious ones, the possibility of prisoners and internees being subject to the free will of a mediocre, incompetent or sadistic field commander was very high. In the Portuguese colony of Timor, no concentration camp was built for prisoners of war following the invasion, and subsequent occupation, of that territory by the Japanese imperial forces in February 1942. Yes, there was, at the request of the local Portuguese authorities, and for security reasons, the establishment of concentration zones where mainly European Portuguese and some Timorese ended up being subject to the same type of hardship and humiliation characteristic of aspects of the Japanese military's treatment of prisoners of war in most of the territories they occupied. But there were also prisoners of war in the true sense of the words. Prisoners who, initially detained in ordinary prison facilities for minor matters, ended up being subjected to the most violent acts of torture, forced expatriation and a life in miserable conditions. It was on these largely forgotten aspects of the Japanese invasion of Timor that we sought to shed light from the scarce sources available, mostly memorialistic. Unexplored, despite some established international contacts, are the possible archival sources in the Japanese language, due to the fact that they were not obtained in a timely manner, but also, and above all, due to the language barrier that is expected to be broken in the future by some scholar in favour of a more plural reading and a more complete understanding of the matter in question. The Japanese occupation of Timor brought starvation and violent death to an already impoverished local community, with a violence that led to the destruction of the most basic social practices and the collapse of Portuguese administration in the colony. It should be recalled that the Japanese forces invaded Timor on the pretext of self-defence arising from the presence of Australian and Dutch forces on that island. However, using and manipulating the «black columns» skilfully, over time they created a permanent state of terror. A state to which they were deliberately giving contours of fratricidal war intended to conceal a real open war and to create conditions for the Japanese authorities to disclaim responsibility for the violent acts that, under cover of that, were practiced by their military. The governor of Timor, Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, wrote about this period: It was a period without history, or rather, in which history is reduced to a few words: it was necessary for the Japanese not to defeat us in this relentless struggle in order to annihilate us physically and morally; whatever happened, they would not defeat us because we had to resist. [48] Notes [1] Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 17 et seqs. [2] Idem, ibidem, 100. [3] Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack (ed.), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia (London: Routledge, 2008), 2‐5. [4] For the excellent context it offers of the events that took place in Timor during WWII, see António Monteiro Cardoso, Timor na 2.a Guerra Mundial - o diário do Tenente Pires (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos de História Contemporânea, ISCTE, 2007). [5] On the actions of this Australian military force, see Bernard Callinan, Independent Company: the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941-43 (London: William Heinemann, 1953). [6] See, among other authors and works, Carlos Teixeira da Motta, O Caso de Timor na II Guerra Mundial. Documentos britânicos (Lisboa: Instituto Diplomático, 1997). [7] Reinos. [8] Arménio Ramires de Oliveira, História do Exército português, 1910‐1945, volume III (Lisboa: Estado‐maior do Exército, 1994), 497 et seqs. [9] For a description of the first actions of these military forces after the disembarkation see, among others, the one carried out in Carlos Cal Brandão, Funo: Guerra em Timor (Porto: Edições A.O.U., 1946), 43‐48. [10] Carlos da Rocha Vieira, Timor - Ocupação Japonesa Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Lisboa: SHIP, 1994), 38. [11] Atamboea natives armed with spears and machetes and framed by elements of the Japanese secret police. Vieira, Timor - Ocupação Japonesa Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, 76. [12] King; tribal chief. [13] José Duarte Santa, Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941‐1945 (Lisboa: Notícias, 1997), 60. See also Brandão, Funo: Guerra em Timor, 78‐83. [14] On the indigenous revolts see Cardoso, Timor na 2.a Guerra Mundial, 62‐66. [15] Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor (1942‐45) (Lisboa: Cosmos, 2003), 397. [16] Idem, ibidem, 397‐399. [17] António de Oliveira Liberato, o Caso de Timor (Lisboa: Portugália, 1945), 233. [18] On the Japanese military occupation of Timor during World War II, and in particular with regard to the living conditions of the European Portuguese in the Liquiçá concentration zone, see Rosas de Ermera, by Luís Filipe Rocha (2016; Fado Filmes). The documentary, based on the autobiographical work of João Afonso, o Último dos Colonos - Entre um e outro mar (Lisboa: Sextante, 2015), describes the separation of the Afonso dos Santos family in 1939 in Mozambique, the trip to Coimbra of the two brothers, João and José (Zeca Afonso) and the departure of the parents and the youngest daughter, Maria das Dores, to Timor. In the second part of the documentary, Maria describes in detail various aspects of her daily life during the occupation of the territory by the Japanese military forces and, in particular, her internment for three years in the Liquiçá concentration zone. [19] Administrative post. [20] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 431. [21] Map adapted from António de Oliveira Liberato, Os Japoneses Estiveram em Timor (Lisboa: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, 1951). [22] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 472. [23] On the difficulties experienced in obtaining food, see Brandão, Funo: Guerra em Timor, 178‐179. [24] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 467. [25] Idem, ibidem, 487. [26] In the second part of the documentary (min. 37) Rosas de Ermera, Maria das Dores fala do seu exame da 4.a Classe realizado em Liquiça. (disponível em http://media.rtp.pt/extra/estreias/rosas‐de‐ermera/). [27] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 498. [28] Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 131. [29] See existing documentation at the Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo under the reference PT/TT/AOS/A/8/8/00003. [30] José dos Santos Carvalho, Vida e Morte em Timor Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Lisboa: LivrePortugal, 1972), 176‐178. [31] Idem, ibidem, 166. [32] Idem, ibidem,171. [33] Idem, ibidem, 176-177. [34] Santa, Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 164‐165. [35] Artur do Canto Resende (geographer engineer), João Jorge Duarte (manager of Banco Nacional Ultramarino) and José Duarte Santa (administrative aspirant, head of post in Liquiçá). Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 598 et seqs. [36] See Janet Gunter, “The restless dead and the stripped empire: World War II and its aftermath in Timor‐Leste”, in Timor‐Leste: Colonialismo, Descolonização, Lusotopie, ed. Rui Feijó, 115‐137 (Porto: Afrontamento, 2016). [37] Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 283‐287. [38] «[...] according to good Japanese habits, accompanied by several aggressions, on the 11th [April 1944] this officer was hung by his wrists from the bars of the prison window, and thus interrogated, removing him from under his feet a bench he relied on whenever his answers didn't satisfy them. This ordeal, accompanied by the torture of thirst, [...] lasted until Lieutenant Liberato, already exhausted and unable to bear it any longer, lost consciousness. [...] In the interrogations of April 24 and 25, they resorted to moral torture, telling him on some occasions that they had arrested his wife [...] and on others that Lisbon had been bombed and destroyed by German aviation.». Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 573‐579. [39] Liberato, Os Japoneses Estiveram em Timor, 173. On other torture methods, see Cardoso, Timor na 2.a Guerra Mundial, 117. [40] «[...] a few spoonfuls of cooked rice, sometimes accompanied by a decilitre of broth, at each meal Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 602. [41] Liberato, Os Japoneses Estiveram em Timor. [42] For a more detailed description of the facts, see Santa, Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 183‐280. [43] Map adapted from Liberato, Os Japoneses Estiveram em Timor. [44] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 662. [45] Cardoso, Timor na 2.a Guerra Mundial, 116. [46] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 702‐710. [47] On the practical results relating to the punishment of perpetrators of war crimes identified in investigations carried out by the Australian authorities in Timor, see Cardoso, Timor na 2.a Guerra Mundial, 116 ‐118. See also William Bradley Horton, «Through the eyes of Australians: the Timor area in the early postwar period», Journal of Asia Pacific Studies (Waseda University), N.o 12 (2009): 251‐277. [48] Ferreira de Carvalho, Relatório dos Acontecimentos de Timor, 475.

Introduction The tiny nation of Timor-Leste, lying in the Indonesian archipelago, one hour’s flight northwest of Darwin, holds a special spot in the heart of many Australians who watched their epic struggle for freedom from occupation by Indonesia and their vote for independence in a United Nations referendum in August 1999. So it is a surprise to most people to learn that in World War II, when Timor-Leste was still a Portuguese colony, links were forged between Portuguese Timor and Newcastle and the Hunter Region. There were Novocastrians among the Australian commandos who, together with Dutch troops, invaded the colony and fought daringly in the mountainous country against the Japanese who had followed the Allied troops into the country. After a year of guerrilla warfare, the Australian commandos were evacuated, accompanied by hundreds of locals. For 15 months 540 of the evacuees from Portuguese Timor were accommodated at a camp at Bob’s Farm in the Port Stephens Shire, only 50 km NE of Newcastle. The camp was to play a role in diplomatic relations between Australia and Portugal, between the evacuees and Hunter Region communities, and between Newcastle and Portuguese Communists. This article covers the reasons for and consequences of Allied troops entering Timor before the Japanese, a brief examination of the Australian commandos exploits in Portuguese Timor, including Novocastrian commando Geoff Laidlaw, considers why Portuguese and Timorese were evacuated with the Australian soldiers, and why Bob’s Farm was chosen for an evacuation camp. These considerations are followed by a detailed account of the experiences of the evacuees in the Hunter region, embedded in the political, racial and class beliefs of the 1940s and new millennium postscript. I have a personal interest in the topic. I became an activist for Timorese self-determination after the Dili massacre in November 1991, I was present at the 1999 vote for independence and from late 1999 I lived in Timor-Leste for three years running an organisation for women, and still retain a connection. Portuguese Timor In 1941 Portuguese Timor had a population of 460,000 Timorese, 2,000 Chinese, and 400 Portuguese. 300 were administrators and soldiers and 100 were deportados who had been exiled to Timor by Antonio Salazar the fascist dictator of Portugal, for anarchist and Communist agitation, like bomb throwing. [2] Although Portugal was ruled by a fascist and might have been expected to align with the Axis powers of Germany and Italy in the war, Portugal announced that the 550-year-old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance ‘remained intact’. Britain did not ask for its assistance and so Portugal adopted a stance of neutrality. [3] Even before the Japanese entered the war, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies (which included West Timor), were concerned that Japan might take ‘protective custody’ of the strategic, oil-rich Portuguese colony on the eastern end of the island of Timor. [4] Australia was especially nervous that Japan could use Timor as a base to invade Australia. [5] When Japan bombed Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, and aligned with the Axis powers, it had no plans of alienating Portuguese neutrality. [6] However two days later it was proposed in the Australian War Cabinet that 2/2 Independent Company be sent to Timor. [7] 2/2 was a commando company of specially selected rugged sportsman types who were trained in guerrilla warfare. [8] On 11 December, Britain’s Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs secretly ordered Australia ‘to stand by for joint action with Dutch forces to invade and take control of Portuguese Timor.’ [9] The next day 1400 Australians troops landed in Dutch Timor. The Australian and Dutch commanders sailed on to Dili, the capital of Portuguese Timor, to tell the Governor Manuel de Carvalho that as Japanese ships were in the vicinity, it was urgent that Allied troops land. After communicating with Lisbon, the governor replied, ‘Unless Portuguese Timor is attacked, my forces must resist such a landing’. [10] Diplomatic courtesy was short lived and the Allied commanders said they were going to land troops anyway and that the Portuguese force wastoo small to stop them. So, in what historian Henry P. Frei called ‘Australia’s blundering overreach’, on 17 December 1941, 155 Australian commandos and 260 Dutch (mainly Ambonese) troops, landed unopposed on a beach just west of Dili, and by doing so, brought the war to neutral Portuguese Timor. [11] The 2/2 commandos divided into three platoons which were based outside of Dili to try and escape the malaria rife in the low-lying capital. B Platoon was led by Captain Geoff Laidlaw. Before enlisting Laidlaw lived in the Newcastle suburb of Maryville and worked for Ampol Petrol. [12] He had been a New South Wales junior swimming and surfing champion and Country Rugby League representative. [13] His nickname ‘Bull’ described his ‘powerful build and demeanour’. [14] The Portuguese and Timorese were soon calling him Captain Karabau meaning Captain Buffalo. [15] It was in Germany’s interests that Portugal did not enter the war on the side of the Allies, but in 1942 the oil-rich Portuguese colony began to figure in Japanese strategy. Hitler coalesced and on 14 February ordered his navy ‘not to obstruct Japanese navy plans for as long as the Australians are sitting on Timor’. [16] On the night of 19 February a Japanese Task Force landed in Dutch Timor, while a subsidiary force secured Dili and its airport on the 20th. The Allied troops in the west of the island surrendered on the 23rd. [17] In Portuguese Timor the Australian commandos relocated deeper into the mountainous territory, an began to conduct guerrilla warfare against the undefeated Japanese troops. [18] The Australians were, in general, popular with the Timorese and Portuguese because of their friendliness, sense of humour, bravery, and payment for services rendered. [19] In contrast the Japanese began requisitioning food without payment and abusing the Timorese women. [20] Geoff “Bull” Laidlaw on the right, in Portuguese Timor, 1943 (Damien Parer) https://museum.wa.gov.au/debt-of-honour/the-criados (originally from the Australian War Memorial) Governor Carvalho had forbidden Portuguese officials to assist the Allied forces but many Portuguese did, as did many Timorese. [21] They variously acted as interpreters, guides, intelligence and food gatherers, provided Timorese ponies for transport and use of the administration telephone system between districts, cared for the wounded and hid the commandos from the Japanese. [22] The Timorese boys who looked after individual soldiers, and formed close relationships with them, were known as criados. [23] Geoff Laidlaw soon had Portuguese offering to fight alongside his platoon. These partisans were nicknamed ‘the International Brigade’ and were mainly deportados. [24] One of them, Arsénio Filipe, joined after his house was burnt down by the Japanese, tragically while his Timorese wife was still inside. [25] Another deportado, Alfredo dos Santos, suffered terrible leg wounds in combat with the Japanese. [26] The commandos avoided pitched battles but were relentless in staging skirmishes and ambushes. [27] B Platoon had observation posts overlooking Dili so, in May 1942, Laidlaw decided to stage a night-time raid on the capital. [28] They darkened their faces with charcoal and grease and armed with tommy guns, grenades and rifles tracked along a dry riverbed and a road till they reached what they thought were Japanese barracks. After shooting up the buildings they escaped without loss, claiming 20-30 Japanese casualties. They found out later that one of the huts they had shot up was the garrison’s brothel. [29] Laidlaw won a DSO for this action. [30] The Japanese began landing thousands more troops to deal with these uppity Australian commandos. [31] Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners’ Advocate (NMH), 1 January 1943, 3 Having been colonised by Catholic Portugal, Portuguese Timor had a strong Catholic presence and the priests also helped the Australians. When a RAAF plane crashed into the mountains after bombing Japanese barracks in Maubisse in August 1942, the pilot parachuted into tall grass. He survived but was badly burnt. [32] To avoid his capture by the Japanese, Monsignor Jaime Goulart, the Roman Catholic Apostolic administrator of the diocese of Dili, loaned his car for the pilot to be taken to a hospital where Portuguese doctor Elvira Teles treated him before he was hidden away. For her own safety, she and her daughter then joined the commandos in the bush. [33] In September 1942 250 commandos from 2/4 company were shipped to the island to reinforce the Australians. [34] After this new influx, it became more and more obvious to the Japanese that the Australians were being supported by a large proportion of the Portuguese as well as Timorese villagers so the Japanese began offering payment to the Timorese to kill all the ‘whites’. [35] The Australian force commander Major Callinan asked the Portuguese officials to help deal with the ramifications. They agreed, but only if their women and children were moved to safety. [36] Callinan radioed an appeal to Army headquarters in Australia to allow the evacuation of Portuguese families because he said, the commandos ‘owe their … existence to the … assistance given by these Portuguese.’ Permission was granted. [37] The Japanese had flooded the south coast with troops to prevent supplies and reinforcements being brought to the Aussies and so mass evacuations had to be carefully planned. [38] The first was staged on 30 November 1942 at Betano. At 10pm signals were exchanged with the 75-foot Kuru captained by Novocastrian John A. Grant, an experienced sailor - born on his father’s sailing vessel. Laidlaw was on the beach to ask Grant to evacuate wounded Portuguese fighters and women and children. By 2am Grant had crammed 70 onto his overloaded boat. All hands vacated their bunks for women with babies, the youngest two weeks old. On the morning of 2 December, the evacuees were transferred at sea to a corvette and taken to the safety of Darwin. [39] With even more Japanese battalions arriving and their scorched earth policy to make it difficult for the commandos to get food, the exhausted Australians were given permission to withdraw. [40] Monsignor Goulart who had been beaten by the Japanese for lending his car for the pilot, was worried about the threat to kill ‘all whites’, as two priests had already been slaughtered. He tracked down Callinan’s mountain hideout and requested evacuation for what came to total 10 Portuguese priests and one mestizo, 20 Italian and Filipino Canossian nuns, and two Dutch priests who had escaped from West Timor. [41] 1942 National Archives of Australia (NAA) SP857/6 PH/1862 In December 1942 the Dutch destroyer Tjerk Hiddes carried out three evacuations from beaches on the south coast, virtually under the noses of the Japanese. After marching for days through mountainous territory to reach the rendezvous point, sick and wounded troops, Dutch and Australians soldiers, deportados like the portly anarchist José Gordinho; the priests and nuns - the oldest an eighty year old - and extended families of Portuguese, and of Timorese who had been recruited to report on Japanese movements, they were all whisked away. Laidlaw and his platoon were the last to be embarked on the destroyer’s second trip. On the third visit the destroyer found no troops on the beach but evacuated 45 Portuguese and mixed-race, known as mestizos. [42] For a further evacuation on 9 January 1943, there were too many locals wanting to flee with the Australians so Major Callinan, in the spirit of the White Australia policy, ordered that only 50 ‘pure-blooded’ Portuguese could go. On the hour of midnight HMAS Arunta snuck into the beach. Women and children were embarked first, followed by wounded partisans, like Arsénio Filipe (with his two daughters Natalina and Nomeia), and the last of the soldiers. Only about 20 Portuguese could be fitted in. Two Portuguese men left behind suicided on the beach rather than be captured. [43] It caused great anguish to the Australian soldiers that none of the Timorese criados were evacuated and many of them were believed to be later killed by the Japanese. [44] What was the significance of the Australian commandos fighting in Portuguese Timor? Vitally important for propaganda purposes - they were the only Allied troops undefeated by the Japanese who had overran the regions north of Australia. They tied up Japanese troops for nearly a year - an entire Japanese division for six months - preventing them from being deployed elsewhere. [45] How the Allied presence and the Japanese occupation affected the Timorese will be discussed later. The White Australia policy which restricted residence to people of European descent was forced into hiatus during the war as thousands of ‘coloured’ people gained temporary residence. Asian seamen stranded in Australian ports; Indonesians evacuated alongside Dutch from the Netherlands East Indies; and Chinese from New Guinea. [46] Despite Callinan’s preference for pure-blood Portuguese, many mestizos and Timorese were brought to Australia. The army had evacuated them, so the army had to find a place to house them. [47] Bob’s Farm Evacuation Camp The Australian Army chose a nearly completed commando training camp in sandy scrub at Bob’s Farm, on the Nelson Bay Road in Port Stephens shire for the evacuees. The training camp was not yet occupied and therefore available, and the isolation was considered an advantage as evacuees with knowledge of Allied operations in Timor were to be kept away from public scrutiny if possible. [48] Australian army nurses with some of the evacuees at the camp, 1943 (photo by army nurse Dorothy Turner, held by the Port Stephens Family History Society (PSFHS)) On, or about, Saturday 9 January 1943, having travelled by boat, train and truck, the first evacuees arrived, more than one hundred, half clothed, hungry and invariably without belongings. [49] There were wooden huts with electric lighting, tables and chairs and beds and mattresses, which were allocated to the priests and nuns and what were called the ‘better class’ Portuguese by the camp commandant. The Army Staff Office at Raymond Terrace had provided army tents and personnel including a hygiene sergeant, butcher, and cook. [50] The remainder of the evacuees were housed in the tents which were equipped with a bucket, a basin and a kerosene lamp and slept on hessian ‘bags filled with straw’. Army rations were generous but not to the taste of people used to a rice diet. [51] Newcastle organisations, mainly women’s, rose to the occasion. The Civilian Aid Services speedily organised clothing and footwear, toys and playing equipment, and ‘comforts’ like soap. The Red Cross sent crockery and cutlery, fruit juice and condensed milk. By the Sunday afternoon a 16-bed hospital had been set-up and a living room furnished for the Portuguese doctor Elvira Teles who had helped save the pilot in Timor. She was now a widow because her husband, also a doctor, is believed to have committed suicide in the colony. [52] Dr Elvira Teles with Australian nurses and a doctor, 1943 (Dorothy Turner, PSFHS) The Bomb Victims Auxiliaries turned up with 5,000 garments, shoes and three sewing machines. With lessons from the nuns and local volunteers, 70 women became competent dressmakers. The RAAF Comforts Fund provided rolls of material, as well as sweets and fruit for the children, who it was discovered did not like chocolate although they were keen on cordial. St Vincent de Paul supplied comforts to the nuns, and the Catholic United Services Auxiliary donated necessities so a school could be opened. The priests and nuns gave lessons and the children quickly grasped some English. For the spiritual side, a makeshift church was soon operational. [53] By 19 January, 502 evacuees, of whom the army categorised 400 as ‘natives or half-castes’, had been moved into the hot, spartan camp. [54] The official desire to delineate gradations of race was obvious and they had to be registered as ‘Aliens’. [55] Police from Raymond Terrace attended to take details, signatures if they were literate, and not just fingerprints, also handprints. [56] Each day a medico from a nearby field ambulance unit visited the camp. Private doctors dentists and eye specialists came as required, many voluntarily. Births and operations took place at the Mater Misericordiae Hospital in Waratah. And some of the deaths. Four year-old Fernando Neves died from heart failure while under anaesthetic for a surgical operation at the Mater. He was buried, as were others who died while at the camp, in the Catholic section of Stockton cemetery. The officiating minister for Neves’ funeral was Father Edward Jordan from the Stockton Catholic church. [57] Because the camp was so heavily camouflaged it was extremely difficult to find the track in, so the new commandant, Bill Crothers, seconded from the Newcastle Milk Board, propped a white painted tin in the fork of a tree to mark the track for the flow of volunteers, suppliers, and medical personnel driving the gravel road to Bob’s Farm to help. [58] Antonia Soares’ alien registration form (NAA: SP11/2, Portuguese/Soares A; copied at PSFHS) In February 1943, another 32 evacuated Portuguese were sent to the Bob’s Farm camp wearing various items of Australian military uniform. [59] They caused a big stir by visiting Newcastle hotels with these items on display. In a time of war this was strictly not allowed but on being questioned, a few of the men explained that Captain Laidlaw has asked them to join the Australian commandos in Timor and they had been supplied with rifles, steel helmets and military paraphernalia. [60] Following an inquiry, five of the men received back-payment for having been ‘armed, equipped and treated as Australian soldiers …’. [61] At the camp, an Australian army report described what it labelled the Bob’s Farm Caste system. ‘The Europeans eat and live apart and do not mix with the natives. Priests and nuns eat and live in their own quarters, but mix more freely with the native population. Natives, Half Castes, and Whites married to natives live and mess together.’ ‘Class feuds’ were ‘the order of the day’ the report said. ‘One set refused to cook for themselves, another refused to cook for them’. No one would dispose of the kitchen waste. [62] The commandant and hygiene sergeant cleaned the quarters after dark a few times to preserve ‘what little white prestige still remained.’ [63] Australians did not like disparities of race, the Portuguese added class concerns to the mix. One camp resident, Custodio Noronha, the judge advocate and chief of all prisons in Portuguese Timor, was in a difficult position as he had previously sentenced some of the deportados, like Arsénio Filipe, to secondary exile on Ataúro island off Dili. [64] In Timor if the deportados passed an official in the street they had to bow their head. [65] At Bob’s Farm they began asserting that they now lived ‘under democratic Government and each and every person must be considered equal.’ The army report determined that ‘whilst Government officials, deportees and natives are congregated in one community, there will be continual unpleasantness and bitterness.’ [66] The pressure cooker atmosphere was not just between Portuguese officials and deportados. Vasco Marçal was a Chinese-Portuguese mestizo who had killed his girlfriend in Shanghai, been tried for the murder in the Portuguese colony of Macau and imprisoned in Portuguese Timor. After the Japanese invasion he had escaped and joined the Australian commandos, interpreting and cooking for them. [67] Dili, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-11. Sergeant G. Milsom (Left) talking to Vasco Maria De Marcal (Right), a Portuguese who had been of great assistance to the Australians of Sparrow Force During 1942. He embarked for Australia with the 2/2nd Independent Company at Betano on 1942-12-12 and later worked in a war factory. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) Marçal was now in charge of the Bob’s farm canteen. A Portuguese bureaucrat complained that Marçal gave too much bread to his friends. The deportados objected to eating in a canteen controlled by a convict and other mestizos. A fight erupted and the ‘portly’ José Gordinho shouted to the other deportados to arm themselves with knives. One of them yelled out ‘someday I am going to kill some of these mestizos.’ [68] Hot-blooded Latin temperament was on display and Australian military personnel had to step in to defuse the situation. Alongside these tensions, affection developed between many Australians and camp inmates. Army Nurse Dorothy Turner née Mills had travelled by train from Townsville with one group and recalled ‘It didn’t take long before we got to know and understand each other and we learned quite a bit of their language. … They told us haltingly of their persecution and hatred of the Japanese … For the most part, they were farming … folk,’ she wrote, ‘dusky, dark-eyed smallish people with happy, gentle personalities. Children were very dear to them and were everywhere.’ [69] There were 200 at the camp. [70] Many of the campers used to walk down the hill to the Bob’s Farm Post Office shop run by the Upton family. The Uptons would invite them in for afternoon tea, and a singalong around the piano. They called Mrs Upton ‘Mother’. [72] One of the Portuguese priests would bring some of the boys there to train them in wrestling. [73] The Uptons also had a market garden and let the Timorese take apron loads of pumpkin runners and Princes Feather which the locals labelled a weed. [74] Cheap cooking ingredients to add to the army rations. 1943 photo by Dorothy Turner, PSFHS Photo by NMH photographer Milton Merrilees, Greg and Sylvia Ray’s collection. [71] A deputation of deportados found their way to the Newcastle Trades Hall in Union Street Newcastle in order to send their greetings to the Soviet Red Army for their official birthday on 23 February, and to ask for help in finding paid employment. [75] The son of one of the Newcastle trade union organisers had been a commando in Timor and while he was at home on leave, told the secretary of the Newcastle Federated Ironworkers Association about the camp, saying that if it had not been for the people there, the commandos’ position would have been hopeless. Because of what the commando said and because the men had been ‘deported from Portugal because of their trade union or political activities’ the Trades Hall was keen to help. The president and secretary took two of them and an interpreter to see the Federal Labor Member of Parliament for the Hunter, Rowley James who in turn wrote to Prime Minister John Curtin (Australian Labor Party) that ‘the government should be able to provide employment for Portuguese’ who had ‘assisted the Australian guerrillas in the fight against the Japanese’. [76] The Prime Minister presumably contacted the Man Power Directorate, in charge of filling labour shortages during the war because the NSW deputy director general Chas Bellemore found a few jobs for the men in a pulp-wood plant in Victoria but complained that it was a difficult task because of their lack of English skills. [77] This was before the post-war immigration of non-English speaking European refugees and the Australian government became more prepared to find work for virtual non-English speakers. That year 1943 twenty deportados joined 2,500 others who marched in the biggest ever Newcastle May Day procession in the city, with 50,000 spectators lining Hunter Street. [78] After they returned to the camp from an exhilarating day, the men were rudely brought back down to earth when they were accused of joining the Communist Party by commandant Bill Crothers, as though belonging to the party was a crime. [79] The Communist Party of Australia had been banned in June 1940 by Liberal Party Prime Minister Robert Menzies but the succeeding Prime Minister John Curtin had lifted the ban in December 1942. [80] The men who marched in the May Day parade would continue to be looked on with suspicion by conservative elements in positions of authority. Portuguese Timorese and Australians in front of the Upton’s shop, 1943 (Lucy Upton photograph album, held by PSFHS) In September 1943 one last batch of evacuees arrived at Bob’s Farm, including more deportados. [81] Two security staff were embedded in the camp to keep an eye on the deportados’ conduct, and to suspiciously log all visitors and car registration numbers. One of the new arrivals teamed up with two others to record pro-fascist Portuguese activities in Timor. Some of the pro-fascists were at the camp, like Francisco Mousinho. [82] However, the three deportados could not generate any interest in their information and Mousinho and his wife were having a disastrous year anyway, with a stillborn baby, and their nine year old daughter Ivelise dying from epileptic convulsions on the way to the Mater hospital. [83] Following threats of violence at the camp, Crothers requested the removal of the most troublesome deportados, and Arsénio Filipe, Amadeu Neves and the portly José Gordinho were sent to live at the Salvation Army People’s Palace and found jobs at Lysaght’s, which made galvanised iron sheeting, (where my mother was coincidentally working at the time making Owen machine guns). But these moves were deemed insufficient. The Army decided that 15 deportados should be interned because they knew a great deal about Australia’s commando operations in Timor, and could use that knowledge to put their own interests before Australia’s national security. [84] Their own interests does appear to be a euphemism for their Communist and Soviet Union sympathies and connections with Newcastle Trades Hall. The three men only worked at Lysaght’s for 3 hours before they were arrested, along with the 12 others, on 23 September 1943 and unjustly imprisoned in Liverpool Internment Camp. [85] They were understandably distressed to be categorised as prisoners-of-war and to have to wear the same red clothing as the fascist Italian prisoners. [86] In marked contrast, 18 young Timorese men staying at the Bob’s Farm camp were chosen for Special Operations training at Fraser Island Commando School. [87] A number of them were returned secretly to Portuguese Timor with two Australian soldiers to gather information on Japanese troop movements. [88] Arsénio Filipe believed that the new Portuguese Consul, Álvaro Laborinho, who the deportados labelled a ‘lackey of the fascist Salazar’ was responsible for their imprisonment. [89] Because of the number of Portuguese now in Australia, Laborinho had arrived that month as the first ever official Portuguese Consul in Australia, and he did choose to pay his first visit to the Bob’s Farm camp on the same day the men were relocated to Liverpool. [90] Newcastle Sun 3 May 1943, 3 The camp had the dubious honour of being mentioned in a Japanese propaganda broadcast: ‘Portuguese refugees … are housed in canvas tents with no flooring in a concentration camp near Newcastle.’ Although the tents did have floors, the Consul was also critical of the conditions and wrote to the Australian authorities that owing to the lack of decent accommodation, poor sanitary conditions and isolation, there were growing signs of despondency and sickness in the camp. He thought the evacuees should be relocated. [91] To brighten up their stay, a Christmas party organised by the Evacuees Welfare Committee was held in December 1943. Secretary Mrs R. Tomlinson had gathered bags of marbles; rag dolls and toy animals made by Home Science High School Ladies Auxiliary; and wooden toys made by men from Stockton and Carrington. [92] Unaffected by the racism of the White Australia policy, many people in the community were embracing the camp members, especially the children. Human kindness was manifest. The Department of Interior, which managed the camp, had the racist belief that the Portuguese could be housed elsewhere and found employment, but the ‘native’ and mestizo Timorese would have to stay at Bob’s Farm because they could not be integrated into the community. [93] However the Consul managed to re-accommodate all the evacuees in private hotels and rental houses in Armidale, Narrabri, Glen Innes and find paid employment for some of them. [94] The religious personnel were dispersed into monasteries and convents. [95] On 22 March 1944 the last evacuees departed. [96] An Upton family member recalled ‘all of a sudden everyone disappeared’. [97] Twenty-two evacuees were still living in private accommodation in the region because the men had employment. [98] Custodio Noronha was working as a clerk at the Dairy Farmers Co-operative, presumably organised by Crothers, who was on secondment from the Milk Board. Stephen Yeow, a Singaporean-born mechanic who spoke English well, was employed by Sandeman’s bus service at Salt Ash; and a few men, including the convict Vasco Marçal, had jobs at the Masonite Factory in Raymond Terrace. [99] The deportados in Liverpool internment camp, who of course had been originally exiled to Timor because of their involvement in radical politics, did not stay there quietly. They wrote letters of complaint, requested a visit by the International Red Cross and, more dramatically, went on hunger strikes. The Newcastle branch of the Boilermakers’ Society wrote to the Minister for the Army protesting the internment of ‘anti-fascists’ who had assisted the Australian army fight the Japanese. [100] NSW Supreme Court Judge Mr Justice Davidson was tasked with visiting the Liverpool camp and checking on the situation. He saw proof of the partisanship of at least five Portuguese who had recently healed battle wounds, with one man’s leg having ‘been riddled with machine gun bullets’. [101] (Probably Alfredo dos Santos). Finally in March 1944 the Director General of Security decided to release most of the Portuguese internees. [102] Meanwhile, to accommodate the deportados and their families after the closure of the Bob’s Farm camp, the Portuguese Consul had rented Minimbah, a 13-acre fenced property with a two-story stone building about 9 kilometres from Singleton. The men were not allowed to leave the property but some of their wives were allowed to visit Singleton to shop. A member of the security services visited once a week, their mail was censored, and the local police and shopkeepers were directed to keep a close eye on the residents. The last of the interned deportados were released and relocated to Minimbah in August 1944, bringing Francisco Horta and Arsénio Filipe’s young daughter, Natalina Filipe, into close proximity. [103] After Japan unconditionally surrendered in August 1945, news filtered out that the Timorese had suffered greatly under the Japanese occupation. There had been torture and killings, burning of villages and crops, and the massive relocation of villagers had prevented new crops being sown with the resultant widespread famine. Many towns had been devastated by Australian and American bombing. In late October 1945 Monsignor Jaime Goulart, living at a monastery in Pennant Hills, had been appointed the first Bishop of Dili by the Pope. When interviewed he expressed ‘appreciation of the hospitality and assistance he and his people have received from Australia. But’, he added, ‘remembering Timor, it has only been hospitality repaid.’ [104] Bishop Goulart had no grand cathedral to return to in Dili. It had been bombed by the Japanese. [105] The Australian and Dutch invasion of this tiny country may have been advantageous to the Allies, as mentioned earlier, but as James Dunn, Australian consul to Portuguese Timor in the 1960s, wrote, the invasion and Japanese occupation ‘was one of the great catastrophes of World War Two in terms of relative loss of life’. At least 40,000 Timorese were estimated to have died out of 460,000. [106] Also, because Portugal was neutral in the war, its colony was not eligible for the reconstruction aid that USA gave to Germany and Japan. The Australian government never offered any compensation. [107] At home, our government reinstated the White Australia policy and the evacuees had to be repatriated. [108] Many of the Portuguese deportados applied for permanent residence. Although they were all nominally ‘white,’ only Alfredo dos Santos of the injured leg was allowed to stay. For the others, not only their politics but also their ‘moral habits’ were considered not to be ‘conducive to good citizenship’. The latter accusation can probably be traced back to a Bob’s Farm camp administration report that Portuguese living with ‘native women’ was a sore point with local ‘decent living people’. [109] A few other evacuees managed to remain in Australia, like the Singaporean Yeow family because the father had a British passport. [110] Senora Angelina da Costa is farewelled by Mrs R Tomlinson NMH, 28 November 1945, 5 They built up a market garden at Fullerton Cove and stayed in the area. [111] Because he spoke fluent English Deolindo de Encarnação had become the secretary to first Crothers, then to Laborinho in Sydney, and in the latter role he and his family were allowed to stay in Australia after the war. [112] On 27 November 1945 a special train brought the evacuees back to Newcastle. The Upton family, Mrs Tomlinson from the Evacuees Welfare Committee, Father Edward Jordan from Stockton Catholic church and the Portuguese Consul, were among the crowd to farewell them. The children, including 70 born during the stay in Australia, had stuffed koalas bears and teddy bears and dolls to take back and the bigger ones had bottles of Newcastle cordial tucked under each arm. Passports were issued by the Newcastle Customs House. 562 evacuees, at the time ‘the largest number of passengers ever to board a ship’ in Newcastle, departed from Lee Wharf on the SS Angola. [113] On board the Angola were Arsénio Filipe and his daughters, the portly José Gordinho and Francisco Horta. Some of the deportados including Horta were returning to Portugal because their exile had been repealed. [114] Horta later returned to Dili where he married Natalina Filipe. In December 1949 they gave birth to José Ramos-Horta, a prime mover in the struggle for Timorese independence. [115] Undoubtedly the radicalism of his deportado father and grandfather influenced his outspoken advocacy for the cause. Geoff Laidlaw returned to Newcastle and was appointed head salesman of Ampol. He took up golf and became captain of Merewether Golf Club from 1950-52. His name can still be seen on the honour board. He later became head of Ampol in Western Australia. [116] Captain Grant returned to Newcastle to work for the Maritime Board before relocating to Yamba. [117] The SS Angola at the Lee Wharf, Newcastle, 1945 (Lucy Upton photograph album, PSFHS) Did the presence of Portuguese-Timorese in the Hunter Region have any significance? While the Australian authorities retained their suspicion of Communists, the Newcastle Trades Hall displayed their internationalism by giving solidarity and support to the deportados. The Newcastle Morning Herald regarded the social service work at the Bob’s Farm camp as ‘one of the outstanding wartime achievements’ of local women's organisations. [118] And despite the racism of the White Australia policy, those who had regular contact with the Portuguese and Timorese forged bonds of affection and never forgot them. So perhaps these cross-cultural experiences in the region led to changed mindsets about the need for a White Australia policy and was one of a myriad of cracks leading to its eventual dismantling. What happened to the camp? The camp commandant Bill Crothers nostalgically went back to Bob’s Farm years later and was sad to find all traces of human habitation had been removed, there was not even a white-painted tin in the fork of a tree. [119] Local Stewart Upton learnt that the Worimi Land Council were granted the land but eventually sold it. There is now a fig and olive plantation there. [120] So it seemed that all that remained were the memories of a few Hunter residents and eight graves in Stockton cemetery. [121] But reminders kept popping up. Retired army nurse Dorothy Turner’s inquiry about the camp in the early 2000s was the catalyst for the Port Stephens Family History Society publication. [122] Because of my interest in Timor-Leste and reference to the camp in Michele Turner’s Telling East Timor, I had started my own research and in that process contacted former Herald journalist Greg Ray who sent me photos he had obtained that were originally from the Newcastle Morning Herald. So when Timorese student Grazela Albino came to the University to study and told me her grandfather had been at the camp, we discovered that Antonio Albino, in his 90s and living in Timor-Leste was in one of the photos. When I took Grazela and another Timorese student to visit the camp site and to Stockton cemetery to show them the graves, Grazela was not happy that seven of the graves were unmarked. So with the permission of Newcastle City Council and the help of a group I belong to, the Hunter East Timor Sisters, and the Newcastle Men’s Shed, all the graves of the young and old people who died while living at the Bob’s Farm camp now have wooden crosses with plaques featuring their name and date of death, and that they had lived at the camp. Francisco Horta and Natalina Filipe 1950c (José Ramos-Horta’s Facebook page, 2019) So although the World War II links between the brave nation of Timor-Leste, and Newcastle and the Hunter Region, are not widely known, besides the relatives of those who died while at the Bob’s Farm camp, there are a number of other people who are determined that the connection is not forgotten, and is in fact held in high regard. 18 February 2024 judithaconway@gmail.com EDITOR'S NOTE: Thank you to Jude Conway for giving permission to reprint this article. REFERENCES [1] This article is based on a joint talk I gave with Denise Gaudion from the Port Stephens Family History Society (PSFHS) at the “Newcastle and the Hunter at War” Symposium, 9 November 2017 and talks I gave to the University of Newcastle’s “War Experience” series on 9 October 2019 and to the Newcastle Family History Society on 5 October 2021. If not directly referenced, the original Australian, Portuguese, Japanese or German sources can be traced through my footnotes. [2] Ernest Chamberlain, Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations in World War II, 2010, http://www.scribd.com/doc/29688334/Forgotten-Men-Timorese-in-Special-Operations-during-World-War-II (accessed 2 May 2023), Annex A 15, 41; Paul Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground: A Gripping Account Of Australia’s First Commando Campaign: Timor 1942, Hachette, 2010, 30; “Who blundered?: Allies Rebuffed—Not Allowed to Aid War Effort,” Tribune (Sydney), 3 March 1943, 2. [3] Joaquim da Costa Leite, ‘Neutrality by Agreement: Portugal and the British Alliance in World War II,’ American University International Law Review, 1998, 14 (1): 185–199, 189. 1998. [4] Australian War Cabinet Secret Agendum, Supplement No. 3 to Agendum No, 270/1941, “Occupation of Portuguese Timor” in A5954 564/1 “Relations with Portuguese Timor,” Shedden Collection, National Archives of Australia, Canberra. [5] Axis History Forum: “Port. Army in Macau and East Timor”, https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=131249 (accessed 8 September 2017). [6] Henry P. Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor, 1 January 1942 ‐ 20 February 1942,” Australian Historical Studies, October 1996, 27 (107), 281-302, 281. [7] Christopher C. H. Wray, Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, Melbourne: Hutchinson Australia, 1987, 24. [8] B.J. Callinan, Independent Company, Melbourne: William Heinemann Ltd, 1953, xiv. [9] Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision”, 284. [10] Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision”, 286. [11] Frei, “Japan's reluctant decision”, 302; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 27. [12] “DSO for Major Laidlaw,” Newcastle Sun 29 May 1943, 3; Tom Nisbett, “Vale Geoffrey Laidlaw DSO”, 2/2 Commando Courier, July 1978; 2. Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 16. [13] The Onlooker, “Geoff Laidlaw Great When ‘Going Was Tough’”, Newcastle Morning Herald & Miners Advocate (NMH), 6 January 1943, 2. [14] Christopher Wray, Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, Hutchinson Aust, Melbourne, 1987, 31. [15] José Ramos-Horta to author, Facebook Messenger, 26 September 2019. [16] Frei, “Japan's reluctant decision”, 296. [17] Frei, “Japan's reluctant decision”, 298-299. [18] Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision”, 299. [19] Wray, Timor 1942, 88, 178. [20] Wray, Timor 1942, 101. [21] Callinan, Independent Company, 9. [22] Wray, Timor 1942, 88; Yvonne Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp: Refugees from Timor in Port Stephens During World War II, PSFHS, Tanilba Bay, 2014, 3. This book can be purchased at https://portstephensfamilyhistory.com.au/shop/bobs-farm-cadre-camp-refugees-from-timor-in-port-stephens-during-world-war-11/. [23] Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 110. [24] Ramos-Horta to author, 2019; Wray, Timor 1942, 97. [25] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 16. [26] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 6. [27] “Astonishing Exploits By A.I.F. On Timor,” NMH, 1 January 1943, 3. [28] Wray, Timor 1942, 101; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 130. [29] Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 131-133. [30] “DSO for Major Laidlaw,” Newcastle Sun, 29 May 1943, 4, Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 278. [31] George Rottman, World War II Pacific Island Guide: A Geo-Military Study. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002, 211. [32] Wray, Timor 1942, 128; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 179. [33] Callinan, Independent Company, 197; Michele Turner, Telling East Timor: personal testimonies 1942-1992, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press 1992, 39. [34] Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 204. [35] Callinan, Independent Company, 197, Wray, Timor 1942, 145. [36] Callinan, Independent Company, 177. [37] Callinan, Independent Company, 188; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 18. [38] Callinan, Independent Company, 200; L. Klemen, “The fighting on Portuguese East Timor, 1942,” 2000, https://warfare.gq/dutcheastindies/timor_port.html (accessed 24 April 2022). [39] Wray, Timor 1942, 156; “Modern Sea Dog On The Beach”, Daily Examiner (Grafton), 4 February 1948, 2; E. Samuels, “HMAS Kuru Beat The Japs: How a Gallant Little Ship Rescued Evacuees from Timor”, Australasian, 10 November 1945, 21. [40] “Japanese ‘Scorched Earth’ Policy and the August Push”, https://museum.wa.gov.au/debt-of-honour/japanese-scorched-earth-policy-and-august-push (accessed 24 April 2022); Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 19; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 262. [41] Callinan 197; “Dramatic Timor Rescues: Nuns, Priests Brought Here by Destroyer,” Catholic Weekly, 5 August 1943, 1; “Evacuees From Timor In Northern Camp,” Newcastle Sun, 30 July 1943, 4. [42] Wray, Timor 1942, 159, 162; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 40; “Life Story: Bishop Goulart of Dili,” Catholic Weekly, 25 October 1945, 2; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 273, 276-77. [43] Callinan, Independent Company, 216; Wray, Timor 1942, 172; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 16; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 291. [44] Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 290, 334; “Criados— A special bond of friendship and mutual respect,” Across the Timor Sea, https://acrossthetimorsea.com/criados/ (accessed 2 May 2023). [45] James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Sydney: ABC Books 1996, 20; Peter Stanley, “Remembering Darwin … and Timor, February 1942,” Pearls and Irritations, 17 February 2022, https://johnmenadue.com/remembering-darwin-and-timor-february-1942/ (accessed 4 April 2022). [46] “Most Refugees Leaving Aust.,” Telegraph (Brisbane) 7 December 1945, 4; Kevin Blackburn, “Disguised Anti-Colonialism”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, April 2001, 55 (1), 101-117, 103; Margaret J. Kartomi, The Gamelan Digul and the Prison Musician who Built It: An Australian Link with the Indonesian Revolution, Rochester (NY): University of Rochester Press, 2002, 63; “Chinese immigrants and Chinese-Australians in New South Wales”, National Archives of Australia, https://www.naa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/research-guide-chinese-immigrants-chinese-australians-in-nsw_0.pdf, (accessed 24 April 2022). [47] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 17, 18. [48] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 18. [49] “Timor Refugees Tested C.A.S.,” NMH, 29 November 1945, 2, reports that 100 evacuees arrived on the Saturday. Fraser, who examined the Australian army archives, wrote that 155 arrived on the Sunday (Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 19). [50] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 20. [51] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 20, 21. [52] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 22; “Newcastle Help For Bob's Farm Evacuees,” NMH, 30 July 1943, 6; “Timor Refugees Tested C.A.S.”. [53] “Newcastle Help For Bob's Farm Evacuees”; Oliver Hogue, “Escape from Timor: priests meet man they thought dead,” NMH, 30 July 1943, 3; “Native Children Won’t Eat Chocolates”, Newcastle Sun, 30 July1943, 4; James Cunningham, “From Timor To Bob's Farm,” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1978, 8. [54] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 38. [55] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 26. [56] I viewed copies of Alien registration forms at the PSFHS. [57] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 24; NSW Death Certificate for Fernando Neves, copy held by PSFHS. [58] Cunningham, “From Timor To Bob’s Farm”. [59] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 40. [60] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 21-22; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 6, 16, 33. [61] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 40. [62] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 38-39. [63] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 22. [64] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 39, Annex A 15. [65] “Timor Vital Point In Australia's Defence,” Townsville Daily Bulletin, 26 September 1945, 3. [66] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 39. [67] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 57; Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 277. [68] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 28-29. [69] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 62-64. [70] Cunningham, “From Timor to Bob's Farm”. [71] For information about this collection see https://www.phototimetunnel.com/ (accessed 18/2/24.) [72] Port Stephens Historical Society interviews with Bob’s Farm locals Norm Blanch, Dorothy Blanch and Gordon Holliday, Rex Coombes and Eric Holliday, 11 May 1999 (copy in author’s possession). [73] Stewart Upton interview for “Sealed with all my love … stories of Love & Migration” exhibition, Newcastle Region Maritime Museum, 2002 (copy in author’s possession). [74] Port Stephens Historical Society interviews, 1999. [75] “Refugees Fought With Aussie Commandoes,” Tribune, 10 March 1943, 2; “February 23 is Defender of the Fatherland Day”, https://pacsto.org/events/23-fevralya-den-zaschitnika-otechestva, (accessed 2 May 2023). [76] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 33 [77] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 33; Deputy Director General of Man Power to Rowley James (MP), 10 June 1943, Newcastle Trades Hall archives, A5062, University of Newcastle Special Collections. [78] “Work Found For Timor Refugees,” NMH, 13 August 1943; “Newcastle's Biggest May Day March,” Newcastle Sun, 3 May 1943, 3. [79] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 29. [80] “Banning of the Communist Party in World War II,” John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 1998, https://john.curtin.edu.au/letters/activities/communism.html (accessed 7 May 2023). [81] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 20. [82] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 26-27 [83] Newcastle Family History Society (NFHS), Stockton Cemetery Burials, NSW 1890-2005, NFHS, 2005; NSW Death Certificate for Ivelise Mousinho, copy held by PSFHS. [84] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 37-38; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A 8, 40. [85] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 71. [86] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 72-73; Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 37. [87] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 60. [88] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 27, 28. [89] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 26; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, Annex A, 17, footnote 45. [90] “Portuguese Consul In Armidale,” Armidale Express and New England General Advertiser, 24 September 1943, 5; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 44, 71. [91] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 44. [92] “Christmas Party Plans For Timor Evacuees,” NMH, 16 December 1943, 4. [93] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 30. [94] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 43. [95] “Life Story: Bishop Goulart of Dili”. [96] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 43. [97] Port Stephens Historical Society interviews, 1999. [98] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 46. [99] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 33-34. [100] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 72-73. [101] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 39. [102] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 74. [103] Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 45; Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 41-42. [104] “Life Story: Bishop Goulart of Dili”. [105] “Dili Cathedral Opened For Use on Feast of Immaculate Conception,” Union of Catholic Asian News, 27 December 1989, https://www.ucanews.com/story-archive/?post_name=/1989/12/28/dili-cathedral-opened-for-use-on-feast-of-immaculate-conception&post_id=39142 (accessed 7 May 2023). [106] Wray, Timor 1942, 179; “Impact on the Timorese: We brought nothing but misery on those poor people,” Western Australian Museum, https://museum.wa.gov.au/debt-of-honour/impact-on-timorese-we-brought-nothing-misery-on-those-poor-people (accessed 7 May 2023); Dunn, Timor, 22-3. [107] Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground, 318. [108] Kevin Blackburn, 'Disguised Anti-Colonialism', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Apr2001, Vol. 55 Issue 1, 101-117, 103. [109] 16 November 1945, H. S. D. Hay, A/g Inquiry Officer, to the Inspector Commonwealth Investigation Branch Sydney, in “Portuguese Evacuees from Timor – Permanent Admission,” Shedden Collection: A367, C63656. [110] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 33-34. [111] Ellie-Marie Watts, “Bobs Farm refugee camp’s story in print”, Port Stephens Examiner, 2 December 2014. [112] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 33, 47. [113] “Angola Sails With 587 Evacuees,” NMH, 28 November 1945, 2; “Escaped Japanese On Timor,” 28 November 1945, 5; Denise Gaudion, Port Stephens Historical Society, email to author 7 October 2017; Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, 45. [114] "Passenger list of Portuguese-Timor evacuees per SS Angola ex Newcastle, 27 November 1945,” Shedden Collection, A367; Chamberlain, Forgotten Men, 33. [115] “José Ramos-Horta Facts: The Nobel Prize, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1996/ramos-horta/facts/ (accessed 2 May 2023). [116] “Personal,” Cessnock Eagle and South Maitland Recorder, 24 January 1950, page 3; “Golf Gossip” Newcastle Sun, 29 August 1951 p12; personal observation; Tom Nisbett, “Vale Geoffrey Laidlaw DSO”, 2/2 Commando Courier July 1978. [117] “Modern Sea Dog On The Beach,” Daily Examiner, 4 February 1948, 2. [118] “Newcastle Help For Bob's Farm Evacuees,” NMH, 30 July 1943, 6. [119] Cunningham, “From Timor to Bob's Farm”. [120] Stewart Upton interview; personal observation. [121] NFHS, Stockton Cemetery Burials. [122] Fraser, Bob’s Farm Cadre Camp, Foreword.

Thanks for your reply Chantal and the photos. I agree with your identification of Ron Trengove in the 75 LAD group photo. Regards Ed

Ron Trengrove was a member of the Citizens Military Force (Reserves) with Service No N107496 and serving in the Australian Army Ordnance Corps in Darwin, when he enlisted into the A.I.F. on 20 August 1941 and was posted to 75th Light Aid Detachment. (https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/nx/ronald-claude-trengove-r686/) He joined the 2/2nd on Timor as a Lance Corporal from 75th Light Aid Detachment, after the fall of Koepang, approx. March 1942. He was one of the former Koepang men, who moved to the village of Mape for intensive commando training and on 8 May 1942, they were formed into a new Platoon, “D” Platoon under the command of Lieutenant Turton and later under Lt Doig. After the campaign on Timor, he embarked with the unit, for Australia aboard the Royal Dutch destroyer “Tjerk Hiddes” on 16 Dec 1942. Ron transferred to 2nd M.T.T.D. (believed to be Motor Transport Training Depot) and became an Instructor. He was promoted to Acting Corporal on 17 Aug 1943 and was discharged on 24 Oct 1945. Post-war Ron was a long term member of the N.S.W. branch of the 2/2 Commando Association of Australia until his death in July 2000. He sent the following series of articles to the Courier that recount his experiences in Dutch Timor prior to his joining the 2/2. They provide an interesting personal insight into the experiences of the group that escaped from the western end of the island after the Japanese invasion on February 19 1942. Just prior to that, he was a member of a group that recovered weapons, ammunition and other equipment and components from eight American Kittyhawk fighters that crash landed near Atamboea – another forgotten incident in the campaign. 1. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.21 no. 200 May 1967: 7-11. 2. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 201 July 1967: 7-12. 3. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 202 August 1967: 5-7. 4. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 203 September 1967: 3-7. 5. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 204 October 1967: 15-16. 6. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 205 November 1967: 6-10. Ron Trengrove has sent to me a couple of exercise books full of his early experiences in Timor. These are far from complete but they do tell a story and I think a story well worth repeating so the time has arrived to include these in our old feature "Historically, Yours!" I hope the readers will have as much enjoyment reading them as I did. __________ HOME LEAVE CANCELLED I am going to try and write down as much as I can remember of my 12 months on Timor as accurately as I can remember it and dates and months as near as I can remember. If I say weeks where it was only days it is only because at times we lost track of days and weeks as Sunday was a patrol day as was Monday and every other day. And when things got hot, and we were on the run, every day was like a week, and nights twice as long. As everyone knows the Japs struck Pearl Harbour on the 7th December 1941 and we of the 75 L.A.D. who were expecting to go on leave from Darwin were attached to the 2/40th Btn. who were also all packed up ready to go to Tasmania on leave. The ship which was to take them was in Darwin. It was the old Zealandia which was sunk in Port Darwin in February, 1942, the day of Darwin's first raid Sunday night, 7th December, 1941. We had gone to bed about nine o'clock and for some reason, I had been lying awake for an hour or more. Everyone had seemed to be expecting something that day. All were kind of excited. It may seem as if I am, or have, imagined it, but I thought of it after the first excitement had subsided that night and often since. 75 Light Aid Detachment AEME – late 1941-early 1942 – location and individuals unidentified [1] Our tents were nearest the "C" Company huts and my tent closer that the other two belonging to our outfit. It was a hot night with the moon well up. It had been like that for a few weeks as we were in the middle of the wet season. All was quiet when I saw lights switched on in "C" Company's orderly room and about five minutes later uproar and confusion was on in "C" Company's lines. Those of us who were not awake in the L.A.D. soon were awake and wondering. I got out of bed and put my boots on (incidentally all that I did put on or had on) and, ran over to the first hut which was No. 13 Platoon's, and enquired as to what all the row was about, to be informed that they were ordered to get out of bed and have everything ready for a move immediately. The boys were convinced it was leave, but I reckoned not as the Japs had everyone guessing for the past few months and we all knew that the Jap Minister was going to see Roosevelt. However, that's all they knew so I went back to our tent and was told that our W.O.2· Willersdorf had gone over to Battalion Headquarters to find the reason for the commotion and would be back in a few minutes. I immediately set to and lit a fire and started to boil the water in the dixie for tea. By the time we had had tea and a biscuit we were waiting on the return of Willersdorf. He seemed to have been away hours and most of us were considering going back to bed when he turned up and called us all together in the tent and told us that the Japs were in the war and that we were to start packing up the L.A.D. immediately. The time then was still before midnight and we knew we would not get any sleep that night. Luckily we had had all our crates for the gear made months before so all we had to do was pack the tools and spare parts which doesn't sound much but when one considers we had two store vans of three ton capacity full of these necessary parts and they had to be packed securely and in their correct crates, and then all the tools of the trailer and the tool kits of our fitters. We had an all-night job in front of us. HMAS Westralia, 1940 [2] We worked right through until four, in the morning by which time everything but our own personal gear had been packed. I had made some hot Bourn Vita about this time so we all had time off for a smoke and the drink and something to eat, after which we packed our own gear and then went down to breakfast and were sitting waiting for the order to move by five o'clock. After a lot of palavering from Ordnance heads and signing various papers, Willersdorf gave us the order to get out on the road and take our place at the end of "C" Company, who had already moved out. Sufficient to say that after one of the slowest rides I have ever had in a truck we arrived at the wharf in Darwin. We had come 27 miles already and some of, us were wondering if we would ever see that road again. TO KOEPANG, DUTCH TIMOR, ON THE WESTRALIA We were lucky in the fact that all attached units to the 2/40th Btn. were to travel on the merchant cruiser Westralia. About 300 of us were put aboard her. She was laying out in the stream and us chaps were among the first half a dozen boat loads to get aboard and so we had a good chance of picking a good spot for ourselves. Everyone thought that we would be pulling out that night but we were mistaken as we did not pull out until Wednesday, 10th December. I am not too sure now whether the sloop Koala went first and the Zealandia then Westralia, or vice versa, however sufficient to say we were on the move at daylight and we were just clearing the boom when the sun began to rise in front of us and it was one of those usual glorious sunrises that one so often sees at Darwin, like the sunsets which were always worth watching and which I very seldom missed seeing when I was stationed at Larrakeyah Barracks. We had to go very slowly to keep up with the Zealandia who was at her top speed of about eight or nine knots. The sloop was nearly always well to the fore and for our protection well in the fore and round on all sides was the pride, and I think, the full strength of the Royal Australian Air Force consisting of three Lockheed Hudsons. By the full strength I mean the strength of the Darwin Squadron and no doubt they did a good job then and later. Koepang landing place [3] We didn't have much to do other than look over the rails of the ship, and it was in doing this that I saw my first sea snake, a yellow, black spotted one - about three feet long, floating on top of the water. After we had been at sea and out of sight of Darwin, or I should say Vesteys and Larrakeyah, we had our first idea of how the Navy worked. A ship was seen on the horizon and on getting nearer to us she made off a little to the east and on our first signal refused to stop but on the second order which was given in typical Navy style: "Heave to or we fire," which she did promptly, and our commander, a big bearded giant, by the way not so much in height but in width, went over to the ship he had ordered to heave to in a naval cutter or pinnace. She turned out to be a Dutch ship and her skipper thought that we were Japs. We continued on our way and on Friday morning of the 12th December, we sighted land and in no time we seemed to be between two islands, one on our left was named Lemoa and the one on the right was Timor - Dutch Timor. ARRIVAL AT KOEPANG Well, we pulled up past a town which we were told was Koepang, and then on to the bay where huge boats, bigger than life boats, came out to us and in no time now it seemed we were piling down the gangway with our gear around us, each man looking like a moving mountain and piled into these cumbersome looking boats. If I remember correctly we were towed about four in line by a motor launch. We couldn't get right up to the jetty as the tide was out, so they took us in as far as they could. We were told to have nothing to do with the natives, but not me. I gave my kit bag to one and my pack, and then clambered on to the shoulders of another who took me to the jetty. A lot of the boys carried out the officers' orders and waded in, but Eric, Cam and I and numerous others, did the same as I mentioned above and even some of the officers lowered themselves for once and took a ride. It was so stupid not to have done it as the Dutch officials had specially mobilised this large force of natives to do just that, and the natives were quite put out about those who, refused to be helped. The order about having nothing to do with natives was so ridiculous as we proved later on and had we been freer with them than we were we might have had a much better understanding with them and they with us later on when we needed it. Well, we got ashore O.K. and then we had to stand about and wait for trucks, but not for very long, as everything was fairly well organised, thanks to the Dutch, I imagine. Australian trucks had been there waiting for us for six months, but the Dutch would not allow us to come over until the Japs came into the war. We were taken to the barracks that had been made for us alongside of, Penfoei Aerodrome, which in peace time was a civilian drome, but now the R.A.A.F. was in charge with the Royal Netherlands Air, Force and the N.E.I. Army. The Dutch had gone to a lot of trouble for us and on their advice we had been supplied with beds which were very heavy and well-made and comfortable. We were debussed at the entrance to the camp and it was here that we met the Javanese soldiers who later on proved such gallant and game fighters, who lost so much by the enemy in Java. A Javanese soldier, a Sergeant, who was in charge of the guard was very friendly and wanted all of us to come and see him and his wife and child in Koepang. His name was Van Nuisenberg who later on up in the Portuguese Timor was such an able and competent spy for Capt. Van Sweetman, a Dutch Captain who I met a month or so later. Koepang – plan of military barracks [4] After a lot of preliminary chopping and changing we were eventually settled in a small hut made of bamboo and grass thatched roof with a concrete floor. They were exceedingly well made and all done by native labour. A number of natives were under the command of a senior native who had had training in carpentry. We had a lot of amusing hours asking the Malayan name for the tools they were using and although I can't remember them now. I still recall "pencil" was pronounced "penceel". All the heavy carting was done by native women who carried the coral rock and concrete in small baskets either on their heads or shoulders. Each basket would not hold as much as the average household bucket. They worked in gangs of' 20 to 30, and either had a native man over them or a woman chief who seemed to favour some and harangue others severely for apparently nothing at all. They all either chewed tobacco or sang, laughed and chattered in some way and occasional fights broke the monotony. When this latter happened a stick or some smart kicks were brought into play by the chief of the respective gang. SETTLING IN – DOWN TO WORK Things began to straighten out after a few days and we of the L.A.D. started work on the trucks in earnest. Our meals, of course, came out of tins, and after a week or so bread was issued which, although very sour was a change from dog biscuits. Troops were not allowed leave to Koepang for at least a week, but me being the driver of our ute. I was in after a few days of Ianding having driven Willersdorf who wasn't such a bad egg if he had only known his job and could have seen his lack of knowledge and let well enough done. Well, things began to settle down to the same lazy, dassie, humdrum life ,we had been living in Darwin and was now in the office cataloguing all our spare parts which were beginning to arrive. Laurie Ross, who was one of the nicest chaps I had the pleasure to meet in the army and who smoothed over a lot of upsets in the L.A.D., was then a L/Corporal but was very soon made a Staff Sgt. which I for one was very pleased to see him get as he managed everything and would have been an ideal officer which he became on his return to Australia in August, 1943. Eric Herd, my pal, who was the second recent addition to our small Unit, had a terrific row with W.O. Willersdorf and in my opinion was justified in his argument and it was the first time that Willersdorf had been spoken to in such a manner. However Laurie smoothed that over but only because he said that he never heard what Eric said and I can't write here what he said as the words are not exactly the words one uses in terms of endearment. Harry Leviston, who was also a champion chap, heard everything that went on and he gave us a running (and running it was) description of what happened and Harry being never any other way but laughing, gave a very vivid description which proved most amusing. Willersdorf was struck dumb and then came to life running after Eric shouting out: "Halt. Stop. Halt that man." Eric turned round and repeated what he had said inside, which inflamed Willersdorf to fresh hues in the face and temper, but to no avail. Harry was asked had he heard what had been said but denied same although as he said he was almost in agony refraining from laughing. However, after a lot of palaver the whole thing was forgotten, and Christmas was on us. CHRISTMAS AND INTO THE NEW YEAR - 1942 We were to have had pork for Christmas dinner but finished up with tinned salmon, tinned fruit and dog biscuits and raspberry jam. Pigs were abundant on the island and although they belonged to the natives and a large number were bought for Christmas. The C.O. Lt-Colonel Leggatt, who was an excellent soldier and was taken prisoner, said that he didn't think they would be fit to eat, which also was later, proved to be wrong as I had in the 12 months hence, than I had ever seen before. Christmas passed and we were getting well into January 1942 when I got a dose of dysentery which was followed by a bout of dengue fever followed by malaria, but all were not very serious and only kept me inactive for about a fortnight. By this time we were well organised and were going to move to Babaoe, half way between Penfoei and Tjamplong, the latter being headquarters and hospital situated on a mountain top. We had lots of leave and plenty of laughs. I mentioned before that we were not allowed in Koepang for a week but it was notable on each occasion that I was in there in that week that a large proportion of officers and senior N.C.O's., W.O's. and Sergeants, were to be seen in the shops and consequently got the pick of everything before the old private had a chance to get any of the good things. I suppose that is known as good old Australian Army fellowship between officers and men that, we hear so much about, but very seldom see. Depicts a portrait of Lieutenant Colonel William Watt Leggatt (VX44907), MC, Commanding 2/40th Australian Infantry Battalion, 'Sparrow Force'. Taken prisoner by the Japanese [5] At the time we left Darwin our C.O., Capt. R.C. Neave, was on leave, also one of our fitters, Col Mackenzie, and they arrived back with a lot of 40th Btn. chaps who had gone on leave and some odds and sods of reos in the beginning of February. Penfoei by this time was protected by one company of 2/40th Btn., "C" Company, the other Companies being spread over about a 30 mile front from Babaoe to Tenau, pronounced, if I remember correctly, “ten hour”. The latter was where all equipment and heavy loads of any description were unshipped and it was situated a few miles south or should I say south west of Koepang. Between Penfoei and Babaoe was our Coastal Artillery, the 2/1st Heavy Battery, consisting of two six-inch naval guns standing out plain on top of the coral rocks overlooking the entrance to the bay and to the west or south Koepang. Singapore style I imagine. Good for practice shooting at nothing or if the enemy were silly enough, at them if they came in that way, which they did not. JAPANESE AIR RAIDS BEGIN I am not sure now whether they the Japs, started their first raids in January or in February. Sufficient to say one afternoon a plane was spotted very high up in the sky almost invisible so high was it up, and circled for a few minutes and then made off. It was the same procedure they had used everywhere. Spotter today, Zeros or bombers tomorrow. In this case if memory again serves me right, no planes came the next day, but they came with a vengeance the next three. Beautiful Zeros, but from photos I had seen of Messerschmitts they were more like German planes than Zeros. However I guess they were Japs. Everyone was that excited afterwards that they didn't appear to know exactly what they were. They scored reasonably well that day. One Dutchman being hit in the knee and one Kittyhawk in for repairs made unrepairable. Needless to say no Japs lost, and could those sons of Tojo fly? They were no mugs. They came in over Tjamplong in a long powerful glide down on to Penfoei drome. The alarm had been given in Babaoe but apparently not at Penfoei as the Dutchman who was shot saw the planes coming and started to shout that the Americans had arrived, and was jumping up and down with excitement at the prospect of Yank fighter planes coming. His jubilant outburst was cut down very smartly when the plane got close and a burst of machine gun fire raced away from the first plane and chopped the ground up near him. He broke into a smart gallop but was brought down much faster than he could have done voluntarily. A good pal of mine, Tom Thick, of the 2/ 11th Engineers, also was whacked on the rump in this raid, and I only wish Tom was here to give the details more clearly than I can remember them. However I will try and write them down as best I can and as Tom told me afterward. It appears that Tom was in the hangar at the time, what for I don't know. Sufficient to say he was there with a couple of Javanese boys who were then looking after the petrol. The nose of the Kittyhawk was there just outside the door of the hangar, and on the first burst from that fast flying Jap Tom and the Javanese tried to drag the Kitty inside, but the next Jap had spotted the Kitty and started firing at it and needless to say Tom and his boys didn't waste time diving for cover under a huge log of wood. For some reason Tom was a bit slow and his rudder was still out in the open when a piece of shrapnel from the Jap's cannon zipped across his stern and sure made him move. He decided that was a bit too hot in there and got up and made for the back door which, to Tom's consternation, was jammed full of Javanese and one or two Aussies all trying to go through in a body like a serum. Just as he got there they broke through with Tom a split second later. He had also been nipped on the arm with some hot lead and some other portion of his anatomy but nothing serious enough to impede his speed. He made a bee-line for a trench and when he jumped in there was another chap there, Aussie or Javanese I don't know which. Tom said he hadn't been there more than a few seconds when he noticed a peculiar smell and he looked at the other chap and decided. that he had either got into the wrong slit trench or the chap had forgotten where he was, and as Tom said, Zeros or no Zeros his nose couldn't put up with the aroma, and he immediately made for another trench where he waited until the Zeros had finished their exhibition and he then noticed that the Javanese Shell Petrol boy was going up on the roof of the hangar to put a fire out which had been started by incendiaries, so Tom went over and up after him and was helping to beat the fire out when back came the Zeros again. The Javanese boy had the best idea, he just sat down and slid off the roof. Tom went down the ladder and was on the ground a matter of seconds after the Java boy, and ·he again went for his trench. When Tom got excited he stuttered a bit and in the telling he got excited and it sounded much more amusing than I have been able to tell it here. But it was not amusing for Tom, believe you' me. There was also one of the Anti-Tank trucks on the drome and another ute and the driver of the truck made for the ute for some reason and dived underneath same. His truck was riddled with bullets and had he stopped in the seat he would have been killed. The Japs must have decided to give the ute the go by. Things now had brightened up. We were evidently going to see a lot more of these raids. Singapore had gone, of course, and we realised that we would have a very poor show as we numbered only about 1,500 strong with the addition in the last week before the Japs visited us in earnest, by an Ac Ac Battery of Tommies from Java, all veterans of Dunkirk and London, Coventry, Liverpool blitzes, and although I had the pleasure of only meeting one of them the 40th boys who later got through, said: "Let us hear anyone say the Tommies haven't got what it takes and God help them if we are around." The Tommies only had Bofors and when the Japs did come they nearly cried because the Japs would not come low enough – but more about that when I come to it. Dutch Timor – road & track index map [6] AT TJAMPLONG I, at this time of the first raid, was having a good time driving the ute between Tjamplong and Koepang and Tenau and Penfoei, and very seldom saw Babaoe except late in the evenings and mornings, either driving Laurie or Capt. Neave about. We had moved half our outfit up to Tjamplong, consisting of the trailer and one ute and Cpl. Norm Hullick, Ron Mears, and Col McKenzie. They were stationed up in the scrub about a mile and a half above Tjamplong. Laurie Ross, Capt. Neave, Harry Leriston and myself at Tjamplong in the shop and house Capt. Neave had commandeered for our use as a store room for our tyres and spare parts. We lived on the verandah. I suppose I was one of the first Privates, if not the first on the island, to have a personal servant. By first I mean Australians to have a batman who used to clean and wash the mud off my boots before I got up and take my clothes down to be washed every day and do my ironing for which he received the colossal sum of one Gulden or Guilder Dutch paper money. He was so good that Capt. Neave wanted him but, I said no as he had no idea how to treat his own batman, but I put forward a scheme whereby we four could have him but at the same time I retained full control and they were to pay him one guilder each pay. I don't remember his name and now as I write I re- member that I was not the first to have a personal boy, but mine seemed more likely to stick than the others had done for their other masters. I felt mighty important having someone working for me and giving the orders, but I had to check on all my things now and again. He wouldn't steal but seemed to believe that what was good for me was just as useful to him and he had a habit of always using my comb and soap and towel but after several threats he stopped all that and I took him wherever I could in the ute. On Feb. 14, Capt. Neave told me that we would probably be going on a salvage expedition with the Air Force up near Atamboea to salvage some eight Kitty Hawks that had overshot the drome in a rainstorm and had force landed near the coast some 26-odd miles from Atamboea. I will go back a bit here. Raids, after the first, were, becoming quite common although no bombers had yet put in an appearance and there had been a huge naval battle in the Macassar Straits or so the wireless said, and the Japs had taken Ambon where the 2/21st Bn. had put up such a magnificent show against terrific odds. The Dutch forces also made a good show there. Kittyhawk’s and Douglas Dive Bombers also were landing at Penfoei and going on to Java and all ports north as the saying goes, but none were left for us. We only had Lockheed Hudson bombers that were so helpless against a pack of Zeroes, but we lost more by accidents than we did by enemy fire. They needed replacements bad but were unprocurable. I was driving a lot between Babaoe and Tjamplong and it was one evening not dark yet, when I got a surprise. I had taken Col down from Tjamplong to Babaoe for the night and was racing back. I always raced on that trip as it was good fun and imagined I was some crack race driver. I was cracked alright, but no track driver. I had a couple of, natives acting as lookouts and was tearing, along about 45 or so when they thumped heavily on the roof of the cabin and pointed up and yelling. I immediately shot of under the trees and jammed my brakes on and got out to see in the sky some 20 odd planes and thought, "Well, Ron me boy, she's on," but after waiting some 10 minutes concluded they were more Kittys or Yanks in some planes making for ports north and so it was. I continued merrily on my way. Eric, who was driving the breakdown with Joe Dean as his partner, was being worked night and day as the A.S.C. and trucks belonging to the Battalion were carting stores and bombs day and night and not a few were having accidents and breakdowns. Things were definitely getting more and more hectic. Lorries, 30-cwt. G.S. (Australian) Ford. Three-quarter front view, right side [7] CONCEALING THE TRUCK I remember one time Capt. Neave and I were just rolling out of Penfoei over the new concrete bridge when some Aussies were running towards us and pointing upwards. I jammed the brake on but did not throw the clutch in as I reckoned this would stall the engine. It did and acted as a brake. Reggie piled out his side and I tumbled out mine and jumped over the side of the low concrete parapet into the mud of the creek. Luckily I jumped where it was hard. Not so our Reggie Neave - mud up over his ankles. He swore. I laughed. Unfortunately there was no cover for the truck and at the time we had had no inclination where or how close the planes were and in any case we didn't stop to think of the truck. I thought of Mrs. Trengove's youngest son first. At this moment up came the Battalion Provost Sgt. who didn't like our ute because we were always exceeding the speed limit, exceedingly so may I add, and he had never been able to catch us red handed. He said: "Who's the driver of this truck?" I said: "I am." He said: "Well take it away under cover." I said: "If you think so much of the so and .so truck, you shift it." He said: "Get it out of here!" "Not me," I said, although I thought the planes were rather long in appearing. Anyway after an argument with Capt. Neave our gallant Sgt. Provost succeeded in getting me to shift it, which I did about 50 yards away underneath a solitary tree that was about as thick as my arm and all its branches on top at about 15 feet. I came back and laughed but by then we had decided it was a false alarm so I raced back, got the ute and picked Reggie up and we scooted along the road that ran around the edge of the drome at about 70 mile per hour because a truck on that road stood out like a mountain on a mole hill. Reggie was acting spotter, a job which we took in turns. I could go on telling about such things and lots of other times we had some scares and laughs but that is not my purpose in writing this diary. To get back to Feb. 14. We packed our gear, Norm, Capt Neave and I, and in the morning, Sunday, 15th, we set off with the Air Force 30 cwt. truck, the ute belonging to the Fortress Sigs, with a Lt. and two Sigs. THE QANTAS FLYING BOAT I'm afraid I must go back again to tell about the time Capt. Neave and I went to the Pashen Grande (hotel) in Koepang for lunch and while having lunch which in those places consists of rice and more rice with a large flat dish some two feet in diameter with small dishes which fit inside the large dish like small squares, and in these small dishes there are delicacies of all descriptions. Little fish about the size of sardines very highly flavoured and salty, and other dishes containing things that I know nothing about. Some looked good and some didn't. However I tried most of them including the chicken, goat, and deer meat, then we had coffee such as one never has had before in Australia. Thick, strong and one makes it very sweet. While there three chaps came to lunch who belonged or were employed by the Qantas or Imperial Airways. They were Co-Pilot, Engineer I think, and one passenger off the flying boat that was shot down off the south coast of Timor by seven Jap Zeroes. It appears that they were flying along at a reasonable altitude when they sighted these seven Japs who were diving or about to dive on the Qantas plane, the pilot of which immediately put the big ship into a dive but of course he was not in the hunt getting her to water level before they got close enough to shoot. Well, the Japs opened up on them wounding and probably killing some of the passengers. The pilot of the Qantas boat managed to get the big ship onto the water where she fell in halves cut by machine gun bullets. The co-pilot was thrown clean through the glass above him out into the water. One of the passengers who had been hit in the knee was lucky enough to grab a mail bag which kept him afloat for a long time and enabled him to eventually get to shore. He incidentally could not swim. The co-pilot had never swum more than 200 yards in his life and the other passenger who was a manager of a plantation in Borneo had not been much further than a quarter of a mile in his life, and a rough estimate was that they were not more than a mile and a half from land, in shark infested waters. Also when they got closer to land there was a good chance of them meeting up with crocodiles or alligators. Personally the difference between the two latter animals are not worth worrying about. I think they both have a taste for human beings. Well they reached shore by devious means, and now I am not too certain whether four or three men escaped from the ship. Unfortunately they landed on a strip of land that was divided from the mainland by a river and although the plantation manager who was English, by the way, could speak Malay, he could not entice the natives to come over with food because of the crocs that were in the river, so he had to swim over himself and get it. He sent a note by natives to Koepang and after about two days a launch came round and picked them up. The Dutch doctor who attended the chap with a wound in the knee, said that the immersion in salt water had saved his leg from infection and amputation. The reason, I guess, why the Japs shot the flying boat down was because they had evidently found out that small arms and other supplies were being flown to Singapore in Imperial Airways ships. Unfortunately the one they attacked had only passengers aboard, all plantation managers from Borneo and a few other British possessions up that way, who had been on a visit to Sydney for a conference. I forget the name of the flying boat. Qantas flying boat Corio – shot down by Japanese fighters off Dutch Timor, 30 January 1942 [8] A SPECIAL JOB Now I will try and continue on with the trip to salvage the planes. We went through Soe some two hours after setting out from Headquarters. By the by I had my breakfast that morning in the Officers' Mess - some contrast to our meals and mess - hotel fashion A La De Luxe - waited on too. Must be marvellous to be one of the chosen few. Soe was a beautiful town situated on a high mountain. The scenery we had already viewed was comparable to any I have seen in Australia. The view from Soe was a superb panoramic sight. One could see part of the Mena River which we had crossed at the base of the mountain by means of a long bridge some three quarters of a mile in length and known as the Mena River Bridge. Also we could see some lovely valleys and away out to sea and part of the coast. We didn't stop long there. This was my second time there. I was to see it twice more but I didn't know about the second time then. We passed on through various small native villages one not far from Soe the name of it I can't recall was later to become a prison camp for our boys. After we had gone down the mountain the other side of Soe, if I remember correctly, some 50 miles of descent, we came to a new concrete bridge over a gorge with sheer rock sides and from one side to the other about 100 feet across. This bridge was also later blown up and stopped the Japs for a month. We stopped after we had crossed and the Air Force chappies took some snaps of this fine bridge which had only been completed some two months or so. We moved off .again with us taking the lead and racing ahead to arrange for lunch for 11 at Kefamenanoe, about 50 mile from Soe. Capt. Neave was at the wheel and when he was at the wheel one needed all one's nerves together and under control to stand the strain. He nearly put us over an embankment. In fact the front wheels had dropped over but that's, all. We managed to get her back on the road between the three of us. Norm got into a very bad temper and said some things about some drivers and their habits and where they should be. However, we arrived at Kefamenanoe in good time and had lunch ready by the time the others arrived. We had a nice meal and it was here that. I had my second glass of stout, or it was like stout. It was called Anker Denker. I first had some in Koepang with a Dutch Captain of an oil tanker who was very soon after blown up by Jap bombers up near Singapore. This Anker Denker was an excellent drink, and I liked it. After lunch we had a walk around the town. It was a pretty town in a valley. The Chinese owned all the shops and there were some very nice Dutch houses there. It was only a small population with a Dutch Administrator in charge, but the town houses and other buildings were spread well out. There were nice gardens on most properties with flowers as one sees in Australia. We left there and went on our way to Atamboea which we reached about seven that night. We had a clean-up at the Dutch Army Barracks and walked back up to the Pashea Grande for dinner which also was another excellent meal. CAPTAIN NEAVE AND THE TIMOR PONY We met Capt. Van Sweetman and he said that everything was ready for us in the morning. Norm and I slept together in one of the Dutch Sgts. rooms and we arose early in the morning with another meal at the Pashea Grande we set out with 11 saddle ponies and some pack horses with our tools and other gear aboard them and some 60 odd native porters who seemed to carry almost as much as the horses. Atamboea area map [9] Capt Van Sweetman led the party on a beautiful pure white Timor pony which he had named Pooti. We had two Javanese soldiers with us,-one bringing up the rear of us who were riding and the other one who took charge of the bearers. It was raining and we followed the road for a few miles then branched off into the bush. We didn't actually get on to the horses till we reached this point as we were taken to this point by truck where we each selected a horse. Mine proved to be a very spirited blighter. I succeeded in losing my hat going down the first mountain from the road and had the devil's own job turning him round to get it. However I did manage and we eventually all got down to the foot of the mountain and across a creek and then we - were going along some boggy and flat country. I have seen some funny things happen on horseback but I have never seen anything so funny as Capt. Neave. He had a tin hat on and was hunched up on the saddle like some crack jockey, but he didn't ride like one. Tom Thick at some future date gave the exact description. Unfortunately this has to be kept clean. His horse was very stubborn and I guess objected to the rider. He tried to belt it along with a stick and then with heels which from my position in the rear, one of· the Air Force chappies poked the horse in the rump with his rifle and away went the pony. Reggie's arms, head, legs and body went to work. I was absolutely convulsed with laughter. The tin hat bobbed up and down like a cork in rough water. His arms flapped up and down as if he was about to take off and his legs were flying out and back like as if he was trying to go sideways and forwards at the same time. His body was see-sawing like as if he was doing some violent exercise. Altogether a very amusing sight. Then the horse stopped and refused to go any further except when led by one of the Javanese boys, and an occasional crack on its rear from behind by another Javanese boy. The country we were now passing through was very jungly and wet now but after riding for some three hours we eventually arrived at a native village for lunch but not before one of the Air Force boys had gone over his horse's head when it went down to its belly in a bog. It was very funny and I wish that I had kept a diary of that trip. I might add that when we stopped for lunch Ronald Claude was very sore and had the skin worn away from his seat (the latter being me) and some ointment was applied to the sore spot. We made good time and arrived at Batapoeti before dark where we were to make camp and work from there. The natives immediately were put to work to make lean-tos for all, themselves included. These rough shelters were composed of sticks in the sand with cross bars and palm boughs laid and tied down and appeared like a gable roof with one side taken away. We were camped some 200 yards from the beach amongst the coconut plantation. SALVAGING THE KITTYHAWKS One plane was here on its nose with the tail up in a tree with the cockpit facing the ground. The pilot had made a perfect landing in the bad light on this strip and had only hit or seen the only tree in the strip too late to miss it. He was unhurt other than a gash on the nose. The other seven planes were some two or three miles further on and a bit inland in a big swamp. I went to them next day on my own. We had tea out of tins and then had a smoke. We got very little sleep that night as the mosquitoes had no trouble in getting inside the nets we had and swatting, cursing and groaning were heard all night. We arose early and after breakfast started work on the plane. This was Tuesday by the way. We were stripping the Kitty pretty fast. We of the L.A.D. were after parts to fit up our Caterpillar Diesel Motor that Col Mackenzie and I had set up on concrete blocks at Tjamplong to supply electricity for the hospital there and electric power for our own use. The Fortress Sigs were after the wireless sets in the Kittyhawk’s and the R.A.A.F. were after spare parts to fix up the Kitty the Japs had shot up and future planes (if any). They needn't have bothered and likewise us and the Sigs but as one can't see into the future ahead we went. It was while stripping the guns that Capt Van Sweetman had a narrow escape from being shot and having his head blown completely off. He showed less agitation about it than anyone. I was sitting under the wing on a piece of engine cowling. A mechanic was standing up with his head and shoulders in the cockpit stripping the instrument panel and the stick with the gun controls on it. Capt. Neave and Flying Officer Cole were sitting on the bottom side of the wing which of course was facing the deep blue sky taking out the hydraulic gadget that worked the guns. Capt. Van Sweetman was standing watching a fitter working on the motor a little in front of the two officers on the upturned wing and in direct line of the 3.5 machine guns. P-40E-1-CU Kittyhawk fighter aircraft A29-133 'Polly' : RAAF [10] The chappie in the cockpit sung out to the pseudo mechanics on the wing not to touch anything as he was taking the firing mechanism out. Whether our would be mechanics caused the gun to go off I don't know and neither do I, but I do know that they were fiddling about when it went pop. Of course it made a noise much louder than that. Anyway I know that I cleared the ground by at least four feet and was in danger of hitting my head on the wing of the plane which the tallest man in the outfit could walk under without stooping. The mechanic on the engine nearly dived into the engine booster and our two bright lads on the wing looked as if they had been struck by lightning. The bullet from the gun could not have missed parting Capt. Van Sweetman's hair by more than the thickness of a cigarette paper. He calmly turned round and made some casual remark about it being close and then smiled. Oh, boy, what nerves. He never even changed colour. There were a lot of words thought but not spoken. Our two potential engineers both disclaimed responsibility. It was here that I had my first drink of tuaca, pronounced too ark uh. It's a sap from a sort of a large palm tree and is gathered over night by cutting a limb off the tree and a bamboo bottle being hung underneath to catch the drips of sap. It tastes like strong ginger ale when fresh, but when allowed to ferment, boy, has it some kick, as Arch MacRury can tell. Tuesday afternoon I made my way out to the other planes and I come to a shameful part of my career. I salvaged the clocks out of four of the Kittyhawk’s. I also got a sheath knife out of a parachute. The three other planes were some distance up in the hills from the swamp. I did not bother to go up to them. The planes in the swamp had been landed various ways but none successfully. They were all piled up. Some with under carriage down, some up. Two pilots had parachuted down. One landed in a tree and had his neck broken. The other one landed O.K. One of these planes that came to earth on its own caught fire. I did not see any of these three planes. I returned to camp and we had, tea and then went to bed, not before I had given Capt. Neave, Norm Hulick and one of the Air Force chappies one each of these clocks. Next day we all went out to the wrecks at the swamp and it was here that F.O. Cole made the tragic discovery that all the luminous clocks had disappeared. Of course I knew entirely nothing about it and after the officers going into a huddle the matter was left until we returned to camp that evening. The Sigs officer was walking round one of the planes when he let out a yell and brought his leg out of the mud and slush which by the way was knee deep in most places, to find that his foot was badly cut and streaming blood. It had been opened up by a piece of metal that had sunk down in the mud from the plane. It was then the Sigs last day as they were already overdue back at Klapalima, the fort. Well, we worked here on the instrument panels and guns and got the ammo and trays holding the ammo out. We didn't get all the guns and it was Capt. Neave's brilliant idea to set these guns up at Penfoei to be used as Ac-Ac. How they were going to be set up was as yet a vague idea in Reggy's mind. I'm not certain now whether it was Wednesday or Tuesday that we saw a large formation of Jap bombers coming back from Koepang but we sure did set them and we had seen some two or three times on Monday going to and returning from Koepang. We afterwards learnt that they had unsuccessfully bombed some ships between Tenau and the island of Semoa, and also the guns at Klapalima. We returned to camp that night and Capt. Neave said to me after tea that some of the clocks had to be returned. He didn't want to part with his and I didn't with mine, and I had no intention of doing so unless he did, so the upshot was he handed his over to me, likewise Norm and the Air Force chappie. I returned them all after a lot of deliberation and put them amongst the panels underneath the lean-to hut where we had put everything that we had stripped from the planes. RETURN TO BASE AT TJAMPLONG The Sigs Officer and his two men returned in the small boat that arrived early next morning to Atapoepoe, some 15 miles up the coast, and just after they left a note arrived by a Javanese soldier. It contained an order for the Air force personnel to return immediately and be back not later than midnight Thursday. Capt. Neave immediately decided he would go and take Norm with him and leave me to pack up the gear. The Air Force chaps had to pack so they and I left some two hours after Capt. Neave arrived. F.O. Cole took the clocks with him. We arrived back on the road at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Again I was left to see that all the gear turned up as there was a large portion of the gear being brought out by the native porters. Capt. Neave came back in the ute about an hour later and he said that I should have taken no notice of Cole and come up to Atamboea, but now be had decided to go to Atapoepoe and pick up some of the Kitty's guns and ammunition that had been sent there in the boat. Kefannanoe map [11] We got there about 5 o'clock where I had my first meal since about 6 a.m. that day, some rice and small salted fish with hot chilli sauce and I mean hot and some good hot coffee, but no sugar. It was here I met Sgt. Slickter, a young Dutch Sergeant who was also later taken prisoner. We left there after getting a phone message from Staff Capt. Arnold to return to Tjamplong immediately. We stopped at Kefannanoe for some coffee and a bite to eat and while sitting in the lounge waiting for it Norm was bitten by a scorpion which didn't improve his temper. We raced away again to Soe but not before we smacked a buffalo in the rear. We had to get out and lift and prise the mudguard off the back wheel. It was of course pitch dark and as Capt. Neave was always a speed merchant I had secretly scraped some black paint off the headlamps before we left Atamboea while he was getting something. He said I had better scrape some off when he came back so Norm and I winked and scraped more off. We had coffee at Soe and something else to eat and got back to Tjamplong at 3 o'clock Friday morning. We, Norm and I, went to bed but were up again at 6.30. Capt. Neave and I were supposed to go down to Babaoe in the ute with spare parts and pick up two fitters and go on to Klapalima or Koepang and operate as an L.A.D. wherever the trucks were or where we were needed, but when Capt. Neave went to see the Brigadier to get permission to go down to Babaoe to carry out the aforementioned plan Brigadier Veale said no. I had to sit in the ute for two hours while Reggie did his best to make the Brigadier see his point of view, but to no avail. THE JAPANESE ASSAULT We had had an early breakfast, we being all personnel at Tjamplong which included a section of Engineers, A.S.C., L.A.D. and other odds and ends who were there. This was before 7 o'clock Jap planes had been over in large numbers and were still over dropping those things that don't care who they hit. Anti personal I believe they call them, also a lot of other names but as they say in Hoyts, unsuitable for general exhibition. High explosives were also being dropped in large lumps as well. It was just on seven when some terrific explosions were felt and heard. Everyone looked at everyone and said, there goes the drome at Penfoei which had been mined for the past six weeks with more dynamite than Whelan the Wrecker could have got rid of in his busiest wrecking mood. Enough to have delighted Lawrence of Arabia for years to come could he have but seen it. Also a bomb dump was blown to blazes and various petrol and oil dumps in the vicinity of Koepang and Penfoei. I was ordered back to my precious ute. If I drove it ten yards I had to fill it up with petrol. Capt. Neave was not going to be caught with a light tank of petrol. At about a quarter to eight Jap bombers came from everywhere. They didn't touch Tjamplong. Whether they knew the hospital was there we don't know but we guessed that they saw the A.S.C. stores were there and a huge ammo dump and petrol was about a mile further up from Champ. The island was rotten with spies and fifth columnists. Things started to get a bit hectic here and so much went on that I have difficulty in remembering what followed, what with it being such a long time ago and so many events following one another in, quick succession. But I will try and set it out as it happened. I may have to go back on myself occasionally but that can't be helped as one thing brings to mind other events which have already happened and I temporarily forgot. JAPANESE PARATROOPS LAND At 8 o'clock I was sitting in the ute still waiting for Capt. Neave to get permission from the Brig. for us to go down, when someone shouted paratroops are being landed. I went to get out of the truck to go and see them but Reggie appeared and told me to stay put. While everyone else rushed down behind the hospital to see the spectacle of some 600 paratroops dropping from the sky. They dropped from some 25 or 30 transport planes preceded by a severe ground strafing of Zeroes and other Jap fighter planes. They dropped onto an open and clear piece of ground about 130 yards from Babaoe on the Tjamplong side and about the same distance from our L.A.D. store van and breakdown wagon which were opposite the house we had commandeered. Sparrow Force positions Dutch Timor 19 February 1942 [12] From here I will tell it as Eric Herd, my pal, experienced it and saw it personally. He had been out nearly all night dragging trucks in and his last job on the breakdown truck was to bring a disabled Bren Carrier from Klapalima. When the raids started on Babaoe he was in the house and the rest of the boys were there also. Naturally they all went for their slit trenches that we had dug outside. I had dug one when I had been stationed there and unfortunately it used to leak in the bottom and was at this time rather slushy on the bottom. It was also the rainy season over there. Joe Dean, who was Eric's offsider on the breakdown, had only a few minutes previous changed into a clean outfit of clothes. When the first alarm went Joe, who didn't like aeroplanes, especially unfriendly ones, bolted for the first trench which happened to be mine. He dived into it and low and behold was smothered in sticky, watery mud. Joe, from all accounts did not appreciate this at all and after the first wave went over and the all clear was given Joe went and changed into another clean outfit. He did look nice and away went the alarm again and so did Joe to repeat his first performance. Sort of act 2, scene 1, sort of style or maybe it was just practice. Anyway Joe once more got into a clean change or put his original clothes back on, I'm not too sure which. Eric who had been on the ground in one of these raids with a handkerchief rolled up in a pad fashion between his teeth and slightly raised up from the ground on his hands, was getting a good shaking up from the explosions that, were going off round him and he was biting so hard on the old handkerchief that a gold filling he had in his teeth popped out never to be found, alas; alack, and alaska. The loss of this made him very annoyed and determined to get a Jap one day for it. Personally I think the gold was worth half a dozen of the yellow men, but who am I to quibble. Don Company of the 2/40th Btn were the roving company at Babaoe. That is wherever the Japs struck Don Company was to go. Well some 20 minutes or so before the paratroops dropped Don Company got a message supposedly from an ally in the shape of the Timorese native Rajah of Koepang, that Japs had landed at some place on the south coast, the name of which I cannot remember. Anyway it meant that Don Company had to go and go they did. The distance would be some 20 miles or more. No sooner had they left than the raids started in earnest and the Zeros and dive bombers gave everything a pasting. This was when Eric lost his gold filling. He said every time the dive bomber started their dives he was sure it as coming straight for him. They however were bombing the kitchens which were all under one roof and the food was sent out in trucks which to my mind had been a mistake from the first as if the Japs found out it would be one of the first places to go, and evidently they had found out because that was their target. It was machine gunned, dive bombed and severely knocked about. The babbling brooks (cooks) were sheltering in holes near the cook house, except Ace who was in a sort of a washaway in the bank at the back of the cook house and he reckoned that one of the dive bomber pilots had seen him and I guess Ace was correct because as that worthy lad said after: I said to myself, Ace, that bloke has taken a definite dislike to you and is out to get you so move boy, and move he did into the nearest slit trench which he had no sooner reached than a bomb landed in the exact place where he had been crouching. In the meantime bombing was going on around Babaoe and by this time there were only about 12 or 15 men left in this little town and it was nearly 8 o'clock when Eric sung out to the boys that some more bombers were on their way. They were strung out in a long line and imagine everyone's surprise when instead of bombs bodies began to fall with great white billowing parachutes opening up behind them. What could they do, those few men in Babaoe against 600 paratroops with Zeroes circling and strafing every blade of grass that moved, so they decided to beat a retreat for the rocks up the back of their sleeping quarters, but not before W.O. Willersdorf had set fire to the store van. They never had time to burn or put out of action the breakdown. That was done later by Don Company men, I think. Capt. Neave's batman would not go with the rest of our L.A.D. boys. He went across the road into a slit trench with one of the Sigs and the last we heard of him some days later was that the last some of the 40th had seen of him was in Babaoe with a bullet wound high upon his left shoulder. We at Tjamplong, after two days of waiting to hear from the L.A.D. boys, gathered that they were either killed or taken prisoner. THE FIGHTING CONTINUES Now to continue my side of the story of the next two days and Friday. The first Japs, which were paratroops landed at about 8 o'clock on the Friday, 20th February, 1942, just two months and eight days after we landed. Sparrow Force positions Dutch Timor 20 February 1942 [13] We at Tjamplong waited all day for news of how the fighting was going. Planes roared overhead all day but none of them had that colour patch we longed to see. The bombing was terrific and it now sounded as if naval guns had been added to the din and we knew that they were not ours. The few Dutch troops comprising Dutchmen and Javanese, came through on their trucks and by all accounts had a bad time. They later in the day tried to go through the Jap lines but were stopped by a road block. A concrete block which a Bren Gun Carrier tried to tow off the road but without success. The block was later blown to pieces by our engineers. About 9 o'clock in the morning Capt. Neave came to me and said that we of the L.A.D. and two Tommy Gunners making five men in all, were to go out past Tjamplong on the road to Soe to look for a paratrooper who was supposed to have landed behind us. We searched the road either side for some miles and questioned one or two natives but saw no sign of the suspect. Expectancy and nervousness was reaching a high pitch as we could get no information from below as to what was going on. Everything was set to blow our ammo dump, petrol and ordnance stores sky high, likewise the house we slept in with all our tyres and spare parts. This was later abandoned because the hospital would have been flattened, so the Japanese got all these supplies which were to have lasted us for six months, including food supplies. No one seems to knows why the hospital was so close to all these stores, but there it is, it was and what's the use of saying or blaming anyone then or now. Night came and a very nervous night it was. There was roughly 200 men at Tjamplong including hospital staff and sick and a few wounded. The Major of the Fortress guns and one corporal had been brought by ambulance from Klapalima seriously wounded. Both died after a few hours, wounded by bombs. The driver of the ambulance was driving along near Babaoe when what he thought were Dutchmen fired on him. He stopped to abuse them heartily, wanting to know who and what the so and so blazes they thought he was and when these supposedly green clad Dutchmen arrived closer he amazedly stared, then in double time jumped back into the cab and drove away. These green clad men were Jap marines. Another attempt was made to bring wounded to Tjamplong but the Japanese refused to let any more go through to hospital. All our natives of Tjamplong had said goodbye and taken to the hills. All the natives when we came to the island and up to when the Japs landed thought that one Australian was as good as, 100 Japs. Their disappointment must have been terrific when after three hard days of battling against odds of nearly a thousand to one Col. Leggatt had no alternative but to surrender. Saturday morning brought more paratroops and supplies by air; for those already established. A rough guess of how many were or had been landed in this fashion between us and Babaoe was 1,200 Japs, and now we had good reason to believe that some 18,000 seaborn troops had been landed somewhere near Koepang but nowhere near where our boys had expected and prepared for them. The two six inch fortress guns had already been blown up without firing a, shot as no crews could have withstood the bombing they received. Although the Japs never actually hit the guns our own men blew them to pieces. TO SOE I don't know whether our anti guns ever went into action but someday I hope we will know much more than anyone knows now. We got orders to evacuate Tjamplong to Soe which we did sometime on Saturday. I can't for the life of me remember whether it was daytime or night time. I think it was early in the morning on Saturday in darkness, but that is open to contradiction. I, for one, could not but help feel badly about Eric and the other boys of our outfit at Baboe. It seemed like desertion. We had all been together so long and now when we were in trouble and meeting the enemy, here we were split up, one half not knowing what had happened to the other half. We arrived at Soe, the L.A.D. ute with Reggie driving, took up last position as an L.A.D. should. We took everything we might need in the way of spare parts and personal gear, the latter being, cut down to a minimum, one complete change of shorts and shirt and a couple of changes of socks. I took five new tooth brushes I bought in the canteen a week or so before and about three tubes of toothpaste, and three or four cakes of soap. My shaving outfit that I had given to me in 1941 and my writing case that my sister gave me and some photos of Mum and Dad. We did nothing at Soe but walk round and later in the morning we, that is Laurie Ross, and Col and Harry, Norm and myself, went for a swim in the lovely concrete and tiled pool that was fed by a stream from up in the mountain. During the day we saw some Jap planes going towards Koepang but not as many as on Friday. I don't remember that we did anything special on Saturday other than go around the various trucks and check them over and walk around passing and listening to various opinions from everyone who knew as much as the .heads themselves knew. Soe, Timor 1945-11-14. Timforce. After avoiding capture In Koepang a party of Sparrow Force under Major J. Chisholm assembled at Soe and decided to go to Portuguese Timor to continue operations against the Japanese. During their overnight stay they stayed in this old schoolhouse. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis.) [14] A guard had been placed on the road some few miles out of Soe and this was maintained up to the last minute that we evacuated Soe. Sunday morning arrived bright and clear when it was decided that the L.A.D. personnel would return to Tjamplong for more spare parts and information. We left Soe early and when we got to the guard Capt. Arnold pulled us up and told us that a phone message had come through to say that some of the L.A.D. and some cooks had turned up at Tjamplong. I was so pleased that tears came to my eyes and for once Capt. Neave could not drive fast enough to please me. UNCERTAIN TIME When we arrived at Tjamplong those of us in the back of the ute nearly broke our necks getting out to greet our mates. I saw Eric and Roy and Cam before the truck stopped. I dived on to them and felt like kissing and hugging them and for the life of me I couldn't stop sniffling and laughing. More like crying, I guess. W.O. Willersdorf in charge of the party of L.A.D. and cooks had walked all the way inland to Tjamplong which had taken them 2 1/2 days with little or nothing to eat, dodging the planes and Japs who at times were very close to them. The Japs had a series of bird calls such as owl hoots and other types of birds, as signals to let one another know where they were and quite a number of times the small party had had Japs on either side. There is a lizard on Timor which because of its queer noise, we named Choco and made a call which sounded just like the word Choco only dragged out much more than that and repeated about five times. Whilst they were settling down for the first night, using banana leaves for blankets, Eric said as one of these lizards started its croaking cry: "If he goes five or more we will know the Japs are not near." It was only said in a joke, but as the boys said after everyone unconsciously counted every lizard they heard and heaved sighs of relief when it reached five. They cursed Eric heartily for ever saying it. We got the things that we came back for and waited until evening before we moved out. I forgot to tell about what happened before we left Champ the first time. We destroyed three new Chevrolet motors which were still in their crates, by giving them some gentle taps with a 14 lb. hammer and ditto the diesel motor Col and I had lost so much sweat over. As we left all other things intact we may just as well have left these intact. We had, we being our fitters, fixed a motor bike up during the day also a couple of heavy trucks. I was to ride the bike back to Soe and as it was getting towards evening and the light on the bike was nearly useless I was told by Reggie to leave immediately the time then being about 5 o'clock Sunday evening. I was kicking the bike over when a dumb cluck of a driver batman came up the road on a push bike and said the Japs were at the bottom of Tjamplong hill and that the Yanks had landed at Koepang. Well it caused a stir believe you me and I was further ordered to move away with the news to Soe, for what it was worth. It wasn't worth anything as the Japs did not arrive up there for another couple of days at least. I reported to Capt. Arnold after reaching Soe and told him who had given the information and he said he didn't believe it especially the Yank part of the message. This chappie who gave the alarm was later severely tongue lashed for his stupidness in not verifying the fact about the Japs and for starting a false rumour about the Yanks. The Japs he supposedly heard were some of "C" Company men who had battled their way through the Jap lines and got to the bridge near Tjamplong and it was these chaps being challenged by the guard down there that this brilliant specimen of manhood had heard and taken for granted that they were Japs. Where he got the rumour about the Yanks no one, not even himself, seemed clear on. But he started a panic at Champ. JAPS DIDN’T HAVE IT ALL THEIR OWN WAY All trucks were ordered to leave with or without their load and Eric was to drive our ute out and some of our lads were a bit slow getting something and a certain Captain who I have mentioned quite often wanted to leave them behind but Laurie said to Eric, don't move off until I tell you, and this made the Captain very wild, threatening nothing short of a firing squad for Staff-Sgt, Ross and Eric, but wait they did and it was all later forgotten when it was found that certain officers had allowed the panic to spread. As the last truck raced away from Tjamplong the chaps from "C" Company, about 13 in all, saw the last one race away and shouted out to it but it never stopped. However they caught us later at Atamboea. TIMFORCE, Koepang. 1945-11-12. In a dump along the Koepang shorefront lies this British Bofors gun and these Australian universal carriers. [15] On Monday word came through that Col. Leggatt had surrendered to the enemy as he could hold out no longer. The men were tired having practically no sleep for three days, and before that nights on guard and false alarms, then fighting against such terrific odds with no meals except tins of bully beef and a packet of dog biscuits, and bayonet charges and bombs, shelling, strafing. Just a general hell without hope of reinforcements who had been turned back eight hours from landing. The 2/4th Pioneers and 600 Yankee Artillery men and various other reinforcements numbering somewhere near 2,000 men. What wouldn't we have given to have seen them two weeks ago, and the promised fighter squadron that secret runways had been built for, that never arrived. It was useless to fight, but they did and Don Company paid the account for the trick that was played on them by wiping out most of the paratroops on their return to Babaoe. They threw grenades in the huts and set fire to them when the Japs refused to come out. They riddled the huts with tommy gun slugs and rifle and machine gun fire. It was sweet revenge. The disabled carrier the L.A.D. left behind that wouldn't go into any gear but first, the Japs got that on the road and was causing us casualties when Leo [16] came along in the only other good carrier out of the ten (something else attributed to two officers and a W.O. that was in working order. The Japs stopped in the middle of the road and jumped behind it to shoot at Leo and his crew, one of whom jumped out and fired his tommy gun at the legs he could see behind the Jap controlled carrier, then jumped back into the carrier and Leo let her go flat out past the Japs and as they sailed past one of the crew dropped a grenade into the Japs carrier which must have went and made an awful mess as our grenades have a habit of doing when released for duty. Just after this Leo was winged in the ear by a Jap sniper. Unfortunately for that worthy fellow he was spotted up in his tree and because they could, not get enough elevation on the Lewis mounted in the back of the carrier. Leo backed her over the edge of the road and the gunner poured 240 rounds into the tree before the Jap fell out.· He had been tied to the tree. A habit they had. Then they came on to Tjamplong later to come on to Soe and thence Atamboea. THE ENGLISH ACK-ACK CROWD Leo told a good story about the English ack-ack crowd who were the cause of him and his carrier crew being at Atamboea to tell the tale. But as the details' are not fresh enough in my memory I cannot set it out clear enough, but suffice to say that Tommies are tops with Leo and his crowd. He told us about how the Tommies couldn't get the Japs to come within range of the Bofors guns which have a ceiling of some 3,000 feet. So while a couple of Tommies stood out in the road and waved towels and anything else to make the enemy dive at them, the others would stand by at the guns and when the Zeroes or dive bombers came low enough to spray lead at the men in the road, the gunners would sight them up and in this fashion got nine Jap planes the first day and at least seven the next day which wasn't a bad piece of work. They wished that they had had their 3.7 that they knew so well in Dunkirk, London, Birmingham, Liverpool, and from a host of other towns in England and France. Veterans of air raids every one of them. Every man of them who was not killed was taken prisoner with our boys because after they were within two miles of Tjamplong their Major stopped one of the 40th Don Rs to be told that the Battalion was surrounded. Upon hearing this the Tommy Major turned around and went and gave assistance. We believe he broke through the Japs but could not break out again. I guess they were in much the same condition as our boys. When they hadn't been on the guns they were doing infantry work where and when they were needed. Whilst doing the latter they had made it possible for Leo with his carrier and crew to get out. Some of the Japs in Babaoe had found our canteen stores and made the mistake of drinking our beer and getting slightly pickled. Leo and his gang, all Tassies by the way, peeped in the door and then let a tommy gun peep and for good measure a grenade. Exit from this world Japs. TO SURRENDER OR NOT Up at Soe after the message arrived about the surrender, with advice for us to do the same from the Jap commander. Brigadier Veale said "No", but his staff advised him to throw in the sponge. We were given, we being all ranks under officers, a sales talk about surrendering according to the military code. But Yours Truly had other ideas. While one was free one had a chance of getting back to Australia. Once a prisoner one may not even have had the chance of life, let alone escape. I told Laurie that I had no intention of giving myself up as I reckoned I could live in the hills and make, for the coast to see what the chances were of getting a boat of sorts to get to Australia as we had compasses and well knew where Darwin was, but any part of the coast was good enough for me. Soe, Timor 1945-11-14. TIMFORCE. After avoiding capture in Koepang a party of Sparrow Force under Major J. Chisholm assembled at Soe and decided to go to Portuguese Timor to continue operations against the Japanese. The convoy of about twelve vehicles carrying the men left the village along this road on its way to Atamboea. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis.) [17] Laurie, a married man, was all for it and we were stripping our packs of things we didn't want or could do without and putting food in tins in their place. Capt. Neave did his best to dissuade us from going bush, but I had made my mind up and was going even if I went alone. As Eric and the. others in the L.A.D. were not at all keen on it remembering the recent experience, later changed their minds, and by that time it had been decided that we would retreat still further to Atamboea. This was decided in the afternoon and then everyone seemed to be racing around putting gear back in trucks and taking unwanted gear out. TRUCK CONVOY TO ATAMBOEA We in our truck left a good portable sigs wireless behind on orders, of course. I won't tell you on whose orders because you will think him a bigger dope than he was and if you think that you're right, he was. A brilliant officer of the C.M.F. who wouldn't join the A.I.F. unless he could join as an officer. Those last few words I heard that man say in Darwin. Needless to say he was an absolute panicky, nervous, dithering, fool whose money got for him anything he wanted. There was not one officer who I knew who had any time for him and would go the other way rather than see him or have to speak to him. He was later mentioned in despatches or commended, which will only show that not all medals are won by the right men, but in this case no one should have got anything. We all did a job and it was all for the one reason, safety first, and by first I mean every man for himself, but later on I will tell more of this brilliant piece of work. We were all ready to go late in the afternoon. Every truck, ute, and man loaded with as much as they could carry. The truck I was in was a three ton Chev loaded with petrol. We were about in the middle of the convoy of some 25 vehicles. It seemed strange at this time of the afternoon, for a few minutes before the first truck pulled out a fog started to-come in one end of Soe while we were going out the other. Just as if it had been sent to-cover our withdrawal. I wonder if it was? We got to Atamboea some 100 odd miles early after midnight, not without mishap. My truck bogged going around the sharp turn off at Kefamenanoe, but was soon pulled out by another. A Dutch Sgts motorbike would not take the grade up one mountain so it was sent over the side to hurtle down the valley. A ute was overturned but no casualties sustained. It was righted and continued on its way. It was a nightmare drive as I seemed to have had very little sleep for a week and I hadn't really had much during the days. Had been doing something all day long. I don't know how the driver kept awake but I was nodding every few miles. That was the reason why I never drove and because he had had more experience in the three tonners than I. The three ton trucks we had over there seemed to have a nasty habit of turning over for no reason at all as Eric well knows because he had had many a sleepless night on the road to Tenau salvaging them. AT ATAMBOEA At Atamboea we were eventually organised into small parties with an officer or Sgt. in charge and given various buildings around the town to sleep in. Guards, of course, had to be maintained and various other duties performed. The heads, Brig. Veale, Capt. Arnold, Brigade Major, Capt. Neave and a couple of other Majors and Captains, stopped at Capt. Van Sweetman's house and the Pashun Grande. Sweetman's house was in the centre of the town overlooking the park and most of the town. Situated in a lovely garden and lawns the house was very pretty and sprawling like one would imagine a big sheep station house out west to be. We had a big wireless set with us which was very heavy and took eight men to lift off the truck. It was set up a mile or so Dili side of Atamboea. We waited for what seemed years but was only two or three days for news that someone would hear our calls, and as time wore on men's spirits became lower and lower. Then a ray of hope. Bandoeng in Java was raised. They said. they would tell Australia. They never got the chance, I guess, because it was not so very long after this bright news that we heard over the radio that Bandoeng had been taken and the Japs were invading Java. All hope vanished with this news and I had never had a feeling like I had then and I know everyone else did. What was the use? We couldn't speak to the outside world. We could expect nothing from them. It was with a bitter laugh that we received the news over the B.B.C. and A.B.C. that Australians and Dutch were still fighting valiantly in Timor. This news after about five days of wondering whether we were going to share the same fate as all of our pals had received some days before. Soon to be written down or written off should I say as dead loss prisoners of war. Some missing believed killed. Some missing believed prisoners of war. Great comfort those few words to our relations. Lae, New Guinea. 1945-10-04. Brigadier W.C.D. Veale Mc DCM, Chief Engineer Headquarters First Army formerly C.O. Sparrow Force [18] Well by the end of the week it was decided that we get out of Atamboea. I mentioned before that we were all split up into small parties in different buildings about the town. Some of us out of each section, myself included, were shown how to get to the rendezvous from our various places around the town, the Sgt. and myself being the two selected to know our route out to the rendezvous. All this in case of a moonlight flit and the O.C. of some of the sections did not happen to be in the vicinity of his particular section, well, then another man who had been shown the route could lead them out. The day after this had been done, Sunday, I think it was, sections were told they would be moving out. I knew where they were being sent. To the swamps at Batapoetie where the Kittyhawks were. What a place to send men ill equipped for such a place. One of the worst places on the island. Rotten with flies in the day and millions of mossies in the night. Very few mosquito nets amongst the boys, and the water down in the area was scarce and not of the best quality. Not quite rotten and not far from it. WITH BRIGADIER VEALE’S PARTY I wondered at the time why we were being sent in that direction. I wasn't left long wondering. My section was all loaded up with packs, rifles and ammunition, ready to move out when Ron Mears who had been Don R at Capt. Van. Sweetman's house since arriving at Atamboea, came up and told me I was wanted at the house immediately with my gear. There I was interviewed by Capt. Neave and asked would I be prepared to go with the Brig. and party and if necessary fight to the death for him if we ran into Japs? Whichever crowd I went with It didn't matter much, so I said I would be in it. I owed all this to Laurie Ross who had spoken to Capt. Neave about it and he in turn had spoken to Capt. Arnold who had given his consent which made the party as follows: Brig. Veale, Capt. Arnold, Capt. Neave, Staff Sgt. Laurie Ross, Sapper Tom Thick, Sapper Les Moule, Pte. Joe Young Arnold's batman, Pte Jim Clout Brig's batman, Lance Cpl. Cam Robertson, Pte. Col Mackenzie, Pte. Ron Mears, and Pte. Ron Trengrove - 12 of us altogether. It was nearly sunset when the last section moved out past the house and Brig. Veale waved them goodbye. We just walked around until it was time to get some sleep and be waked up for our turn on guard in front of the house. We all arose very soon after midnight and had breakfast and coffee. Then we proceeded to do the trucks over, by over I mean letting the oil out of the sump and water from the radiators then starting the motors up and letting them seize up. You can't imagine the din that was caused unless you have heard a motor seize up. If you have imagine 25 or 30 trucks with throttles half out racing engines until the pistons seized. I must go back a couple of days to tell you about Loss, one of our sigs. from Tjamplong who had been left behind. He walked from the latter to Soe, some 40 odd miles, and got there too late to catch us again, and was driven from Soe to the bridge our engineers had blown up where he was let down by a rope to the bottom of the gorge and then hauled up the other side where some of our chaps had been sent back from Atamboea to pick him up. It took 21/2 hours to get down and up this place so will give you some idea of the trouble it must have caused the Japs. On Loss's arrival at Atamboea he had to go and tell the Brig. And company all that he knew, and when he came out I was sitting in the ute outside, and he said to me: "What happened to that wireless set that was put in your ute at Tjamplong?" I told him it was left at Soe. Loss walked away singing "I lost my hopes on Blueberry Hill", a song which will always bring to my mind Loss and that wireless set. Loss had got Australia on that set which was supposed to only reach about 30 miles in its wave length. ON FOOT TOWARDS PORTUGUESE TIMOR We moved out from Atamboea at 4 o'clock in the morning in a truck up the old Dili road. Stopped to disable the wireless set, then turned off and went as far as we could in the truck, and then transferred our gear to a couple of horses we had managed to get. We went as far as the road went and then two of us were sent on ahead to scout and when we reported all O.K. we moved on, each man of us loaded down under more than we could carry. The lower ranks were not allowed to throw anything away. I eventually got rid of a spare bayonet. Capt. Arnold threw his rifle away as soon as we got out of the truck, hence the spare bayonet. I had to carry that but as I have no love for a bayonet I got rid of it at the first opportunity. The Brig. was going to throw his rifle away, thinking the same as Arnold, that a revolver was enough hardware for him, but Capt. Arnold said: No, he had better keep it, which we all were very amused at: The Brig. kept it. Portuguese timor. 1942. Horses (Timor ponies) being loaded with gear, part of a pack train used by members of the 2/2nd Independent Company. Part of Sparrow Force, the Company conducted guerilla operations against the Japanese on the island. [19] After a bit it was decided that I should stay hidden with all the gear while the rest of them moved on and found a place to camp for the night. They were away about five hours in which a couple of times I got the jitters and thought I saw Japs but they turned out to be Aussies and the next lot were Javanese going bush. Capt. Neave, Laurie and Cam came back just when I was quite convinced I had been ditched. I'll never forget that first night or day. When I got to the camp they had selected my legs were jelly. We had walked up a dry river bed with great stones that one finds in the Nepean River in New South Wales and what with stumbling along up this river leading a stubborn horse and a great pack that seemed to be stuffed, with lead, I was in no condition to fight a snail that evening. It was dark when we got to the camp where tea had been prepared for us. We had taken as much tin food as we could put on the horses and we could carry in our packs. We went to bed that night very tired. Capt. Arnold took one of the guards that night and very pleased everyone was because that meant a few minutes less for each one of us. 260 ODD MEN BEING SACRIFICED FOR THE SAKE OF ONE MAN We arose early next morning and after breakfast and we had packed everything together on horses and ourselves we set off once more. It was easy to see now why the others had been sent to the north coast and us making for the south coast. 260 odd men being sacrificed for the sake of one man. The reasoning was this that if the Japs got into Atamboea very soon they would find out from the natives which way the men had gone and would go after the big party rather than the small one. It's nice when you think of it. One man was supposedly worth roughly 260 men, because he was a Brigadier. A similar story to Malaya. They didn't think to get Lt-Col. Anderson out. The man who really knew what the Japs were like and who hadn't sat at a table to visualise how they fought. Likewise Lt. Sharman, of the 2/40th Btn. who knew by practical experience how they fought. Why wasn't he taken instead of Capt. Neave or Arnold or even the Brig.? None of these three had any idea what a Jap was like even to look at except in all probability that they were supposed to wear glasses and had buck teeth. Sixty of those men or thereabouts were later caught by the Japs and every one of those who had fought their way through the Jap lines at Koepang, Babaoe and Penfoei were caught. Good battle experienced men. People wonder why I am so bitter against untried officers who didn't get the commissions in the battle field. In my opinion that's enough reason and I will give you some more reasons if I finish my story. THE TIMOR PONIES We had been walking on the flat all the previous day but were now about to go mountaineering and the tracks the natives used were made by mountain goats and our first climb was up about 4,000 feet. Climb, climb, climb, and here we were. We had been riding in trucks for 12 months and the walking we had done in 12 months was harmless. We climbed all that day with frequent rests, and dinner. After lunch Cam and I went on ahead. When I say went on ahead I mean we staggered on with our packs on our back and rifle, looking for horses to buy or, if possible, catch, but none could we buy, borrow, beg, or steal. Had we known what we knew some months later we would have taken what we wanted from the natives. Cam and I walked many a weary mile of the track that day, climbing and crawling up to native huts and villages without success. Later on the rest of the party caught us up and Les Moule and Tom Thick went ahead and had all the luck. We stopped by a fast mountain stream, had a bath and tea and by then it was dark. Tom and Les came back after dark with the good news that they had struck some Javanese soldiers in a native village who had persuaded the native chief to lend them as many horses as we wanted which was 11. Capt. Neave, Les, Cam, Col, Joe and myself went on up in the dark to this village for the rest of the night. When we awoke in the morning I for one got a surprise to find what a natural fort we were in. Two huge boulders were facing out towards Atamboea and overlooking the track and behind us was clear open space also sloping away and in the village plenty of big rocks to get out of the way of rifle fire and return same. I would have been quite willing to have stopped there with the Javanese boys. The rest of the party arrived early and we had something to eat. A boiled egg and some bully beef. We then put all the gear on the Timor ponies and it was here that I really saw how good these horses really were. Up and down the narrow mountain tracks with these great loads and never a stumble or a falter in their steady gait. Nose to tail plodding along with a native to each horse. Lebos location map [20] We descended from our home of the night before. It reminded me of a Zane Grey story and still does. It was grassy and tree dotted this side of the mountain and away in front of us stretched more mountains and valleys. The mountains immediately in front of us were barren and seemed like old volcanoes, but red clay was their main composition, studded with small tufts of grass. Down the bottom of the mountain we had just come down there was a creek and on all sides were signs of soil erosion. The track wound up this creek for a little way; then crossed over and straight up the aforesaid volcanic looking mountain and I mean straight up. It was a goat track. The horses went up it though. We went up at a smart clip at first and were exhausted when we reached the top and the old Brig. sure felt the pull. We went on after a spell up and down until we thought we would never get to our set destination which was a Chinese trading post for the natives. The Chinese had built a big bamboo hut, two in fact, which he called the Pashen Grande. We arrived there at dusk, tired and fed up, but after a great feed of rice, a boiled egg and some tinned herrings we got off the Chow we went to bed and slept well. JOURNEY’S END – LEBOS, PORTUGUESE TIMOR The natives call the Chinese on the island Sheena, meaning, of course, China. Next morning we again set off and we had a great climb up, and what a climb up and up until I thought we would never reach the top. We did however, and after a rest while we drank some coconut milk and the boys ate some bananas which natives brought out, we moved on again still going up. We stopped frequently and had some coconut milk and bought eggs from natives who offered them when we passed through their villages, also chickens. I don't remember now whether we reached the first Portuguese fort this day or the next but I know we got our first view of Portuguese territory this day. We walked along the ridge of a clear mountain and it was a lovely view. We had valleys and mountains on all sides and across to our left was the Fort Lebos but we had to go around another mountain and over a ridge upon which we got our view of the sea that stretched away to Darwin and then the sea behind us where the Japs had full command of Java, Sumatra, Bali and all those other islands. We wondered what was going on. Whether Darwin had yet been attacked and invaded. We sat below this ridge for a fair while looking and a great crowd of natives gathered around us. We got to Lebos after Capt. Neave had gone up with Jim Clout and had a look see. There was no one there except the old native telephone operator. We took up residence in this place which was built like a fort such as one sees in the Foreign Legion pictures. It had walls about three feet thick with great sloping sides outside and a path or concrete ridge inside for the guard to walk around and the wall was loopholed like around the parapets or ramparts of an old English castle. The entire structure was built up high with steps on one side and a ramp some 75 yards long to the front. These great structures had been built because of the native uprisings in the early settlement of the island. It was at this point our party joined up with the lads of the 2nd Ind. Coy., and from there on my experiences were their experiences. ________________ REFERENCES [1] https://hdl.handle.net/10070/848202 [2] Allan C. Green 1878-1954 photographer. - This image is available from the Our Collections of the State Library of Victoria under the Accession Number:, public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27843619 [3] Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies / Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacific Area. - [Brisbane] : The Section, 1943. – (Terrain study (Allied Forces. South West Pacific Area. Allied Geographical Section); no. 70): photos 7-9. https://repository.monash.edu/items/show/26287#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0 [4] Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies: map 22. [5] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C170486 [6] Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies: map 19. [7] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C207818 [8] David Crotty. - Qantas and the Empire flying boat. - Havertown: Key Publishing, c2022: 110. [9] Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies: map 28. [10] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/REL%3A20242 [11] Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies: map 25. [12] Peter Henning. - Doomed Battalion: mateship and leadership in war and captivity - the Australian 2/40 Battalion 1940-45. – 2nd ed. - [Exeter, Tasmania]: Peter Henning, c2014: 108. [13] Peter Henning. - Doomed Battalion: mateship and leadership in war and captivity - the Australian 2/40 Battalion 1940-45. – 2nd ed. - [Exeter, Tasmania]: Peter Henning, c2014.: 118. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C199678 [15] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C47570 [16] Possibly referring to Cpl Leonard Jack Bell, TX 2945 - 4 Pl Carriers http://www.sparrowforce.com/2-40th%20posting-unit.pdf – see also Henning, Doomed Battalion: 141. [17] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C199681 [18] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C75388 [19] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C209635 [20] Adapted from Area study of Portuguese Timor / Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacific Area. - [Brisbane] : The Section, 1943. – (Terrain study (Allied Forces. South West Pacific Area. Allied Geographical Section) ; no. 50.): Map 1. https://repository.monash.edu/items/show/26455#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0 _________________ TRENGOVE RONALD CLAUDE : Service Number - N107496 : Date of birth - 24 Mar 1920 : Place of birth - PLYMOUTH ENGLAND : Place of enlistment - PADDINGTON NSW : Next of Kin – TRENGOVE HAROLD - NAA: B884, N107496 - https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=5688051&isAv=N TRENGOVE RONALD CLAUDE : Service Number - NX42322 : Date of birth - 24 Mar 1920 : Place of birth - PLYMOUTH ENGLAND : Place of enlistment - DARWIN NT : Next of Kin – TRENGOVE HAROLD - NAA: B883, NX42322 - https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=4894731&isAv=N Ronald Claude Trengove [Men of the 2/2] - https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/nx/ronald-claude-trengove-r686/ ________________ Transcribed by Edward Willis Revised 30 December 2024

CAPTAIN REGINALD CLAYDON NEAVE’S SERVICE ON TIMOR SERVICE RECORD NEAVE REGINALD CLAYDON : Service Number - NX70843 : Date of birth - 01 Nov 1907 : Place of birth - NORTHWOOD NSW : Place of enlistment - NSW : Next of Kin - NEAVE BARBARA - NAA: B883, NX70843 - https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=4640795&isAv=N Light Aid Detachments (LAD) were small elements of Workshop units, comprising one officer and 20-30 enlisted personnel who provided 2nd Line repair and recovery support to forward units in a formation (Brigade). They augmented the repair and recovery resources (referred to as '1st Line') within the units of the Brigade. The LAD would comprise a number of specialist trades determined by the nature of the Brigade unit's principal equipment (particularly numbers and types of vehicles and armaments). Reference: https://vwma.org.au/explore/units/3428 75th Light Aid Detachment was a support unit for Sparrow Force, to service and repair firearms and equipment. Members of the Australian Army Ordnance Corps, they wore the same colour patch as Lines of Communications personnel. Some rolls list some of these men as being Electrical and Mechanical Engineers however they were AAOC members. At Darwin, the 104th LAD was originally to accompany Sparrow Force to Timor however their rifle shooting was not up to standard and they were taken to the rifle range with 2/40th instructors to improve their shooting over a period of weeks. This would not seem to have improved their marksmanship sufficiently because in November 1941, the 75 LAD was attached to Sparrow Force and eventually accompanied them to Dutch West Timor on the HMAS Westralia. Initially the 75th LAD was stationed at Penfui near the airstrip but after a rear supply depot was established at Babaoe for transport, maintenance, fuel reserves and a first aid dressing station, the Ordnance Corps men were moved to Babaoe on 9th January 1942. D Company of the 2/40th was stationed there as a mobile reserve from 7th January 1942. 75 LAD Personnel - Captain Reginald C. Neave - Officer in Command, L/Cpl. Leslie V. Osborne plus privates Esson, Cusack, Herd, Hullick, Leviston, McKenzie, Robertson and Trengove. One officer and 9 other ranks, plus two men listed as AAOC on the 2/40th nominal rolls (craftsman Dean & Pte. Mears) so these were likely unit armourers. Both have NX prefix regimental numbers so they were not from Tasmania or Victoria, likely seconded in Darwin before Sparrow Force left for Timor. The 75th LAD contingent was not captured at Airkom (Irekum) on 23rd like most of Sparrow Force, but they were at Champlong with the new HQ group there. So they joined up with the 2nd Independent Company (Commando) in Portuguese Timor and eventually returned to Australia. The two AAOC men Dean and Mears returned to Australia early, likely with the Brigadier Veale group. There was only one casualty of the 75th LAD on West Timor, Pte. John Esson, missing and believed killed in action on 20th Feb. 1942. As the ordnance men were stationed at rear depot at Babaoe which was attacked and captured by the SNLF paratroops on 20th, it is likely that Esson was killed in that vicinity. Some hastily organised patrols of cooks and rear echelon personnel were hastily assembled to meet the paratroops coming from the rear. A number of these men were killed before the 2/40th infantry companies retook Babaoe. Rank Name Regt No. Notes Captain Neave, Reginald Clayton NX70843 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Lance Corporal Osborne, Leslie Victor VX34061 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Esson, John VX39770 Believed KIA 20/2/42 Private Cusack, Roy Andrew VX35633 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Herd, Eric James NX52731 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Hullick, Norman Maitland VX17171 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Leviston, Harold Keith VX38849 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private McKenzie, Colin VX38850 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Robertson, Campbell VX39128 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Private Trengove, Ronald Claude NX42332 Joined 2nd Ind. Coy. Reference: http://www.sparrowforce.com/75LAD.htm 75 Light Aid Detachment AEME – late 1941-early 1942 – location and individuals unidentified (https://hdl.handle.net/10070/848202) RON TRENGOVE MEMOIR Private Ronald (Ron) Claude Trengove (NX42322) was a member of the 75th Light Aid Detachment and wrote a lengthy memoir covering the period 10 December 1941 – 4 March 1942 during which time he was in close company with Captain Reginald Neave who is referred to frequently. See: 1. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.21 no. 200 May 1967: 7-11. 2. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 201 July 1967: 7-12. 3. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 202 August 1967: 5-7. 4. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 203 September 1967: 3-7. 5. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 204 October 1967: 15-16. 6. "My early days on Timor" by NX42322, R. Trengrove, 75 L.A.D., later 2/2nd Ind. Coy. 2/2 Commando Courier v.22 no. 205 November 1967: 6-10. A full transcript of Trengove’s memoir is available. Trengrove - my early days.pdf REGINALD NEAVE DIARY Captain Reginald Neave kept a comprehensive daily diary covering the period 15 February – 9 August 1942 – the diary is held in the Australian War Memorial collection: Neave, Reginald Claydon (Captain, b.1907 - d.1958). – Diary 15 February 1942 – 9 August 1942. – Australian War Memorial Private Record PR85/023 Reference: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C88477 A full transcript of Neave’s memoir is available. Neave diaries transcripts - working version.pdf The following maps identify the locations in Dutch Timor and Portuguese Timor referred to by Neave in his diary: References: Area study of Portuguese Timor / Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacific Area. - [Brisbane] : The Section, 1943. – (Terrain study (Allied Forces. South West Pacific Area. Allied Geographical Section) ; no. 50.): map 1. https://repository.monash.edu/items/show/26455#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0 Area study of Dutch Timor, Netherlands East Indies / Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacific Area. - [Brisbane] : The Section, 1943. – (Terrain study (Allied Forces. South West Pacific Area. Allied Geographical Section) ; no. 70): map 1. https://repository.monash.edu/items/show/26287#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0 RECOVERY MISSION TO DOWNED KITTYHAWK FIGHTERS, 15 – 19 FEBRUARY 1942 Neave covers the mission he lead to recover weapons, ammunition and other equipment and components from the Kittyhawk fighters that crash landed near Atamboea in his diary entries for the period 15 – 19 February 1942. Trengrove also recounted the mission in his memoir – see transcript pp.11-15. The following references provide background on how the Kittyhawk fighters crash landed in that location. References: William H. Bartsch. - Every day a nightmare: American pursuit pilots in the defense of Java, 1941-1942. - College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010: 156-159. Walter D. Edmonds. - They fought with what they had: the story of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942. – Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951: 324-325. https://archive.org/details/TheyFoughtWithWhatTheyHad REPORT ON RECONNAISSANCE OF EAST PORTUGUESE TIMOR BY CAPT. R.C. NEAVE 2 MAY – 4 JULY Neave prepared a comprehensive report on the reconnaissance mission to the eastern provinces of Portuguese Timor that is described in his diary entries for the period 4 May – 4 July 1942. A transcript of his report is available. Neave recon report.pdf Reference: Report on reconnaissance of East Portuguese Timor by Capt. R.C.N. Neave, 2 May - 4 July - AWM 54 571/4/34, PR 00249.233-.247 (item 97) – copy in possession of the author. INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECCE OF SOUTH COAST PORTUGUESE TIMOR, JULY 1942 These instructions were issued on 16 July 1942 by Major T. Cape for the reconnaissance mission completed by Neave described in his diary entries for the period 16 – 31 July 1942. A transcript of these instructions follows: Instructions for recce of south coast PT - SF -15:7:42.pdf Reference: Sparrow Force instructions for recce of South Coast Port. Timor / Major Cape, 16 July 1942 - copy in possession of the author. MISSION TO ACQUIRE RUBBER FROM PORTUGUESE TIMOR, 17 NOVEMBER – 17 DECEMBER 1942 The Services Reconnaissance Department report on the LIZARD III operation records: … (xi) In response to repeated requests from Capt. BROADHURST to S.O. H.Q. in MELBOURNE three further officers and another signaller …. were made available and sent to DARWIN from where they were introduced by M.L. * on 17/11/42 with a further supply of arms. … (xii) In addition to LIZARD reinforcements, there were introduced at the same time: NX70843 Capt. NEAVE, R.C. VX40398 Sgt. ROSS, L.W. Both ex-SPARROW Force, and at that time employed by G.H.Q. under Col. ELLIOTT, U.S. Army. They were charged with the duty of attempting to purchase and export from TIMOR as much rubber as could be obtained. With LIZARD’s assistance they were able to purchase approximately 4 tons of this commodity, which was shipped back to AUSTRALIA accompanied by NEAVE and ROSS on 19/11/42 [sic]. **…. The LIZARD III report also includes a subsidiary report prepared by Neave: “Statement By Captain R.C. Neave Concerning Eastern Timor From Which He Has Recently Returned” – see the attached transcription. Statement by Captain R.C. Neave concerning Eastern Timor .....pdf Note: * The group were actually inserted by the corvette H.M.A.S. Kalgoorlie – see log entries for 16-19 November 1942 in AWM78 -Reports of Proceedings, HMA Ships and Establishments HMAS KALGOORLIE (I) - AWM78 179/1 - April 1942 - May 1946 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1420214 ** Actually 19 December 1942. Neave and Ross and the rubber consignment were extracted from Aliambata on the Dutch destroyer H.M.N.S. Tjerk Hiddes along with a large group of Portuguese refugees. “OBJECT 2. To take in about 41/2 tons of stores and to evacuate from ALIAMBATA … about 283 persons including 75 Portuguese men, 58 women and 130 children and 20 Native women and children. Also to embark about 33/4tons of rubber if it is available and time permits”. See H.M.N.S. Tjerk Hiddes Darwin Operation Order No. 23, 17 December 1942 – copy in author’s possession. References: Cleary, Paul. - The men who came out of the ground: a gripping account of Australia’s first commando campaign, Timor 1942. – Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: 195-196. “Moving rubber under the very noses of the Japanese” in El Tigre : Frank Holland, M.B.E. - commando, coastwatcher / [editor: Peter Stone, with Mabel Holland & John Holland]. - Yarram, Vic. : Oceans Enterprises, 1999: 96-101, 102. See the attached transcription. Moving rubber under the very noses of the Japanese - El Tigre - Frank Holland MBE - rescan.pdf [Tanimbar, Timor, Lesser Sunda, Java -] LIZARD, copy I [Timor] - NAA: A3269, D6/A - https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=235186&isAv=N RECOGNITION FOR TIMOR SERVICE Mention in Despatches (M.I.D.) Reference: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1576797 Service Commendation Card BLAMEY PRAISES TIMOR "SPARROWS" The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Land Forces (General Sir Thomas Blarney) this week sent service commendation cards to 10 of the A.I.F. "Sparrows of Timor". The most surprised "sparrow" was Captain Reginald Clayton Neave, of Garnet Crescent; Killara, who said yesterday: "I'm sure there are plenty of chaps who deserved this more than me. Still, it's a darned nice souvenir." The service commendation cards are the equivalent of a "mention in despatches". Captain Neave's card reacts: "Your name has been brought to my notice for services rendered in Timor from March 9 to May 25,1942. I congratulate you on your devotion to duty, and thank you for the example you have given. I have directed that a note of your conduct should be made on your record of service." Special Duty at Timor Captain Neave, who is on sick leave, told a Sunday Telegraph reporter that the "Sparrows" had been sent to Timor on special duty. "There was nothing specifically significant in the title 'sparrows' as different units carried bird names, but I must confess the Japs kept us hopping, like sparrows", he said. "I always suspected that the natives did a bit of reconnaissance work themselves. "Whenever I turned, up at a village they, had a meal ready, and never seemed the least surprised at my sudden appearance." Captain Neave praised the Portuguese for sending secret supplies of food to the Australian patrols. Reference: Daily Telegraph (Sydney, NSW), Sunday 27 September 1942: 32 - https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/247887016/27296294# ADDITIONAL READING Wigmore, Lionel. - The Japanese thrust. - Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. Ch. 21 ‘Resistance in Timor’: 491-492 (Australia in the war of 1939-1945. Series 1, Army; v. 4) Wray, Christopher C.H. - Timor 1942 : Australian commandos at war with the Japanese. - Hawthorn, Vic. : Hutchinson Australia, 1987 – “Every man for himself”: 78-89. Neave diaries transcripts - working version.pdf

LOS PALOS WATER PROJECT UPDATE At the Committee meeting on Monday 2 September 2024 minuted: 2024 Applications – A$5000 to add Rotary Club water project. EW to provide all banking information to CT to enable funds transfer. Moved RC, Seconded JC. This was in reference to a funding proposal from Byford Rotary Club – “Water Treatment Plant - Los Palos Timor Leste”: https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/452-water-treatment-plant-los-palos-timor-leste/ Max Bird (Project Manager for Rotary Projects Timor-Leste East, Kwinana Rotary Club International Manager) contacted me on 4/12 (e-mail copy and Word document attached) and identified a Technical School in Los Palos as the project site. Max, the on-the-ground site manager, advised that the funds for the project will be required by late January – early February 2025 so that he can purchase the equipment required in Australia that will be transported by container from Melbourne to Dili and reach there in time for him to commence work in June. I will ask Max to provide the required banking details. Los Palos School - Max Bird e-mail.pdf 4-12-2024 Los Palos School 2-2.docx FW Shipment to Timor Leste.pdf

To Doublereds members and supporters: In the lead up to Christmas, please be aware that a limited number of copies of the Guide are now available for purchase from the Doublereds online store priced at $100 per copy (this price covers production and postage costs in Australia and includes a small donation to the Association). Go to: https://doublereds.org.au/store/product/24-wwii-in-east-timor-by-ed-willis/ “The Guide provides an overdue addition to the history of WWII in East Timor – a history surprisingly little known and underappreciated despite its significance to Australia’s participation and contribution to that conflict. Drawing on new information derived from sources in Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese and Tetum it provides a fresh site-based perspective on a war that had devastating consequences for the Timorese people and yet, through Australia’s involvement, established the special and close relationship that exists between the two nations today. Australia’s Army, Navy and Air Force played significant roles in the campaign between December 1941 and the end of the War in August 1945. The guide content, for example, enables travellers to locate and find their way to the sites where battles were fought, ambushes laid and gives an insight into the extensive Japanese defensive infrastructure built by them using Timorese forced labour in the eastern districts in anticipation of an Allied attempt to retake the island. The extensive use of maps and images enhances the descriptive and narrative content of the text and enables a well-informed appreciation of each site described that have not been readily accessible before, in contrast, for example, to the extensive battlefield guide information available for the Kokoda campaign”. Please consider buying a copy of the book and spreading the word to family, friends and other interested parties that it is available. Thank you and regards Ed Willis Committee member, 2/2 Commando Association of Australia 1-60 - Final full version copy 4.pdf

Thanks Rob - another little known aspect of WWII on Timor!

TIMORESE RESISTANCE IN THE AINARO AREA – OCTOBER 1942 – MAY 1943 - Dom Aleixo Corte-Real, the liurai of Suro It deserves to be better acknowledged that a Timorese community in Ainaro, led by Dom Aleixo Corte-Real, the liurai of Suro, resisted Japanese rule until May 1943. As a consequence of his actions, Corte-Real was enshrined as a post-war Portuguese national hero in Timor. The following narrative of Dom Aleixo’s people’s resistance to the Japanese led assault on his domain was prepared by a Portuguese colonial-era historian Humberto Leitao in 1970 and smacks of patriotic fervour but it still conveys the large scale extent and ferocity of the fighting that continued in 1943 in the Ainaro – Suro – Hatu-Udo area after the departure of Lancer Force in January 1943. [1] Luirai Dom Alexio Corte Real of Ainaro and WWII hero (Centre) with Local Chiefs and Antonio Magno (far right). Aileu, Portuguese Timor 1938 “On September 2, 1939, WWII broke out. Portugal as well as neighboring Spain manage to remain neutral. In Portuguese Timor, since 1936, there were some Japanese officers who, in order to be able to travel around the island, disguised themselves as farmers and traders. However, unless you were familiar with the processes used by Japanese people in the preparations for the war against Russia could take those smiling and measurable subjects for harmless and peaceful people, who, after all, were taking advantage of every opportunity to carry out expeditious topographical surveys, take note of the main terrestrial communication routes and collect the more necessary and convenient elements for future war operations. Until the moment arrived, they wore the uniforms of modest officers. Because the island was so far away from the operations fields and we remained neutral, life there went on without much care. On December 8, 1941, however, news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in Honolulu, was captured in Dili. Dutch and Australian Occupation of Dili Japan's entry into the war came with a clear threat of Japanese attacks on the Dutch East Indies and Australia. A few days later, on December 17th of the same year 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Stressman of the Dutch Army disembarked in Dili and, in an audience requested from the Governor, announced that it would become necessary for them to disembark in our territory that same day, Dutch and Australian forces in order to protect the island against an imminent Japanese attack. Shortly afterwards, disembarkation began at the mouth of the Comoro river, located to the west and close to the capital. Surprised, the Governor, after listening to the service chiefs and the commander of a unit stationed a short distance from Dili - made up of indigenous people, for the most part, poorly armed and poorly equipped, decided, due to lack of resources, not to offer resistance. to invaders; but, in order to mark his protest against what had happened, he became a prisoner, entering the Government palace. A few days later, in order to avoid any incidents between personnel from that unit and those from foreign forces, he ordered them to be transferred to Maubisse [2], a post located in the interior of the island, close to Suro. The Dutch [led] force consisted of around 1200 men, many of whom are Javanese; the Australian, for 380, specially trained for guerrilla warfare. They entered the city in the best order and then, it must be said, they proceeded with full respect for Portuguese sovereignty. And yet, it is surprising that there was anyone who could conceive the possibility of, with such meagre forces, preventing the Japanese landing in Dili or at any other point on the island's vast coast, and that, necessarily, it had to be carried out the shadow of warship artillery, against which the Allied forces could not respond effectively. That operation, whose purpose was doomed to complete failure, was, in the end, an act of arrogance that served as justification for the Japanese to also disembark on the island, where they began to commit the most heinous crimes. The Japanese Assault on Dili As was natural, his landing did not take long, as it occurred in the early hours of February 20th of the following year - 1942 -, preceded by a heavy bombardment of Dili. The operation was carried out at the mouth of the Comoro river and then, directing it on land, there were in uniform the peaceful Japanese who a few years earlier had settled on the island under the guise of farmers and traders. The Dutch, who were entrusted with the defense of the city, offered little resistance, except those defending the aerodrome. At the time, the Australians were in the interior of the island reconnaissance of the terrain and preparing for guerrilla warfare. Some Portuguese joined them. Contrary to the way the Australian and Dutch troops behaved, the Japanese soon showed themselves to be arrogant, incorrect and provocative. They did not respect other people's property. They indulged in looting commercial establishments and private homes and destroying everything that was of no use to them. They released the criminals imprisoned in the Dili jail and associated them with the looting. They had vexatious demands. Thus, a sergeant, head of the police, was tasked with finding women for a lupanar (prostitution) [3]. They presented themselves to the indigenous people as their liberators and tried to incite them to revolt. With indigenous people from Dutch Timor and neighboring islands, they formed columns, later known as “black columns”, which grew larger with people from our territory, mainly from Manufai, Maubisse and border kingdoms. By this means, gangs of jackals were released, incited to commit heinous crimes - devastation of cultures and towns, murders of men, women and children, ill-treatment, mutilation and torture. They served as cover when, in difficult interior regions, they intended to advance. For the “saviours of Asia” the lives of those people - the vast majority of whom were brutish people - did not count. They also used them to carry out crimes that they intended not to be accused of. In the early days, the guerrillas caused great damage to these columns, as well as to the Japanese troops. They caused hundreds of deaths. In this distressing situation, the Portuguese from the Metropolis sought to explain to the Timorese chiefs the reasons for the struggles that were taking place in our territory and assured them that, after the war ended, Timor would continue to be Portuguese. Meanwhile, in Ainaro, D. Aleixo, accompanied by highly trusted leaders, was getting news of everything that was happening and any “black column” that wanted to disturb the peace near his Tranqueira [territory] was chased away. Dom Aleixo Moves to Suro-Lau In mid-1942, seeing the direction events were taking, he decided to leave Ainaro to settle in Suro-Lau, whose altitude is 1800 m. As happened at that post, the guerrillas went there from time to time to acquire the living they needed most. Because they fought the Japanese - the “matan bubo” (swollen eyes), as the Timorese called them, D. Aleixo considered the Australians as friends. In return for the favours received, they gave him weapons and ammunition, which were later used in the heroic defense of Suro-Lau. In August of the same year, a revolt broke out in Maubisse. From the Commander of the Companhia de Caçadores, then stationed in Aileu, D. Aleixo was telephoned for men to help quell the revolt. The reguloimmediately ordered 350 men to be presented to that Command under the orders of his son Alexandre [4]. In mid-September, the town of Ainaro was visited by one of the so-called “black columns”. As there, if the leader was not found, the leaders went to the Mission, where Fr. Norberto de Oliveira Barros and Fr. Antonio Manuel Pires. That time they limited themselves to demanding different foods from them and taking possession of several animals that the missionaries were raising for their sustenance. The Black Columns Attack Shortly afterwards, with Maubisse's revolt having already been suppressed, as, according to their intentions, the Japanese wanted to maintain free movement in Aileu, where the Command of the Companhia de Caçadores was located - which, although made up of a small number of men, it could well withstand the attack of a “black column” and even put it into disorganized flight - on the night of October 1st of the same year 1942, they bombarded the commander's residence with mortars and the barracks of that Company, an operation immediately followed by a ferocious assault by bandits from the “column”, largely armed with rifles and hand grenades. The bombing made the officers and soldiers of the Portuguese unit believe that it was an irresistible attack by Japanese forces, which would be followed by the usual horrors. Of this false judgment gave rise to confusion. Most of the soldiers fled. Commander Freire da Costa and his wife, unwilling to fall alive into the hands of the cruel enemy, committed suicide. At least some of the Europeans who were at the commander's residence did the same thing. If there were anyone who did not follow their example, they were murdered, with the exception of one who managed to save himself by hiding under a bed and behind a corpse that he pulled towards him, in order to remain more hidden. However, he was injured by a bullet fired at the deceased, with the suspicion that there might still be a breath of life in him. This attack carried out by the “black column” with invaluable cooperation from the Japanese, resulted in the loss of 9 European lives and several indigenous soldiers. [5] Perhaps it was this column that D. Aleixo, on the following day, October 2nd, saw heading towards Ainaro. As soon as he noticed this, he sent a messenger ordering him to quickly warn the Mission priests that they should flee without delay, as the column, which was not far away, was heading that way. Back in Suro-Lau, the messenger still managed to say that the priests refused to abandon the Mission, as their consciences were clear. Moments later, he fell lifeless because he had demanded greater efforts from his heart than he could take it. The sacrifice of the helpful Timorese was, therefore, useless and all the more so because Fr. Norberto de Oliveira Barros and Antonio Manuel Pires, and also the deportado Ferreira da Silva, who had remained with them, were savagely murdered, their bodies taken behind the church and there covered with straw to which the fire was placed [6]. At the time of this horrible event, the people of Suro, on the advice of their rulers, had already taken refuge in the mountains. Should D. Aleixo, after this and other nefarious crimes, have no doubt that, soon, he would be the target of Japanese attacks and the “black columns”, where there were people from Manufai who hated him to death. On February 11, 1943, the Australians who were still fighting in Timor withdrew to Australia because they were needed to defend New Guinea, which was being attacked by the Japanese. Dom Aleixo’s Defensive Dispositions Near Ainaro Dom Aleixo’s defensive dispositions near Ainaro Aware of the increasing danger in which he and his people found themselves, D. Aleixo decided to man some difficult-to-access positions that surrounded part of the Ainaro plain and dominated the roads that led to Suro. At the time, the group formed by the head of the Atsabe post, second sergeant José Estevão Alexandrino, by the Atsabe D. Cipriano regiment, was already taking refuge in Suro-Lau, accompanied by his son-in-law Jose dos Reis and the latter's brother, from name Alarico Fernandes; by the deportado Felnes Duarte, by the two mestiços José Cachaço and Romualdo Aniceto and by Talu Bere, chief of Maliana. This group, which had been busy fighting against the Atsabe's rebels, finding themselves harassed by Japanese forces, managed to escape from them and take refuge in Suro-Lau. Sergeant Alexandrino, when Lieutenant Liberato ordered him to join the detachment operating on the border, in order to go to the Liquica concentration camp, did not obey and, when in Suro-Lau, he was invited to join the other Portuguese to be evacuated to Australia, he refused the invitation, preferring to stay at D. Aleixo's side. [7] He, as he had planned, distributed his companions and people from the camps in the following positions: (1) In Suro-Lau [8] he stayed with 4 children - Benjamin, Adriano, Alexandre and Afonso -, his beloved friend Francisco Costa, known as Nai-Chico, from Hato-Udo, and people from this village and from Ainaro; (2) The defense of the second position, which was also in Suro-Lau and very close to that occupied by D. Aleixo, was handed over to Cipriano do Carmo Verdial, head of Suro-Craic, and his brother Jaime Verdial da Silva. It was garrisoned with people from Ainaro. These Verdial brothers were 3.0 degree cousins of D. Aleixo, as they were sons of Nai-Pusso, brother of Nai-Cau, of whom we already talked about it [9]. (3) The stronghold of Leo-Moa was entrusted to Sergeant Alexandrino, who had with him those who accompanied him in the fights in Atsabe and also Professor Araujo, his son Vasco and indigenous warriors. [10] (4) The city of Fato-Mera, which dominated the road from Atsabe to Ainaro, was handed over to Antonio Magno and the people of his jurisdiction - this Antonio Magno, also a son of Nai-Pusso, was, therefore, the brother of Cipriano and Jaime Verdial. (5) The last position was that of Manu-Tassi [11], overlooking the road from Maubisse to Ainaro and the paths that lead to Hatu-Builico and defended by chief Marcos, from Nunamogue, by his son Ananias and by people from the same Manu-Tassi, Soro and Nunamogue. Once these positions were occupied, criminals from “black columns” who came within firing range were harshly punished. Aware of D. Aleixo's firm attitude, the Japanese decided to send emissaries to invite him, with tempting proposals, to cooperate with them. To such proposals, the regulo haughtily replied that he was Portuguese and, therefore, he would only serve the Portuguese. Hatu Udo, Portuguese Timor 1945-12-14. Sergeant G. Milsom talks with Jamie Verdial of Ainaro who had helped the Australians in the Hatu Udo area. Sergeant Milsom, formerly of the 2/2nd Independent Company, accompanied the Military History Section Field Team attached to TIMFORCE and acted as a guide. (Photographer Sgt K. Davis) [12] Initial Successful Defense of the High Ground Seeing that it is not possible to lay hands on him due to stupidity and mildly means, they decided to attack the strong positions in which he and his companions were perched. Certain that in the fight they were going to fight they would lose many lives, they tried to reinforce the “black columns” with people gathered in various lands, especially in Manufai, nearby, and the border - at the time completely unmanned by Portuguese troops. According to estimates, around 15,000 men were gathered. As was customary, the indigenous forces were tasked with carrying out the attack, as the certain death of many hundreds of those poor people, deceived by false promises and incited to crime, would not weigh on the conscience of the “liberators of the Timorese people”. With a huge shout, the “black columns” launched the assault. They received very harsh punishment. To this assault others they followed, but, in all cases, the assailants were repelled. The losses he suffered were enormous. Seeing the “black columns” being decimated in such a way by those obstinate people, the Japanese, enraged by so many failures, decided to reorganize the forces at their disposal and resume the fight, successively attacking position by position. Fall of the High Ground Defences It was Manu-Tai which was the first to be captured, but it only fell into their hands after a very hard fight. Chief Marcos, his son Ananias and many of the warriors who fought with them lost their lives there. The attack on the stronghold of Fato-Mera followed, which, despite having been bravely defended, fell into their hands. Chief Antonio Magno was imprisoned there, who managed to survive until the end of that war. After Fato-Mera, Leo-Moa's position was attacked. In this case, the defenders still managed to hold out for a day, but then the lack of ammunition and supplies forced them to surrender. There, the enemy captured alive the Sergeant Alexandrino, D. Cipriano, a regulo of Atsabe, the mestiços Romualdo Aniceto and José Cachaço, the chief Talo-Bere, as well as several indigenous warriors. Sergeant Alexandrino and the mestiços were taken to Ermera, where a Japanese officer killed him with a pistol shot. His two fellow prisoners were killed by firing squad. As for D. Cipriano, a ruler of Atsabe, and the chief Talo-Bere, before the fight for the conquest of Suro-Lau began, they were savagely murdered by people from the “black columns”, who threw them from the bridge from Mau-Mali to the rocks between which the river runs. What now remained was to conquer the position where D. Aleixo found himself. To achieve this more easily, the Japanese preceded the assaults by bombarding them with mortars and three planes, which, at the same time, tried to strafe the defenders, believing that this would reduce their morale. They were wrong, as it seems to have given them renewed courage to fight fiercely and repel all the assaults carried out that day, causing considerable losses to the opponent. That day, the Japanese also suffered the disappointment of the besieged having hit a plane that crashed in Ainaro, near the Mission. [13] The following day, the fighting continued with enormous ferocity. Meanwhile, the Portuguese flag remained, exposed to the wind, in Suro-Lau, defended by a heroic group of Portuguese from Timor. When the third day arrived, the assaults continued, which the defenders, with unwavering bravery, repelled. Despite the successes achieved, the besieged found themselves in a very precarious situation, as the continued fighting during those three days had almost exhausted their ammunition, and the ammunition they had in reserve was already very few. It became urgent to make a resolution. D. Aleixo took it, sending a message to Jaime Verdial so that, during the night, with his companions, he would try to break the siege and head to the plains to seek refuge. He would however try the same, following other paths. Dom Aleixo Captured and Executed According to what was established, those, in the dead of night, because they were not present, saved themselves from martyrdom and certain death. Less fortunate, D. Aleixo and his companions did not escape the surveillance of the enemy, who managed to imprison them in the vicinity of Hato-Udo. [14] Taken to the old posto in this location, D. Aleixo, his main companions, as well as family members, and also the nurse João da Costa Tilman, were locked up there under Japanese surveillance. The remaining prisoners were placed, with a sentry in sight, in nearby barracks. At the beginning of the afternoon, they heard the prisoners discussing, in the yard, about the fate that would be given to them and, among other things, they realized that they intended to tie them up. Hearing this, D. Aleixo, angry, not accepting humiliation or dishonourable death, broke down the door and threw himself, although unarmed, at the first Japanese man who came across him, but, after a brief struggle, he fell with his chest pierced by a bayonet. Of his companions, those who imitated him, it was not long before they were shot or killed with a bladed weapon. Two managed to escape through a window and escape, getting into the dense vegetation. They were D. Aleixo's grandson, Joao Cesar Corte-Real, then a boy of about 19 years old, and Fausto Corte-Real, the governor's brother-in-law. Nurse Tilman, due to his bulk, not being able to use that exit easily, remained in the office where, found by the Japanese, he was murdered. [15] This was followed by another no less horrible tragedy - the death of those brave people who had been placed in the hut. It is possible that this woman, although unarmed, had also fought hand to hand with her tormentors and did not allow herself to remain inert and receive death. This time, the Japanese, with a few remnants of humanity, ordered the women and children to be spared from the slaughter. The Hato-Udo yard was covered in corpses and they remained there unburied for more than two years, until, after the surrender of the Japanese in Timor, on September 11, 1945, it was possible to collect their remaining bones. Portuguese colonial era school book depiction of the assassination of Dom Alexio by Japanese soldier [16] NOTE: Shortly after their recovery, the skulls of Dom Aleixo and his three sons, Alfonso, Francisco, and Alveira, were placed on public display, in Ainaro and were photographed there on 24 January 1945 by Sergeant K.B. Davis of the visiting Australian Military History Section team. The remains were subsequently re-interred in a new monument in Ainaro honouring the Memory of Dom Aleixo. Ainaro, Portuguese Timor. 1946-01-24. Skulls of the King Alexio and his three sons, Alfonso, Francisco and Aliveira displayed in the sepulchre of the royal family. The four were killed by the Japanese because they had been of great help to the Australians of Sparrow Force. (Photographer Sgt K.B. Davis) [17] Portuguese Honour the Memory of Dom Aleixo To honour the memory of D. Aleixo, there is a tapestry of Portalegre on display in the Noble Hall of the Palácio das Repartições, in Dili, where he is depicted with the Flag of Quinas wrapping his belt, his muscles tensed, with his sword raised in a position to deliver a blow capable of annihilating any opponent. On the right, in the bottom corner, there is the following caption: WRAPPED IN THE FLAG OF THE MOTHERLAND THE REGULO OF TIMOR D. ALEIXO CORTE-REAL PREFERS TO DIE NOT YIELDING TO THE INVADERS. The Tapestry (from the Portalegre Factory) that disappeared in the maelstrom of the Indonesian occupation and which recalled, in the Noble Hall of the Palácio das Repartições, the heroic act of Dom Aleixo Corte Real In Ainaro a monument was erected to him. It is an arch with sober but elegant shapes, set on a platform, to which six steps give access. At the opening of the arch, supported by a metal frame made of curved pieces, an Avis cross stands out. From the severity of the highest mountains of Timor, which partly surround Ainaro, the place offers special conditions for meditation and recollection. Time wastes the importance of events and even causes some, although important, to be forgotten. It would behove time not to do anything more to the sublime act performed by D. Aleixo. To prevent this from happening, it seems to us that, annually, on a fixed day in the month of May, the youth of Timor's schools or their representatives would go on a pilgrimage to Ainaro to lay flowers at the base of the monument, giving them this is an occasion to remember the Hero's glorious deed, the nobility of his character and the unyielding patriotism that led him to sacrifice his own life”. NOTE: “On May 10, 2002, the day of the restoration of Independence in Ainaro, … the inauguration ceremony [was held] of the rehabilitation of the monument promoted on the ground by the late Nuno Franco and coordinated by Dr Rui Fonseca. The Monument dedicated to Regulo Dom Aleixo, in Ainaro Timor-Leste. Under the motto "For Portugal" (top of the Arch), the heroic struggle of this Timorese Regulo against the Japanese Invader is remembered. The monument is also a tomb, and the remains of this Regulo, killed by the Japanese in 1943 during the Second World War, were deposited there. The Monument is also flanked by two stone graves approximately 5 meters to the right and left in front of the monument, where the remains of two martyred Fathers will be found. [?] On the left side of this monument are the ruins of the old Regulo Dom Aleixo Residence, which was destroyed in the 70s. [19] Monument erected in Ainaro in memory of D. Aleixo Corte-Real References [1] Humberto Leitao. - O Regulo Timorense D. Aleixo Corte-Real. – Lisboa: Edição do Grupo de Estudos de História Marítima, 1970: 57-71. [2] Liberato, O Caso de Timor: 40. [3] Brandão, Funo - guerra em Timor: 60. [4] José Simão Martinho, Vida e Morte do Regula Timorense D. Aleixo: 22. [5] Liberato, O caso de Timor: 162, 167. [6] P.e Martinho da Costa Lopes, “D. Aleixo Corte Real, Um Herói já Lendário do Nosso Seculo, revista” Defesa Nacional n.os 193-194. [7] Ezequiel Enes Pascoal, A alma de Timar na sua fantasia: 94. [8] Google Maps - 9°00'58.9"S, 125°32'22.5"E [9] Ezequiel Enes Pascoal, A alma de Timar na sua fantasia: 94. “This post dominated the Ainaro-Cassa-Mape-Bobonaro road”. - Rocha, Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial: 110-112 [10] P.e Martinho da Costa Lopes: 20. [11] 8° 59' S, 125° 32'E – ASPT: 83; 8°58'55.6"S 125°32'02.0"E – Google Maps. “This post dominated the main road Maubisse-Ainaro and the road from Ainaro to the post of Hato-Builico” - Rocha, Timor: ocupação japonesa durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial: 110-112. [12] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C200646. [13] There are those who claim that two planes were shot down. [14] Os Ultimas Dias de D. Aleixo Corte-Real - version of his grandson João Cesar Corte-Real, who managed to save himself from the Hato-Udo massacre. [15] João Cesar Corte-Real. [16] https://scontent.fper7-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.6435-9/31543090_10210566516790335_9091489310774919168_n.jpg?_nc_cat=104&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=5f2048&_nc_ohc=4qJBLxuThZwQ7kNvgFHXWnC&_nc_ht=scontent.fper7-1.fna&oh=00_AfBdTkI-oaUTtsTg8Hojt6olIxr5GP1Lowfe8qzrY4IwUg&oe=6662EC13 [17] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C221127 [18] Rui Brito da Fonseca. - Monumentos portugueses em Timor-Leste. - Dili, Timor Leste: [Crocodilo Azul?], 2005: 80-81.

Tom Hoyer sent me the attached additional info about the Los Palos water project. Ed Water Project in Timor Leste 2024.docx

Laclo 8° 33' 20” S, 125° 55' 11" E [1] Laclo is 7 miles (11 km.) at a bearing of 246° from Manatuto. It is a posto town of about 20 stone and many native houses on the North Laclo River. There are few native villages in this district, which is rather arid. North of Laclo there is a mountain range of nearly 5,500 feet (1,675 m.) elevation at its highest point; the crest of this range is only 3 miles (5 km.) north of Laclo. An old motor road passed through Laclo for Manatuto to Meti Naro and Dilli. It is now fallen into disrepair and is only traversable by horse. [2] Laclo location map [3] The 4AIC becomes active in the Laclo area: "From Laclubar we carried out daily patrols to familiarise ourselves as quickly as possible with our area of responsibility - along both sides of the Sumasi River which flowed from Laclubar past Cribas before joining the North Laclo River south of the major coastal town of Manatuto, situated on the east-west road between Dili and Baucau on the east end of the Island. Other roads from Dili, Manatuto and Baucau all went south for relatively short distances, the one from Manatuto went south from Cribas to approximately the centre of the Island. Our early patrolling was completely unhindered by the Japanese." [4] Demolition Work On The Manatuto-Dili Road – 20 October 1942 “Lieut. Morgan, who had led the 2/2nd Company party that blocked the road east of Manatuto on the 22nd of September, decided to do it once more before he left the island. A patrol, comprising troops from No.4 Section 2/2nd Company, escorted the 2/4th Company's Engineers and a cuda pack train, with native handlers worrying about their cargo of 400 lbs of amatol, set off from Fatu Maqueric on 20 October. Jack Jones goes over some of the details with his old OC Frank Hammond and Curly Papworth. Jack: ‘We went through Laclo to the Manatuto-Dili road to see if we could do some damage to that road. We arrived at Laclo Village in the late afternoon and made our way over the mountain, reaching the other side in the twilight. ‘We were digging our holes - we only had dixies and digging sticks to dig with - when we heard voices down below. We kept very quiet until we learnt that the 'voices' came from a group of Timorese fishermen who were singing on their journey home. We resumed digging and completed our holes. Then we filled them up with Amatol and stuffed it up the drains that were there too’. Frank: ‘Jack and I cleared the area and lit the safety fuse. The good book says don't run, so we didn't. I think a quick jog would more describe our retreat to a nearby culvert. Jack just beat me to it, but I managed to squeeze in beside him and then the earth shook. We were splattered with light rubble and earth and could hear the whiz of bigger rocks and clods of earth go over our heads. On inspection the road was completely blocked’. Curly: ‘It would have taken a lot of hard work to clear that road again’. Jack: ‘We went back over the range and came to a village we thought was Laclo, but it turned out to be Ili-Heu. It was on the Laclo River. We stayed there until the following day when we moved back to Fatu Maquerec’. On the 23rd, Japanese troops were observed clearing the debris, a task which kept them busy for the next few days. They were last seen returning wearily to Hera on the morning of 27 October. Planning An Ambush There were reports, however, both from the Portuguese and native sources, of large parties of Japanese troops moving across from both Aileu and Dili to Manatuto, presumably to deter the road-blowers. Early on the 27th, Captain O'Connor moved No.4 and No.6 Sections into position to ambush them at the North Laclo River on the western outskirts of Manatuto. The 2/4th Company's Engineer Section prepared to lend a hand by blowing big holes in the near vicinity in another road leading south from Manatuto to Cribas. But nobody thought to mention that to Gordon Hart, who recalls the details: ‘Dan had No.4 Section positioned on the east bank of the river with Manatuto to our rear, with No.6 Section and B Platoon HQ positioned on the west bank. We spent all the first day so positioned - but no Japs! After dusk HQ withdrew with both sections to a rendezvous at a village, Ili-Heu (about a half hour east of Laclo Posto, and approx three hours west of Manatuto), leaving Cpl Arthur Stevenson and two others as a listening post in a village named Nuno-Laluli, near No. 6 Section's ambush site, to observe and report enemy movements into or out of Manatuto during the night. Looking east over the Laclo township – Laclo River in the background – 8 August 2022 ‘No.4 Section led out from Ili-Heu before dawn and as we were entering the Nth Laclo River, John Vierra, a Porto attached to my section, pointed out Jap footprints heading in the direction of Laclo’. Arthur Stevenson explains further: ‘At the listening post that night, I got my first attack of malaria. One of the fit boys pulled me to my feet and said the Japs were in the village. We hacked our way out the back of the hut we were in and went 100 yards or so into a rice paddy where, for the first time I heard the click of a Japanese bayonet in its scabbard as about 120 of them filed past a few yards away on the levee bank heading towards the No.6 Section position just east of Laclo. There was no future in trying to rejoin my section, so I headed instead for Hart's Section position east of the river’. Gordon continues: ‘Word was passed back to Captain O'Connor and No.6 Section was detached to check out Laclo, while No. 4 Section continued on to its ambush position of the previous day. Platoon HQ would remain on the track in its present position until No. 6 Section ascertained what the Japs were doing around Laclo. ‘After we took up our ambush position, contact was made with Arthur Stevenson's listening post, and he reported that a Jap party had passed him during the night headed towards Laclo. As we hadn't had any further contact from No. 6 Section or Pl. HQ, I considered it advisable for the listening party to join No. 4 Section. I then withdrew the section to a village, Obrato, due south of Manatuto. Sketches of views in the Laclo River area – late 1942 [5] ‘A lookout was posted in a high tree which gave a complete view of all approaches. We had safe lines of withdrawal south to Cribas, or down the Sumasi River. Sgt. Jack Shand, (ex Pl. HQ), arrived as we awaited developments. He had become separated from the HQ party. ‘Being in what I considered to be a relatively safe area, I decided to give the troops a breather and a meal before our first face to face confrontation with the enemy. We had been moving around for a couple of days with very little rest or food. ‘I pondered over the options left to us and the Japs, using the limited information that I had. I thought they could patrol back to Dili via the North Laclo, or they could patrol to Laclo and return to Manatuto later in the day. Their movement to Laclo suggested that they may have picked up B Pl.'s wireless messages indicating our base to be at Laclo. ‘Our option if they patrolled back to Dili would be an exercise in shadowing and waiting for an opportunity. If they took the second option, our opportunity to ambush them depended on our anticipating correctly which route they would follow to Manatuto. There were two well defined routes from Laclo to Manatuto. The first was on the northern side of the North Laclo river by which they had moved out to Laclo. The second started along the same track but branched off to cross the North Laclo and an island near its junction with the Sumasi River and then across the Sumasi to the Cribas road running north to Manatuto. ‘I felt the Japs were most likely to choose the southern track crossing the rivers and the island, as this would enable them to cover a much wider area in their patrol for approximately the same mileage. If they took that route, they provided us with the much safer option. If we covered the northern track and they took the southern one (which they did) we would possibly be caught between the returning patrol and any troops they had remaining in Manatuto. ‘Having puzzled over these options I decided to enjoy my lunch! ‘While I was doing so, our lookout, Tom Price, reported heavy smoke rising from Laclo. It appeared the Japs had torched the town. As Laclo was a couple of hours distant from us, I considered we had sufficient time to set up an ambush on the island. Before moving out to do so, I detailed L-Cpl Price to remain in charge of our base and OP, with Jack Ellis (who had a stye in one eye) and Ron Kemp (who had a nasty looking tropical ulcer on one leg) to clear up any sign of us having been in the village and to organise the criados if we had to make a quick exit to our RVs. Jack Shand was also left, he being responsible for B Pl. HQ's radio equipment’. Laclo area showing road demolition and ambush sites [6] Improvising An Ambush While Hart was pondering over his options at Obrato village, No.6 Section was having problems in finding out just what the Japanese were up to at Laclo. Bob Fleming provides an account of some confusion and excitement before the situation was resolved: ‘Halfway through the night, I was awakened by a native runner frantically endeavouring to convey a message from the listening party to the effect that 200 Japs had come to Manatuto. Since the message was verbal and our custom was to communicate in writing when using native runners, little notice was taken of him. We settled back to rest again. ‘But a couple of hours later, another native came running in to say that approximately half the reported Jap force had passed by our village and gone to Laclo, about half an hour's walk further on. This was a bit hard to believe too, but I investigated, taking Pte K. Beaver with me. We went to a hill overlooking the town to observe. There were Japs in it, sure enough, having a fine time bashing the place about and shooting any poor unfortunates not quick enough to get out in time. ‘On returning to our position I was confronted by a native who had been in Laclo when the Japs arrived. He said they were actually poorly armed Dutch Timors in the main, with a few Japs amongst them armed only with pistols. He was cross-examined at length but made no alteration to his story and it was taken as reasonably accurate, although we knew from our observations that there were more Japs than he said and that they were a little better armed. It turned out that his information was badly astray. ‘The section was split into two groups of equal size. One group was set in ambush on a long ridge overlooking the track to Laclo. This was a good position providing a fine view of the track, perfect concealment and a good get-away. I took the second group which was to move around the back of the Laclo and drive the enemy - with the knowledge of native reaction to this sort of thing - back along the track they had used to come to Laclo so as to allow the ambush party to deal with them. The First Ambush ‘The enemy, however, left the town earlier than anticipated. They also chose the same track back as the sub-section was taking to the town, so the two parties moved towards each other along the same track unaware of the other's movements. But luck was on our side. The Nips were careless, and the leader of the column was turning around talking to the fellow behind him when I spotted them about 50 yards away. We hopped off the track in record time and waited in the scanty cover less than 10 yards away. We opened fire on them as they were in a satisfactory position opposite us and kept it up for about a minute before withdrawing, while they were still confused, to let the ambush party, whose fire we were masking have their turn. ‘As our fire was returned with LMGs, rifles and mortars, it wasn't hard to guess that the force was composed of many more Japs than we thought. We later learned that it was about 100 in strength and principally Japanese in composition. ‘An estimated 30 casualties were inflicted on the enemy in this engagement without harm to us. There were a few close calls. Ted Coops was fired upon twice by one Jap from a distance of five yards without being hit. The Jap did not survive Ted's first shot. ‘After our withdrawal, the enemy burned the village we had occupied for the night and apparently burned his dead in the fire. The remainder of his force then proceeded towards Manatuto to be set upon by No.4 Section about an hour and a half later’. The Second Ambush Hart describes that action: ‘Just as our ambush party was about to cross the Sumasi River, Tom Price sent up a message to the effect that it wasn't Laclo town that was burning, but the village Ili-Heu. As this village was much closer to the island, I had to abort or find another suitable spot for the ambush on the eastern side of the Sumasi. Its eastern bank at the road crossing was no more than two to three foot high. The verge was sparsely covered by cane grass and there was an uncultivated paddy field behind it. The cover provided was minimal. ‘We then moved back along the track towards Manatuto searching for a suitable spot with more cover. Suddenly I realised that even if we found a spot with better cover, we would be trapped between the returning patrol and their base at Manatuto. While tossing up in my mind whether to make a mad dash to the island - which had a perfect ambush position - or set up on the not so good spot on the eastern bank of the Sumasi, the Japs settled the matter for me. They suddenly began to enter the Sumasi at its west bank. We had to take up our stations on the east bank at the double. ‘Fortunately, while the paddy field didn't provide much cover, it enabled the men to move quickly off the track and take up positions along the low mound bordering the field adjacent to the riverbank. The width of the riverbed, covered with large and small rocks and stones, was between 200-300 yards, although the stream itself was, at that time, only 20-30 yards wide and only inches deep. ‘The section held their fire until the leading Jap, a veritable giant, was within 10 yards. Then all hell broke loose. ‘It shook me at the time how quickly the Japs 'homed in' on us in a matter of seconds, as if they were expecting us. These were seasoned troops. We were not aware at that time that they had been ambushed by Bob Fleming's No. 6 Section boys earlier near Laclo. However, on looking around, I saw the reason why they had 'homed in' so quickly. Good old John Vierra was standing up in full view of them, blazing away with his rifle. I managed to attract his attention and got him to go to ground. When I queried him later as to why he stood up in full view of the Japs, he replied: 'When you fired the opening shot, they all went to ground, and I couldn't see any of them. I stood up to get a better view’. ‘John may not have been the best-trained soldier, but he sure was enthusiastic when it came to having a crack at the Japs. Withdrawal ‘We didn't hang around for long as it is not too comfortable having mortar bombs dropping around you. ‘Wimpy’ Clarke, our Bren gunner, relishing his first crack at the enemy, had hosed off several mags. One of John Vierra's criados, 'Africano', was acting as No. 2 on the Bren. When we had to skedaddle, he picked up the gun by the barrel. He learnt the hard way. His hand was very badly burned - but not a whimper out of him. Quite a stoic 'Africano', and a very valuable member of No. 4 Section. ‘On our somewhat hasty withdrawal, we ran into a problem. We had committed ourselves to an ambush in haste, without having reconnoitred our line of withdrawal. Now in that Province they had eight - to 10-foot-high cactus hedge rows marking the borders of their land and gardens. This particular field had a buffalo corral attached. We withdrew through a set of sliprails right into that corral. One of the boys had a brainwave and he grabbed those sliprails and laid them horizontally across the face of the cactus hedge to form a ladder. We all negotiated this obstacle, except Wimpy. He decided to fall off right into the middle of the cactus fence. He shot out of that cactus and took off like a startled goanna and he reckoned he never felt a thing. But he was still picking cactus needles out of his hide years after the war ended! Private Owen Williams – “Our First Comrade Killed In Action” ‘We had nominated a couple of rendezvous if we were forced to scatter. One was our OP village, Obrato. The other was Cribas, so I didn't worry unduly when Owen Williams didn't turn up initially. I felt he might have gone round the cactus corral and not through it and then headed straight for Cribas. Tom Price, watching from our OP reported that we had killed 10-15 Japs and wounded another five. Considering the circumstances, we were reasonably content with this outcome of our first face to face brush with the enemy. …. ‘Next day, when Owen Williams hadn't turned up, Jack Ellis, Ron Kemp and Charlie Ranken returned to our ambush spot and learnt that Owen had been killed instantly in the action by a bullet through the forehead. Our first comrade killed in action. The sad news had a very sobering effect on us all. His sub-machine gun was later recovered from a Portuguese official’ Sparrow Force refers to these actions in the War Diary: ‘29 Oct '42: Jap party ambushed by Sec. 6, 2/4 Ind. Coy between Manatuto and Laclo 0630 hrs 28 Oct., 45 Jap casualties, ours nil. Sixty Japs ambushed by Sec. 4, 2/4 Ind. Coy 28 Oct near Manatuto, 12 enemy casualties, ours nil. Cribas road blown by Eng. Sec. 2/4 Ind. Coy night 28 Oct’. The loss of Owen Williams had not then been confirmed.”. [7] NOTE: Private Owen Richard Williams, NX77951, B Platoon, 4AIC – his body was buried by Timorese villagers nearby where he was KIA. All of his personal effects, and his Tommy gun, had been taken by Timorese villagers and handed to the administrator at Manatuto, who returned them to Lieutenant Fleming. [8] Though the location of his grave was noted for 4AIC records, his remains were not found by the War Graves team post war. His name is listed on the Monument to the Missing at the Adelaide River War Cemetery. João Vieira (John Vierra or Viera) “João Vieira [9] – Portuguese (or mestiço). [10] From Taibessi. Corporal - infantry. Assisted the 2AIC – João Vierra [sic] noted as the ‘organizer of food supplies’ in the Dili area [11] Member of the ‘International Brigade’ fighting alongside Sparrow Force: ‘On 22/23 Nov 42 John [sic] Vierra, a Portuguese attached to 4 Sec entered Dili disguised as a Timor’ – highest praise and commendation [12] In action against the Japanese with 2/4 Independent Company at the Sumasi River [13] Assisted SRD’s OP LIZARD - his group operated in Uai Alla area between Bibileu and Mundo Perdido [14] In January 1943, Vieira was cited in Lancer Force’s instruction to S Force: ‘John Vierra (Cribas area)’ – particularly recommended. Operated with S Force. [15] He was a principal in PORTOLIZARD after the LANCER FORCE/LIZARD evacuation – and led a reconnaissance to Dili in mid-May 1943. [16] Vieira joined the LAGARTO group on its arrival under Lieutenant M. de J. Pires on 1 July 1943. From 12 August 1943, Vieira (codename ‘JVP’) led an armed group and established an OP overlooking Dili. [17] Vieira and party moved off and at the end of August 1943 were located between Laclo and Remexio about 10 miles east of Dilli. A certain amount of information was passed to LAGARTO by runner, but the wireless link was not a success and never functioned, a state of affairs which is attributed to the incompetence of Procopio. At the beginning of September 1943, contact was lost with Vieira and no word was received of him until 3 weeks later when it was learned that he was hiding in the vicinity of Kuri 8 miles west of Manatuto. On 25 September 1943, Vieira with Rebello and a few natives rejoined LAGARTO bringing news of Japanese strength and disposition around Dilli. Procopio with the W/T gear and 10 other men who were with Vieira had been captured in Laclo where the party had been ambushed. [18] The LAGARTO group was attacked by a Japanese and native force at Cape Bigono on 29 September 1943 and its leadership captured – Vieira escaped, but was captured a few days later. He was seen in prison in Dili by the deportado António Santos. [19] Vieira reportedly ‘died in prison in Dili, detail not known’. [20] Australian veterans of 2/2 and 2/4 Independent Companies established the “Francisca Vierra [sic] Fund” - i.e. for the widow of John [sic] Vieira. [21] References [1] ASPT: 82. [2] ASPT: 31. [3] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [4] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 108. [5] ASPT: Photographs 40-42. [6] Adapted from MapCarta map – 24 January 2024. [7] Text on road demolition and ambushes from Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 143-148. [8] Cleary, The men who came out of the ground: 233-234. [9] See Carvalho, Relatório ... : 441, 471, 555, 736. [10] Brandão, Funo : 133. [11] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 125. [12] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 154. [13] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 147. [14] Captain D.K. Broadhurst report – A3269, D6/A, p.114. Six of ‘João Vieira’s party’ are listed at A3269, D27/A. p.2. [15] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 228. [16] A3269, D4/G: 376, 380. [17] A32369, D4/G: 99. [18] The official history of the operations and administration of ‘Special Operations Australia’ (SOA) conducted under the cover-name of ‘Services Reconnaissance Department’. V.2 – Operations: 61-100. [19] Cardoso, Timor na 2a Guerra Mundial: 101. [20] Carvalho, Vida em morte em Timor: 130. [21] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 438.

Good morning Tom - apology for not replying to your message much earlier - the 2/2 Committee will meet in the near future to consider the funding proposals that it has received and we'll let you know the outcome immediately after that meeting. Regards Ed Willis - Committee member

Portraits of Rolf Baldwin and Bernard Callinan, lieutenants in the 2nd AIF, at Darby River, Victoria, early 1941. [1] Rolf Baldwin played a key leadership role during the 2nd Independent Company’s successful guerrilla campaign against the Japanese on Portuguese Timor during 1942. Baldwin, commander of A Platoon, was a 33-year-old school teacher from Melbourne. An erudite man with a wide and deep knowledge of Australia, especially its bush and old gold-field areas, he was never lost for a yarn. As an officer and man he was known to be wise and fair, and was respected by the troops under his command. Later in the campaign he was to be a hard-working and loyal second-in-command of the unit. [2] In the cadre of potential officers brought together on Wilson’s Promontory when the No. 2 Independent Company was being formed, Bernard Callinan, 28, an engineer was joined by Rolf Baldwin, 32, a teacher at Melbourne Grammar School. An ‘eccentric’ schoolmaster with a pencil moustache, Baldwin was not the typical rugged type found in the unit. He freely admitted that he didn’t like sport, but he was chosen because his knowledge of astronomy had impressed Spencer Chapman when he met him on his recruitment drive. Baldwin had grown up at the Melbourne Observatory where his father had worked as the government astronomer. And his work as a schoolmaster at Melbourne Grammar made him the well-organised, efficient type that was needed at the top. Baldwin and Callinan had both read and discussed Reitz’s book, which described how a small force of well-organised Boer guerrillas could tie up a conventional army many times their number. [3] The salutary lesson of the book for Callinan and Dexter was why the Boers eventually failed: through exhaustion, lack of food, and because the friendly population had been driven away from them. When formed, the company was led by Major Alexander Spence, 35, a journalist from Proserpine, Queensland, with Captain Callinan as his second-in-command. The formation of this elite unit had been rather hasty, and it was about 50 men short of its full complement of 270 officers and men. But all the officers needed to run the company were there, 17 in total. While most of the company’s ordinary ranks came from Western Australia, only four officers were drawn from that state. Captain Baldwin, the Melbourne Grammar master, commanded A Platoon. Captain Geoff Laidlaw, 31, a salesman and surf champion from Newcastle, NSW, led B Platoon. Laidlaw, with a huge bear-like frame, was known in the company as ‘the Bull’. George Boyland, 30, a Western Australian, led C Platoon. [4] Baldwin provided his own self-deprecating account of his contribution to the Timor campaign to the ‘Courier’ in March 2000: TIMOR MEMORIES SERIES 7. ‘Recollections’ by Rolph [Rolf] Baldwin [6] In the early part of the war a Lieutenant on the reserve of officers, aged 30 and in a reserved occupation to boot was a drug on the market. It was J.R.D. [7] who solved that one for me by introducing me to Freddy Spencer-Chapman. [8] Formation of No. 2 Independent Company The result was that I called up as a Fieldcraft Instructor under Freddy. There were two of us, the other being David Dexter (Old Geelong Grammar) who came to the position by quite a different channel. In that position we stayed together during the training of the officers and NCOs of the first and second Independent Companies, later Commando Squadrons, and were posted together to the 2/2 Aust Independent Company quite an adventure for two Victorians to serve in a unit that was overwhelmingly Western Australian. Together we shared the long, rigorous winters training on Wilson Prom, which was odd training for the tropics but nevertheless, served its purpose well, for the real hardships of that apprenticeship formed a very cohesive unit. Dexter and I were together all through Timor. [9] ‘Shipped across to Timor’ It was as well for us that it was formed as soon as the war with Japan broke out we were shipped across to Timor, first for only a few days to the western part and then to the eastern end which was then Portuguese. In some ways we were on easy street for we never suffered serious bombing nor shelling and casualties were comparatively light. On the other hand, we shared a small territory with vastly superior numbers of the enemy, we had to live mostly off the land under the same conditions as the natives did, our line of communication with Australia was non-existent for 6 weeks at the beginning of 1942 and was never better than tenuous and these conditions had to be endured for nearly a year without any leave or rest, with rations becoming poorer all the time and the health of us all deteriorating. The story is told in 'Independent Company' by Bernard Callinan [10] which appeared in 1953 and in ‘Timor 1942’ by Wray [11] which was published in 1992 so I shall not attempt to summarise but merely mention a few incidents in which I was personally concerned. ‘When the Japanese first arrived’ When the Japanese first arrived in Dili the Independent Co. was dispersed in the hills surrounding the town except for one section (an officer and 20 men) which manned the airfield. This section fought fiercely from midnight until the early hours of the morning then blew the numerous demolition charges which had already been set and in the resulting confusion, vanished into the hills behind the town. After taking a while to consolidate their position in Dili the Japanese came out into the hills to search for their elusive enemy. There, of course, they were met by the 'ambush and vanish' tactics in which the Independents had been trained, and suffered heavy casualties from an enemy they did not see. [12] After their first burst of activity, the company broke contact, except for maintaining a few observation groups and made clear away, over the central range of rugged mountains to previously selected places in the southern part of the island where we could re- group and prepare ourselves for the next phase. This was a jump into the unknown for the selection of bases had been made off the map without any chance of reconnaissance. Bobonaro and Senor Souza Bobonaro was the place that fell to my lot and there I presented myself after a couple of days spent in moving under cover of darkness and lying up near native villages during daylight, living the while on such provisions as we could buy from the Timorese. By this time these people had accepted us as friendly, but we still did not know how we should be received by the Portuguese. So, it was with some inward trepidation and very conscious of our bush ranger appearance that I marched into the square of the first Portuguese posto that I had seen, with the platoon sergeant and a couple of men for escort. All doubts were groundless, however. Senor Souza [13] was provincial governor of a province of perhaps 300,000 people, very pro-British in his outlook and most cordial in his reception of people who were technically invaders. My escort was handed over to the hospitality of the local military detachment and I was taken into his own household for lunch. To one who had been living hard for some weeks and absolutely native for the last few days it was indeed a shock to see neatly uniformed servants, crisp white napery to sit in a capacious leather easy chair and be offered his choice of Fosters or Johnnie Walker with an accompanying tray of delicious sandwiches. Such luxury could not last and we were soon back to the bush, but the impression is still strong. ‘I had gravitated to the position at Company HQ …’ At this time Koepang had already fallen and with that had gone our only link with Australia so that we were lost to the people at home and they were similarly denied any means of telling us of their situation. All we knew of the war situation was what we could hear from our Portuguese friends. During the six weeks of this silence I had gravitated to the position at Company HQ and so was privy to a wildly exciting moment when 'Winnie the War Winner' by a near miracle managed to establish contact with Darwin. Even more memorable was quite a while after when RAAF Hudsons came over and dropped some of the supplies we so urgently needed, boots, medical supplies and best of all, silver money with which to buy food from the natives. The August Push For a while after this our fortunes brightened. The platoon 'were all situated in tactically useful positions where the food supply was adequate and could carry out vigorously their roles of observation and harassment. This they did to such effect that in August the Japanese set out on a full scale, well-coordinated effort to round up their tormentors. With probably 2500 first rate troops in five columns converging on a centre from as many points of the compass they gradually forced the Australians inwards. Finally, they were in the position where they were denied the possibility of hit and run and would have to engage their enemy in pitched battle which could only end in surrender or annihilation. On what seemed the vital night at about midnight I was standing chatting with the CO 'It looks now like the last man and the last cartridge' said he and almost as he spoke a big green rocket went up. Mentally finger on trigger we waited for what seemed the inevitable, but nothing happened. Then at first light our patrols went out and gradually it was confirmed that the unbelievable had happened - the enemy had simply vanished. Nor was this only temporary, over days it became clear that they had actually gone back to Dili and we could carry on our little war under something like the old terms. Arrival of No. 4 Independent Company This we did for another month or so when we faced our next great excitement, that the 2/4 Independent Company, a unit identical with our own in numbers and organisation had arrived on the island. Their arrival provided me with another set of vivid memories for it fell to my lot to be the OC beach during their landing. This was a complicated task. For one thing the troops coming ashore would have no transport to convey their stores and for another they would have no idea of how to find their way to the positions they were to occupy. To cope with this each section of the 2/2 Company had to provide two guides and such and such number of ponies and have them at the designed beach at an appointed time. There were many difficulties involved for it was a matter of moving a total of 400 ponies from several directions to the one point without arousing the suspicion of the enemy and then, when they had arrived at the beach, keeping them hidden and fed and watered until they were needed. As this had to be managed on a large tract of flat ground about two thirds of which supported a scrub not unlike a big tea tree or old man Mallee, providing good cover from the air whilst the remainder was scattered patches of kunai grass. The landing and dispersal The fixed point in regard to movement was that a Japanese reconnaissance plane came along regularly every morning soon after sun rise. The troop ship was to be the destroyer HMAS ‘Voyager’ and of course she would have to come in after dark and be away before first light. By the night ‘Voyager’ was due, all was ready when we struck our first difficulty in the shape of a signal which said that her departure was to be delayed by 24 hours, but the hiding, feeding and watering of the ponies for the extra day was managed. Then came the actual night. ‘Voyager’ arrived punctually and the disembarkation went on smoothly from my point of view. As each 2/4 section came ashore it was met by the 2/2 representative concerned, carried its stores to the waiting ponies and went on its way. Keeping an eye on this kept me pretty well occupied but towards the end it seemed to me that the ship was coming pretty close inshore. Then, as the last troops were on the beach I went along to the Commander of the ship for a few words. From him I had the devastating news that the ship was aground and unable to move herself. The fate of the ‘Voyager’ On our feet we concocted the plan that enough men would be left aboard to fight the ack-ack guns against the certain air attack next daylight and that the rest of the sailors, unarmed, for the ship carried only a few rifles, would occupy the hiding places of the horses. We hoped against hope that there would be no land attack and, in fact, none did come while the sailors were ashore. By the time all the sailors were in their new quarters it was full light and soon after the 'chaffcutter' as we called the plane, came over and went back to Dili. Later came the bombers. A stranded ship would be an easy target, but they scored only a couple of hits and one bomber was smoking so heavily that we felt the natives were right when they reported it destroyed. In the afternoon the Commander of the ‘Voyager’ had her engines destroyed and the poor old ship was fired. Red hot rivets flying from her plates were a sight to remember. During the night two corvettes took off the sailors. Next day another soldier and I had the eerie task of going back to the ship to look for a signals book that it was thought might have been left behind. [14] End of the Timor Campaign The Timor part of my recollections ends with the beach on the south coast of the island as we waited for the destroyer HMAS ‘Arunta’ to take us off. The 2/2 Company had already gone in December 1942 but my great friend Bernard Callinan who was originally 2/IC of the 2/2 had become Commanding Officer of the combined 2/2 and 2/4 Companies and stayed on with me as Adjutant till the 2/4 came off in January 1943. [15] We were separated on the beach and I was on my own as, in nothing more than filthy old shirt and a pair of old ragged drill trousers, I went up the scramble nets and fell asleep on the first flat piece of deck I could find. None of us wore badges of rank then so it was some time before I was found and taken along to the ward room where I met a similarly bedraggled Bernard. What would you like to drink? Would you have a Pym’s No. 1? and of course, the Navy had. Final war years That concludes these recollections for I spent 1943-45 as a staff officer in Melbourne, New Guinea, the Tableland and then New Guinea again. Finally, by an odd quirk of fortune I fetched up after the Japanese surrender in Rabaul where I met old comrades in what had become the 2/2 Aust Commando Squadron and was shipped home with them in December 1945. Captain R.R. Baldwin VX50054 NB: Baldy, as he is affectionately known, turned 90 on 16 December 1999. REFERENCES [1] National Library of Australia digitised item, http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-136262775 [2] Christopher C.H. Wray. – Timor 1942: Australian commandos at war with the Japanese. – Melbourne: Hutchinson Australia, 1987: 31. [3] Deneys Reitz. - Commando : a Boer journal of the Boer war / introduction by Leo Cooper ; preface by General the Right Honourable J.C. Smuts. - London : Folio Society, 1982. [4] Paul Cleary. – The men who came out of the ground: a gripping account of Australia’s first commando campaign, Timor 1942. – Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: esp. Ch. 1 ‘The Pick of Australia’, 1-17. [5] https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/RCDIG1068966/large/5387433.JPG [6] Rolph [Rolf] Baldwin ‘Timor memories series 7. “Recollections”’ 2/2 Commando Courier March 2000: 11-14. https://doublereds.org.au/couriers/2000/Courier%20March%202000.pdf , published online 2016, accessed online 12 June 2024. [7] Sir James Ralph Darling (1899–1995), Headmaster of Geelong Grammar School (1930-1961). See Peter Gronn, 'Darling, Sir James Ralph (1899–1995)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/darling-sir-james-ralph-21871/text31931 , published online 2019, accessed online 12 June 2024. [8] Edward Willis ‘Lieutenant Colonel Freddie Spencer-Chapman, 1907-1971 – master of guerrilla jungle warfare’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/144-lieutenant-colonel-freddie-spencer-chapman-1907-1971-–-master-of-guerrilla-jungle-warfare/ , published online 2018, accessed online 12 June 2024. [9] Michael McKernan, 'Dexter, David St Alban (1917–1992)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/dexter-david-st-alban-307/text29034 , published online 2016, accessed online 12 June 2024. [10] Bernard Callinan. - Independent Company: the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941-43. – Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1953 (repr. 1989). [11] Wray. – Timor 1942. [12] Edward Willis ‘Commando Campaign Sites – East Timor -Ermera District - the unit strikes back - the “Battle” of Grade Lau’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/250-commando-campaign-sites-–-east-timor-ermera-district-the-unit-strikes-back-the-battle-of-grade-lau/ , published online 2020, accessed online 12 June 2024. [13] Senhor António Policarpe de Sousa Santos, Administrator of Fronteira Province; see also Callinan, Independent Company: 68, 83, 115. [14] See also Edward Willis ‘75 Years On - the arrival of the No. 4 Independent Company and the wreck of the Voyager - 23 September 1942’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/116-75-years-on-the-arrival-of-the-no-4-independent-company-and-the-wreck-of-the-voyager-23-september-1942/ , published online 2017, accessed online 12 June 2024. [15] Edward Willis ‘Quicras - Manufahi District - WWII In East Timor an Australian Army site and travel guide’ https://doublereds.org.au/forums/topic/346-quicras-manufahi-district-wwii-in-east-timor-an-australian-army-site-and-travel-guide/ , published online 2022, accessed online 12 June 2024. ADDITIONAL READING ‘Rolf Redmond BALDWIN - Regimental Number: VX50054’ Men of the 2/2 – VX. https://doublereds.org.au/history/men-of-the-22/vx/rolf-redmond-baldwin-r101/ , published online 2017, accessed online 12 June 2024. NAA: B883, VX50054 - BALDWIN ROLF REDMOND : Service Number - VX50054 : Date of birth - 16 Dec 1909 : Place of birth - SOUTH YARRA VIC : Place of enlistment - ROYAL PARK VIC : Next of Kin - BALDWIN JOSEPH. https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=6131176&isAv=N , published online 2003, accessed online 12 June 2024. Command and leadership 2/2nd Independent Company Timor, 1942: an interview with Captain Rolf Baldwin.(In retrospect). 83 min 20 sec. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C299666, published online 1992, accessed online 12 June 2024. Lana Capon ‘Rolf's war service’ Investigator: Geelong Historical Society No. 201, December 2015: 157-162. Michael Collins Persse ‘Rolf Redmond Baldwin (1909- 2006)’ Investigator: Geelong Historical Society No. 201, December 2015: 163-165. Rolf Baldwin (Baldy) interviewed on 30th May 2003. 98 min. Australians at War Film Archive. https://australiansatwarfilmarchive.unsw.edu.au/archive/364 , published online 2003, accessed online 12 June 2024. ‘Sparrow’ spread his seeds of knowledge far: Rolf Redmond Baldwin, teacher and soldier 16-12-1909 - 8-7- 2006’ The Age Tuesday, October 3, 2006: 10. http://libraryedition.com.au/library_edition/Print.Article.aspx?mode=image&href=AGE%2F2006%2F10%2F03&id=Ar01003 , published online 2006, accessed online 12 June 2024.

TLV has made funding submissions for (1) Magical Child Group Youth Group, Gleno, Ermera and (2) Youth as Instrument for Peace Youth Group, Fatukahi Village, Fatuberliu Administrative Post, Manufahi Municipality Timor Leste Vision Grant Proposal.doc

Manatuto 8° 44′ 16″ S, 126° 22′ 23″ E [1] Manatuto location map [2] Manatuto (see Photo No. 54 and Map No. 20) is 30 miles (48 km.) at a bearing of 840° from Dili. It is east of the North Laclo River and on the coast. Manatuto is the capital of its province and is a posto town of about 30 to 40 stone houses. The posto is on a dominating conical hill which slopes gently northwards to the beach. Most of the town is built around the foot of this slope, but also extends a short distance along the coast eastwards to another isolated ridge which runs down to the sea. The two hills and town area have a fair amount of air cover from trees. Manatuto is important in that it commands a major road junction. The main motor road runs east/west through the town, and another runs inland between the posto hill and the river to Cribas with a horse track to Laclo. The area surrounding the town and two hills is absolutely flat and is covered with paddy fields (sawa). [3] ………. 10. Manatuto—Manatoetoe on chart (126° 01'E.) - See Photo No. 54: About 3 miles (5 km.) ESE of Cape Subao (Soebang on chart), is a fairly important place and the residence of a Government official. There is anchorage in about 30 fathoms (60 m.). The bottom in the anchorage is soft mud and not good holding ground. There is no landing place except on the beach, which is steep-to, and there is a heavy swell at times. Easy to approach. It can be easily distinguished by a white church with two towers and some houses built on a hill. Anchorage is with the light structure, a white conical masonry beacon, bearing about 210°. There are many reefs eastward from this anchorage. One Portuguese ship recently lost two anchors in the coral. Manatuto was the exporting place for the surrounding district, and a coastal steamer called monthly to collect cargo. Sheep and fowls were obtainable. It was used as an anchorage by the Japanese forces and they landed troops from here in shallow draught barges in which they also conveyed M.T. [4] Manatuto (Vila de Manatuto) – 27 December 1942 [5] Manatuto – current map [6] Callinan: A similar occurrence in November resulted in the murder by natives of the Administrator and his secretary at Manatuto. It was a strange coincidence that both these administrators at Aileu and Manatuto had attempted to remain strictly neutral, even to the extent of providing food and assistance to the Japanese and attempting to restrict the movement of Australians in their areas. When these murders were followed up by that of the Chefe de Posto at Fuiloro, in the east, the Portuguese saw there was no other alternative but to come to the Australians for active protection. [7] …….. 56. Administrator’s House [Posto], Manatuto [8] Administrative Posto - 8 August 2022 The best killing field for Japanese was in the eastern end where their developmental work left them open to attack, also where the natives, under the Administrator, Senhor Pires, were in general actively hostile to them. So I arranged for Laidlaw to move Nisbet's platoon to a position just west of the Baucau-Ossu road. In this way we would have a watch along the whole of the road from Manatuto to Baucau and down to Viqueque, and it was hoped to inflict greater casualties. [9] ……… Ayris: Ray Parry’s No. 5 Section was fortunate to have made the river mouth rendezvous. About a week earlier Parry had led a two-man reconnaissance patrol to a village near the north coastal town of Manatuto, to check out forty armed pro-Japanese Chinese who were said to be in the area. They reached the village after a long trek across mountains and through steep-sided gorges, only to find it ominously quiet. The Australians were creeping up on an administration building when they were confronted by about forty Chinese-Japanese, all carrying weapons. It was a tense moment which was relieved only when the two Australians turned about and returned to their section. [10] Cleary: Baucau, the second largest centre on the island, came in for special treatment, as did Manatuto, the coastal centre between Dili and Baucau. Manatuto was first bombed on 16 October when three Hudson bombers from 13 Squadron hit the town because their original target, Dili, was obscured by cloud. After dropping two 250-pound bombs and more than 30 incendiaries over the town the main buildings were seen to be ‘burning fiercely’. [11] …….. Two days later [19 November 1942?], a second mission flown by 31 Squadron had better luck when two Beaufighters strafed Japanese barracks and Timorese huts in a coordinated attack on the northern centres of Manatuto, Laleia, Vemasse, and Point Bigono, while another two strafed Baucau, Laga, and Point Lavai. All four returned safely. [12] 54. Manatuto = looking northeast (21/8/42 [13] Harry Wray: The town with the pro-Jap Comandante was Manatuto, and it was to this town that the burned R.A.A.F. officer was taken and removed from there by our Sapper Corporal. Manatuto was a seaport on the north of the country, which is the same side of the island as Dili, and to the east of Dili. An excellent motor road ran along the coast to Manatuto and in consequence it was a favourite Jap resort. They frequently made trips out from Dili, and in the later stages sent troops mounted on bikes for a jaunt out there. A party of our men from the Company, which relieved us had a most successful ambush on this road and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japs travelling along the road on bikes. One of the Aussies said that the Japs seemed unable to locate them and amused themselves firing back along the road in the direction from which they had come, while the Aussies were actually in front of them. Our troops were able to withdraw in comfort while the Japs fought imaginary assailants in their rear. This road was a favourite hunting ground for the men from The Bull’s Platoon who were in the area most of the time, and they made things lively for Jap passers-by. Manatuto was a favourite target for our bombers, not that there was much there to bomb apart from a small fleet of native fishing boats, but I suppose it was bombed from time to time in the hopes of catching the Japs there as it was such a favourite resort of theirs. I have mentioned the ‘queer blokes’, the two ex-Malayan police officers who trained natives in the eastern end of the island. One of them hid in the roof of a house in Manatuto and overheard the conversation of some Jap officers in the room below him. He gained some useful information I believe, as he was a Jap linguist of some ability. He escaped from the town without the Comandante or the Japs being any the wiser. As already mentioned the Comandante had always been pro-Jap and was on most friendly terms with them. This happy state continued until about the time we were in Mindelo district, say October/November 1942. One day a large party of Japs and numbers of their native followers went to Manatuto. They left during the afternoon and camped a short distance from the town. Our H.Q. was given information that the Japs were in Manatuto and sent a message to Australia with the news. Over came the bombers and gave the town a good doing over while the Japs watched from a safe distance. The moment the bombers went we assume the Japs must have said to themselves that it could be coincidence, and that the Comandante must be friendly to the Australians and have tipped them off to send the bombers. Whatever they thought they sent a party of their native adherents back and they chopped the Comandante into pieces in their own inimitable style. We were pleased to hear that our enemy the Comandante was no more but regretted that the Japs had left the town before the bombs fell. [14] …….. Back to Manatuto – now and again the Japs would take a trip inland from Manatuto to Ossu as the road from Manatuto was good for cars or bicycles. The ‘queer blokes’ heard that the Japs were on one of these jaunts to Ossu one night took a small army of the local natives they had trained to the town where the Japs were camped quite unsuspecting that any enemies were in the neighbourhood, and let their natives armed with Sten guns loose on the sleeping Japs. The natives had a thoroughly enjoyable night and caused considerable casualties we hoped among the confused and unprepared Japs. [15] Aerial Photo - Manatuto Village [16] REPORT ON JAP VISIT TO MANATUTO By T.C. Nisbet, Lieut. At Fatu Makeric, 12 September 1942 The information contained in this report although coming from Porto sources must be considered as near correct because all the reliable sources told the same story. Approx. 200 Japs went to MANATUTO in six launches or small boats on the morning of the 1st September. They disembarked at about 0300 hrs and encircled the town. At daybreak they commenced an intensive search hoping to find the aviator (F.O. Wadey, RAAF) as they are supposed to have persistently demanded to be shown his whereabouts. When they could not locate him they went to the Administrator’s House and demanded that he be brought to them. The Administrator at the tome was absent (Timor Revolt) and the Japs were interviewed by the Secretary who told them that without a direct order from the Government he couldn’t have the aviator brought to MANATUTO. The Japs then asked to be put on the phone to speak to the Porto Doctor at CALICAI telling him that unless the airman was [produced] they would go to CALICAI and destroy the hospital with their big guns – the Doctor refused replying that were plenty of mountains behind CALICAI. The Japs had a meal in the Administrator’s House and also carried out mortar practice. Corporal Loud reports seeing wheel marks which he states to have been made by a field piece of some sort. The Japs returned to Dili by boat leaving MANATUTO at approximately 1600 hrs on 1st September. There was no indication in any of the reports that the Japs took supplies of rice or tinned foodstuffs back with them. The Jap air force was represented by one fighter which was noticed stunting over MANATUTO in the morning and also in the afternoon. My conclusion is that the Jap did hope to nab the airman as his movement in this case is most unlike his methods against us (NB) and he had no reason to visit MANATUTO for food as the Administration in that province is most helpful towards the ENEMY in this respect as is born out by the behaviour of the troops while there. T.C. Nisbet 1700 hrs (NB) Six launches I consider hardly strong enough to indicate an attempt to ‘take’ the place against opposition. [17] Mitchell Bomber A47-3 Brought Down Over Manatuto “The following day, 22 September, four Mitchells were dispatched on a shipping sweep along the north coast of Timor. During a strafing attack on a barge in the harbour at Manatuto, which was narrow with steep banks on both sides, Flying Officer Allen Slater's aircraft (A47-3) crashed into the sea from 500 feet, about 400 metres from shore. All on board were killed. It was thought the enemy machine-gun emplacements were responsible, but A47-3 had been fouled by wires stretching between the headlands. Jim Henderson explained: ‘Our strategy was to dive in low and bomb the ships but the Japanese had anticipated this and strung wire ropes from bank to bank. The first B-25 hit the wire ropes and dived into the sea out of control. I was fortunate in that my turn to attack did not come until next day and 20 we were told to bomb from 6,000 feet’”. [18] Crew List Mitchell Bomber A47-3 – All Killed in Action [19] NAME AND RANK SERVICE NUMBER ROLE Flying Officer Allen Wallace Slater 414849 Captain Flying Officer Murray Scott Millett 426641 Navigator Flying Officer John Francis Daggett 434341 Gunnery Officer Flying Officer Bernard Alwin Wisniewski 423966 Gunnery Leader Officer Flight Sergeant Keith Rutherford Philipson 429669 2nd Pilot Flight Sergeant Desmond Frederick Harberger 435448 Air gunner All crew members are listed at the Adelaide River War Cemetery on the Northern Territory Memorial. Slater, Wisniewski and Millett on panel 7. Daggett on panel 6. Philips on panel 9. Harberger on panel 10. References [1] ASPT: 83. [2] Adapted from ASPT: Map 1. [3] ASPT: 31. [4] ASPT: 11. [5] ASPT: Map 20. [6] Adapted from MapCarta map – 20 January 2024. [7] Callinan, Independent Company: 173. [8] ASPT: Photo 56. [9] Callinan, Independent Company: 189-190. [10] Ayris, All the Bull’s men: 374. [11] Cleary, The men who came out of the ground: 248. //AWM64, 13 Squadron// [12] Cleary: The men who came out of the ground: 250. //AWM64 ORMF 0118, 31 Squadron// [13] ASPT: Photo 54. [14] Harry Wray memoir: 229-230. [15] Harry Wray memoir: 231. [16] Lambert, Commando, from Tidal River to Tarakan: 90. [17] National Archives of Australia: NAA: AWM52, 25/3/2/4 [War diary] October 1941 – October 1942. [18] Bennett, Highest traditions: 219-220. [19] MILLETT, Murray Scott - (Flying Officer); Service Number - 426641; File type - Casualty - Repatriation; Aircraft - Mitchell A47-3; Place - Timor Coast; Date - 22 September 1944. - NAA: A705, 166/27/572. [Digitised]

Kevin Stanley Curran (10 December 1920 – 20 April 1978) - VX47342 I was attracted to the story of Kevin Curran by a former friend (since passed away) who grew up in post WWII Melbourne and one of whose favourite memories was watching Kevin Curran play for Hawthorn. My friend knew about Curran’s wartime heroics because they were well publicised in the press; and he thought that the way Curran played football epitomised his fighting spirit. This narration of Kevin Curran’s life has been prepared from material in the public domain – newspaper reports (some quoting his own words), articles and correspondence from the 2/2 Commando Association’s Courierand books on the Timor campaign that describe Curran’s activities and actions. Gordon and Kevin Curran Pte. Curran, Gordon Thomas VX47360 11 Platoon, B Company, 2/40 Infantry Battalion KIA Baboe 21/2/42 (DVA lists 22/2/42). Cpl. Curran, Kevin Stanley VX47342 No.2 Section, A Platoon, 2/2 Independent Company. [1] EARLY YEARS Kevin Curran played just 85 games for Hawthorn, but his story from recruitment to captaincy was so remarkable and full of incident it could be mistaken for a movie script. Curran was just a raw 18-year-old playing for Traralgon when chairman of selectors and former great Albert Hyde visited to see another player called Jones. He wasn’t impressed with Jones, but definitely was with Curran, and asked him to join Hawthorn on the spot. Kevin was less than enthusiastic. He was happy on his farm hunting rabbits and foxes, and it was only after his local team had a bye and getting permission from his father he travelled to the big smoke to join the ‘Mayblooms’ as Hawthorn were then popularly known. Hyde asked the selectors to give Curran plenty of time in the reserves to acclimatise to league football, but his performances were so good he was eventually promoted for the Round 7 match against Fitzroy at Brunswick Street. However, the vice-president at Hawthorn, Jim McGuire, was unhappy, as the player Curran had replaced was one of his employees. Amazingly, McGuire took out his anger on Curran – abusing one of his own players, an 18-year-old making his VFL debut no less, before the ball was even bounced. Not surprisingly, Curran was overawed and struggled. Hyde quit the selection committee in disgust the following week, and Curran, possibly disillusioned with the treatment, enlisted in the army. ENLISTED IN THE ARMY Kevin and his brother Gordon enlisted on the same day, 23rd July 1940. After being assigned to the same training battalion, they went their separate ways in March 1941 with Kevin, by then an Acting Corporal, volunteering to be tested for a special assignment at the 7th Infantry Training Centre, Foster on Wilson’s Promontory and Gordon being transferred to the 2/40 Battalion. Kevin proved his worth in the commando training cadre at Foster and was taken on the strength of the 2nd Independent Company on 14th July 1941 becoming a member of No. 2 Section of A Platoon. The brothers were temporarily reunited in Darwin on 8th December 1941 when their two units embarked on the troop ship Zealandia for transport to Koepang in Dutch West Timor as part of the ignominiously named Sparrow Force. They separated again a few days later when the 2nd Independent Company departed by sea to occupy Dili in Portuguese East Timor. PREPARATIONS TO DEFEND THE DILI AIRFIELD Curran’s Section under the command of Lieutenant Gerry McKenzie was assigned to the defense of the Dili airfield: “As the Australians grew more comfortable with their surroundings, they soon joked and skylarked their way through local settlements along the hills. They were making an effort to learn the local languages, which was avoided by the Portuguese. Corporal Kevin Curran employed a novel technique for breaking the ice with the locals. Pulling back his ears with both hands, Curran's false teeth would emerge from his mouth and then drop into his hands. The villagers would yell and laugh and come from all around to see Curran's magic”. [2] Doig gave a good description of the defensive preparations at the airfield and Curran’s role in preparing them: “… McKenzie returned to the drome and set about constructing his own defences. A Bren strong post forward, reached by a tunnel from the deep storm drain, camouflaged by ‘sling nets’ off the grounded Japanese Nanyei Maru freighter. A Bren post held back on the rough apex where diagonal runways met, to cover our demolition post and signal pit and give depth and also flank protection to our forward post. Sub-section weapon slits supporting the Brens, the whole system linked by crawl trenches, controlled from a deep command post, centrally sited. The whole earthworks being revetted by the large quantity of hewn foot square 40 ft. lengths of hardwood (the Portuguese had conveniently brought there to build a modern hangar) and which was ‘taboo’ thereby making it a sheer delight to the hefty Curran and crafty Delbridge and their subsections to axe into suitable sizes with competitive glee. Having thrilled the adjutant with their ‘fire power’ and convinced him of their marksmanship, No. 2 Section was given a 40 deg. arc of responsibility on the drome perimeter and permitted to cut fields of fire. This turned into ‘wails of misfire’ when shortly it was discovered that a considerable acreage of ‘valuable palms’ were swiftly felled and placed to roof over pits and posts, now bending under the weight of sand and bristling with cactus and carefully transplanted clumps of tussock, kunai grass and the like, for camouflage”. [3] THE JAPANESE ATTACK Wray provides an excellent account of the defence and demolition of the airfield on the night of the 19th February 1942 and Curran’s key role in what happened: “At the aerodrome McKenzie was not satisfied with Van Straaten's contention that the shelling was coming from a Japanese submarine and that it was only part of a minor raid. From his position McKenzie could see a destroyer in the harbour and the silhouette of a tramp steamer standing off shore opposite the aerodrome. The rattle of chains as the ships unloaded could be heard clearly across the harbour. He again telephoned Dutch Headquarters, but Van Straaten insisted that the shelling was coming from a submarine and that, at most, the Japanese would land a raiding party to attack the aerodrome, then withdraw. Still not satisfied, and preferring to believe the evidence of his own eyes and ears, McKenzie sent out a further patrol under Corporal Kevin Curran (subsequently captain of Hawthorn Football Club in Victoria) to check for enemy movements between the aerodrome and the Comoro River. The patrol made its way across the Comoro River through a darkened, white- walled Arab village and onto the main Dili road. The men waited until 2 a.m. and as all seemed quiet they returned to the aerodrome. … Back at the aerodrome McKenzie sent Corporal Curran out to check all positions and ensure that his troops were ready for action. In the dark it took Curran about an hour to make the circuit of the defensive positions, ever watchful for Japanese infiltrators, and to satisfy himself that all was well. McKenzie's section - a small number of men in fixed positions faced by a well-equipped, numerically superior foe - was in a difficult position. Once the sun rose the Japanese would be able to blast the defenders out with mortar and machine-gun fire. However, McKenzie had his orders. The aerodrome was to be held as long as possible. If McKenzie's small force had to withdraw, the aerodrome must be destroyed. … There were constant skirmishes as the Japanese probed the Australian defences looking for weaknesses. Then fighting flared near the main defensive positions around the hangars. At one stage Corporal Curran and the remaining members of his subsection were cut off from the rest of the Australians by the Japanese attack but they fought their way back at bayonet point, Curran killing five Japanese, including an officer. With concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire the Australians fought off parties of Japanese attackers repeatedly, but shortly before dawn McKenzie decided that he could hold the aerodrome no longer. The Japanese were pushing down on the defenders, the Dutch reinforcements had not arrived and with the coming of daylight the Japanese would overwhelm the Australians who would be trapped within a small defensive perimeter. The small force was cut off from the Dutch force and from Independent Company Headquarters and could get no orders from above. In view of these insurmountable difficulties McKenzie decided to blow up the runways, demolish the stores and withdraw his troops by fire and movement through the craters, which would be left by the demolition. … To cover the withdrawal, McKenzie arranged a dawn diversion using privates Poynton and Thomas, armed with tommy-guns, and privates Hudson and Hasson, who had rifles. Corporal Curran was to lead the demolition party. At this time Curran's subsection was in action using grenades against Japanese parties attempting to force their way into the Australian positions along a large drain near the hangars. Just before dawn Hasson was forced from his position. The other three members of the covering group counter-attacked, their intense machine-gun fire creating havoc among the streams of Japanese trying to force their way across a plank over the drain by the hangar. Under cover of this counter-attack the sappers fired the demolition charges. They had arranged several different means of detonation, so despite the Japanese attempts to cut the wires the charges all went off. As the aerodrome exploded in clouds of dust and smoke the Japanese machine-gun fire reached a crescendo. Despite the concentrated fire most of the Australians managed to take advantage of the confusion to escape into the half-light. … In the final withdrawal it was every man for himself, and the section split up, men making their way individually or in small groups through the Japanese fire, moving from crater to crater across the aerodrome. The main body reformed at a pre- arranged rendezvous point in a recently abandoned Dutch artillery position some distance from the aerodrome. Lieutenant McKenzie, accompanied by Private Hooper, set off for Dili in an attempt to join up with Captain Callinan, while Corporal Curran, believing correctly that news of the Japanese landing was not known to Company Headquarters, set off with his remaining subsection and the sappers for the camp at Three Spurs. … After leaving the aerodrome early on 20 February Corporal Curran, sappers R.S. Richards and R. Williamson had gone only about a kilometre when they almost walked into a Japanese unit headquarters. They went to ground and had to lie all day under the blazing tropical sun, without water and only metres from the Japanese. After nightfall they continued their trek, … By day they had to keep under cover, hiding from low-flying Japanese planes, and by night move on as best as they could. They finally arrived at Three Spurs on 27 February to find preparations for the abandonment of the position under way”. [4] GORDON CURRAN KILLED IN ACTION In an amazing parallel to Kevin’s exploits in Dili, his brother Gordon performed similar heroics in the Australian defence of Koepang a couple of days later, but tragically did not survive. “A number of veterans retell the story of the action of G.T. Curran, who was killed by a sniper as he single-handedly wiped out two enemy machine-gun posts by deliberately walking straight into their line of fire”. [5] Gordon service record shows that he was originally posted as missing then as a Prisoner of War (POW). It was not until the end of the war that released POWs from the 2/40 revealed his fate and his wife and parents were notified. “Private Gordon Curran, a soldier from Traralgon, who had been posted missing in Timor for a lengthy period, has now been officially declared killed in action. He is a son of Mr. and Mrs. Jack Curran of Argyle Street, Traralgon. A sister, Mrs. J. Turnbull, resides in Morwell. The young soldier was a smart footballer prior to joining the services, and was employed at the Traralgon Gasworks. A young wife and son are the chief bereaved”. [6] SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN TIMOR Kevin Curran made significant contributions later in the Timor campaign as Wray records: “Any advance of the Japanese force from Dutch Timor - the more immediate of the two threats - would doubtless be through Memo and Maliana and from there to Cailaco, Marobo or Bobonaro. Dexter had to ensure that each possibility was covered: 1 Section, under Corporal Doug Fullarton at Cailaco, was to watch the approaches to the craggy fortress; 2 Section, under Corporal Kevin Curran at Maliana, was to keep contact with the enemy; and 3 Section, under Lieutenant Clarrie Turner, was to watch the Bobonaro track. Dexter and Curran had reconnoitred beyond Memo to the border on 8 August when arrangements were made with the Dutch about the appropriate action to take in the event of an enemy advance. On 11 August Curran made contact with about 400 Japanese soldiers crossing the Malibaku River to Memo. Next day he opposed their move to Maliana before withdrawing to Lone Tree Saddle where Dexter's ambush delayed the enemy later that night. The Japanese turned towards Bobonaro with 3 Section on their flank. Laden with command of the Dutch, Dexter led his charges through a mountain pass; they were on their way quickly and took no further part in proceedings”. [7] PROMOTED IN THE FIELD AND DECORATED The Australian force was re-organised in November: “In November Callinan took over the command of the force from Spence, with the ever-reliable Baldwin as his second-in- command. For reasons of military security the name of the force was changed on 18 November 1942 from Sparrow Force to Lancer Force. Laidlaw was promoted to major and appointed Commanding Officer of the 2/2 with Turton, now promoted to captain, as his second-in-command. At the same time Dexter, Nisbet and McKenzie were also promoted to the rank of captain - Dexter leading A Platoon, Nisbet assuming command of B Platoon and McKenzie taking over C Platoon from Boyland. … After Captain McKenzie was detached from 2 Section to his new role, and Lieutenant Turner of 3 Section retired sick, corporals Fullarton (1 Section), Curran (2 Section) and Palmer (3 Section) took over the sections and commanded them during the final months of frequent fighting. In B Platoon Sergeant M. Morgan was posted to higher duties. Largely as a result of their actions during the Timor campaign Smyth, Denman, Fullarton, Curran and Palmer all received commissions [as lieutenants]”. [8] On his return to Australia, Kevin Curran was awarded a Mention in Despatches for “Exceptional services in the S.W.P. [South West Pacific] Area”; it could reasonably considered that he deserved more. [9] BACK IN AUSTRALIA After being evacuated from Timor in mid-December 1942, the 2nd Independent Company were in a period of hiatus before being given a new assignment. Men of the 2/2nd A Troop are pictured at Larrimah after their return from Timor – Kevin Curran in the centre of the front row [10] Eric Smyth says that one ‘irregularity’ which appeared to stick in the Army’s craw was that some 2/2nd men had received field commissions in Timor without going through an officers’ training school. Smyth, who was one of them, said when word went out that they would be required to do the course at Canungra, there were serious rumblings of discontent. However the Army insisted – no course, no commission. The first to be called in was Kevin Curran, a Victorian footballer who weighed a hundred kilograms and who was a good fighter, to boot. Eric Smyth: “He was a clumsy sort of bloke but he had very good reactions. A staff sergeant was teaching him how to use a bayonet, which was rather ironic given that Kevin had used one in the fight for Dili Airfield. The staff sergeant made the mistake of telling him that as far as the bayonet was concerned, he was too clumsy to be any good. This must have been too much for Kevin to swallow because he dropped the staff sergeant on the spot. He was placed on a charge and they sent him back to the unit while it was decided what to do with him”. [11] DOIG’S ‘STRAIGHT MAN’ The 2/2 spent some time in Canungra re-training. Doig did his best to lighten proceedings using Curran as his straight man: “As a training centre Canungra was a thorough heap of bastardry, peopled by a bundle of diced officers from the Middle East campaigns. Food was poor, and generally living conditions damnable. It seemed that they were trying to approximate the conditions of the Kokoda Trail. The Company was divided into three Cadres, namely Officers, N.C.O. 's and O.R's. We officers were being instructed by a professional Captain who had been to Duntroon, but with no overseas service. I'm afraid we were inclined to treat him as some sort of joke. The weather was warmish and to sit down in the shade of a tree after a lunch listening to boring lectures by a bloke who wouldn't know shit from honey, was sleep inducing. One afternoon, Lt. Kevin Curran, who was a terrific reactor to a good joke was playing with a piece of stick, and I said, ‘I'll tell you a yarn on that stick. It went like this. A bloke was boasting in the bar that blindfolded he could tell any piece of timber just by its smell. Bets were made and the blindfolded chap was tried out on different pieces of wood, which he accurately identified. Then the barmaid took over, got a used match, wiped it on her private parts, and handed it over for identification. This chap took about three deep sniffs and said, 'I'm absolutely sure it's either pussy willow or a splinter off the outhouse seat’. Kevin went into his usual paroxysm of laughter with tears streaming down his cheeks. The instructor wanted to know what was going on. Nobody said a thing and he stalked away mumbling under this breath about uncouth animals. We never saw him again”. [12] ANOTHER CLOSE CALL IN NEW GUINEA The 2/2nd then campaigned in New Guinea; Doig described a particular incident in which Curran again paid a lead role: “Another' patrol to go out on New Year's Day was the Transport Section under Lt. Kev Curran, This was the longest patrol, to Japa and beyond. It took two canoe loads to cross the river (Lt. Curran couldn't swim and after donning a couple of Mae West lifejackets his instructions to the canoe gang which included three top grade swimmers was to save him first and bugger the weapons). They safely made it over the river and headed in the direction of Topopo on the way to Japa. They reached Topopo on January 3rd and onto Japa the next day, returning to Topopo on the 5th January. On the night of 5th-6th January the Japs returned to Topopo, perhaps led by natives who had been seen in the area and the Australians were stranded on a knoll in Topopo commanding all the approaches. At dawn when the patrol was about to stand to the Japs opened with heavy fire from rifles and machine guns at about ten yards; as usual their shooting did not measure up to their fieldcraft and all the encircled men made their escape by doing a back flip over the side of the ridge through the Japs and into the surrounding jungle where several fired on the enemy from vantage points. Sgt. Cash who was in charge of the natives on a knoll further back fired his Bren gun into the Japs and got many. The Australians then rendezvoused at Damaru, except for five who were missing for some days. The Jap had achieved complete surprise and had superior fire power but had wounded one man and slightly wounded four others. The patrol later reported that the distance they had to travel to Japa plus the fact that they had to use the same track on the return journey had enabled the Kanakas to inform the enemy of their movements”. [13] Ramu River, Faita Area, New Guinea. 1944-01-07. Corporal K.J. Monk Of Gippsland, Vic (1) And VX47342 Lieutenant K. S. Curran Of Glenferrie, Vic (2) Of The 2/2nd Commando Squadron being ferried back to camp by natives in their dugout canoe after an eight day patrol into Japanese territory towards Bogadjim. [14] Curran told what happened in his own words: “The Jap whistle was the signal and then all hell broke loose. The Nips used grenades – there seemed to be hundreds of them – a woodpecker [medium machine gun], machine guns, rifles and sub-machine guns. Our men jumped up half-dressed and hurled grenades. There were squeals from the Japs. The natives who had spoken to our boys kept calling ‘White fella him come over this place’. It was just as well our boys did not get at them. We have no idea of the Jap casualties, but from the fire we sent out in those wild few minutes they must have been heavy.” In circumstances much the same as what occurred after Dili aerodrome fire fight: “… Lieutenant Curran lay in a hole within earshot of the Japs for more than eight hours. The rest of the men had dispersed”. [15] Curran’s service record states that he was ‘Wounded, remained on duty’ in this incident. Lamarien, Henry Reid Bay, New Britain, 28 July 1945. A group of officers of 2/2 Commando Squadron. Kevin Curran can’t be missed in the centre of the back row [16] WARTIME FOOTBALL IN NEW GUINEA In quieter times towards the end of the war, football became a prime leisure time activity: “The Unit got together a very good looking Aussie Rules footy side under Lt. Kevin Curran who was a Vic. League player with Hawthorn. They thumped most of the units in our area very comfortably. The news of our successes spread to Wau and we got a challenge from 7th Inf. Bn. to play them on the Wau strip. Their sports officer's first remark was how much did we want to back ourselves for. Kevin Curran made a few enquiries and found out that this 7th Bn. mob were hot stuff and had trounced nearly every unit while in Australia. Their coach was their C.O. who was an ex V.F.L. player and his team had been all allocated good jobs such as batman, drivers etc. so they were always in a position to train together and fed well. They had never had malaria whereas half our mob was still suffering the effects of this debilitating disease. We smartly cried off any punting. It's just as well we did. When we played they ate us without salt. I counted their side a dozen times to see that they didn't have at least twenty men playing, they seemed to have so many loose men all over the field”. [17] CURRAN RETURNS TO PLAY WITH HAWTHORN After joining Hawthorn from Traralgon in 1940, Kevin Curran managed just one senior game before embarking on five years of military service, much of it abroad. When he resumed in the VFL in 1946, by this time aged 26, he immediately impressed as a follower who combined an almost recklessly rugged approach with considerable skill; he became known as the ‘foundation stone’ of the Hawthorn team. [18] In 1946 he made a return to Hawthorn and the following season represented Victoria at the Hobart Carnival, the first on 9 interstate appearances during his career. He won Hawthorn's best and fairest award in 1948, also winning the Simpson Medal for his performance against West Australian in an interstate game. Curran captained Hawthorn for the 1950 season and his appointment saw a disgruntled Alec Albiston leave the club feeling he should have got the job. When he retired at the end of the following year he had played a total of 85 VFL games and booted nine goals. 1946 Keith Shea returned to coach the Hawks again in 1946, but this time in a non-playing role as Jim Bohan was formally appointed captain. Confidence was also boosted by the return of Col Austen, Kevin Curran and Wally Culpitt with the end of World War II. … The season ended with another loss to Fitzroy in front of just 6,000 at Glenferrie Oval, and another wooden spoon, the 7th since Hawthorn had entered the league in 1925. The new recruits struggled and not one of the 14 players to debut would go on to play more than 50 games. Jim Bohan and Jack McLeod played well enough to represent the Big V, and Kevin Curran won the most determined player award, but it was a bitterly disappointing season that saw Shea sacked at season's end. Hawthorn Football Club – season 1946 – Kevin Curran is in the middle of the back row [19] 1947 1947 was another lack lustre year for Hawthorn and they again just avoided the ‘wooden spoon’. Curran played well enough to retain his spot in the Victorian team that won the mid-season interstate carnival in Hobart. Kevin’s predilection for a beer or two after the match was recalled many years later by Geelong legend Fred Flanagan: “At one carnival - I think it was 1947 in Hobart - a Hawthorn player named Kevin Curran got stuck between his door and the wall one night after a few too many. I was rooming with Leo Turner in the next room and Curran's roommate, Wally Culpitt, woke us up with his yelling. It was quite unusual. But he was a terrific bloke, Curran, and a commando in the war”. [20] Victoria’s team for the 1947 Hobart Carnival – Kevin Curran is in the back row as usual [21] 1948 The Hawks began 1948 full of hope and confidence, but with a list short on height and big bodies. Alec Albiston knew he would be forced to use players out of position and hope that teamwork would get his side through. … War hero Kevin Curran was superb, winning the club champion award as well as the Simpson Medal as best player for Victoria against the Sandgropers. Wally Culpitt was also selected for the state game, whilst mates and leaders Col Austen and Albiston finished 2nd and 3rd in the best and fairest. [22] Doig recalled Curran’s visit to Perth with the Victorian football team: “Perhaps one of the most outstanding early social events was, the visit of Kevin Curran to W.A. in 1948 with the Victorian State Football team. Big Curran was one of the younger members' of the team, which included oldsters like Jack Graham and Jack Dyer (Capt. Blood). Kevin reckoned the fitness level was much below average and most of them had to use the lifts in the old Shaftesbury Hotel where they were housed, as the stairs were beyond them. A special evening was arranged by the Association for him to meet as many of the boys as possible. It was held on the Tuesday evening after the second game between the Vics and W.A. Kevin had won the Simpson Medal for fairest and best player of the Saturday match but was injured in the Tuesday game when he had a confrontation with a goal post. The turnout was nothing short of amazing with over sixty present, as well as many members of the Press”. Left to right: Jack Denman, Tom Nesbit, Jack Carey, Bruce Dooland, Kevin Curran, Joe Poynton, Colin Doig “We also welcomed Bruce Dooland who was playing for South Australia in the baseball carnival at the same time. Tom Nisbet was an outstanding member of the W.A. side also. To add a further dimension to our sporting prowess Jack Carey had been selected in the W.A. Amateur Football side, which was playing in an Australia-wide carnival. What a line up for our Unit Association! A lot of the Victorian players accompanied Kevin to this night out which was well catered for in the way of eats and beer. Kevin was like a king holding court with his courtiers. The boys made a big fuss of him and he lapped it up. Probably the best part of Kevin's visit was the night he arrived at Perth Airport when a lot of the boys were there to welcome him, whisked him away and headed for an old haunt of ours on the Esplanade foreshore. Battles were fought and football matches replayed until the early hours of the morning when we poured him into bed at the hotel. The vigorous night out did not seem to affect the big man's footy ability next day as he was kicking the ball about 60-70 yards every boot”. [23] 1949 Hawthorn entered 1949 with Alec Albiston at the helm as captain-coach for the third year in succession. … Hawthorn was thumped by Geelong by over 14 goals the following week, and then trailed the lowly Saints by 39 points at half time. Albiston finally lost it, telling the players to hand in their jumpers unless they started performing. He also read out a telegram from champ Kevin Curran, who was in hospital with a broken jaw. Inspired, the Hawks rallied for a sensational 8 point victory, kicking 10 goals to 3 in the second half. … Lack of forward options was killing the Hawks - they failed to kick above 100 points all season, and on seven occasions didn't even get above 50. However, individuals such as Albiston, Col Austen and Curran continued to shine. All were selected in Victoria's 87 point win over Western Australia, in which Coleman kicked 7 goals. [24] 1950 A change of jumper, a change of coach, a former captain and the best player quitting the club, threats of player strikes, supporter outrage and not a single victory. 1950 is remembered by Hawthorn supporters for all the wrong reasons. At the end of 1949 Alec Albiston was told he would not be coaching the club the following year, but was still very much required as a player. This was fine with Albiston, and the board, led by new president David Prentice, eventually settled on Bob McCaskill as a replacement. McCaskill had played for the Tigers in the 1920's, and after a successful spell with Sandhurst in the Bendigo League had managed to coach North Melbourne to the finals for the first time. McCaskill immediately set about changing the club, starting with the jumper. The guernsey was changed from brown with a gold V to brown and gold stripes to make the players look more physically imposing. McCaskill also said in an interview he believed the Hawks could make the four, and the club had a 'splendid leader in Alec Albiston'. Certainly on reading that last quote it would seem pretty clear Albiston was considered the leader and captain for 1950. Indeed, Albiston swore he was promised this role by the board when he was told his services as coach were no longer required. Despite several tempting offers to captain-coach in the country, he ignored his good mate Col Austen's advice and decided to stay at Glenferrie. Albiston missed the early practice matches due to cricket commitments, and in that time McCaskill was greatly impressed by the tough play of Kevin Curran. A former war hero, Curran was a big man who threw his body around, a very different style of play to the fast roving of Albiston who loved a goal so much he was nicknamed ‘Hungry’. The new coach believed Hawthorn needed a more imposing figure as captain, and so it was announced on April 11 that Kevin Curran had been appointed captain by unanimous vote of the selection committee. To say the manure hit the fan would be the understatement of the century. Albiston and Austen immediately asked for clearances, Alec coming out the following day and slamming the selection committee in the press, calling it 'one of the dirtiest things I have ever had put over me'. Players threatened to strike in support of Albiston, and many supporters called for the board to resign. The selection committee issued a statement saying Albiston and made a mistake and no promise had been made. Hawthorn, a club that had maintained a low profile since it joined the VFL, was suddenly all over the papers. Albiston and Austen turned up to the final practice match on April 15 and were told they were no longer required. McCaskill had said his position was untenable with his players making statements in the press, and either they went or he went. That night there was the sad sight of Austen and Albiston standing outside Glenferrie Oval in tears. Two of the club's greatest players who genuinely loved the club had been told they weren't wanted - a tragic series of events. Just whether Albiston was ever offered the captaincy is still a matter of debate. Indeed, some people put his demotion down to religion. Albiston's father Walter had founded the Victorian Protestant Federation in 1918, whilst Curran and McCaskill were Catholic. The allegations have never been proven, although sectarian difference did exist within the club at the time. Albiston and Austen were cleared to North Melbourne and Richmond respectively, and all of a sudden the club was without its two best players just a week before the season started. Given its reliance on so few already, the team was always going to struggle. The club lost its opening three games by a combined margin of 258 points and only 7.25 from Collingwood in Round 4 prevented another caning. The side was nothing short of pathetic, getting smashed every week and suffering real embarrassment when The Argus suggested other clubs give Hawthorn financial assistance. New captain Curran was already on the sidelines, suspended for four weeks for attempting to kick Tom Miller of Footscray. “New captain disqualified MELBOURNE, Wed: Kevin Curran, Hawthorn’s newly appointed captain and interstate follower, was disqualified for four matches last night by the Victorian League tribunal. Curran was found guilty of misconduct in attempting to kick Footscray ruckman Tom Miller during the final quarter of the Footscray Hawthorn match on Saturday. … Before the charge against him was sustained, Curran said in a statement to the tribunal: ‘I would rather get out of the game then be found guilty of kicking anyone’”. [25] His former 2/2nd comrades sprang to his defence against this charge: “Former W.A. commandos up in arms Former W.A. members of the famous 2/2nd Australian Commando Squadron are up in arms again. This time they are fighting a verbal battle - in defence for of a former officer of the unit, interstate footballer Kevin Curran. Curran now captain at Melbourne League football club Hawthorn was recently outed for two months [sic] for kicking an opponent. Instantly, Curran’s Army comrades in all states took up the cudgels on his behalf. One of the most outspoken was Western Australian Archie Campbell - a fellow officer of Curran’s – who is currently living in Melbourne. Campbell who roved road for West Perth during seasons 1933 to 1940 said that he had played in many Army games with Curran over several years and had never seen him do anything unsporting. He described it as ‘unbelievable that such a scrupulously fair player as Curran would deliberately kick an opponent. Campbell’s sentiments echoed in Perth today by another squadron officer, Colin Doig. Other W.A. members of unit have written letters of protest on Kev Curran’s disqualification”. [26] His first game back was against Austen's new side Richmond. Austen had expressed doubts about Curran's tactical ability in the lead-up to the game, and Curran decided to take matters into his own hands. Kevin lined Austen up from 40 metres away and flattened him after kicking the footy away, resulting in another 4 week suspension. Although contact was apparently minor, Curran probably didn't help his chances by stating ‘If I was going to do something, I would pick a place - not in the open’”. [27] The Age report of the tribunal hearing where Curran was suspended makes interesting reading: “Curran Suspended for Four Matches The V.F.L. Tribunal suspended hawthorn captain, Kevin Curran, for four matches last night for charging Richmond back man, Col Austen, in Saturday's Hawthorn Richmond game. … After the Tribunal has announced its decision on Curran, Austen, who played with Hawthorn last year, shook hands with him and said, ‘Bad luck, Kev'. During the hearing Austen said he had been good friends with Curran while at Hawthorn, and there was no reason why they should not be good friends now. Curran refused to comment on the disqualification. The game on Saturday was Curran’s first after a four weeks term of suspension attempting to kick Tom Miller (Footscray) on May 6. Last Saturday he was reported by field umpire Hogan and boundary umpires Cranch and Lee for charging Austen in the centre of the ground after Austen had disposed of the ball in the last quarter. Announcing the tribunal’s decision, the Chairman (Mr T. Hammond) said Curran had ample opportunity to slow down before colliding with the Richmond player. Field umpire Hogan said Austen had kicked the ball from the centre of the ground and taken for five paces when Curran ran in and bumped him to the ground. He said Curran could have stopped colliding with Austen. He was about seven or eight yards away when the ball was kicked. Hogan said he himself was about 15 yards away when the incident occurred. ‘Other players converged on the spot and I ran in between them’, he said. ‘I had not the slightest doubt what had happened’. Boundary umpire Cranch said after Austen kicked the ball Curran kept on running at him and crashed him down. Boundary by Lee said Curran had deliberately charged Austin from about 10 yards away. Austen said the only thing he could remember about incident was kicking the ball and then getting bumped from the side and going down. He was slowing down at the time and did not travel more than a pace or two before being bumped. The bump was not hard enough to hurt, Austen added. The player’s advocate, Mr. Dan Minogue, then asked permission to ask Austen if there was any personal feeling between the two players. Mr Hammond said the question could be asked if it had any bearing on the case. Asked the question, Austen said he had been the best of friends with Curran while he was at Hawthorn and there was no reason why they should be anything but the best of friends. Curran said he was moving to intercept Austen when that player had the ball and after he had disposed of it could not pull up and ran into him. ‘If I had wanted to do something, I would not do it while everyone was watching me. I have nothing against Austen’”. [28] 1951 After the disastrous winter of 1950 only two changes were made to the to the senior list, which, not surprisingly, subjected the club to a fair amount of criticism. But coach Bob McCaskill had faith in the team and stuck to his guns. … Peter O'Donohue was formerly appointed captain, Kevin Curran choosing to concentrate on playing after his turbulent reign as skipper the previous year. … John Kennedy Snr won his second Best and Fairest from as many starts, starring along with fellow second year player Roy Simmonds. Kennedy and Curran represented Victoria against both South Australia and Western Australia. [29] “Bulldozer ruckman” [30] Curran was Victoria’s best player in a narrow defeat to South Australia in heavy conditions in Adelaide: “South Australia gave Victoria a five-goal start from the end of the first quarter at Adelaide Oval today, then sailed in to outslug, outplay, and finally defeat them by six after one of the comebacks for many a year. … [Kevin] Rose, Victoria’s high powered dynamo at centre began the third term as if he intended to win the game on his own efforts. But he and ruckman Kev Curran were the only two in the team who looked as if they would still be kicking on at the finish. … Curran’s goal gave the lead back to Victoria – four points – just before the end of the third term, but the Victorians had had it. … Victoria’s best was ruckman Kev Curran. So burly he looked above himself in weight, he was going on at the finish when others were run into the ground”. [31] CURRAN GOES TO BENDIGO Ex Hawthorn captain Kevin Curran left the club to accept the position of playing coach of Sandhurst and to take over the Athenaeum Hotel in Bendigo, robbing the team of one of its best players. Ironically, Sandhurst was where McCaskill [the new Hawthorn coach] had honed his coaching technique, winning nine premierships, six of them in a row. Sandhurst would also be where Hawthorn recruited Graham Arthur and Brendan Edwards a few years later, with no small thanks going to Curran. [32] Curran won the 1952 Michelsen Medal, while playing in Bendigo for the Sandhurst Football Club. But after the glory came heartbreak, when Sandhurst suffered four consecutive grand final defeats from 1952-55, the most gut-wrenching a one-point loss to South Bendigo in 1955. The 1950s are widely considered the golden age of Bendigo football. In the days before car ownership and television began diverting attention to Melbourne, the Bendigo grandstand would heave and crowds would pack six and seven-deep to watch heroes such as Noel McMahen, a Melbourne premiership captain who went to Rochester. In 1955, spectators saw arguably Bendigo's greatest individual performance in the grand final between the Queen Elizabeth Oval co-tenants, Sandhurst and South Bendigo. Kevin Curran was still playing-coach at Sandhurst. South Bendigo burst ahead early and led by nine goals to one at half time. Teeming rain seemed to rule out Sandhurst's chance before Curran imposed his will on the game. Like a “bullock dragging a stump”, he hauled the Dragons within sight of victory before South Bendigo held on to win by a point. In the grand final two years later, Eaglehawk defeated Kyneton by five goals before 16,600, an attendance that remains the record. [33] Curran was also later inducted into the Bendigo Football League's Hall of Fame. [34] LIFE AFTER FOOTBALL A letter to the Courier from 2/2 compatriot ‘Blue’ Sargent in March 1967 summarised Curran’s life after football: “I haven't seen any of the old mob for a long time now apart from the old Curran. I call in every now and again to hear the latest on who has passed this way. He's usually got some news regarding someone from the Unit. I've never seen a man do so much for others as does this Kev Curran. He's a very active Bendigo City Councillor and always off to do something or other for one of his ratepayers. He's also very active with the Scouts, Legacy and every other damn worthwhile organisation in Bendigo. He's standing as a Labor candidate for the Upper House in the forthcoming State elections. Bendigo Province, which covers a large section of central Victoria includes the Shires of Haywood, Marong, Strathfieldsaye, Maldon, Carisbrook, Castlemaine, Maryborough, Daylesford, Kyneton, Woodend, Gisborne, Lancefield, Heathcote, Avenel, Seymour and Kilmore so if the lad should happen to get elected, as he richly deserves, he would have quite an area to look after and believe me he's just the boy who could handle it. … Kev Curran and I have talked about the grand Safari and are eager to participate. Perhaps Bendigo could be a night stop either to or from Sydney. Good accommodation is available and an excellent barbecue could be arranged”. [35] VALE KEVIN CURRAN Col Doig recorded the sudden and unexpected passing of Kevin Curran in April 1978: [36] REFERENCES [1] http://www.sparrowbook.com/#!gordon-and-kevin-curran/zoom/c50a/i22211jt [2] Paul Cleary. – The men who came out of the ground: a gripping account of Australia’s first commando campaign, Timor 1942. – Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2010: 35. [3] Colin Doig. – A history of the 2nd Independent Company and 2/2 Commando Squadron. – Perth: [The Author], 1986: 38. [4] Christopher C.H. Wray. - Timor 1942 : Australian commandos at war with the Japanese. - Hawthorn, Vic. : Hutchinson Australia, 1987: 65-67. [5] Peter Henning. - Doomed battalion: mateship and leadership in war and captivity: the Australian 2/40 Battalion 1940-45. - St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1995: 95. [6] Morwell Advertiser, Thursday 4 October 1945: page 6. [7] Wray, Timor 1942 : 118-119. [8] Wray, Timor 1942 : 149-150. [9] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1569666 [10] Cyril Ayris. - All the Bull's men : No. 2 Australian Independent Company (2/2nd Commando Squadron). - [Perth, W.A.] : 2/2nd Commando Association, 2006: 387. [11] Ayris, All the Bull's men : 390. [12] Col Doig. – The ramblings of a ratbag. – [Perth: The Author], 1989: 109. [13] Doig, A history of the 2nd Independent Company … : 215. [14] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C19074 [15] “Betrayed patrol fights off Japs” The Daily News Tuesday 11 January 1944: 3. [16] https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C71280 [17] Doig, Ramblings: 123. [18] “Curran will lead Hawks” The Argus Thursday 5 April 1951: 11. [19] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2238 [20] “Footy doesn't get any bigger than the Big V” http://www.heraldsun.com.au/afl/more-news/state-of- euphoria/story-e6frf9jf-1111116286143 [21] The Mercury Hobart 15 July 1947: 23. [22] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2240 [23] C.D. Doig. – A great fraternity: the story of the 2/2nd Commando Association, 1946-1992. – [Perth: The Author], 1993: 3. [24] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=2241 [25] “New captain disqualified” The Daily News Wednesday 10 May 1950: 21 22. [26] “Former W.A. commandos up in arms” Mirror Saturday 20 May 1950: 9. [27] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/printarticle.aspx?articleid=1038 [28] “Curran suspended for four matches” The Age Wednesday 15 June 1950: 22. [29] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=1065 [30] “Curry on the menu” Mirror Saturday 30 June 1951: 1. [31] “A mud patch, S.A. outplay Victorians, comeback fight in hard-hitting wet-day game” The Mail Saturday 7 July 1951: 6. [32] http://www.hawkheadquarters.com/article.aspx?articleid=1072 [33] “Sandhurst lost through the wind and toss” The Argus October 3 1955: 15. http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article71699109 [34] Luke West “BFNL to hold Hall of Fame night” Bendigo Advertiser February 27, 2014 http://www.bendigoadvertiser.com.au/story/2117305/bfnl-to-hold-hall-of-fame-night/ [35] 2/2 Commando Courier March 1967 : 9. [36] 2/2 Commando Courier June 1978 : 1. Ed Willis Revised: 14 May 2024 © 2/2 Commando Association of Australia

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